Interdisciplinary elucidation of concepts, metaphors, theories and problems concerning INFORMATION by Nafría, José María Díaz et al.
   
 
Interdisciplinary Elucidation 
of Concepts, Metaphors, 
Theories and Problems 
Concerning INFORMATION 
 
 
Coordinators: 
José María DÍAZ NAFRÍA, Mario PÉREZ-MONTORO GUTIÉRREZ, 
Francisco SALTO ALEMANY 
glossariumBITri  
Interdisciplinary elucidation of concepts, 
metaphors, theories and problems concerning 
INFORMATION 
Elucidación interdisciplinar de conceptos, metáforas, 
teorías y problemas en torno a la INFORMACIÓN 
The glossariumBITri, planned as a central activity 
for the interdisciplinary study of information, 
developed by BITrum group in cooperation with 
the University of Santa Elena (Ecuador), 
essentially aims at serving as a tool for the 
clarification of concepts, theories and problems 
concerning information. Intending to embrace the 
most relevant points of view with respect to 
information, it is interdisciplinarily developed by a 
board of experts coming from a wide variety of 
scientific fields. The glossariumBITri kindly invites 
the scientific community to make contributions of 
any kind aimed at clarifying in the field of 
information studies.  
El glossariumBITri, concebido como uno de los ejes para 
el estudio interdisciplinar de la información desarrollado 
por el grupo BITrum en cooperación con la Universidad 
Estatal Península de Santa Elena, pretende servir de 
instrumento para el esclarecimiento conceptual, teórico 
y de problemas en torno a la información. Tratando de 
abarcar el máximo de puntos de vista relevantes 
respecto a la información, su desarrollo es 
interdisciplinar contando con la participación de 
expertos de reconocido prestigio en muy diversas áreas 
científicas. El glossariumBITri invita cordialmente al 
conjunto de la comunidad científica a realizar 
contribuciones que busquen el esclarecimiento en el 
ámbito de los estudios informacionales. 
Editorial Coordination |  Coordinación 
José María Díaz Nafría, University of Santa Elena, Ecuador; 
Munich University of Applied Sciences, Germany 
Mario Pérez-Montoro Gutiérrez, University of Barcelona, Spain 
Francisco Salto Alemany, University of León, Spain 
Correction team |  Equipo de corrección 
Basil Al Hadithi, Technical University of Madrid, Spain 
Rosa Macarro, University of Extremadura, Spain 
Mercedes Osorio, I.E.S. Ramiro de Maeztu, Madrid, Spain 
Anthony Hoffmann, University of Wisconsin Milwaukee, USA 
Editorial board  |  Equipo de redacción 
Juan Miguel Aguado (University of Murcia, Spain) 
Carlos Aguilar (University of Barcelona, Spain) 
Basil Al Hadithi (Technical University of Madrid, Spain) 
Juan Ramón Álvarez (University of León, Spain) 
Balu Athreya (University of Pennsylvania, USA) 
Leticia Barrionuevo (University of León, Spain) 
Søren Brier (Copenhagen Business School, Denmank) 
Luis Emilio Bruni (Aalborg University, Denmark) 
Mark Burgin (University of California, Los Angeles, USA) 
Manuel Campos (University of Barcelona, Spain) 
Rafael Capurro (Institut für Digitale Ethik, Germany) 
María Herminia Cornejo (University of Santa Elena, Ecuador) 
Emilia Curras (Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, Spain) 
José Maria Díaz (University of Santa Elena, Ecuador; Munich 
University of Applied Sciences, Germany) 
Gordana Dodig-Crnkovic (Mälardalen University, Sweden) 
Jesús Ezquerro (Basque Country University, Spain) 
Juan Carlos Fernández Molina (University of Granada, Spain) 
Peter Fleissner (Technische Universität Wien, Austria) 
Christian Fuchs (University of Westminster, United Kingdom)  
Xosé Antón García-Sampedro (I.E.S. Bernaldo Quirós, Spain) 
Roberto Gejman (Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile) 
Igor Gurevich (Institute of Informatics Problems of the Russian 
Academy of Sciences, Rusia) 
Wolfgang Hofkirchner (Technische Universität Wien, Austria) 
Manuel Liz (Universidad de La Laguna, Spain) 
Marcelo León (University of Santa Elena, Ecuador) 
Rosa Macarro (University of Extremadura, Spain) 
Alfredo Marcos (University of Valladolid, Spain)  
Estela Mastromatteo (Universidad Central de Venezuela) 
José Méndez (University of Salamanca, Spain) 
Jorge Morato (Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, Spain) 
José Antonio Moreiro (Universidad Carlos III, Spain) 
Walter Orozco (University of Santa Elena, Ecuador) 
Tomás Ortiz (Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Spain) 
Julio Ostalé (UNED, Spain)  
Mario Pérez-Montoro (University of Barcelona, Spain) 
Carmen Requena (University of León, Spain) 
Gemma Robles (University of León, Spain) 
Blanca Rodríguez (University of León, Spain) 
Shendry Rosero (University of Santa Elena, Ecuador) 
Francisco Salto (University of León, Spain) 
Lydia Sánchez (University of Barcelona, Spain) 
Sonia Sánchez-Cuadrado (Universidad Carlos III, Spain) 
Jérôme Segal (Interdisciplinary Centre for Comparative 
Research in the Social Sciences, Austria) 
Washington Torres (University of Santa Elena, Ecuador) 
Margarita Vázquez (Universidad de La Laguna, Spain) 
Rainer Zimmermann (Munich University of Applied Sciences, 
Germany; Clare Hall-Cambridge, United Kingdom) 
Coolaborators  |  Colaboradores  
Yorgos Andreadakis (Universidad Carlos III, Spain) 
Sylvia Burset (University of Barcelona, Spain) 
Anabel Fraga (Universidad Carlos III, Spain) 
Mehrad Golkhosravi (University of Barcelona, Spain) 
 Interactive-gB | gB-interactivo 
http://glossarium.bitrum.unileon.es 
Contacto | Contact 
bitrum@unileon.es   
Edita | Edited by: Universidad Estatal Península de Santa Elena, Ecuador, 2016 
Diseño | Design: J.M. Díaz Nafría, M. Ortiz Osorio 
ISBN: 978-9942-8548-3-4 
El glossariumBITri está protegido por una licencia de Reconocimiento - No Comercial - Sin 
Obra Derivada 3.0 Ecuador de Creative Commons. Se permite la reproducción, distribución y 
comunicación pública, siempre y cuando se cite adecuadamente la obra y sus responsables. 
The glossariumBITri is licensed under a Creative Commons Atribución-Sin Derivadas 
3.0 Ecuador License (CC BY-NC-ND 3.0 EC). Public reproduction, distribution and 
communications is allowed whenever the work and its authors are properly quoted. 
INDEX 
 
 iii 
Index 
 
Introduction to the first edition ..................................................................................... v 
Introduction to the present edition ............................................................................. vii 
Methodological notes ................................................................................................... ix 
Methodology: pluralism and rightness .......................................................................................... ix 
Abbreviations and article organisation ......................................................................................... ix 
Editorial Team ............................................................................................................. xi 
Coordinators ..................................................................................................................................... xi 
Editors ............................................................................................................................................... xi 
Other authors ................................................................................................................................. xiii 
Language and style correction ...................................................................................................... xiii 
Abbreviations and Acronyms ..................................................................................... xiv 
Abbreviations of authors and editors’ names ............................................................................ xiv 
Other abbreviations and acronyms used in the glossariumBITri ........................................... xiv 
INTERDISCIPLINARY GLOSSARY ............................................................. 15 
Table of contents of English articles .............................................................. 221 

INTRODUCTION TO THE FIRST EDITION 
 v 
Introduction to the first edi-
tion
 
“Concepts lead us to make investigations; are the expression of 
our interest, and direct our interest.”  
Ludwig WITGENSTEIN, Philosophise Untersuchungen 
 
 
“Information is a difference which makes a difference.” 
Gregory BATESON, Steps to an ecology of mind 
 
 
Terms included in this glossary recap some of the main 
concepts, theories, problems and metaphors concern-
ing INFORMATION in all spheres of knowledge.  
This is the first edition of an ambitious enterprise cov-
ering at its completion all relevant notions relating to 
INFORMATION in any scientific context. As such, 
this glossariumBITri is part of the broader project 
BITrum, which is committed to the mutual under-
standing of all disciplines devoted to information 
across fields of knowledge and practice. 
This glossary pretends to make explicit the conflicts and agreements among use and meaning 
of terms related to information phenomena. Information is approached from opposing para-
digms and also from competing and cooperating disciplines. Both in science and in ordinary 
life, conceptual, ethical, technical and societal problems regard information in an essential way. 
This glossary does not endorse or presuppose any paradigm or any theory, but rather locates 
into a public, explicit and commonly understandable space some of the crucial assumptions 
dividing informational concepts, theories, problems and metaphors. Moreover, we purport to 
embrace all distinct paradigms with a critical and comprehensive attitude. 
The glossary is the result of an original methodology, which places any entrance under the re-
sponsibility of its editor. Authors possibly distinct from the editor contribute to different articles 
with texts, comments or discussions. Since authors come from many distinct fields of 
knowledge, each article should reflect many perspectival but rigorous approaches. 
Ramon Llull´s tree of science 
METHODOLOGICAL NOTES INTRODUCTION TO THE FIRST EDITION 
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The glossary is an open work: the number and contents of all its entrances are updated and 
submitted to revision by editors and authors. For this reason, this first edition is only a first step 
in the active development of this collaborative methodology. Any interested reader wishing to 
contribute, may contact the general editors. 
This glossary is most indebted to the enthusiasm and work of José María Díaz Nafría. The 
editorial team, authors and correctors thank the Universidad de León and Caja España for their 
support to this initiative. 
Francisco Salto Alemany 
León (Spain), November 2010 
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Introduction to the present 
edition 
“There have always been thinkers to believe that the 
fields of human knowledge betrays a fundamental 
unity. In modern times people ready to discuss this 
unity have come under grave suspicion. Surely, the crit-
ics argue, no man is so presumptuous as to imagine 
that he can comprehend more than a tiny fraction of 
the scope of contemporary science. [...] And yet there 
are still men prepared to pursue the path of unity, and 
to discuss problems in an inter-disciplinary fashion: 
that is, without regard to the specialised viewpoint of 
any one branch of science.” 
Stafford BEER (Cybernetics and Manage-
ment, 1959) 
 
 
Four years after appearing the first book edition of the glossariumBITri (gB), it faces now a new 
phase of development, in which this new book version represents a milestone. The first devel-
opment phase, 2008-2010, was clearly marked by an intensive cooperative work to stand up the 
clarification enterprise in which the gB is embarked on. Right after such phase, the gB was 
nurtured through valuable inputs covering essential aspects as semiotics, computation, com-
plexity, etc., by distinguished researchers who have certainly enriched not only this book but 
the working team who is now before a more ambitious horizon. 
Besides some improvements in previous articles, the most important additions to the previous 
edition, incorporated herewith, corresponds to the articles developed in the areas of algorithmic 
theory, complexity theory, General Theory of Information and Cybersemiotics that we heartily 
thank to the cherished contributions of Mark Burgin and Søren Brier. Nevertheless, the flesh 
of the glossariumBITri has been enriched as well through entries, which do not show up in this 
book since they are still under review or discussion, but they surely will in the next edition. They 
are, of course, available in the interactive-gB. For this dressing up the naked bones of the gB, 
we warmly thank the contributions provided by Balu Athreya, Igor Gurevich, Basil Al-Hadithi, 
Agustín Jiménez, Alexis Rocha, Daniel Gómez, Carlos Sarmiento. The incorporation of some 
of the topics which are now available, either in this book or in the interactive-gB was simply a 
must (as algorithmic information), others represent an initiation into fields we have to deepen 
(as information in biological sciences). But nonetheless, if we take into account all the concepts 
we have not weaved yet into the network of clarified concepts, metaphors, theories and prob-
lems, then we can clearly state that we are at the very beginning. By simply looking into the 
interactive-gB’s list of open voices, which are still empty, or into the number of voice proposals 
we have not open yet, it is easy to conclude we are before a large and of course open enterprise. 
METHODOLOGICAL NOTES INTRODUCTION TO THE PRESENT EDITION 
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One could argue the situation is not as different as before; then why are we saying we are now 
facing a different horizon? This is entangled with the current rearrangement of BITrum’s activ-
ities. On the one hand, we have more coherently organised the different endeavours we have 
been pushing along the years in order to bring about a more effective cooperation among 
BITrum’s members and other stakeholders; on the other hand, gB has been structured in three 
branches: a) interactive-gB, b) gB-journal, and c) book editions. Through a rationalisation of 
efforts, this new gB landscape obviously offers a multiplied effect regarding impact, dissemina-
tion and educational applications. To cope with the new challenges gB team has been enlarged 
and put besides other three BITrum’s operating units: (i) domusBITae devoted to the deployment 
of telematic tools for the facilitation of the distributed and interdisciplinary community of re-
searchers and educators cooperating in the development of information studies. (ii) PRIMER, 
oriented to the promotion, development and underpinning of interdisciplinary studies; and (iii) 
a Research Unit, integrated by the teams working on specific scientific projects.  
Through this reorganisation, gB offers a more coherent platform for the clarification and theo-
retical enterprise BITrum has been aiming at since its beginnings, linking its development to 
BITrum’s information environment (dB), educational activities (PRIMER) and research pro-
jects. Such interplay – albeit the autonomy of the respective operations – represents a nurturing 
flow that will provide a new life to the clarification goals of the gB in connection to real prob-
lems and the education of scientist to tackle them.  
The activities deployed since 2014 under support of Ecuadorian institutions, in both research 
and education, constitute a powerful balloon to lift up our scientific enterprise. This book in 
itself represents a sign of it. It is a result of the cooperation agreement signed in 2014 between 
the University of the Peninsula of Santa Elena (UPSE) and BITrum, which targets at several 
collaborative activities concerning: the development and co-management – together with the 
University of León – of the glossariumBITri open journal; the development of educational pro-
grams; the cooperation in interdisciplinary research projects. Furthermore, the Ecuadorian Na-
tional Secretary of Higher Education, Science, Technology and Innovation (SENESCYT) is 
supporting in the field of interdisciplinary information studies – through the Prometeo Pro-
gramme –: the development of theoretical work and practical applications, the training of re-
searchers, the development of scientific networks, etc. On one side, BITrum warmly thanks this 
support to the interdisciplinary study of information provided by the UPSE and SENESCYT; 
on the other side, we offer our deep commitment to contribute to the great scientific and edu-
cational effort Ecuador is doing since the constitution of 2008. We are convinced that the trans-
disciplinary capabilities of the information studies offers a toehold for the intense integration of 
knowledge we nowadays need for coping with the complex challenges our societies that are 
facing regarding the coverage of basic needs, environment, peace, inequality, urban manage-
ment, climate change, democratic issues, waste reduction… We can use the language of infor-
mation to refer to the physical, biological, societal, technological reality, to address theoretical 
and practical issues. Then we have a fantastical tool for weaving the scientific enterprise in a 
more integrated fashion. 
José María Díaz Nafría 
Santa Elena (Ecuador), February 2015 
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Methodological notes 
Methodology: pluralism and rightness 
The glossariumBITri is conceived as a cooperative work in the following sense: each voice has a 
responsible editor who regulates, animates and organize the discussion of the term and the 
different contributions provided by the rest of the authors. It is furthermore an open work in a 
very particular sense: it is electronically accessible and opened to gather new contributions and 
discussions at any voice. Hence, subsequent editions will constantly increase the extension and 
deepness of the different entries. 
Furthemore the glossariumBITri interdisciplinary insofar it gather scientists from different 
knowledge areas in which the informational notions play a central role. Moreover, basic con-
cepts are trans-disciplinary, as far as they cross different disciplines and fields of knowledge and 
action. The glossariumBITri does not assume an informational paradigm above others, but it 
endeavors to expose all coherently without hiding the theoretical and practical conflicts.  
According to the conceived methodology for glossariumBITri’s elaboration, all editorial team 
members can participate in any article under the assumption of certain commitments:  
― All members of the writing team –which is always open to whomever may be interested– 
are potential authors of ENTRIES for each proposed voice. Thus, each voice may gather 
several independent entries, or related through debates or criticism to previous contribu-
tions. 
― The EDITOR (one per voice) is committed to allocate each entry –with sufficient quality– 
in the final article in a structured way and without redundancy. At the same time, the editor 
can ask authors for further clarification or deepening here and there, improving the text, 
providing references, etc. 
― For each article, there is a DISCUSSION space where members can make comments, crit-
ics, suggestions, questions to the given entries. 
― The COORDINATORS overview the elaboration of the glossariumBITri as a whole and 
coordinate the development of different tasks related to its development: management and 
development of the edition system, content review, correction request, layout, call organi-
zation, dissemination, etc. 
Abbreviations and article organisation 
As one can see in the adjacent example, right after the voice the usual designation in Spanish, 
French and German is shown between brackets, preceded by the initials S., F. and G. respec-
tively. 
METHODOLOGICAL NOTES  
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Immediately after, the scientific or discipli-
nary usage contexts, in which the article is 
developed, is indicated between square 
brackets. The goal has been to point out the 
field better suited to the usage of the term. 
Thereby there are voices of specific usage 
for certain theories (e.g., self-re-creation de-
fined in the context of the Unified Theory 
of Information). On the other hand, “trans-
disciplinary” has been used in the soft sense 
of crossing different disciplines (e.g., [trans-
disciplinary, system theory]). 
As subindex going along the list of usage 
contexts, the object type to which the article 
refers to is highlighted. It can be: concept 
(e.g., autopoiesis), metaphor (e.g., infor-
mation flow), theory (e.g., channel theory), 
theorem (e.g., fundamental theorems of Shannon), discipline (e.g., hermeneutics), problem (e.g., fo-
toblogs and adolescents), or resource (e.g., semantic web). 
In case the article is large, the titles of the sections, in which the article is divided, are enumerated 
right after the heading. 
The article structure has been freely determined by the corresponding editors, striving for a 
systemization of the entries provided by authors or participants in discussions. 
For citation and bibliographic reference listing and style adapted to ISO 690 standard has been 
used. 
The authorship in indicated at the bottom of each article through abbreviations specified in 
the section devoted to the editorial team. “ed” denotes editor, “tr” translator. If only an abbre-
viation is indicated at the article bottom this means the corresponding author has not received 
–or incorporated yet– contributions of other authors. 
Additionally other abbreviations and acronyms referred to right after the authors and editors’ 
abbreviation list. 
EDITORIAL TEAM 
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Editorial Team 
Coordinators 
José María Díaz Nafría (Senescyt–UPSE, Ecuador), jdian@unileon.es 
Francisco Salto Alemany (Universidad de León, Spain), francisco.salto@unileon.es 
Mario Pérez-Montoro (Universitat de Barcelona, Spain), perez-montoro@ub.edu 
Editors 
The following list recaps for each editor the set of articles he is in charge of (in the introductory 
section devoted to glossariumBITri’s methodology the particular role of the editors as to the 
interdisciplinary elaboration of articles is specified). This list does not reflect the contributions 
of editors to other voices as authors. 
Juan Miguel Aguado (Universidad de Murcia): Autopoiesis, Communication; Constructivism; 
Cybernetic; Endogenous information; Observation 
Carlos Aguilar (Universidad de Barcelona): Audio-visual content; Situational logic 
Basil M. Al Hadithi (Universidad Politécnica de Madrid): Automatic regulation; Control Theory; 
Feedback; Fuzzy logic 
Juan Ramón Álvarez (Universidad de León): Biosemiotics; Memetics 
Leticia Barrionuevo (Universidad de León): Open Access; Repository 
Søren Brier (Copenhagen Business School, Denmark): Cybersemiosis 
Luis Emilio Bruni (Aalborg University, Denmark): Symbol, Biosemiosis 
Mark Burgin (University of California Los Angeles, USA): General Theory of Information, Algo-
rithmic Information Theory, Kolmogorov Complexity, Super-recursive 
Manuel Campos (Universitat de Barcelona): Correlation; Regularity; Representation; Situation 
semantics; Situation theory (ST); Truth value 
Rafael Capurro (Institut für Digitale Ethik, Germany): Angeletics; Automatic Identification (Ra-
dio-Frequency Identification, RFID); Hermeneutics; Human Enhancements Technologies 
(HET); ICT implants; Information Ethics; Intercultural information ethics; Interpretation; 
Message; Roboethics; Surveillance society 
María Herminia Cornejo (UPSE, Ecuador), Oceanography and information 
Emilia Curras (Universidad Autónoma de Madrid): Informacionism 
José María Díaz Nafría (Senescyt-UPSE, Ecuador; Munich University of Applied Sciences, Ger-
many; Universidad de León, Spain): Alphabet; Code; Communication channel; Context; Dialogic 
EDITORIAL TEAM 
 
  g l o s s a r i u m B I T r i  xii 
vs. Discursive; Disinformation; Encoder and Decoder; Fundamental Shannon's Theorems; 
Holographic Principle; Noise; Sign; Signal 
Gordana Dodig-Crnkovic (Mälardalen University, Sweden): Info-computationalism 
Jesús Ezquerro (Universidad del País Vasco): Cognition; Natural Psicology 
Juan Carlos Fernández Molina (Universidad de Granada): Information Rights 
Peter Fleissner (Technische Universität Wien, Austria): Commodification; Input vs Output [Sys-
tem Theory]; Reversibility vs. Non-reversibility; System theory 
Anto Florio (Institute for Logic, Language and Computation, Amsterdam): Intentional Content 
Christian Fuchs (University of Westminster, UK): Critical Theory of Information, Communica-
tion, Media, Technology  
Xosé Antón García-Sampedro (I.E.S. Bernaldo Quirós, Mieres): Information Aesthetics 
Roberto Gejman (Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile): Difference; Record 
Igor Gurevich (Institute of Informatics Problems of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Rusia) Infor-
mation as heterogeneity 
Wolfgang Hofkirchner (Technische Universität Wien, Austria): Capurro's Trilemma; Emer-
gentism; Information Society; Self-re-creation [UTI]; Self-reproduction [UTI]; Self-restructur-
ing [UTI]; Structural information [UTI]; Unified Theory of Information (UTI) 
Manuel Liz (Universidad de La Laguna): Content; Informational Content; Mental Content; 
Mind; Non-informational access; Referential ability; Semantic content 
Rosa Macarro (Universidad de Extremadura): Receiver, Sender, Source 
Alfredo Marcos (Universidad de Valladolid): Information Measurement; Information as relation 
Estela Mastromatteo (Universidad Central de Venezuela): Digital divide; Information Literacy; 
Information Technologies 
José Méndez (Universidad de Salamanca): Contradiction 
Jorge Morato (Universidad Carlos III): Information Retrieval; Web social/Social Web; Topic 
Maps 
José Antonio Moreiro (Universidad Carlos III): Indexing language; Folksonomy; Taxonomy 
Walter Orozco (Universidad Estatal Península de Santa Elena, Ecuador), Data Bases 
Tomás Ortiz (Universidad Complutense de Madrid): Cerebral oscillations 
Julio Ostalé (Universitat de Barcelona): Barwise, K. Jon; Channel theory; Information Flow; In-
formation Reports 
Mario Pérez-Montoro (Universitat de Barcelona): Data; Dretske, Fred; Information architecture; 
Information management; Information visualization; Knowledge; Knowledge management; 
Propositional content; Usability 
Carmen Requena (Universidad de León): Emotion; Motor information 
Gemma Robles (Universidad de Salamanca): Consistency; Paraconsistency 
Blanca Rodríguez (Universidad de León): Document; Documental content analysis; Library 
Science 
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Shendry Rosero (UPSE, Ecuador), Telematic Networks 
Francisco Salto (Universidad de León): Incompleteness; Infomorphism; Infon; Modal logic; 
Net; Tautology; Turing's Halting Theorem 
Lydia Sánchez (Universitat de Barcelona): Fotoblogs and Teenagers; Image; Incremental infor-
mation [ST] 
Sonia Sánchez-Cuadrado (Universidad Carlos III): Knowledge Organization; Knowledge Or-
ganization System; Ontology; Semantic Web; Thesaurus 
Jérôme Segal (Interdisciplinary Centre for Comparative Research in the Social Sciences, Austria): Claude 
Elwood Shannon 
Washington Torres (UPSE, Ecuador), Telecommunication politics 
Margarita Vázquez (Universidad de La Laguna): Paradox; Surprise; System; Temporal Logics; 
Virtual 
Rainer Zimmermann (Munich University of Applied Sciences, Germany; Clare Hall-Cambridge, 
UK) Network; Space 
Other authors 
The following authors (not included in the former list) have contributions to the articles spec-
ified bellow:  
Yorgos Andreadakis (Universidad Carlos III): Semantic Web, Social Web 
Sylvia Burset (Universitat de Barcelona): Image, Fotoblogs and Teenagers, Information Aesthe-
tics 
Eva Carbonero (Universidad Carlos III de Madrid): Folksonomy 
Anabel Fraga (Universidad Carlos III): Folksonomy, Semantic Web, Social Web 
Mehrad Golkhosravi (Universitat de Barcelona): Data; Dretske, Fred; Information Architecture; 
Information Management; Information Visualization; Knowledge; Knowledge Management; 
Propositional Content; Usability 
Language and style correction 
The following were in charge of enhancing grammar and style correctness: 
Basil M. Alhadithi  (Universidad Politécnica de Madrid) (inglés) 
Anthony Hoffmann (University of Wisconsin Milwaukee, EE.UU.) (inglés) 
Rosa Macarro  (Universidad de Extremadura) (inglés, español)  
Mercedes Osorio (I.E.S. Ramiro de Maeztu, Madrid) (inglés) 
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Abbreviations and Acronyms 
Abbreviations of authors and editors’ names 
Abbreviations used at the footing of each article for the identification of the contributors.  
AF Anto Florio JFM J.C. Fernández Molina MPM Mario Pérez-Montoro 
AFV Anabel Fraga Vázquez JE Jesús Ezquerro MV Margarita Vázquez 
BA Balu Athreya JGS J. A. García-Sampedro PF Peter Fleissner 
BH Basil M. Al Hadithi JM José Méndez PM Pedro Marijuán 
BR Blanca Rodríguez JMA Juan Miguel Aguado  RC Rafael Capurro 
CA Carlos Aguilar JMD José Maria Díaz RG Roberto Gejman 
CF Christian Fuchs JML Jorge Morato Lara RM Rosa Macarro 
CR Carmen Requena JO Julio Ostalé RZ Rainer Zimmermann 
EC Eva Carbonero JRA Juan Ramón Álvarez SB Søren Brier 
ECP Emilia Curras Puente JS Jérôme Segal SBB Sylvia Burset Burillo 
EM Estela Mastromatteo LB Leticia Barrionuevo SR Shendry Rosero 
FS Francisco Salto LEB Luis Emilio Bruni SSC S. Sánchez-Cuadrado 
FV Freddy Villao LS Lydia Sánchez TO Tomás Ortiz 
GR Gemma Robles MB Mark Burgin WH Wolfgang Hofkirchner 
GD Gordana Dodig-Crnkovic MC Manuel Campos WO Walter Orozco 
IG Igor Gurevich MG Mehrad Golkhosravi WT Washington Torres 
JAM José Antonio Moreiro ML Manuel Liz YA Yorgos Andreadakis 
Other abbreviations and acronyms used in the glossariumBITri 
AIT  Algorithmic Information Theory  
EHEA  Europeo Higher Education Area  
FIS  Foundations of Information Science  
GTI General Theory of Information 
ICT  Information and Communication Technologies  
INFOLIT  Information Literacy  
LIS  Library and Information Science  
MTC  Mathematical Theory of Communication  
OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development  
ST  Situational Theory  
UTI  Unified Theory of Information  
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A 
ALGORITHMIC INFORMATION (S. in-
formación algorítmica, F. information algorithmique, 
G. algorithmische Information) [transdisciplinary, 
ICT] concept, theory 
Algorithmic information reflects aspects and 
properties of information related to algo-
rithms (s. also →Algorithmic Information Theory, 
and →Axiomatics for Algorithmic Information). 
Many information processes, such as network 
messaging or computer information pro-
cessing, have algorithmic nature as they are 
performed according to various algorithms. 
Two kinds of algorithmic information are 
considered: (1) algorithmic information neces-
sary to build a constructive object by a given 
system of algorithms and (2) algorithmic in-
formation in an object, e.g., message, which al-
lows making simpler construction of another 
object. The most popular measure of algorith-
mic information of the first type is absolute Kol-
mogorov or algorithmic complexity. The most pop-
ular measure of algorithmic information of the 
second type is relative Kolmogorov or algorithmic 
complexity (→Kolmogorov complexity). 
According to the classes of algorithms used 
for information acquisition, processing and 
utilization, three types of algorithmic infor-
mation have been separated and studied: 
― subrecursive algorithmic information, 
― recursive algorithmic information (→Kol-
mogorov complexity), and 
― super-recursive algorithmic information 
(→Super-recursive Kolmogorov complexity). 
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ALGORITHMIC INFORMATION 
THEORY (S. Teoría Algorítmica de la Infor-
mación, F. Théorie Algorithmique de la Information, 
G. Algorithmische Informationstheorie) [Infor-
mation Theory, Computer Science, Coding 
theory, Complexity theory] theory 
Contents.— 1) Symbolic objects and symbols; 2) Recon-
structive sense of algorithmic information; 3) Versions of al-
gorithmic information measures; 4) Algorithmic vs common 
sense information: object vs carrier of information; 5) Timely 
and semiotic aspects of algorithmic information with respect 
to other information meanings. 
Algorithmic information theory is based on 
the concept of Kolmogorov or algorithmic 
complexity of objects, which provides means 
to measure the intrinsic information related to 
objects via their algorithmic description length 
(s. also →algorithmic information).  As it is gener-
ally assumed, this measure was introduced and 
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studied by three authors: Ray Solomonoff 
(1964), Andrey Kolmogorov (1965) and 
Gregory Chaitin (1966). Algorithmic ap-
proach explicates an important property of in-
formation, connecting information to means 
used for accessing and utilizing information. 
Information is considered not as some inher-
ent property of different objects but is related 
to algorithms that use, extract or produce this 
information. In this context, a system (person) 
with more powerful algorithms for infor-
mation extraction and management can get 
more information from the same carrier and 
use this information in a better way than a sys-
tem that has weaker algorithms and more lim-
ited abilities. This correlates with the conven-
tional understanding of information. For in-
stance, system (person) that (who) has a code 
C can read codified in C texts, while those who 
do not have this code cannot read such texts. 
As a result, efficiency or complexity of algorithms 
becomes a measure of information in contrast 
to the traditional approach when information 
is treated as uncertainty or diversity. Efficiency 
is a clue problem and a pivotal characteristic 
of any activity. Consequently, measures of ef-
ficiency and complexity provide means for 
measuring information as a dynamic essence. 
Algorithmic information theory has been ap-
plied to a wide range of areas, including the-
ory of computation, combinatorics, medicine, 
biology, neurophisiology, physics, economics, 
hardware and software engineering, probabil-
ity theory, statistics, inductive reasoning, and 
machine learning. 
1. Symbolic objects and systems. Objects 
considered in algorithmic information theory 
are strings of symbols because the most habitual 
representation of information uses symbols 
and it is possible to represent other structures 
codifying them by strings of symbols. It is nat-
ural to interpret such strings as words or texts 
in some language. It means that information is 
presented and processed in the symbolic form 
and all systems are represented by their symbolic 
(semiotic) models (→symbol). Exact models 
have mathematical structure. The main ques-
tion is how much information we need to re-
construct (compute) a given string (word). 
Thus, the traditional approach in algorithmic 
information theory treats only symbolic infor-
mation. This question relates information to 
complexity because measure of necessary in-
formation appears here as a measure of com-
plexity of the string reconstruction. 
2. Reconstructive sense of algorithmic in-
formation. Reconstruction/computation of a 
string of symbols is an action that is realized 
as a process. Its complexity depends on means 
that are used for reconstruction. To make this 
idea precise a concept of an algorithm is used. 
Namely, strings are reconstructed (built) by al-
gorithms. Algorithms are working in the do-
main of strings and this domain usually con-
sists of all finite strings in some alphabet. In 
this context, an algorithm (it is also possible to 
say, automaton or computer) takes one string 
of symbols z and eventually produces another 
string x, as represented in the following figure. 
 
The input string is a carrier of information 
about the output string, i.e., string that we are 
going to reconstruct/compute. It is possible 
to consider the input string z as the program 
that has been given to the algorithm/machine 
for computing x. This program provides in-
formation about x for an algorithm (compu-
ting device). In such a way, researchers come 
to information size (complexity) of a string of 
symbols, which is the theory's fundamental 
concept. Note that very often, information 
content of a string is called Kolmogorov com-
plexity. Namely, the information content C(x) 
of a string x is the minimum quantity of infor-
mation needed to reconstruct this string. In 
the conventional approach, such quantity of 
input information is measured by the size of 
information carrier and as carriers are strings 
of symbols the volume of a string z is the 
length l(z) of this string. Thus, the length of 
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the shortest program for calculating the out-
put string x gives the measure of information 
needed to reconstruct/compute this string. 
3. Versions of algorithmic information 
measures. Although this is the most popular 
information measure in algorithmic infor-
mation theory, other versions of algorithmic 
measures of information have been intro-
duced. The most known of then are: uniform 
complexity KR(x), prefix complexity or prefix-free 
complexity K(x), monotone complexity Km(x), con-
ditional Kolmogorov complexity CD(x), time-bounded 
Kolmogorov complexity Ct(x), space-bounded Kolmo-
gorov complexity Cs(x), and resource-bounded Kolmo-
gorov complexity Ct,s(x). In addition, algorithmic 
information theory has been extended to infi-
nite processes, infinite words (Chaitin, 1976; 
1977), →super-recursive algorithms (Burgin, 1995; 
2005; Schmidhuber, 2002) and quantum com-
putations (Svozil, 1996; Vitanyi, 1999; 2001). 
Each new development of algorithmic infor-
mation theory has been connected to consid-
ering different classes of algorithms as means 
for information acquisition, processing and 
utilization. At first, only subrecursive classes 
(i.e., subclasses of the class of all Turing ma-
chines, such as the class of all delimiting Tu-
ring machines) were used for this purpose. 
Later more powerful, →super-recursive algo-
rithms, such as inductive Turing machines were 
applied to the study of algorithmic infor-
mation (s. also →algorithmic information). 
Existence of a variety of approaches and algo-
rithmic measures of information caused a ne-
cessity for a unifying approach. This approach 
called →axiomatic information theory  was intro-
duced and developed by Burgin (1982; 1990; 
2005; 2010). 
4. Algorithmic vs common sense infor-
mation: object vs carrier of information. 
An essential problem with algorithmic com-
plexity as a measure of information is related 
to its information theoretical interpretation. It 
is generally assumed that the algorithmic com-
plexity of a binary string x measures the 
amount of information in the string x. Thus, 
according to the algorithmic information the-
ory, random sequences have maximum com-
plexity as by definition, a random sequence 
can have no generating algorithm shorter than 
simply listing the sequence. It means that in-
formation content of random sequences is 
maximal. 
Physicists were the first who attracted atten-
tion to this peculiarity. For instance, Richard 
Feynman (1999) wrote: 
"How can a random string contain any infor-
mation, let alone the maximum amount? Surely we 
must be using the wrong definition of  'infor-
mation'?..." 
To eliminate these contradictions and discrep-
ancies that are prevalent in algorithmic infor-
mation theory and to solve the problem of 
correct understanding the meaning of the 
function C(x), it is more adequate to consider 
C(x) and all its versions as measures of information 
about x or the information size of x with the spe-
cial goal to build or reconstruct x. It means 
that in reality, x is not the carrier of information 
measured by C(x), but the object of this infor-
mation. Thus, it becomes not surprising that 
people, or a machine, need more information 
about a random sequence of letters to recon-
struct it than about a masterpiece, such as a 
poem by Dante or a novel by Cervantes. 
5. Timely and semiotic aspects of algorith-
mic information with respect to other in-
formation meanings. In order to reconcile 
the common sense of information with the 
one provided by the algorithmic information 
theory, the timely distinction introduced by 
Weizsäcker (1984) between potential and actual 
information is also fruitful (Lyre, 2002). In our 
case, while the aforementioned carrier (z in the 
figure above) represents potential information 
(i.e. the possibility to reconstruct x), the object 
of information x represents actual information 
when the algorithmic system has effectively 
reconstructed it. By abstracting the algorith-
mic resources and therefore addressing to an 
alleged optimal means, the specificity of z with 
respect to a given algorithmic system is lost 
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and only the objective of reconstruction, x, 
prevails. To this respect algorithmic infor-
mation can be seen as actual information. On 
the contrary, the information concept pro-
vided by the Mathematical Theory of Commu-
nication (MTC), information entropy, exclu-
sively refers to the degree of uncertainty at the 
recipient before being informed, thus abstract-
ing the specific outcome. This shows that in-
formation entropy has a fundamental poten-
tial character complementary to algorithmic 
information. 
The semiotic distinction between syntactic 
and semantic aspects offers as well some in-
sights to distinguish algorithmic information 
from other senses of information. As argued 
by Lyre (2002) algorithmic information – un-
like →Shannon’s information – reflects, at the 
same time, semantic and syntactic aspects: 
“The algorithmic information content 
measures actual information under both syn-
tactic and sematic aspects” (Lyre 2002, p. 38). 
In our context, x can be regarded as the se-
mantic value of the algorithmic information or 
process (note x may be a set of operations 
with a particular effect on the environment, 
for instance, a manufacturing process, there-
fore it reflects not only semantics but also 
pragmatics), whereas z represents its syntacti-
cal value. In the invariant form of algorithmic 
information, z corresponds to the minimal 
syntactics to address the object semantics rep-
resented by x. On the contrary, is well known 
that MTC programmatically restrict infor-
mation to its syntactic dimension. 
These same distinctions are to some extent 
also used in the common senses of infor-
mation. When we consider that we need infor-
mation, this is regarded in its potential value. 
While when we say that we have the infor-
mation someone need, this is regarded in its 
actual value, though what we factually have is 
some z that might eventually be shared and we 
suppose the third party has the algorithmic 
means (as we do) to reconstruct some x, which 
for some reason might be cherished. Then 
having z is practically equivalent to having x. 
Although it would not be formulated as such, 
it is commonly clear that z has a syntactical 
value, whereas x has a semantic one. 
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ALPHABET (S. alfabeto, F. alphabet, G. alpha-
bet) [transdisciplinary, ICT] concept, resource 
The term (from Latin alphabētum, and this from 
Greek ἄλφα, alfa, and βῆτα, beta) has been origi-
nally used to refer to the writing system whose 
symbols (letter) are in relative correspondence 
with phonemes of the spoken language, in con-
trast to those writings in which the corre-
spondence is established withmorphemes or syl-
lables. However, the usage has been extended 
to refer to the set of symbols employed in a 
communication system. This is the sense nor-
mally used in communication theory and par-
ticularly in the model of information transmis-
sion (especially in its syntactic level, such as in 
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the case of MTC), labelling the finite set of 
symbols or messages that make up the →code 
which must be known for both the emitter and 
receiver. 
There are two fundamental features to charac-
terise the alphabet with regard to its performance 
in communication efficiency: 1) its adequacy to the con-
straints of the communication channel (e.g., 
that the stroke could be continuous or not, or 
that the spectral content had to be limited to a 
given range); 2) thedifferentiability of its compo-
nent symbols. The former because it will just 
be effective whatever succeeds in crossing the 
channel; the latter because depending on it the 
reception in noisy environments will be better 
or worse. Indeed, Kotelnikov (1959) proved 
that the detection error probability is a func-
tion of such differences (measured in terms of 
energy with respect to the noise spectral den-
sity). 
Concerning alphabets coming from natural 
languages, they exhibit relevant features re-
garding an efficient coding for transmission 
through artificial channels: 1) the statistical fre-
quency of each symbol, and 2) the statistical de-
pendence between a symbol and its adjacent 
ones (i.e., the transmission probability of a 
symbol j when the previous was i or a given 
sequence). The observation -by Alfred Vail- of 
the first feature in the development of the 
Morse code played a major role in the success 
of Morse Telegraph (Oslin 1992) and proba-
bly, it played an important heuristic role in the 
forging of the concept of information meas-
ure, especially in Hartley and Shannon work 
(Lundheim 2002, Segal 2003). The last one ac-
counts for both features in his famous "Math-
ematical Theory of Communication" in order 
to determine the entropy (or information amount) 
of a source (Shannon 1948). 
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ANGELETICS (S. angelética, F. angeletique, G. 
Angeletik) [Communication theory, Infor-
mation ethics] concept 
Contents.— 1) What is angeletics?, 2) To what extent 
is this a new science?, 3) A transparent society?, 4) A time 
of empty angels, 5) From hermeneutics to angeletics, 6) Con-
clusion 
1. What is angeletics? It is the name of a field 
of philosophic and scientific research. Why is 
it called like that? The word 'angeletics' derives 
from Greek angelia, meaning message. We use 
it when we refer to angels or divine messen-
gers. There is a long tradition in theology and 
religious studies called angelology. Angeletics 
is different from angelology, its purpose being 
to study the phenomenon of messages and 
messengers within the boundaries of the condi-
tion humaine, i.e. having as its primary object 
human communication. This does not imply 
that studies relating to messages and messen-
gers in religion or the natural sciences are ex-
cluded.  Since the Internet, digital messages 
and messengers are playing an important role 
in social communication. 
2. To what extent is it a new science? It is 
evident that the social phenomenon of mes-
sages and messengers is a vast, old and com-
plex phenomenon. The industrial revolution 
has attributed a lot of value to the marketing 
theory, that is, the study of propagating mes-
sages to obtain economic benefits. Moreover, 
when we go back to the cultural revolution 
caused by the invention of the press we can 
perceive the influence of this technique in the 
worldwide dissemination of political, religious 
and economic messages in modern times. We 
should not forget the history of the technique 
and organization of the post offices and, last 
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but not least, the history and theory of rela-
tions between the states based on embassies 
and ambassadors. 
3. A transparent society? The technical rev-
olution of the printing press creates a new sit-
uation that is both informative and angeletic. 
Immanuel Kant sees in the non-censored dis-
tribution of scientific research through the 
press the medium in which the ideals and mes-
sages of Enlightenment can spread and indi-
rectly influence public politics. Since then new 
political and (pseudo)-scientific messages ap-
peared seeking to occupy the place of religious 
messages and messengers with catastrophic 
consequences for society and nature, making 
full use as, for instance, in the case of Nazi 
Germany, of radio-diffusion. The peak of 
mass media, through its one-to-many struc-
ture, opened the debate about the task of cre-
ating a public space free of pressure structures, 
where the force of the arguments and reason-
ing of the players has precedence. This was the 
ideal proclaimed by philosophers like Jürgen 
Habermas. According to Habermas, Kant 
could not foresee the transformation of the 
public space dominated by mass media 
(Capurro, 1996a). Italian philosopher Gianni 
Vattimo, in his turn, criticized the Haber-
masian transparent society, with emphasis on 
its utopian aspect and leveler of differences, so 
that a "weaker" or less transparent structure 
permits different kinds of cultural mixes that 
are more clearly reflected today in the decen-
tralizing character of the Internet (Vattimo 
1989).  
4. A time of empty angels. German philoso-
pher Peter Sloterdijk has pointed out that we 
live in a "time of empty angels" or "mediatic 
nihilism", in which we forget what message is 
to be sent while the messengers of transmis-
sion media multiply: "This is the very disange-
lium of current times" (Sloterdijk 1997). The 
word disangelium (por bad news) stands out, in 
contrast to euangelium, for the empty nature of 
the messages disseminated by the mass media, 
culminating in the widely-known words of 
Marshall McLuhan: "The medium is the mes-
sage". The question then is exactly to what ex-
tent the Internet creates a new angeletic space 
giving rise to new synergies of messages and 
messengers beyond the hierarchical and abso-
lute or pseudo-absolute character of sacred 
messages or their political substitutes. If, ac-
cording to Sloterdijk (1983), mass media have 
a cynical structure, the question arises now 
about the "fantasmatic" character of the new 
media (Zizek 1997, Capurro 1999a). 
Based on that, we now reach what we call 
→information ethics, aimed at explaining the 
possible theoretical and practical horizons in 
order to maintain, organize and create new 
forms of common life. This current praxeo-
logical horizon explored by the information 
ethics is given in a world where, on the one 
hand, the classic parameters of time and place 
are questioned as determining factors for the 
creation and diffusion of messages; on the 
other hand, the local structures of political 
power up to now controlling such a phenom-
enon are now paradoxically in the inverse sit-
uation. The great economic and social (r-)evo-
lutions are founded less on the prevalence of 
media to produce material objects, as Karl 
Marx thought, than on the media to communi-
cate messages. The latter are the basis of the 
former (Capurro, 1995, 1999).  
5. From hermeneutics to angeletics. Lastly, 
I would like to mention the relationship be-
tween angeletics and hermeneutics (Capurro, 
2000b). Hermeneutics was one of the main 
schools of philosophical thought in the 20th 
century. Apart from the disputes between 
schools (positivism, Marxism, critical rational-
ism, analytical philosophy, scientific theory, 
etc.), we can say that one of the great results 
of the study on the 20th century has been the 
awareness of the interpretative nature of hu-
man knowledge. This is valid both for Karl 
Popper, for example, who presented a charac-
terization of scientific knowledge as being an 
eminently conjectural knowledge, subject to 
empirical falsifications, or for the "hermeneu-
tic circle" explained by Hans-Georg Gadamer 
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with basis on Heideggerian analytics. Each in-
terpretation presupposes a process of message 
transmission. Hermes is first and foremost a 
messenger and, consequently, an interpreter 
and translator. This message-bearing nature of 
knowledge and communication is exactly an-
geletics aims to analyze. Of course, this is just 
as complex and far-reaching a task as herme-
neutics was in the last century. 
6. Conclusions. A s angeletics is a message 
theory, it is in itself only a message aiming to 
create common knowledge, which might be-
come a key-science for the newly-born cen-
tury. Its issues relate to the origin, purpose and 
content of messages, power structures, tech-
niques and means of diffusion, ways of life, 
history of messages and messengers, coding 
and interpreting, and psychological-, political-
, economical-, aesthetical-, ethical- and reli-
gious aspects. In other words, a new scientific 
cosmos. We are far away from such a science 
of messages and messengers as well as from its 
philosophical foundations. 
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AUDIO-VISUAL CONTENT (S. contenido 
audiovisual, F. contenus audiovisuels, G. audiovisue-
ller Inhalte) [transdisciplinary, ICT]concept 
The audio-visual content has a double relation 
with information. As physical objects they can 
be observed as carriers of information about 
their own nature and given the transmitted 
content, can also be considered as information 
carriers, in the terms of the Unified Theory of 
information. UNESCO’s Memory of the 
World Program recognizes that documents, 
including audiovisual documents, have two 
components: the information content and the 
carrier on which it resides. 
The value of information often depends on 
how easily it can be found, retrieved, accessed, 
filtered and managed. An incommensurable 
amount of audiovisual information is becom-
ing available in digital form, in digital archives, 
on the World Wide Web, in broadcast 
DataStream and in personal and professional 
databases, and this amount is only growing. In 
spite of the fact that users have increasing ac-
cess to these resources, identifying and man-
aging them efficiently is becoming more diffi-
cult, because of the growing volume. The 
question of identifying content is not just re-
stricted to database retrieval applications such 
as digital libraries, but extends to areas like 
broadcast channel selection, multimedia edit-
ing, and multimedia directory services. 
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Furthermore, images are rich in contents, 
while in many applications text may not be 
rich enough to describe images in an effective 
way. To overcome these difficulties, in the 
early 1990s, content-based image retrieval 
emerged as a promising means for describing 
and retrieving images. Content-based image 
retrieval systems describe images by their own 
visual content, such as color, texture, and ob-
jects’ shape information rather than text. In 
1996 MPEG recognize the need to identify 
multimedia content, and started a work item 
formally called ‘Multimedia Content Descrip-
tion Interface', better known as MPEG-7. 
The Moving Picture Experts Group (MPEG) 
is a working group of ISO/IEC (formally 
ISO/IEC JTC1/SC29/WG11) in charge of 
“development of international standards for 
compression, decompression, processing, and 
coded representation of moving pictures, au-
dio, and their combination, in order to satisfy 
a wide variety of applications”. 
This standard includes the description of 
physical characteristics of the image but 
MPEG-7 also includes Descriptors that define 
the syntax and the semantics of the image. The 
specific structure, semantics and relationships 
among the components of the content are col-
lect in Description Schemes. There are two 
different schema types:  Descriptors and De-
scription Schemes. 
According to this philosophy, the MPEG-7 
descriptors of the audio-visual content may in-
clude all the items that the standard considers 
as informative: 
― Information describing the creation and 
production processes of the content (direc-
tor, title, short feature movie). 
― Information related to the usage of the con-
tent (copyright pointers, usage history, 
broadcast schedule). 
― Information of the storage features of the 
content (storage format, encoding). 
― Structural information on spatial, temporal 
or spatio-temporal components of the con-
tent (scene cuts, segmentation in regions, 
region motion tracking). 
―  Information about low level features in the 
content (colors, textures, sound timbres, 
melody description). 
― Conceptual information of the reality cap-
tured by the content (objects and events, in-
teractions among objects). 
― Information about how to browse the con-
tent in an efficient way (summaries, varia-
tions, spatial and frequency sub bands,). 
― Information about collections of objects. 
― Information about the interaction of the 
user with the content (user preferences, us-
age history). 
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AUTOPOIESIS (S. autopoiesis, F. autopoïèse, 
G. Autopoiesis) [system theory, cibernetics, the-
ory of social systems] concept 
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(αυτο-ποιησις, ‘auto (self)-creation’), neologism 
introduced in 1971 by the Chilean biologists 
Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela to 
designate the organisation of living systems in 
terms of a fundamental dialectic between 
structure and function. Although the term 
emerged in biology, afterwards it came to be 
used in other sciences as well. Its use by the 
sociologist Niklas Luhmann is worth pointing 
out. It can be said that the →UTI takes and 
reproduces the concept in more differentiated 
categories (→self-restructuring, self-reproduction 
and self-recreation). 
For Maturana and Varela, autopoiesis is a fun-
damental condition for the existence of living 
beings in the continuous production of them-
selves. According to Maturana (Transfor-
mation in coexistence), “living beings are net-
works of molecular production in which the 
produced molecules generate, through their 
interactions, the same network that creates 
them”. Autopoietic systems are those that 
show a network of processes or operations 
that characterise them and which have the ca-
pacity to create or destroy elements of the 
same system as a response to the disturbances 
of the medium. Within them, even if the sys-
tem changes structurally, the network that 
characterises them would remain invariable 
during its whole existence, maintaining its 
identity. 
For Luhmann, autopoiesis means a new theo-
retical paradigm, which, if applied to social 
systems, has a self-referential nature that does 
not restrict itself to the structural level; the na-
ture itself constructs the elements that make it 
up. So, whereas in biological systems self-ref-
erence corresponds to self-reproduction, in 
social (or psychic) systems, it is constituted 
through meaning (Sinn), which, in its turn, is 
produced by the “processing differences” 
which permit to “select” from the “meaning 
offer” (Mitteilung). According to the Luh-
mannian interpretation, “communication” 
(Kommunikation) melts the difference be-
tween “information” (Information), the 
“meaning offer” (Mitteilung) and “under-
standing” (Verstehen) (in which each part dif-
ferentiates the other two and leads them to-
wards a unity), where the information is but a 
selection within the “meaning offer” through 
a connection between differences. Therefore, 
there would not be strictly a transmission of 
information between emitter and receiver; in-
stead, the first one makes a suggestion for the 
selection of the second one, so that the infor-
mation for both is different, although, in any 
case, it is constituted through communication 
pro-cesses. 
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AXIOMATICS FOR ALGORITHMIC 
INFORMATION (S. Axiomatica de la Infor-
mación Algorítmica, F. Axiomatique de l'information 
algorithmique, G. Axiomatik für die algorithmische 
Information) [AIT, Complexity theory, Com-
puter science, Coding theory] theory 
Contents.— 1) Direct information sizes; 2) Dual com-
plexity measures; 3) Origin and advantages of the axiomatic 
approach to algorithmic information 
The existence of a variety of algorithmic 
measures of information brought forth a ne-
cessity for a unifying approach (→Algorithmic 
information theory, and Algorithmic information). 
This approach has been called axiomatic infor-
mation theory. 
Algorithmic information measures infor-
mation that is necessary to construct (build) a 
constructive object by means of some system 
of algorithm A. That is why algorithmic infor-
mation is dual to a static complexity measure 
(static direct information size) a of a constructive 
object x and is called by the name (A, α)- infor-
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mation size of x. Dual information size is con-
structed from direct information size by the 
minimization operation. For instance, a natu-
ral direct information size for algorithms/pro-
grams is the length of their description (sym-
bolic representation), and the same is true for 
data. It is possible to measure length in such 
natural units of information as bits and bytes. 
When taking the dual to this measure in the 
class of recursive algorithms, we obtain Kol-
mogorov complexity or recursive information 
size (→Kolmogorov complexity). 
The axiomatic description of dual information 
size uses axiomatic descriptions of direct com-
plexity measures suggested by Blum (1967; 
1967a) and further developed by Burgin (1982; 
2005; 2010). 
1. Direct information sizes. All kinds of direct 
information sizes are divided into three classes: 
1) Direct static information size depends only on 
an algorithm/program that is measured. 
Direct static information size usually re-
flects information in the algorithm/pro-
gram representation. The length of a text 
(of an algorithm) measures information in 
bits. If we say that a memory has the capac-
ity 1 gigabytes, it means that it is possible to 
store 8×109 bits of information in this 
memory. 
2) Direct functional information size depends both 
on an algorithm/program that is measured 
and on the input. Examples of a direct 
functional information size are such popu-
lar measures as time of a computation or 
space used in a computation. 
3) Direct Processual information size depends on 
an algorithm/program, its realization, and 
on the input. Examples of a direct proces-
sual information size are time that it takes 
to process given input or the number of 
data transactions between memories of dif-
ferent type used in this process. 
2. Dual complexity measures. Information 
size, or algorithmic complexity, can be defined 
for different classes of algorithms, resulting in 
different measures. However, all these 
measures are constructed by a similar tech-
nique. As a result, it is possible to axiomatize 
this approach. The result of this axiomatiza-
tion is called dual complexity measures (Burgin, 
2005). As before, we are going to call these 
measures by the name dual information size as 
they reflect information necessary to compute 
(construct) a given object.  These measures 
give much more opportunities to estimate in-
formation size of words and infinite strings 
than conventional types of information size 
(→Kolmogorov complexity). 
Let A = {Ai ; i ∈ I} be a class of algorithms,  
A be an algorithm that works with elements 
from I as inputs and α: I → N be a direct 
static information size of algorithms from a 
class A that satisfies axioms from (Blum, 1967) 
or (Burgin, 2005, Ch.5). Elements of I are usu-
ally treated as programs for the algorithm A. 
The dual to α complexity measure or 
(A, α) – information size αAo of an object 
(word) x with respect to the algorithm A is 
the function from the codomain (the set of all 
outputs) Y of A that is defined as 
αAo(x) = min {α(p); p ∈ I and A(p) = x} 
When there is no such p that A(p) = x, the 
value of αAo at x is undefined. 
When there is no such p that A(p) = x, the 
value of αAo at x is undefined. 
When the class A has universal algorithms, 
the invariance theorem is proved stating 
that αUo(x) where U is a universal algorithm 
in the class A is an optimal – in some sense – 
measure in the class of all measures αAo(x) 
with A from the class A (Burgin, 2010). This 
allows one to take αUo(x) as an axiomatic com-
plexity measure (axiomatic information size) 
in the class A. 
3. Origin and advantages of the axiomatic 
approach to algorithmic information. An 
axiomatic approach to algorithmic infor-
mation theory was introduced by Burgin in a 
paper presented for publication by Kolmogo-
rov (Burgin 1982) and further developed in 
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the paper (Burgin, 1990) and in books (Burgin 
2005; 2010). The axiomatic approach encom-
passes other approaches in the algorithmic in-
formation theory. It is possible to treat differ-
ent measures of algorithmic information as 
particular cases of axiomatically defined 
measures of algorithmic information. Instead 
of proving similar theorems, such as the basic 
invariance theorem, for each particular meas-
ure, it is possible to easily deduce all such re-
sults from one corresponding theorem proved 
in the axiomatic setting. This is a general ad-
vantage of the axiomatic approach in mathe-
matics. 
References 
― BLUM, M. (1967). On the Size of Machines. Infor-
mation and Control, v. 11, pp. 257–265 
― BLUM M. (1967a). A Machine-independent Theory 
of Complexity of Recursive Functions. Journal of the 
ACM, v. 14, No.2, pp. 322–336 
― BURGIN, M. (1982). Generalized Kolmogorov 
complexity and duality in theory of computations. 
Soviet Math. Dokl., v.25, No. 3, pp. 19–23 
― BURGIN, M. (1990). Generalized Kolmogorov 
Complexity and other Dual Complexity Measures. 
Cybernetics, No. 4, pp. 21–29 
― BURGIN, M. (2005). Super-recursive algorithms. Mono-
graphs in computer science, Heidelberg: Springer. 
― BURGIN, Mark (2010). Theory of Information: Funda-
mentality, Diversity and Unification. Singapore: World 
Scientific Publishing. 
(MB) 

g l o s s a r i u m B I T r i   29 
C 
CHANNEL THEORY (S. teoría de canales, F. 
théorie des canaux, G. Kanaltheorie) [logic, seman-
tics, computer science] theory 
Contents.— 1) Formulation of the subject matter, 2) In-
formation flow in a distributed system, 3) Information chan-
nels, 4) Information flow: the ideal case, 5) Information 
flow: the practical case, 6) Fallibility in the flow of infor-
mation, 7) Two versions of the theory. 
Channel Theory (also known as the Theory of 
Information Channels, the Theory of Infor-
mation Flow or simply IF-Theory) is a logico-
mathematical theory that models the flow of 
information among components of a so-called 
"distributed system". Barwise and Seligman 
(1997) is the standard source. There are previ-
ous versions of the theory that are acknowl-
edged by the same name; in the last section we 
will deal with that problem. 
1. Formulation of the subject matter. There 
is a fundamental question that channel theory 
tries to answer: "How is it possible for one 
thing to carry information about another?" 
(Barwise and Seligman 1997: xi). Since entities 
convey information about each other as far as 
they are classified by abstract states, and more-
over the conveyed information depends also 
on certain background of connections (be-
tween things) and regularities (between ab-
stract states), any answer to a particular in-
stance of the previous question has to fit the 
following scheme (Barwise and Seligman 
1997: 13). 
Information report: 
The fact that a is in the abstract state F carries 
the information that b is in the abstract state G 
with respect to certain relationships that link a 
and b on the one hand, F and G on the other. 
It does not matter what a, b, F, G are. It might 
be the case that a, b are objects and F, G are 
properties (as in monary predicate logic); per-
haps a, b are situations whereas F, G are situa-
tion types (as in situation theory); maybe a, b 
are different instants a system goes by, while 
F, G are system descriptions in the form of tu-
ples consisting of numbers (as in mathematical 
modelling). The point is that every part of a 
distributed system consists of a collection of 
tokens {a1, a2,...} as well as a collection of 
types {F1, F2,...}; both collections relate to 
each other by means of a classificatory rela-
tion, giving rise to items of the form "a is F". 
This account of information reports goes back 
to Dretske (1981). It was partially developed 
in the theory of situations of Barwise and 
Perry (1983), which Devlin (1991) updates. In 
situation theory, regularities betweenF and G 
were studied under the name of "constraints", 
but physical connections between a and b were 
hardly taken into account. Restrictions serve 
to explain appropriately the relativity of infor-
mation flow, while the combination of re-
strictions and connections seems to be the key 
to understand his fallibility. 
2. Information flow in a distributed sys-
tem. Even though information is not defined, 
it is assumed as something that "flows" among 
the components of a system. Such compo-
nents may be distant from one another in time 
and space; furthermore, they can be very dif-
ferent one to each other. That is why it is said 
that the system is "distributed" (in computer 
science this term has another meaning). Ex-
ample: all the noticeboards, travel tickets and 
trains that make up a railway network form to-
gether a distributed system.  
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There are systematic correlations among com-
ponents in every distributed system. They are 
"regularities" that support the system's infor-
mation flow, which in turn can be modelled by 
different theoretical constructs we call "infor-
mation channels". 
There are four principles of information flow. 
They lead the mathematical development of 
the theory. 
4) Information flow results from regularities 
in a distributed system. 
5) Information flow crucially involves both 
types and their particulars. 
6) It is by virtue of regularities among connec-
tions that information about some compo-
nents of a distributed system carries infor-
mation about other components. 
7) The regularities of a given distributed sys-
tem are relative to its analysis in terms of 
information channels. 
Let us see how to formalize the concepts of 
distributed system and information channel in 
such a way that they match the above four 
principles. 
3. Information channels. Parts of a distrib-
uted system are modelled as classifications. A 
classification A is a structure (A,T,R) where A 
and T are non-empty sets of tokens and types 
respectively, and R is a relation from A to T. 
There might be tokens classified by several 
types, as well as types that classify several to-
kens. If a is in A and t is inT, then eRt means 
that a is of type t. 
A classification provides the vocabulary (via 
T) and the context (via R) whereby it is possi-
ble to speak about each component of the sys-
tem. Typically, different tokens of a classifica-
tion can be seen as the same physical system 
across different time points; types would be 
state descriptions of the system. 
Two classifications A1=(A1,T1,R1) and 
A2=(A2,T2,R2) can be related one to another 
by means of an infomorphism f  from A1 to A2, 
where A1 is the domain and A2 the codomain 
of f. Intuitively, an infomorphism is a "part-to-
whole" informational relationship. It is built 
up by two functions f = (f+, f–) that go in oppo-
site directions (see diagram) and fulfill the fol-
lowing condition: f–(a)R1t if and only if aR2f+(t) 
for all a in A2 and t in T1. This implies that the 
image of type t says in A2 what t says in A1. 
 
Vertical lines represent classificatory relations; 
horizontal arrows are functions. Since the di-
rection of f+determines that of f we can also 
write: 
 
We do not consider subscripts in R1 and R2 
whenever it does not give rise to misunder-
standing. In the diagrams we can do without 
the expressions R1 and R2. 
Barwise and Seligman (1997: 34, 76) define an 
information channel as a collection of info-
morphisms that share the same codomain. We 
can also say that a channel consists of a set 
{A1,...,An} of classifications that represent the 
parts of the distributed system, a classification 
C (the core) that represents the system as a 
hole, and a set of infomorphisms {f1,...,fn} that 
go from each of the parts onto C. Classifica-
tions in {A1,...,An} can be repeated. Tokens in 
C are the connections of the system: of every 
c in C it is said that it connects the tokens to 
which c is related by means of {f1,...,fn}. Parts 
{A1,...,An} inform about each other as long as 
they all are parts of C. 
Every channel models those conditions that 
make the information flow possible in a dis-
tributed system, which in turn can be mod-
elled by different information channels. A dis-
tributed system D is a collection of elements 
informing about each other. Formally, D con-
sists of an indexed class cla(D) of classifica-
tions together with a class inf(D) of infomor-
phisms whose domains and codomains are all 
in cla(D). 
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An information channel K covers a distributed 
system D if and only if cla(D) are the classifi-
cations of the channel and for every info-
morphism f in inf(D) there are infomorphisms 
from both the domain and codomain of f to 
the core of K such that the diagram formed by 
these three infomorphisms commutes. The 
underlying idea is that all classifications in the 
distributed system are informational parts of 
the core whose channel covers the system. In 
Barwise and Seligman (1997: 89-97) it is 
shown how to construct an information chan-
nel out of a distributed system. 
An information channel with four compo-
nents could be e.g. a flashlight of which we 
consider the bulb (A1), the switch (A2), the bat-
teries (A3) and the case (A4). The correspon-
ding diagram: 
 
Information flows across the channel: switch 
being ON and battery being charged inform 
that the bulb is lite unless the case is broken; 
battery working properly informs that the bulb 
can be either lite or unlite, etc.  
It is possible to simplify a channel so that it 
contains only two classifications and one info-
morphism. In order to do that we get together 
its parts A1, A2, A3... in a sole classification by 
means of a "sum" that generates the classifica-
tion [A1+A2+A3...] where all the information 
that the parts of the channel previously con-
tained separately is now contained in a single 
classification. In the case of a channel with 
two parts: 
 
Tokens of [A1+A2] are ordered pairs that com-
bine all the tokens in A1 and A2. The type set 
of [A1+A2] is the disjoint union generated by 
types in A1 and A2. A token is of certain type 
if any of its components was of that type. In-
fomorphisms from the parts to the sum and 
from the sum to the core are defined so that 
the diagram commutes. 
4. Information flow: the ideal case. Infor-
mation channels tell us why the information 
flows within a distributed system; which are 
the conditions of possibility of information. 
The logical apparatus we present in this sec-
tion and the next one is suitable for studying 
how that information flows. 
Every classification A is equipped with its own 
"theory", namely the class of regularities 
among types that are supported by the tokens. 
How to formalize this idea of regularity that 
depends on the idea of classification? IfT1, T2 
are subsets of T, then a token a of A satisfies 
the pair (T1,T2) if and only if aRt for all t in T1 
implies aRt for some t in T2. Every pair (T1,T2) 
satisfied by some token is a regularity. 
The theory Th(A) generated by A is a structure 
(T, ⇒) consisting of the set T of types in A to-
gether with a consequence relation ⇒ com-
prised by all regularities in A. Given a theory, 
we write T1⇒T2 and say that T1 implies T2 
whenever (T1,T2) is a regularity of the theory. 
Relation ⇒ obey the logical properties of iden-
tity, monotony and cut that characterize de-
ductive inference. 
Once we have the concepts of classification, 
theory, infomorphism and information chan-
nel, it is feasible to try out a first analysis of 
information flow. Let be given a channel K 
wherein two classifications A1 and A2 inform 
one about another in virtue of their informa-
tional memebership C. The diagram looks like 
this: 
CHANNEL THEORY 
 
32  g l o s s a r i u m B I T r i  
 
Initial proposal: Let a1 be of type t1 in A1 and 
a2 of type t2 in A2. Then a1's being of type t1 
in A1 informs that a2 is of type t2 in A2, rel-
atively to the channel K, if and only if a1 and 
a2are connected through some token in C 
and moreoverf+(t1) implies f+(t2) in the teory 
Th(C) (Barwise and Seligman 1997: 35). 
This first analysis bears in mind regularities in 
C instead of regularities among the parts of 
the system. This is because we have adopted a 
viewpoint external to this system, assuming as 
well that we are given complete information 
about its regularities. We have idetified that in-
formation with Th(C). But in practice it is un-
likely, if not impossible, that we know all these 
regularities. That's why it is convenient to re-
vise the previous analysis: we have to assume 
an internal viewpoint with respect to the sys-
tem, wherein we are so to speak considering 
just a part of the system; from observation of 
that part -together with our incomplete and 
fallible knowledge of the system as a whole- 
we have to extract information about other 
parts of the system. How to do this? By means 
of local logics. 
5. Information flow: the practical case. 
Given a classification A, its theory Th(A) is 
sound and complete. But we can consider log-
ical systems associated to A that are neither 
sound nor complete. It is precisely what local 
logics are all about. Motivation for considering 
such systems comes from the study of situa-
tions in which we have the theory of a "prox-
imal" classification A1 but we want to reason 
about a "distal" classification A2 from what we 
know about A1. Example: we drive a car and 
the proximal classification consists of the 
speedometer, counting machine, gasoline indi-
cator, and so on, whereas the distal classifica-
tion is the engine. 
 
In general, for all infomorphism f from A to B 
there are two rules Intro-f and Elim-f for mov-
ing regularities from A to B and from B to A 
respectively. Intro-f translates T1–f ⇒T2–f  in A 
into T1 ⇒ T2 in B. Elim-f translates T1f⇒T2f in 
B into T1 ⇒ T2 in A. By means of Intro-f, va-
lidity is preserved, while non-validity is not; by 
means of Elim-f, non-validity is preserved, 
while validity is not. Closer analysis of rules 
Intro-f and Elim-f suggests that we should 
generalize the concept of theory in order to 
cover logical systems that are possibly un-
sound or incomplete. 
In the car example, as we apply Intro-f1 to the 
theory Th(A1) we get a consistent theory that 
might not be complete, and as we apply Elim-
f2 to that theory we get a third one (this time 
over A2) that might be unsound or incomplete 
or both. 
 A local logic L = (A, ⇒, N) consists of a clas-
sification A, a binary relation => on type sets 
from A satisfying identity, monotony and cut, 
as well as a subset N of "normal" tokens from 
A satisfying all pairs (T1,T2) such that T1⇒T2. 
Logic L is sound if every token is normal; it is 
complete if for every pair (T1,T2) satisfied by 
every normal token, it is true that T1⇒T2. The 
sound and complete local logic of A is Log(A), 
which is but a generalization of Th(A). 
If we have in the previous diagram a local logic 
L(A1) associated to A1, we can define the logic 
f1[L(A1)] generated by Intro-f1 from L(A1) and 
associated to C, as well as the logic f2–
[f1[L(A1)]] generated by Elim-f2 from the for-
mer logic and associated to A2. The last logic 
might be unsound or incomplete, but it is all 
we have to reason about A2 from the starting 
point of the local logic L(A1). In general, it can 
be proved that every local logic associated to a 
classification is the local logic induced by 
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some binary channel, i.e. for every classifica-
tion A2 and local logic associated to it there 
exists a classificationA1 and a channel linking 
both classifications such that the local logic as-
sociated to A2 is of the form f2–[f1[Log(A1)]]. 
Does this fact bear any relation at all with our 
logical model of information flow? Let us sup-
pose there is a channel equipped with two 
components, as in the former diagram, but 
this time we do not have Log(C) for the core 
C. What we have is a local logic L on C that 
might be either unsound or incomplete. 
Hence C can be seen as the distant classifica-
tion of a new channel whose core is C' and 
whose "proximal" classification O (for ob-
server) supports the logic Log(O), which is the 
logic the observer uses to reason C. It turns 
out that L on Cequals to g2–1[g1[Log(O)]] 
 
As we take L instead of Th(C) we overcome 
the initial proposal because we assume now 
that our knowledge about  C is incomplete and 
fallible, for it is the knowledge of an observer 
that tries to acquire information about 
A2from direct access to A1. But we still have 
to define the flow of information on the basis 
of regularities taking place among parts of the 
system, not on the basis (as in the initial pro-
posal) of regularities among images of types 
within the core of the channel. In order to 
move forward we have to simplify the channel 
by means of the sum operation until we get a 
channel made up by a single component A and 
a single infomorphism f (otherwise we should 
have regularities within each part of the system 
instead of regularities among those parts). At 
this point we use the rule Elim-f for getting f–
1(L), a local logic on A that happens to be the 
"distributed logic" or logic that codifies the in-
formation flow of the channel. In other words: 
Basic proposal: Given a channel with only one 
infomorphism, its distributed logic is the in-
verse image of the local logic associated to 
the core (Barwise and Seligman 1997: 183). 
This proposal is somehow less explicit than 
the previous one in that it does not mention 
the "information report" of the first section. 
However, it is obviously coherent with such a 
scheme. To see it you only have to work out 
the basic proposal having into account the 
concepts involved in the sum of classifica-
tions. 
6. Fallibility in the flow of information. 
Whether a pair of types (T1,T2) is a regularity 
or not, with respect to a distributed system, 
depends on the information channel we use to 
model the very system (recall principle 4). And 
this in turn depends on the analysis we adopt, 
as well as the tokens and types being assumed. 
As soon as we fix a distributed system, chang-
ing the channel might imply a change in the 
regularities we are to accept, hence a change in 
the flow of information our logical model cap-
tures. 
A way of restricting the number of regularities 
in a channel K is to "refine" it by means of a 
channel K'  that has the same parts as K yet a 
different core C' that lies between C and the 
parts in such a way that the following diagram 
commutes. 
 
A straightforward case is that where functions 
in r are identities and C' contains more tokens 
than C. From this case it should be obvious 
that, the more refined a channel, the more re-
liable the information it supports, since the 
number of connections between tokens of dif-
ferent parts of the system increases. With re-
spect to the types: by Intro-r every regularity 
in K'  is a regularity in K as well; now, by Elim-
r not every regularity in K is a regularity in K' . 
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This means that whenever a regularity inK fails 
(because of exceptions) we do not have to 
seek alternative logics but alternative channels. 
Suppose that A1 classifies the switch of a flash-
light at different times, whereas A2 classifies 
the bulb of the very same flashlight again at 
those times. If C does not take into account 
connections with the battery, it is a regularity 
that the image of the type "on" implies the im-
age of the type "lite". As soon as a flashlight 
with a discharged battery plays the role of a 
counterexample to that regularity, we do not 
have to seek a new logic (e.g. non-monotonic), 
rather we should try to define a new core C' 
that takes into account the battery as a relevant 
component of the flashlight, thus the new 
channel would not admit as a regularity that 
the image of "on" implies the image of "lite". 
7. Two versions of the theory. There are two 
versions of channel theory. The second one is 
a development of the first one, which in turn 
stems from situation theory. Both versions 
originate in the collaborative work of Jon Bar-
wise and Jerry Seligman during the 1990s. 
First version. The first published paper is Bar-
wise (1992). There it is suggested that situation 
theory cannot explain fallibility in the infor-
mation flow because it considers relationships 
between types of situations without paying at-
tention to relationships between concrete sit-
uations. Such relations are introduced and the 
resulting model is analyzed. Barwise (1993) is 
a much more sophisticated exposition. Selig-
man (1990, 1991a, 1991b) had developed very 
similar ideas to those of Barwise inde-
pendently. From collaboration of these two 
authors arise the technical paper Barwise and 
Seligman (1993) and the more philosophical 
Barwise and Seligman (1994). This version of 
the theory was summarized in the survey pa-
per Moss and Seligman (1994). 
Second version. The first and still standard refer-
ence is Barwise and Seligman (1997), where 
the previous version of the theory is reformu-
lated in the mathematical framework of cate-
gory theory, in particular the theory of Chu 
spaces (Barr 1979; Pratt 1999). Algebraic con-
structions over Chu spaces provide the se-
mantics of the theory. Barwise (1997) investi-
gate linkages to modal logic, whereas Barwise 
(1999) is an application of the theory to the 
study of non-monotonic reasoning. Seligman 
(2009), in turn, is an attempt of merging the 
second version of channel theory with Shan-
non's statistical theory of signal transmission 
and codification (1948). 
Pérez-Montoro (2000, 2007) takes the view-
point of information content in his compre-
hensive survey of Shannon, Dretske, situation 
theory and the first version of channel theory. 
Restall (2005) deals with the first version of 
the theory from a logical perspective. Some re-
cent surveys of information theories, like 
Devlin (2001) or Bremer and Cohnitz (2004), 
devote a separate chapter to the second ver-
sion of channel theory. 
Related resources 
― Ontologos: http://www.ontologos.org/ 
― The Information Flow Framework: 
http://suo.ieee.org/IFF/ 
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CODE (S. código, F. code, G. Kode) 
[transdisciplinar, communication theory, 
cybernetics, semiotics] concept 
Code is a system of signs and rules for con-
verting a piece of information (for instance, a 
letter, word, or phrase) into another form or 
representation, not necessarily of the same 
type. In communication (especially, in tele-
communications) and information processing: 
encoding is the process by which information 
is converted into symbols (usually belonging 
to an →alphabet) being communicated, stored 
or processed; whereas decoding is the reverse 
process which reconverts code symbols into 
information understandable or useful to the 
receiver (→encoder and decoder) 
Notice that from this point of view the code 
is supposed to be simultaneously known by 
the sender (or source) and the receiver (or des-
tination), which explains the inter-comprehen-
sion between them (in case it involves inten-
tion) or interoperability (if the information is 
understood only at a pragmatic or operational 
level). Therefore, this point of view deals with 
a traditional relation to →reversibility, which 
would explain neither the emergence nor the 
dynamics of code. An improvement of this 
perspective can be found in Foerster´s criti-
cism of cybernetics of the first order, which is 
intended to be improved in cybernetics of the 
second order as means of explaining self-ref-
erential and autopoietic processes (→cybernet-
ics, autopoiesis; Foerster 1984). 
In semiotics, a code -as system of signs- is a sys-
tem of correlations or correlational rules be-
tween the coding system (system of signifiers 
or syntactic space or expression space) and a 
codified system (system of meanings or se-
mantic space or content space). In words of 
Umberto Eco: the code “associates a vehicle-
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of-the-sign (or signifier) with some-thing that 
is called its meaning or sense” (Eco 1973). 
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COMMODIFICATION (S. mercantilización, 
F. marchandisation, G. Ökonomisierung) [political 
economy, moral] concept 
On a general level the concept “commodifica-
tion” (C) denotes the transformation of mere 
goods (use values) into "commodities" (Ger-
man: "Waren") by selling and buying them on 
a market. Commodities carry both, use value 
and exchange value. As use values they are 
useful things for anybody (in any type of soci-
ety) and represent concrete labour. As ex-
change values they embody a certain amount 
of abstract labour (in market economies only). 
C is closely related to the more general con-
cept of "commercialization" (Z), which is not 
only true for physical or energetic objects, but 
also for services. The essential difference be-
tween C and Z is that only commodities con-
tribute to the surplus product which is the ba-
sis for capital investment (on the physical 
level) and for surplus value (on the value 
level). Without surplus product in a closed 
economy there cannot be any profit. 
Information societies are characterized by 
three new technologies, the computer, the In-
ternet and Mobile Communication. The eco-
nomically essential features are on the one 
hand that those technologies allow to reduce 
the transaction cost of business and private in-
dividuals (all activities of identification, re-
trieval and exchange of information, coordi-
nation, and management). This enables new 
groups to enter business and markets and de-
stroys others, but also empowers individuals 
to improve their organizational and network-
ing competence. On the other hand, new dig-
ital technologies allow for the commercializa-
tion of more and more human activities (in 
particular cultural ones). While digital tele-
phone services enable business to create new 
profitable markets and open up new spheres 
of investment, by a tricky interplay of Tech-
nology and the Law information goods can be 
transformed into new commodities. In the 
manner of a time machine Information Tech-
nology allows for freezing language, sound, 
movements (talking, singing, making music, 
dancing, writing etc.) on a carrier and for re-
animating them at different points in time and 
space. In principle, Information and Commu-
nication Technology would also allow to copy 
the information and to distribute it on a global 
scale. There would be an abundance of infor-
mation goods, because they do not disappear 
when they are consumed. But this would not 
be profitable. Therefore legal measures (Intel-
lectual Property Rights) were creatively in-
vented to secure markets of commodified in-
formation goods. By adding prices to infor-
mation goods and services artificial shortage is 
created and can be directly and indirectly (by 
building up the infrastructure needed) ex-
ploited by private companies. 
Lawrence Lessig (2004) rightly stresses that C 
and Z restrict the universal access to cultural 
products. Further cultural development and 
creativity could be severely hampered. 
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COMMUNICATION (S. comunicación, F. 
communication, G. Kommunikation, Verbindung, 
Mitteilung) [transdisciplinary] concept 
Contents.— 1) Three dimensions of a complex phenom-
enon (a. the organizational dimension, b. the interactional 
dimension, c. the meaning dimension), 2) The ‘information-
alist’ conception of communication, 3) The socio-cultural 
conception of communication. 
1. Three dimensions of a complex phe-
nomenon. It is possible to weave, from the 
perspective of complexity, a continuity line 
among the three epistemological dimensions 
of communication: organizational dimension, 
interactional dimension and meaning dimen-
sion. 
a) The organizational dimension. Commu-
nication and information enter the heart of 
contemporary epistemology together with 
Shannon and Weaver’s Mathematical Theory 
of Communication, von Bertalanffy’s General 
Systems Theory and Wiener’s Cybernetics. 
The organizational and adaptive dimension of 
the concept of communication is posed by 
Norbert Wiener as follows: 
“Information is a name for the content of 
what is exchanged with the outer world as we 
adjust to it, and make our adjustment felt upon 
it. The process of receiving and of using infor-
mation is the process of our adjusting to the 
contingencies of the outer environment, and 
of our living effectively within that environ-
ment. To live effectively is to live with ade-
quate information. Thus, communication and 
control belong to the essence of man's inner 
life, even as they belong to his life in society” 
(Wiener, Cybernetics and Society, 1954:18) 
Information is that way linked to the idea of 
order (in the sense of organizational regulari-
ties) as well as conceived as a product of that 
very organizational order. If information is the 
matter of complex organizational logics, com-
munication is then the process par excellence 
of that same organizational dynamics. That 
very concept of information, as well as the or-
ganizational relevance of communication pro-
cesses, supports the foundations of the inter-
actional dimension of information and com-
munication, which in turn makes possible 
their role in the meaning sphere. 
b) The interactional dimension. To exist, 
for a living being, is to be related to somebody. 
No living organism can develop efficiently far 
from ‘the others’, to such an extent, that the 
net of relations between an organism and its 
environment, between an organism and other 
organisms, becomes a prerequisite for life. 
That relational condition is shared by every 
living thing, not only by human beings. On the 
basis of its organizational condition, and as far 
as any living organization is a refined example 
of a complex organization, communication 
comes to be the interactional logics among liv-
ing beings. 
It is necessary, however, to distinguish be-
tween the conception of communication as in-
teractional logics among living beings (behav-
ioural coordination) and that of communica-
tion as a meaning practice. While certain con-
sensus around ‘behavioural ecology’ can be 
observed in the first conception, there is no 
clear consensus in the latter. Thus, for in-
stance, Pradier (1985) and Mac Roberts (1980) 
emphasize the need of intentionality as re-
quirement for referring to communication in 
a natural sense. To some extent, these and 
other authors presume self-consciousness as a 
communicational prerequisite which, in the 
end, restricts communication to the human 
domain. They obviate, in that perspective, 
those contributions from ethology (Lorenz, 
1972; Tinbergen, 1979; y von Frisch, 1957) 
and zoo-semiotics (Sebeok, 1972), which 
point, in one way or another, to an evolution-
ary line between communication in the biolog-
ical sense and communication in those mean-
ing oriented interactions that characterize hu-
mans. 
From a different point of view, and keeping a 
convenient distance from Neo-Darwinian so-
cio-biological assumptions, the Chilean biolo-
gists Maturana and Varela (1996) depart from 
the biological basis of the social phenomenon 
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to depict communication as a kind of recur-
sive behaviour: communication is a behaviour 
specialised in behavioural coordination. Pre-
cisely due to that condition of being a behav-
iour that coordinates behaviours, the above 
mentioned authors state that any social form 
(human or not) is based on communicative be-
haviour, since behavioural coordination 
comes to be the phenomenic expression and 
the prerequisite of society. 
c) The meaning dimension. The conceptual 
frame of Symbolic Interactionism constitutes 
the point of departure for the evolutionary 
change of constructivism: from epistemologi-
cal and psychological constructivism to social 
constructivism. That process is marked by the 
contributions of Palo Alto Group (Watzlawick 
et alt., 1981), Goffman’s interactional micro-
sociology (Goffman, 1970) and Garfinkel’s 
Ethnomethodology (Garfinkel, 1967). That 
constructivist current of sociological thought 
progressively moves its focus from cognitive 
processes to the symbolic processes, and lies 
at the base of those communication studies 
posing an alternative to the ‘black box’ para-
digms (which obviate the observation of 
mind-behaviour and society-action correla-
tions). 
Especially, George Herbert Mead posed the 
interactional perspective as a critical answer to 
behaviourism and its stimulus-response 
model, putting the stress in the relevance of 
individual’s internal experience and in the 
symbolic nature of inter-individual interac-
tions. The influence of Mead’s view can be 
even tracked in Habermas’ Theory of Com-
municative Action (1987) and in Berger and 
Luckmann’s phenomenological-constructivist 
thesis on the social construction of reality 
(1979). 
In his well known Mind, Self and Society (1970), 
Mead posed a theory for the social constitu-
tion of the self as a sphere where the individual 
develops self-consciousness on the basis of his 
or her capacity to adopt the other’s point of 
view. That kind of externalized reflexivity 
would be the process through which the so-
cially conscious self emerges. 
Since communication constitutes the sphere 
where interactions –which constructivism 
deals with at the epistemological level- take 
place, Meads’ idea takes communication as the 
prerequisite for human being both in its indi-
vidual and social dimension. In addition, by 
conceiving those internal processes (obviated 
by behaviourism under the black box para-
digm) as intrinsically social, Mead’s theory be-
comes the driving force for all those perspec-
tives focusing attention on subjects and pro-
cesses, in opposition to those views which -
like functionalism- emphasize structures and 
normative regularities. 
Assuming Mead’s proposal on communica-
tion as the core principle for both societal and 
individual constitution, Habermas (1987:134) 
develops his foundation of sociological 
thought in the terms of a theory of communi-
cation. From Mead on (together with the con-
tributions of the Linguistic Turn in philoso-
phy), thinking the human subject becomes 
thinking inter-subjective communication. The 
process of objectivizing the self that symbolic 
interactionism elucidates comes to be in this 
sense a socio-linguistic version of the episte-
mological reflection on the nature of the ob-
server. 
Together with the interactional conception, 
how the bond between the individual and the 
social system is conceived also changes. None 
of them can be thought of as external to each 
other, since it is language, cognitive patterns, 
rules and values of community the point of 
reference for the subject to give sense to any 
action. In its turn, social action has a sense 
which is simultaneously ‘subjective’ (the at-
tributed sense) and ‘objective’, reified, exter-
nalized in the expressions, patterns and norms 
of relations. Thus, to understand how a sub-
ject builds an image of the self involves (in the 
perspective of social relations but also in the 
perspective of language use) his or her inter-
actions with others, as well as the meaning and 
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value systems and the rules that organize be-
haviours and relations. 
2. The ‘informationalist’ conception of 
communication. On the basis of the sym-
bolic conception of communication and under 
the powerful influence of Shannon and 
Weaver’s model, the process of human com-
munication is generally defined as a kind of 
symbolic action in which an emitter (or sender) 
intentionally decides to start the process of 
sending a →message to a receiver through a 
→communication channel in order to express a 
given meaning. The emitter codifies the mean-
ing via symbols, →signs or concrete represen-
tations, which may be verbal or non verbal, 
and are attached to common interpretations 
the receptor also knows (→code). The receiver 
receives and identifies the signals, and using 
his or her knowledge of attributed conven-
tional meanings, the receiver changes his or 
her attitudinal behaviour. 
In that process both emitter and receiver con-
stantly and simultaneously exchange their 
roles, using a wide variety of variables from 
the context that make possible an appropriate 
interpretation of the message. Communicative 
processes are, in this view, essentially transac-
tional, simultaneous and interactive. Both the 
emitter and the receiver are involved in a pro-
cess of mutual cooperation in the construction 
of the message. 
In any case, cognitive, psychological, social or 
cultural interferences can often affect the cor-
rect interpretation of the message by the recip-
ient. Nevertheless, the absolute coincidence is 
usually not a requirement to produce commu-
nication. Generally, we manage to exchange 
information although the level of accuracy in 
the interpretation is not complete. 
In case of interpersonal communication, the 
problem of semantic perception is usually 
counterbalanced by means of receiver's ability 
to answer (→feedback), and emitter’s ability to 
put him/herself in the place of the recep (role-
taking function). Both functions help to avoid 
-as far as possible- the semantic gap between 
emitter and receiver. The receiver can show 
the emitter, through verbal and non verbal sig-
nals, how he or she interprets the message. 
And the emitter can adjust his or her message 
taking the place of the receiver, thus facilitat-
ing that receiver's interpretation adapts to the 
preferred original meaning. In the role taking 
function, the emitter imagines the message 
from the receiver’s viewpoint, considering if 
the receiver will be able to understand it as it 
will be intendedly formulated, or if some mod-
ification is instead required. 
3. The socio-cultural conception of com-
munication. Up to now we have character-
ized communication as a kind of information 
transmission. That idea of communication as 
information transmission has been the domi-
nant model for theoretical considerations on 
the communicative actions. However, com-
munication is related also to other functions. 
Some authors (Carey, 1989; Van Zoonen, 
1994; Radford 2005) underline that the term 
communication (Lat. Communicatio) is related to 
communion, having in common, sharing, and 
participating. From this viewpoint, communi-
cation shows a clear socializing function, since 
it contributes to building and developing com-
munity through shared rituals, narratives, be-
liefs and values. 
References 
― ABRIL, G. (1997). Teoría general de la información. Ma-
drid: Cátedra. 
― AGUADO, J.M. (2003). Comunicación y cognición. Sevi-
lla: Comunicación Social Ediciones. 
― BERGER, P. y LUCKMANN, T. (1979). La cons-
trucción social de la realidad, Buenos Aires: Amorrortu. 
CASSIRER, E. (1998). Filosofía de las formas simbólicas. 
Vol. I. México: Fondo de Cultura Económica. 
― FRISCH, K. von (1957). La vida de las abejas. Barce-
lona: Labor. 
― GARFINKEL, H. (1967). Studies in Ethnometodology. 
Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice- Hall. 
― GOFFMAN, E. (1970). Ritual de la Interacción, Bue-
nos Aires: Tiempo Contemporáneo. 
― HABERMAS, J. (1987). Teoría de la acción comuni-
cativa 1. Racionalidad de la acción y racionalización 
social. Madrid: Taurus. 
― HABERMAS, J. (1989). Teoría de la acción comuni-
cativa II: Crítica de la razón funcionalista. Madrid: 
Taurus. 
COMMUNICATION CHANNEL 
 
40  g l o s s a r i u m B I T r i  
― LORENZ, K. (1972). El comportamiento animal y hu-
mano. Barcelona: Plaza y Janés. 
― MAC ROBERTS, M. H. y MAC ROBERTS, B. R. 
(1980). «Toward a minimal definition of animal 
communication». The Psychological Record, 30.  
― MEAD, G. H. (1970). Espíritu, persona y sociedad. Bue-
nos Aires: Paidós. 
― PRADIER, .L. M. (1985). «Bio-logique et semio-
logique». Degrés, 42-43. 
― SANCHEZ, L. (2008). «El fenómeno de la comuni-
cación», en Duran, J. y Sánchez, L. (eds.)Industrias de 
la comunicación audiovisual. Barcelona: Publicacions i 
edicions de la Universitat de Barcelona. Col. Comu-
nicación activa 
― SEBEOK, T. A. (1972). Perspectives in Zoosemiotics, 
The Hague: Mouton. 
― SHANNON, G. E. y WEAVER, W. (1981). Teoría 
matemática de la comunicación. Madrid: Forja. 
― TINBERGEN, N. (1975). Estudios de Etología, I y II, 
Madrid: Alianza Universidad. 
― VARELA, F. (1996). Conocer. Las ciencias cogniti-
vas: tendencias y perspectivas. Cartografía de las 
ideas actuales. Barcelona: Gedisa. 
― WATZLAWICK, P. y otros (1988). La realidad inven-
tada. Barcelona: Gedisa. 
― WATZLAWICK, P., BEAVIN, J. y JACKSON, D. 
(1981). Teoría de la comunicación humana, Barcelona, 
Herder. 
― WIENER, N. (1969). Cybernetics and Society, Cam-
bridge, MIT Press. 
(JMA –ed.-; JMA, LS) 
COMMUNICATION CHANNEL (S. ca-
nal de comunicación, F. canal de communications, G. 
Kommunikationskanal) [transdisciplinary, MTC, 
channel theory, situation theory] concept 
Contents.— 1) In Mathematical Theory of Communi-
cation, 2) In Channel theory 
1. In Mathematical Theory of Communi-
cation. In the MTC and many other infor-
mation and communication theories by exten-
sion, C.C. deals with the medium (or set of 
media) that allow(s) transmitting the signals 
generated by the transmitter to the receiver. 
As stated by Shannon: “merely the medium 
used to transmit the signal from transmitter to 
receiver. It may be a pair of wires, a coaxial 
cable, a band of radio frequencies, a beam of 
light, etc”. 
It could be said that the objective of the trans-
mission codifier is to adapt the messages, sent 
through the information source, to the char-
acteristics of the channel (which has certain 
limitations and available resources, such as the 
bandwidth or frequency margin that can be 
sent). In the analysis, Shannon distinguishes 
between channels without noise (which is 
nothing but a theoretical abstraction that can 
approximately correspond to a situation in 
which the noise is negligible with respect to 
the received signals) and channels with noise 
(which is the normal situation and must espe-
cially be taken into consideration when the 
noise is notably present with respect to the sig-
nal). 
A fundamental part of Shannon’s theory is 
aimed at finding the limits of the →infor-
mation amount that can be sent to a channel 
with given resources (→Shannon’s fundamental 
theorems).  
2. In Channel Theory. In →channel theory a 
channel sets up an informative relation between 
two situations. The fact that a channel relates 
two situations, s1 and s2, is formally denoted as: 
21 ss
c
⇒  
Which means that the situation s1 contains in-
formation about the situation s2, given the ex-
istence of channel c. 
The regularities of higher order, discriminated 
and individualised by an agent for a given sit-
uation, constitute a type: the →information flow 
is caused by the existence of a type T sup-
ported by situation s1 (s1  T) transmitting in-
formation about another type T’ supported by 
situation s2 (s2  T’). In this schema, situations 
s1 and s2 are respectively named signal situation 
and target situation with respect to c. 
In formal terms, a channel c supports a con-
straint between types T and T’, supported by 
both signal and target situations: 
c  T→T’ 
if and only if for all situations s1 and s2, when 
s1  T and T→T’  then s2  T’. 
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In other words, if the situation s1 supports type 
T, and there is a channel c between s1 and s2 
supporting the constraint between two types 
of the respective situations (c  T→T’), then sit-
uation s2 supports type T’. 
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CONTENT (S. Contenido, F. Contenu, G. In-
halt) [semantics, mind] concept 
In many contexts, the term “content” is syn-
onymous with “meaning”. There is content 
where it is possible to make semantic evalua-
tions consisting in the attribution of properties 
like reference, connotation, sense, truth, etc. 
The three sorts of entities with the capacity to 
have content are certain mental states (beliefs, 
desires, intentions, decisions, etc.), linguistic 
entities (words, sentences, texts, etc.), and ac-
tions (and their results). In addition, a very im-
portant and widespread thesis, due to Paul 
Grice, is that linguistic entities and actions 
have content only because they are the out-
come of certain mental states having content. 
There is however another sense of the term 
“content” when it is applied to mental states. 
According to that second sense, mental states 
could have two different kinds of contents. 
They could have a conceptual content or a 
non-conceptual one. Non-conceptual content 
would be the experiential, qualitative or phe-
nomenological content present in some men-
tal states like sensations, feelings, emotions, 
etc. It would consist in a special way of expe-
riencing the world and ourselves. 
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CONTEXT (S. contexto, F. fr, G. al) [transdis-
ciplinary, communication theory]concept 
“Context” stems from the Latin verb “contex-
tere”, meaning ‘to weave’ or ‘to interlace’. In a 
figurative sense, it refers to the interlacing of 
the meanings contained in a text or, generally, 
in a communication, as well as in the circum-
stance in which this communication occurs 
(e.g. physical, pragmatic and cultural environ-
ment). It is this interlacing which enables spec-
ifying the meaning of what is intended to com-
municate. Although the meaning of ‘context’ 
in relation to statements is common, it is also 
applicable to the structure in which something 
is located, and without which it would be un-
intelligible or less intelligible. 
A distinction can be made between situational 
context (or non-expressive context) and ex-
pressive context, in reference to the set of syn-
tactically and semantically related expressions, 
which, at the same time, are articulated 
through deixis and modal indicators in the sit-
uational context. Furthermore, the situational 
context can be divided into: general (related to 
the communicational situation defined by the 
time, place and action within which the com-
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munication is framed), socialand personal (de-
fined by the relationship between the commu-
nicants in their social interaction, their atti-
tudes, interests and their respective 
knowledge). 
There is a great disparity in the analysis of con-
text from the different notions of information: 
from complete oblivion (in the most objectiv-
isable meanings of information, according to 
which information is entirely contained within 
the message) to central attention (in those per-
spectives for which information makes only 
sense in social frameworks or in the adapta-
tion to the environment, and where the mes-
sage is often regarded as a key to release the 
information contained in the context). It is 
ironic that, while in linguistics the importance 
of context was highlighted, and in physics the 
classical conception of the outside observer 
was lost, at the same time Shannon's Mathemat-
ical Theory of Communication defined information 
as a typical characteristic of the information 
source without referring to its context. Some-
thing similar can be said concerning the ori-
gins of the cognitive sciences in the 1956 Sympo-
sium on Information Theory, where the con-
sideration of cultural and historical contexts in 
which cognitive processes are immersed was 
minimized. However, although we might 
speak about epistemological anachronism, it 
also has to be acknowledged that the discus-
sion about the hidden variables in quantum 
theory was alive, and the project on the unifi-
cation of sciences of the Vienna circle was still 
running; on the other hand, the so-called his-
toricist turn, which would underline the im-
portance of cultural contexts, was still far 
away. 
Nevertheless, in the field of →cybernetics, the 
contextualization of information has been an 
intrinsic aspect of its theory from the very be-
ginning, since it is in the pragmatic situation 
(in which the environment is involved) that in-
formation gains meaning as a fundamental 
means to pursue an objective. Even so, it is 
cybernetics of the second order that will stress 
its demand with regard to contextualisation, 
because, in order to survive, it is the regulatory 
structure of the system (underpinning purpose 
orientation) which depends on the eventual 
changes in the environment. 
Likewise from the quantum physics point of 
view, information is –as stated by Mahler– a 
“contextual concept”, intrinsically linked to a 
“situation”. This situation is the dynamic sce-
nario where an interacting system makes “de-
cisions”, leading to a proper “information 
flow”. Therefore, in accordance with current 
physics, it cannot be said that information is 
encoded or conveyed in physical, elementary 
components; instead, it only appears after 
measuring. (v. Mahler 1996).  
From the analysis of the semantic aspects of in-
formation there has also been a change to-
wards a stronger concern on contexts: from 
the “ideal receiver” of Bar-Hillel and Carnap 
(1952), capable of assessing information in 
terms of a structure of atomic statements (in 
an almost formalised language), to the situa-
tional semantics of Barwise, Perry, Israel… 
(1980s and 1990s) in which information is not 
anymore conceived as a property of events but 
something essentially dependent on the con-
text and the consistency restrictions between 
statements (→informational content). Here, it is 
also worth pointing out the proposal of 
Dretske that considers information in relation 
to a knowledge background and the proposal 
of Floridi basing information not on truth (as 
Dretske or the situationalists do, involving, in 
a certain way, a privileged view beyond any 
context), but on veracity, which entails the fal-
libility of the interpreter and the belonging to 
a temporality and a finite knowledge (Floridi 
2005). 
Although, as stated above, many of the infor-
mation theories related to cognitive sciences 
show a reducing tendency to minimise the role 
of context, in other fields of social science, a 
number of approaches stressing context as an 
essential element have arisen. Thus, while un-
der the cognitive interpretation the subject ex-
tracts information from the physical-chemical 
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properties of the sensory stimuli, in the her-
meneutic, historical, critical-sociological and 
Luhmannian approach, the reference and 
meaning only appear contextualised in a cul-
tural world. 
In →hermeneutics, understanding is seen as 
something determined by schemas of pre-un-
derstanding determined by the cultural con-
text of the interpreter. In the historical ap-
proximations, information acquires the level 
of genuine historical phenomena (Brown & 
Duguin 2000, Borgman 1999) or endowed 
with an essential temporality, which is also 
concluded from strictly physical assumptions 
(Matsuno 2000, Lyre 2002). 
In Luhmann’s →system theory, there is not 
properly a transmission of information. In-
stead of a direct conveying process, the emit-
ter limits him/herself to making a suggestion 
for the selection within the “offer of mean-
ings” (Mitteilung), which defines a communi-
cation process in a specific, socio-linguistic 
scenario (Luhmann 1987). However, in Ha-
bermas’ critical sociology, the subject (or re-
ceiver) –although framed closer to a specific 
life horizon– has a reflexive faculty (or com-
municative competence, attained by virtue of 
being part of a certain social group). Such re-
flexivity eventually allows him/her to show 
the distortions, irregularities and censures that 
conditioning all factual communication pro-
cesses (Habermas 1981). Hence we might say: 
Habermas’ contextual interpretation of infor-
mation enables going beyond Luhmann’s “of-
fer of meaning” or to move –by means of will-
power– the hermeneutic life horizon. 
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CONTRADICTION (S. contradicción, F. con-
tradiction, G. Widerspruch) [transdisciplinary, 
logics, semantics, critical theory] concept 
Relationship between an affirmation and a ne-
gation having the same subject and predicate. 
It was traditionally studied under the “law of 
non-contradiction” and initially formulated 
and studied by Aristotle as a supreme principle 
of beings and thinking. It can be formulated 
as:  
“the same attribute cannot at the same time 
belong and not belong to the same subject 
and in the same respect.” (Aristotle, Metaph. 
B.IV, §3) 
It has adopted a twofold interpretation distin-
guished by either a logical or an ontological 
sense, even erecting as an ontological princi-
ple, i.e. as expression of the constituting struc-
ture of reality. However, its fall as unquestion-
able principle can be found in Hegel’s regard 
of contradiction  as a basis of reality’s internal 
movement (though generally the philosopher 
refers more to opposing realities than contra-
dicting ones) (Hegel 1841). Within the dialec-
tic tradition of Hegelian roots, Adorno judges 
that there exists a link between the ontological 
and logical aspects (Adorno 1966). According 
to such link the “repressive structure of real-
ity” and the coercive character of survival as 
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well are reflected in the logical principle of 
contradiction (1956). Regarding Adorno’s 
negative dialectics, the possibility of trans-
cending both the law of non-contradiction 
and the law of identity accounts for the capac-
ity to overcome social contradictions. Gener-
ally according to dialectical schools, the con-
sideration of the logical law is just subordinate 
to the need of overcoming contradictions of 
reality. 
This –so to speak– utilitarian regard (genetic, 
following Adorno’s interpretation) of the law 
of non-contradiction can also be found in 
some of the information theories based on self-
referential systems (→autopoiesis). For instance, 
from a cybernetic perspective, the logical law of 
non-contradiction can be considered as being 
a part of the regulation mechanism under nor-
mal conditions, whereas the overcoming of 
such law corresponds to the need of re-adapt-
ing the mentioned regulation to changing cir-
cumstances (s. positive and negative →feedback, 
→cybernetics). 
Although the law of non-contradiction might 
be easily refuted in its most brief expression 
(removing the italic text in the above formula-
tion, without which it might be exposed to a 
large number of paradoxes), it must be 
pointed out that the remark of “at the same time 
and under the same respect” makes it less vulnera-
ble. This remark also introduces a necessary 
contextualization of the statements (to which we 
have referred to in the →context article) for a 
correct analysis of the consistency of the se-
mantic content of information, such as the ap-
proaches of Bar-Hillel and Carnap (1953), 
Dretske (1982) and Situation Theory (Barwise 
1997) propose –though only the last ones con-
sider context as a key issue– (→Situational 
logic). 
In any case, the claim to consistency in what is 
considered →informational content means that 
contradictions have no place in informational 
context and, consequently, the probability of 
receiving self-contradicting information 
would be zero (according to a naturalistic ap-
proach on information, such as the one of 
Dretske, the ontological version of the law of 
non-contradiction states that contradictory in-
formation cannot emanate from reality, since 
reality itself rejects contradiction). Therefore, 
in case of considering the semantic content of 
an informative statement as inversely related 
to its probability –under Barwise’s inverse rela-
tionship principle (1997)–, the following paradox 
might arise: a contradiction provides a maxi-
mum amount of information, which Floridi 
(2005c) labels as the Bar-Hillel-Carnap Paradox. 
Circumventing this paradox, most of semantic 
approaches get somehow rid of contradic-
tions. 
Nevertheless, if a dialectical point of view is 
adopted (for instance, in critical theory) con-
tradictions will not be something for turning a 
deaf ear, but, on the contrary, the possibility 
of updating the view of reality with fewer con-
tradictions. That is, contradictions might 
somehow announce –so to speak- a new 
world, a new Weltanschaung. If it could be 
achieved, a new state of affairs could be seen, 
whereas much of what was previously seen 
would dissolve with the smoke of past errors. 
For instance, the superseding of classical phys-
ics due to accretion of contradictions of dif-
ferent nature –optical, electrical, astronomical, 
etc– can be regarded as one of these cases 
(Pointcaré 1904). However, it must be re-
marked, on the one hand, that rarely the so-
called contradictions follow the clause of “at 
the same time and in the same respect”, on the other 
hand, that in normal situations –or what Kuhn 
(1962) called, concerning research work, “nor-
mal science”– the contradictions serve to de-
tect false information, wrong interpretations, 
etc. Thus the law of non-contradiction be-
comes an essential tool to receive information 
in normal situations, as well as for its incorpo-
ration into knowledge systems. 
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CORRELATION (S. correlación, F. corrélation, 
G. Korrelation) [transdisciplinary, communica-
tion theory, situational theory, cognitive sci-
ence] concept 
There is a correlation between two factors 
when the presence of one makes the presence 
of the other vary with respect to the average 
situation. 
We may obtain knowledge about the world in-
ferring, from the occurrence of a fact (the sign), 
the occurrence of a different fact (the signified), 
based on the existence of a correlation be-
tween them. This correlation is supposed to 
hold given certain local conditions (Dretske’s 
(1981) channel conditions). We then say that the 
occurrence of the sign carries information on 
the occurrence of the signified, or that it is a 
signal of this occurrence. Millikan (2004) calls 
this notion of information local natural infor-
mation. 
An obvious problem with it concerns the 
value of the conditional probability of the sig-
nified, given the sign. In his explanation of the 
notion, Dretske required that this probability 
be of 1, which, in most cases of transmission 
of information, has as a consequence the need 
for a theoretically dubious strengthening of 
the channel conditions. On the other hand, if 
one accepts that the conditional probability 
might be less than 1, not only a signal might 
occur without the occurrence of its signified 
(even with local conditions holding) −as when 
a beaver splashes the water with its tail in the 
absence of any real danger)− but we would be 
compelled to say, for instance, that the splash-
ing of the water by the beaver informs its 
group of the presence of danger even if the 
corresponding conditional probability is low. 
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CRITICAL THEORY OF INFORMA-
TION, COMMUNICATION, MEDIA 
AND TECHNOLOGY (S. teoría crítica de la 
información, la comunicación, los medios y la tecnolo-
gía, F. théorie critique de l'information, communica-
tion, media et technologie, G. Kritische Theorie der In-
formation, Kommunication, Medien und Technologie) 
[transdisciplinary, critical theory, information 
society, communication and media studies, 
ICT] theory 
The notion of critical theory has a general and 
a specific meaning (Maces 2001: 74f, Payne 
1997: 118). Critical theory as a general term 
means theories that are critical of capitalism 
and domination. Critical Theory as a more 
specific term means the work of the Frankfurt 
School, and particularly of Theodor W. 
Adorno, Max Horkheimer, Jürgen Habermas, 
and Herbert Marcuse. Its starting point is the 
work of Karl Marx (Held 1980: 15, Macey 
2001: 75, Payne 1997: 118, Rush 2004: 9, Wig-
gershaus 1994: 5). For Horkheimer and his 
colleagues, critical theory “was a camouflage 
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label for ‘Marxist theory’” (Wiggershaus 1994: 
5) when they were in exile from the Nazis in 
the USA, where they were concerned about 
being exposed as communist thinkers and 
therefore took care in the categories they em-
ployed.    
First, there are definitions of critical theory 
that remain very vague and general. So for ex-
ample David Macey provides a definition that 
is circular, it defines critical by being critical 
without giving a further specification what it 
means to be critical. By critical theory he 
means “a whole range of theories which take 
a critical view of society and the human sci-
ences or which seek to explain the emergence 
of their objects of knowledge“ (Macey 2001: 
74). Unspecific theories include those that do 
not define a certain normative project, but ar-
gue that critical theory is about political en-
gagement or showing the difference between 
potentiality and actuality. So for example Mi-
chael Payne sees political engagement as the 
central characteristic of critical theory. He de-
fines the latter as “research projects in the so-
cial sciences and/or humanities attempt to 
bring truth and political engagement into 
alignment” (Payne 1997: 118). Craig Calhoun 
focuses on defining critical theory as a project 
that shows the difference between potentiality 
and actuality and argues for potential futures: 
Critical social theory “exists largely to facilitate 
a constructive engagement with the social 
world that starts from the presumption that 
existing arrangements – including currently af-
firmed identities and differences – do not ex-
haust the range of possibilities. It seeks to ex-
plore the ways in which our categories of 
thought reduce our freedom by occluding 
recognition of what could be. (…) It helps 
practical actors deal with social change by 
helping them see beyond the immediacy of 
what is at any particular moment to conceptu-
alize something of what could be. (…) By tak-
ing seriously the question of what it would 
mean to transcend the current epoch, critical 
theory opens more space for considering the 
possibility that the world could be different 
than it is than does any simple affirmation of 
existing differences or claim that postmoder-
nity is just a matter of perspective” (Calhoun 
1995: xiv, 9, 290). 
It is certainly true that critical theory focuses 
on society, wants to foster political engage-
ment, and wants to show the difference be-
tween potentiality and actuality in society. But 
these specifications do not suffice for speak-
ing of critical theory. Further characteristics 
need to be added in order to avoid for exam-
ple that theories, which argue for right-wing 
extremist or nationalist goals, can be consid-
ered as critical.   
Second, there are definitions that are so spe-
cific that they only consider one approach or 
a few approaches as critical theories and ex-
clude other approaches. So for example 
Rainer Forst gives a definition of critical the-
ory that is clearly focusing on a strictly Haber-
masian project. Critical theory would explain 
and question factors that constrain communi-
cation: ”As normative theory, Critical Theory 
thus argues for the integrity of a sphere of 
communicative, normative integration as well 
as for the realization of the possibility of social 
and political discourse; as social-scientific the-
ory, it explains the factors and structures that 
impair the communicative social infrastruc-
ture and that hinder discourse (e.g., by the ex-
clusion of actors from political argumentation 
and decision making); and as participant in so-
cial struggles, it argues for those norms and in-
stitutions that can be defended to all those 
who are ‘subjects’ of these norms and institu-
tions” (Forst 1999: 143). 
Axel Honneth puts two concepts at the heart 
of critical theory, disrespect and malrecogni-
tion. He sees critical theory as an analysis of 
structures that cause disrespect and malrecog-
nition: 
Critical Theory analyzes “social relations of 
communication (…) primarily in terms of the 
structural forms of disrespect they generate”, 
it focuses on “the damage and distortion of 
social relations of recognition” (Honneth 
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2007: 72). Honneth says that all Critical Theo-
rists share the assumption that “the process of 
social rationalization through the societal 
structure unique to capitalism has become in-
terrupted or distorted in a way that makes pa-
thologies that accompany the loss of a rational 
universal unavoidable” (Honneth 2004: 349). 
So on the one hand, if one defines critical the-
ory in very broad sense, then the normative 
aspect of critical theory as critique of domina-
tion becomes lost. On the other hand, if one 
defines critical theory in a very strict sense fo-
cusing on specific theories, scholars, or single 
concepts, then one risks advancing a narrow-
minded definition that weakens the academic 
and political power of critical theory by isolat-
ing approaches. 
A third way of defining critical theory is to see 
it as analysis and questioning of domination, 
inequality, societal problems, exploitation in 
order to advance social struggles and the lib-
eration from domination so that a domina-
tionless, co-operative, participatory society 
can emerge. Some examples of such defini-
tions can be given: 
Fred Rush sees critical theory as the analysis 
of domination and inequality for fostering so-
cial change: “It is an account of the social 
forces of domination that takes its theoretical 
activity to be practically connected to the ob-
ject of its study. In other words, Critical The-
ory is not merely descriptive, it is a way to in-
stigate social change by providing knowledge 
of the forces of social inequality that can, in 
turn, inform political action aimed at emanci-
pation (or at least at diminishing domination 
and inequality)” (Rush 2004: 9). 
David Held argues that the critical theorists 
Adorno, Habermas, Horkheimer, and Mar-
cuse have aimed at establishing a free society 
and at exposing the obstacles for this develop-
ment: “Following Marx, they were preoccu-
pied, especially in their early work, with the 
forces which moved (and might be guided to 
move) society towards rational institutions – 
institutions which would ensure a true, free 
and just life. But they were aware of the many 
obstacles to radical change and sought to ana-
lyse and expose these. They were thus con-
cerned both with interpretation and transfor-
mation” (Held 1980: 15). 
Douglas Kellner defines critical theory as a 
project that confronts societal problems and 
domination and seeks liberation from these 
conditions: “Critical Theory is informed by 
multidisciplinary research, combined with the 
attempt to construct a systematic, comprehen-
sive social theory that can confront the key so-
cial and political problems of the day. The 
work of the Critical Theorists provides criti-
cisms and alternatives to traditional, or main-
stream, social theory, philosophy and science, 
together with a critique of a full range of ide-
ologies from mass culture to religion. At least 
some versions of Critical Theory are moti-
vated by an interest in relating theory to poli-
tics and an interest in the emancipation of 
those who are oppressed and dominated. Crit-
ical Theory is thus informed by a critique of 
domination and a theory of liberation” 
(Kellner 1989: 1). 
Alvesson and Deetz define critical studies as 
the disruption of domination that provides 
impulses for liberation from it: “Critical re-
search generally aims to disrupt ongoing social 
reality for the sake of providing impulses to 
the liberation from or resistance to what dom-
inates and leads to constraints in human deci-
sion making. (…) Critique here refers to the 
examination of social institutions, ideologies, 
discourses (ways of constructing and reason-
ing about the world through the use of a par-
ticular language) and forms of consciousness 
in terms of representation and domination. 
Critique explores if and how these constrain 
human imagination, autonomy, and decision 
making. Attention is paid to asymmetrical re-
lations of power, taken for granted assump-
tions and beliefs. (…)” (Alvesson and Deetz 
2000: 1, 8f). 
Karl Marx provided a definition of critique 
that allows us to define critical theory not just 
as critique and analysis of capitalism, but of 
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domination in general. Critical information 
theory as critique of domination in the context 
of media, culture, and communication corre-
spond perfectly to the understanding of cri-
tique given by Marx in the Introduction to the 
Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right in 
1844: “Theory is capable of gripping the 
masses as soon as it demonstrates ad homi-
nem, and it demonstrates ad hominem as soon 
as it becomes radical. To be radical is to grasp 
the root of the matter. But, for man, the root 
is man himself. (...) The criticism of religion 
ends with the teaching that man is the highest 
essence for man – hence, with the categoric 
imperative to overthrow all relations in which 
man is a debased, enslaved, abandoned, des-
picable essence, relations which cannot be bet-
ter described than by the cry of a Frenchman 
when it was planned to introduce a tax on 
dogs: Poor dogs! They want to treat you as hu-
man beings!“ (MEW 1: 385). 
If we conceive ontology as the philosophical 
question about being (What exists?), episte-
mology as the philosophical question about 
the cognition of being (How do we conceive 
and perceive reality?), and axiology as the phil-
osophical question about human praxis as the 
consequence of the cognition of being (What 
form of existence is desirable for humans?), 
then we can say that an academic field has 
three dimensions. Based on this insight and on 
Marx’s notion of critique, we can identify 
three important elements of critical theory:    
1) Epistemology – Dialectical Realism: 
Realism assumes that a world exists that is 
larger than the human being and its imagi-
nations. The material world is seen as pri-
mary and it is assumed that humans are able 
to grasp, describe, analyze, and partly trans-
form this world in academic work. Analyses 
are conducted that are looking for the es-
sence of societal existence by identifying 
contradictions that lie at the heart of devel-
opment. Critical theory analyzes social phe-
nomena not based on instrumental reason 
and one-dimensional logic, i.e. it operates: 
1. With the assumption that phenomena do 
not have linear causes and effects, but are 
contradictory, open, dynamic, and carry 
certain development potentials in them and 
hence should be conceived in complex 
forms; 2. Based on the insight that reality 
should be conceived so that there are nei-
ther only opportunities nor only risks inher-
ent in social phenomena, but contradictory 
tendencies that pose both positive and neg-
ative potentials at the same time that are re-
alized or suppressed by human social prac-
tice. 
Dialectic analysis in this context means 
complex dynamic thinking, realism an anal-
ysis of real possibilities and a dialectic of 
pessimism and optimism. In a dialectical 
analysis, phenomena are analyzed in terms 
of the dialectics of agency and structures, 
discontinuity and continuity, the one and 
the many, potentiality and actuality, global 
and local, virtual and real, optimism and 
pessimism, essence and existence, imma-
nence and transcendence, etc. Such an anal-
ysis assumes that the world is not as it is 
presented to us, but that there is a larger es-
sence underlying existing phenomena. 
2) Ontology – Dynamic Materialism: Criti-
cal theory is materialistic in the sense that it 
addresses phenomena and problems not in 
terms of absolute ideas and predetermined 
societal development, but in terms of re-
source distribution and social struggles. Re-
ality is seen in terms that address owner-
ship, private property, resource distribu-
tion, social struggles, power, resource con-
trol, exploitation, and domination. 
To make a materialistic analysis also means 
to conceive society as an interconnected 
whole (totality) and as negativity, to identify 
antagonisms means to take a look at contra-
dictory tendencies that relate to one and the 
same phenomenon, create societal prob-
lems and require a fundamental systemic 
change in order to be dissolved. To analyze 
society as contradictory also means to con-
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sider it as dynamic system because contra-
dictions cause development and movement 
of matter. 
In order to address the negativity of con-
temporary society and its potential, research 
also needs to be oriented on the totality. 
That dialectics is a philosophy of totality in 
this context means that society is analyzed 
on a macro-scale in order to grasp its prob-
lems and that reasons for the necessity of 
positive transformations are to be given. 
3) Axiology – Negating the negative: All 
critical approaches in one or the other re-
spect take the standpoint of oppressed or 
exploited classes and individuals and make 
the judgement that structures of oppression 
and exploitation benefit certain classes at 
the expense of others and hence should be 
radically transformed by social struggles. 
This view constitutes a form of normativity. 
Critical theory does not accept existing so-
cial structures as they are, it is not purely fo-
cused society as it is, but interested in what 
it could be and could become. It decon-
structs ideologies that claim that something 
cannot be changed and shows potential 
counter-tendencies and alternative modes 
of development. That the negative antago-
nisms are sublated into positive results is 
not an automatism, but depends on the re-
alization of practical forces of change that 
have a potential to rise from the inside of 
the systems in question in order to produce 
a transcendental outside that becomes a 
new whole. The axiological dimension of 
critique is an interface between theory and 
political praxis. It is based on the categoric 
judgement that a participatory, co-operative 
society is desirable. 
Critical theory is a transdisciplinary project 
that at the epistemological level employs 
methods and theoretical categories that are 
employed for describing reality as dialectical 
contradictory field that poses risks and oppor-
tunities so that at the ontological level reality 
is grasped in terms that address ownership, 
private property, resource distribution, social 
struggles, power, resource control, exploita-
tion, and domination so that at the axiological 
level dominative structures are judged as being 
undesirable and potential ways for alleviating 
suffering and establishing a co-operative, par-
ticipatory society are identified that can enter 
as impulses into into political struggles and 
political transformations of society. 
Two central texts of Critical Theory, Hork-
heimer’s Traditional and Critical Theory and 
Marcuse’s Philosophy and Critical Theory, can 
be interpreted for not being constitutive for 
Frankfurt School Critical Theory, but for crit-
ical theory in general. In these works, Hork-
heiemr and Marcuse on the one hand stress 
the limits and one-dimensionality of positiv-
ism that they consider as stabilizing forces that 
neglect potential alternatives to capitalism in 
their analyses. On the other hand, the most 
important uniting feature of the two works 
that makes them grounding works for critical 
theory in general is the axiological questioning 
of domination and the focus on the necessity 
of the establishment of a non-dominative so-
ciety. 
For Horkheimer, the goal of critical theory is 
the improvement of society: “In the interest of 
a rationally organized future society”, critical 
theory sheds “critical light on present-day so-
ciety (…) under the hope of radically improv-
ing human existence” (Horkheimer 1937: 
233). He specifies this improvement as the 
right kind of society that in negative terms is 
non-exploitative: “The Marxist categories of 
class, exploitation, surplus value, profit, pau-
perization, and breakdown are elements in a 
conceptual whole, and the meaning of this 
whole is to be sought not in the preservation 
of contemporary society, but in its transfor-
mation into the right kind of society” (Hork-
heimer 1937: 218). Critical theory strives for 
“a state of affairs in which there will be no ex-
ploitation or oppression” (241), a “society 
without injustice” (221). 
This emancipation in positive terms would 
bring happiness and self-determination for all: 
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“Its goal is man’s emancipation from slavery” 
(249) and “the happiness of all individuals” 
(248). Critical theory advances “the idea of 
self-determination for the human race, that is 
the idea of a state of affairs in which man’s ac-
tions no longer flow from a mechanism but 
from his own decision” (Horkheimer 1937: 
229). Such a society is shaped by “reasonable-
ness, and striving for peace, freedom, and hap-
piness” (222) and the “the establishment of 
justice among men” (243). Mankind will then 
become conscious of its existence: “In the 
transition from the present form of society to 
a future one mankind will for the first time be 
a conscious subject and actively determine its 
own way of life” (233). Political transfor-
mation is a process of negation, the corre-
sponding theoretical procedure in critical the-
ory is the method of negation: “The method 
of negation, the denunciation of everything 
that mutilates mankind and impedes its free 
development, rests on confidence in man” 
(Horkheimer 1947/1974: 126) 
For Marcuse, critical theory is oriented against 
the negative totality of capitalism: “Marx’s the-
ory is a ‘critique’ in the sense that all concepts 
are an indictment of the totality of the existing 
order” (Marcuse 1941a: 258). In turning nega-
tivity into a potential positive result, Marcuse 
(1937: 135) says that critical theory is con-
cerned “with human happiness, and the con-
viction that it can be attained only through a 
transformation of the material conditions of 
existence” is a central element of critical the-
ory. Its goals is “the creation of a social organ-
ization in which individuals can collectively 
regulate their lives in accordance with their 
needs” (Marcuse 1937: 141f), a societal condi-
tion, in which we find “the subordination of 
the economy to the individuals’ needs“ (Mar-
cuse 1937: 144). It struggles for universal free-
dom and can therefore be considered as a uni-
versalistic theory. It claims that “all, and not 
merely this ort hat particular person, should be 
rational, free, and happy. (...) Critical theory’s 
interest in the liberation of mankind binds it 
to certain ancient truths. It is at one with phi-
losophy in maintaining that man can be more 
than a manipulable subject in the production 
process of class society” (Marcuse 1937: 152f). 
Critical theory’s task is “to demonstrate this 
possibility and lay the foundation for a trans-
formation” (Marcuse 1937: 142). It wants to 
bring “to consciousness potentialities that 
have emerged within the maturing historical 
situation“(Marcuse 1937: 158). 
If we assume that information, media, com-
munication, culture, and technology play an 
important role in contemporary capitalism, 
then the critique of these phenomena in con-
temporary society becomes one of the tasks of 
a critical theory of society. A critical theory of 
information, communication, and media 
therefore is a sub-domain of a contemporary 
critical theory of society. 
Based on the general notion of critical theory 
that has already been outlined, we can from a 
praxeo-onto-epistemological perspective on 
science (See Hofkirchner, Fuchs and Klaun-
inger 2005: 78-81) define critical studies of in-
formation, communication, and media as 
studies that focus ontologically on the analysis 
of information, media, communication, cul-
ture, technology in the context of domination, 
asymmetrical power relations, exploitation, 
oppression, and control by employing at the 
epistemological level all theoretical and/or 
empirical means that are necessary for doing 
so in order to contribute at the praxeological 
level to the establishment of a participatory, 
co-operative society. Given such a definition, 
critical communication and media studies are 
inherently normative and political. 
This definition is fairly broad and allows to 
combine different concepts that come from 
different critical backgrounds, such as for ex-
ample – to name just some of many – audience 
commodity, media accumulation strategies, 
commodity aesthetics, culture industry, true 
and false consciousness/needs, instrumental 
reason, technological rationality, manipula-
tion, ideology critique, dialectical theatre, crit-
ical pedagogy, aura, proletarian counter-public 
sphere, multiple publics, emancipatory media 
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usage, repressive media usage, alternative me-
dia, radical media, fetish of communication, 
ideological state apparatuses, the multitude, 
the circulation of struggles, hegemony, struc-
ture of feelings, articulation, dominant read-
ing, oppositional reading, negotiated reading, 
capital-accumulation function of the media, 
commodity circulation function of the media, 
legitimatizing function of the media, advertis-
ing- and public-relations function of the me-
dia, regenerative function of the media, prop-
aganda model of the media, communicative 
action, dialogic communication, discursive 
communication, communication empire, 
transnational informational capitalism, work-
ing class culture, subculture, etc, under one 
united umbrella definition that sees them as 
differentiated unity in plurality that is termed 
critical information, communication, and me-
dia studies. 
Critical studies of information, media, and 
communication should be embedded into a 
broader social science perspective in order to 
show which position they occupy in the over-
all field of the social sciences. They should 
therefore be connected to social theory and 
social theory typologies. 
Anthony Giddens sees the “division between 
objectivism and subjectivism” (Giddens 1984, 
xx) as one of the central issues of social theory. 
Subjective approaches are oriented on human 
agents and their practices as primary object of 
analysis, objective approaches on social struc-
tures. Structures in this respect are institution-
alized relationships that are stabilized across 
time and space (Giddens 1984, xxxi). Integra-
tive social theories (such as the ones by Roy 
Bhaskar (1993), Pierre Bourdieu (1986), An-
thony Giddens (1984), or Margaret Archer 
(1995)) aim at overcoming the structure-
agency divide. 
Burrell and Morgan (1979) have combined the 
distinction between subject and object with 
the distinction between continuity and discon-
tinuity in order two identify two axes that set 
up two dimensions so that four different ap-
proaches can be identified in social theory: 
radical humanism (subjective, radical change), 
radical structuralism (objective, radical 
change), interpretive sociology (subjective, 
continuity), and functionalism (objective, con-
tinuity).  
 
Figure 1: Four paradigms of social theory identified by 
Burrell and Morgan (1979) 
The problem with this approach is that in con-
temporary social theory there are approaches 
that cross the boundaries between the four 
fields and that the four paradigms therefore 
can no longer be strictly separated. The dis-
tinction continuity/discontinuity remains 
valid in political terms. So for example the ap-
proaches by Roy Bhaskar (1993), Pierre Bour-
dieu (1986), Anthony Giddens (1984), and 
Margaret Archer (1995) have in common that 
they are based on a dialectical subject-object-
integration, but Bhaskar and Bourdieu are 
overall critical of class society that they want 
to abolish, whereas Giddens and Archer want 
to transform modernity, but overall aim at its 
continuation. The approaches by Bhaskar and 
Bourdieu could therefore be described as inte-
grative-radical change, the ones by Giddens 
and Archer as integrative-continuous. This re-
quires certain changes to the typology of Bur-
rell and Morgan that are shown in Figure 2.  
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Figure 2: A refined version of Burrell’s and Morgan’s 
typology 
A number of communication scholars have 
stressed that it makes sense to use the typology 
by Burrell and Morgan for identifying differ-
ent approaches in communication studies and 
communication theory (Deetz 1994, McQuail 
2002, Rosengren 1993, 2000). “This scheme is 
equally helpful in mapping out the main alter-
native approaches to media theory and re-
search, which have been seriously divided by 
their chosen methodologies and priorities, as 
well as by their degree of commitment to rad-
ical change” (McQuail 2002: 5). “It is highly 
relevant when trying to understand different 
traditions within the study of communication” 
(Rosengren 2000: 7). 
Robert T. Craig (1999) has identified seven 
traditions of communication theory that are 
based on how they communication is defined 
(See table 1). Although his approach is very 
relevant and his paper (Craig 1999) has been 
one of the most frequently cited papers in 
communication studies in the past decade, he 
does not specify an underlying distinctive cri-
terion for his typology, which gives it a rather 
arbitrary character. Therefore it makes sense 
to combine his seven traditions of communi-
cation theory with the refined version of Bur-
rell’s and Morgan’s typology. The results are 
shown in figure 3. 
Table 1: Typology of communication theories accord-
ing to Craig (1999, 2007) 
Type of ap-
proach: 
Communication 
theorized as: 
Subject/ 
object 
Examples 
Rhetorical The practical art 
of discourse 
Subjective Aristotle, Lloyd F. 
Bitzer, Kenneth 
Burke, Thomas B. 
Farrell, Sonja Foss 
& Cindy Griffin, 
Stephen W. Lit-
tlejohn, Plato 
Semiotic Intersubjective 
mediation by 
signs 
Objective Roland Barthes, 
Wendy Leeds-
Hurwitz, John 
Locke, Charles 
Morris, Charles 
Sanders Peirce, 
John Durham Pe-
ters, Ferdinand de 
Saussure 
Phenome-nolo-
gical   
Experience of ot-
herness; dialogue 
Subjective Martin Buber, 
Briankle G. Chang,  
Hans-Georfg Ga-
damer, Edmund 
Husserl, Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty, 
Joseph J. Pilotta & 
Algis Mickunas, 
John Robert Ste-
wart 
Cybernetic Information pro-
cessing 
Objective Gregory Bateson, 
Annie Lang, Ni-
klas Luhmann,  
Claude Shannon, 
Paul Watzlawick, 
Warren Weaver, 
Norbert Wiener 
Sociopsy-cholo-
gical 
Expression, in-
teraction, & in-
fluence behav-
iour in communi-
cation situations 
Subjective Albert Bandura, 
Charles R. Berger 
& Richard J. Cala-
brese,  
Carl Hovland, 
Marshall Scott 
Poole 
Socio- 
cultural 
Symbolic process 
that reproduces 
shared sociocul-
tural patterns 
Objective Peter L. Berger, 
Deborah Cam-
eron, Thomas 
Luckmann, 
George Herbert 
Mead, Mark 
Poster, James R. 
Taylor 
Critical Discursive reflec-
tion 
Subjec-
tive/ Ob-
jective 
Theodor W. 
Adorno, Stanley A. 
Deetz,  Jürgen Ha-
bermas, Max 
Horkheimer, Sue 
Curry Jansen 
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Figure 3 shows that critical communication 
studies are primarily characterized by their 
radical change perspective, i.e. the analysis of 
how communication contributes to domina-
tion and how ways can be found that commu-
nication can take place in a dominationless 
way within a participatory society. This also 
means that there are subjective, objective, and 
subject-object-dialectical approaches within 
critical communication studies. Craig men-
tions several boundary-crossing approaches 
that can be considered as representing at-
tempts at combining some of the four fields in 
figure 3: Kennth Burke, David S. Kaufer and 
Kathleen M. Carley (Rhetoric-Semiotics); Bri-
ankle Chang, Richard L. Lanigan (Phenome-
nology-Semiotics), David S. Kaufer and Brian 
S. Butler (Cybernetics-Rhetoric), Klaus Krip-
pendorff (Cybernetics-Phenomenology), John 
C. Heritage, Gerald T. Schoening and James 
A. Anderson (Sociocultural Studies-Phenom-
enology-Semiotics), W. Barnett Pearce (Soci-
ocultural Studies-Rhetoric-Cybernetics), 
Rayme McKerrow (Critical Studies – Rheto-
ric), Robert Hodge and Gunter Kress, Norb-
ert Fairclough (Critical Studies-Semiotics). 
 
Figure 3: A typology of communication theories 
For Craig, the characteristic that distinguishes 
critical communication studies from rhetori-
cal, semiotic, phenomenological, cybernetic, 
sociopsychological, and sociocultural tradi-
tions of communication theory is that for 
“critical communication theory, the basic 
‘problem of communication’ in society arises 
from material and ideological forces that pre-
clude and distort discursive reflection. (..) Fun-
damentally, in the tradition of Marx, its point 
is not to understand the world (…) Its point is 
to change the world through praxis, or theo-
retically reflective social action” (Craig 1999, 
147f). Craig works out the specifics of critical 
studies and other traditions in communication 
studies. However, I would add to Craig’s ac-
count of critical communication studies that it 
is not only about the analysis of those condi-
tions that distort communication, i.e. the ways 
how communication is embedded into rela-
tions of domination, but also about finding al-
ternative conditions of society and communi-
cation that are non-dominative and about 
struggles for establishing such alternatives. 
Craig argues that “communication theory has 
not yet emerged as a coherent field study” and 
that this fragmentation can be overcome by 
constructing “a dialogical-dialectical discipli-
nary matrix” (Craig 1999, 120) that enables the 
emergence of a conversational community, “a 
common awareness of certain complementa-
rities and tensions among different types of 
communication theory, so it is commonly un-
derstood that these different types of theory 
cannot legitimately develop in total isolation 
from each other but must engage each other 
in argument” (Craig 1999, 124). The same can 
be said about critical communication studies 
as a subfield of communication studies: A dis-
ciplinary matrix of critical communication 
studies can enhance the dialogue between var-
ious subfields of the subfield, such as critical 
theory-, critical political economy-, cultural 
studies-, feminist theory-, postcolonial theory-
, queer theory-, new social movements-ap-
proaches in critical communication studies, so 
that common assumptions and differences 
about what it means to conduct critical studies 
of communication can emerge. 
Fuchs (2010) identifies different types of crit-
ical media, information, and communication 
theories (See Table 2). Those approaches that 
see media, information, and communication 
primarily as embedded into repressive con-
CRITICAL THEORY OF INFORMATION, COMMUNICATION, MEDIA AND TECHNOLOGY 
 
54  g l o s s a r i u m B I T r i  
texts, can be considered as more structural-
istic-objectivistic approaches, they focus on 
how media structures negatively shape hu-
mans and society. Those approaches that see 
media, information, and communication pri-
marily as potential forms of liberation can be 
considered as more humanistic-subjectivistic 
approaches, they focus on how media struc-
tures positively enable human participation 
and liberation. Integrative approaches try to 
blur the boundaries between subjective and 
objective theories. 
Table 2: A typology of critical media theories 
  Production 
Sphere 
Circula-
tion 
Sphere 
Consump-
tion 
Repression 
Hypothesis 
Commodity Hypothesis: 
Media as commodities for 
accumulating capital 
  
Repression 
Hypothesis   
Manipulation- and Ideol-
ogy Hypothesis: 
Media as means of manip-
ulation for the ideological 
enforcement of class inter-
ests 
Emancipa-
tion Hy-
pothesis 
Alternative Media Hy-
pothesis: 
Media as spheres of grass-
roots production and cir-
culation of alternative 
content 
Reception 
Hypothesis: 
Media recep-
tion as con-
tradictory 
process in-
volving op-
positional 
practices 
Unification Integrative critical media theories 
Representatives of the commodity hypothesis 
argue that the media are not primarily ideolog-
ical means of manipulation, but spheres of 
capital accumulation. The basic contention 
underlying the manipulation and ideology hy-
pothesis is that the media are used as tools that 
manipulate people, advance ideologies, fore-
stall societal transformations, create false con-
sciousness, false needs, and a one-dimensional 
universe of thought, language, and action. 
Scholars who argue that there are alternative 
ways of doing and making media for critical 
ends and for fostering participatory media 
practices advance the alternative media hy-
pothesis. Such approaches have a strong sub-
jective orientation. Representatives of the re-
ception hypothesis argue that reception is a 
complex and antagonistic process that pro-
vides potentials for oppositional interpreta-
tions and actions. The most prominent repre-
sentatives of this hypothesis can be found in 
cultural studies. The shortcomings of existing 
critical approaches can be overcome by inte-
grative dialectical critical media theories/stud-
ies that try to bring together some or all of the 
various levels of critical media studies. One 
can identify some existing approaches that 
point into this direction. Integration and uni-
fication does not mean that difference is abol-
ished at the expense of identity. It rather 
means a Hegelian dialectical sublation (Auf-
hebung), in which old elements are preserved 
and elevated to a new level. New qualities 
emerge by the interaction of the moments. 
Such a dialectical integration is a differentiated 
unity that is based on the principle of unity in 
diversity. It is a dialectical relation of identity 
and difference. Fuchs (2010) mentions the fol-
lowing example theories for integrative critical 
media theories: Robert McChesney, Stuart 
Hall, Douglas Kellner, Shane Gunster, Vilém 
Flusser, Herbert Marcuse. These theories 
would bridge certain hypotheses of critical 
media and information studies to a greater or 
lesser degree, but an overall synthesis would 
still be missing. 
One of the reasons why critical theory is im-
portant for analyzing media, technology, and 
information is that it allows to question and 
provide alternatives to technological deter-
minism and to explain the causal relationship 
of media and technology on the one hand and 
society on the other hand in a balanced way 
that avoids one-dimensionality and one-sided-
ness. Technological determinism (See Figure 
4) is a kind of explanation of the causal rela-
tionship of media/technology and society that 
assumes that a certain media or technology has 
exactly one specific effect on society and so-
cial systems. In case that this effect is assessed 
positively, we can speak of techno-optimism. 
In case that the effect is assessed negatively, 
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we can speak of techno-pessimism. Techno-
optimism and techno-pessimism are the nor-
mative dimensions of technological determin-
ism. 
A critical theory of media and technology is 
based on dialectical reasoning. This allows to 
see the causal relationship of media/technol-
ogy and society as multidimensional and com-
plex: A specific media/technology has multi-
ple, at least two, potential effects on society 
and social systems that can co-exist or stand in 
contradiction to each other. Which potentials 
are realized is based on how society, interests, 
power structures, and struggles shape the de-
sign and usage of technology in multiple ways 
that are also potentially contradictory. 
 
Figure 4: Technological/media determinism and dia-
lectic of technology/media 
Andrew Feenberg argues in his critical theory 
of technology that technology is an ambiva-
lent process: “Critical theory argues that tech-
nology is not a thing in the ordinary sense of 
the term, but an ‘ambivalent’ process of devel-
opment suspended between different possibil-
ities. This ambivalence of technology is distin-
guished from neutrality by the role it attributes 
to social values in the design, and not merely 
the use of technical systems. On this view, 
technology is not a destiny but a scene of 
struggle. It is a social battlefield, or perhaps a 
better metaphor would be a ‘parliament of 
things’ in which civilizational alternatives con-
tend. (…) Critical theory holds that there can 
be at least two different modern civilizations 
based on different paths of technical develop-
ment. (…) Technologies corresponding to dif-
ferent civilizations this coexist uneasily within 
our society” (Feenberg 2002: 15). “In sum, 
modern technology opens a space within 
which action can be functionalized in either 
one of two social systems, capitalism or social-
ism. It is an ambivalent or ‘multistable’ system 
that can be organized around at least two he-
gemonies, two poles of power between which 
it can ‘tilt’” (Feenberg 2002: 87). “Technolog-
ical development is overdetermined by both 
technical and social criteria of progress, and 
can therefore branch in any of several differ-
ent directions depending on the prevailing he-
gemony. (…) While social institutions adapt to 
technological development, the process of ad-
aptation is reciprocal, and technology changes 
in response to the conditions in which it finds 
itself as much as it influences them” (Feenberg 
2002: 143). Feenberg says that the critical the-
ory of technology is a dialectical theory of 
technology (Feenberg 2002: 176-183). Its goal 
is a transformation of technology from “reifi-
cation to reintegration” (Feenberg 2002: 183). 
Feenberg’s critical theory questions techno-
logical determinism, which he defines as “the 
deterministic assumption that technology has 
its own autonomous logic of development. 
According to this view, technology is an invar-
iant element that, once introduced, bends the 
recipient social system to its imperatives. (…) 
Determinism is based on the following two 
theses: 1. The pattern of technological pro-
gress is fixed, moving along one and the same 
track in all societies. Although political, cul-
tural, and other factors may influence the pace 
of change, they cannot alter the general line of 
development that reflects the autonomous 
logic of discovery. 2. Social organization must 
adapt to technical progress at each stage of de-
velopment according to ‘imperative’ require-
ments of technology. The adaptation executes 
an underlying technical necessity. (…) Tech-
nology appears to be an application of the laws 
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of nature to problems of production, as inde-
pendent of human will as the movements of 
the heavenly bodies” (Feenberg 2002: 138f).  
The dialectical critical theory of technology is 
grounded in the works of Karl Marx, who said 
that technology has contradictory potentials 
and that under capitalism the negative ones 
predominate: “The contradictions and antag-
onisms inseparable from the capitalist applica-
tion of machinery do not exist, they say, be-
cause they do not arise out of machinery as 
such, but out of its capitalist applications! 
Therefore, since machinery in itself shortens 
the hours of labour, but when employed by 
capital it lengthens them; since in itself light-
ens labour, but when employed by capital it 
heightens its intensity; since in itself it is a vic-
tory of man over the forces of nature but in 
the hands of capital it makes man the slave of 
those forces; since in itself it increases the 
wealth of the bourgeois economist simply 
states that the contemplation of machinery in 
itself demonstrates with exactitude that all 
these evident contradictions are a mere sem-
blance, present in everyday reality, but not ex-
isting in themselves, and therefore having no 
theoretical existence either. Thus her manages 
to avoid racking his brains any more, and in 
addition implies that his opponent is guilty of 
the stupidity of contending, not against the 
capitalist application of machinery, but against 
machinery itself” (Marx 1867: 568f). Also Her-
bert Marcuse is a representative of a dialectical 
critical theory of technology that identifies 
contradictory potentials of technology: “Tech-
nics by itself can promote authoritarianism as 
well as liberty, scarcity as well as abundance, 
the extension as well as the abolition of toil” 
(Marcuse 1941: 41). 
In recent years, the possibility of combining 
critical theory and information science has 
been stressed (Day 2001, 2005, 2007, Fuchs 
2008b). Ronald E. Day argues that infor-
mation science has treated information mainly 
as a “reified and commoditized notion” (Day 
2001: 120). “The unwillingness of research on 
information to actually attempt to situate a 
culture of information and communication in 
terms of interested and powerful social and 
historical forces is evident by even a brief 
glance at journals in information management 
or information studies or in policy papers. 
Coupled wit the dominant tendency of such 
research to be ‘practical’ in the service of pro-
fessional and business organizations and in the 
service of military and industrial research pro-
jects, research in information simply shies 
away from critical engagement, as well as from 
foundational, qualitative, or materialist anal-
yses, especially from that which is seen to em-
ploy ‘pretentious’, ‘political’, or, equally, ‘for-
eign’ vocabulary, let alone philosophical or 
Marxist analyses” (Day 2001: 116f). Day un-
derstands critical theory in a very general sense 
as “the deployment of concepts in critical and 
interruptive relation to the conceptual founda-
tions of commonly accepted practices” (Day 
2001: 116). The problem with such a contex-
tual definition of critical theory is that it is 
purely contextual: In case that socialism be-
comes a commonly accepted practice, right 
wing extremist theory then becomes a “criti-
cal” theory. Therefore additional qualities for 
defining critical theory are needed. A critical 
theory of information for day examines infor-
mation’s “institutional, political, and social” 
context and its “reflexive relationships to ma-
terial forces and productions” (Day 2001: 
118). Day (2007) argues that Rob Kling on the 
one hand has defined Social Informatics as 
empirical research, which brings forward pos-
itivistic associations, but that on the other 
hand he tried to deconstruct technological de-
terminism as ideology. Social informatics 
would therefore be “’critical’ of the ‘uncritical’ 
discourses about the social values and uses of 
computers/IT/ICTs” (Day 2007: 578). He 
concludes that “the heart of Kling’s concep-
tion of social informatics was a critical infor-
matics, and that the cornerstone for critical in-
formatics were approaches that remained a 
minority in Kling’s overall work” (Day 2007: 
582). 
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Ajit K. Pyati (2006) suggests that critical infor-
mation studies should be based on a Marcu-
sean infusion because his notion of technolog-
ical rationality allows explaining why infor-
mation is primarily treated as a commodity 
and thing in contemporary society and con-
temporary library and information studies. 
Marcuse’s notion of one-dimensionality 
would allow deconstructing the neoliberal dis-
course that argues for the privatization and 
commodification of information and libraries 
as ideologies. “An information society that is 
associated with techno-capitalism, neo-liberal-
ism, and ideologies of deregulation can ulti-
mately undermine the basis of the public ser-
vice mission of libraries. In a certain sense, li-
braries with public service mandates (particu-
larly public and certain academic libraries) act 
in some degree as ‘anti-capitalist spaces’ and 
have the potential to reframe an information 
society in a more radically democratic, cultur-
ally inclusive, and progressive vision. (…) The 
discourse of ICTs does not have to necessarily 
be part of a free market, capitalist ideology, 
but can serve more radical democratic aims, 
particularly in democratizing access to infor-
mation and knowledge. Libraries, in becoming 
active developers and shapers of ICTs for 
democratic and progressive ends, may help to 
combat some of the hegemony of the domi-
nant information society” (Pyati 2006: 88).  
Christian Fuchs (2008a, b, 2009) has argued 
that critical information studies should best be 
conceived within the framework of Marxian 
theory (i.e. the critique of the political econ-
omy, cp. also the “Cyber-Marx” approach by 
Nick Dyer-Witheford 1999) and a broad no-
tion of a critical theory of media, information, 
communication, technology, and culture. The 
task is to analyse domination and capitalism as 
the context of information and media in con-
temporary society and to give intellectual im-
pulses for finding alternative modes of infor-
mation and media that work outside of capi-
talism and domination. Fuchs suggests that 
this approach allows constructing a critical 
theory of Internet/ICTs and society (Fuchs 
2008a, 2009) and a critical theory of infor-
mation (2009a). An objectivist notion of infor-
mation is for Fuchs an ideology that drives the 
commodification of information. If infor-
mation is seen as a thing, then it is obvious to 
argue that it should be treated as a commodity. 
But also subjectivistic notions of information 
are ideologies for Fuchs: If knowledge is con-
sidered as individual creation, then the call for 
intellectual property rights that make sure that 
knowledge is treated as commodity that is sold 
on markets in order to generate money profit, 
can easily be legitimated. In the end, subjectiv-
ist notions of information turn out to be ideo-
logies that legitimate private property and the 
commodity form of information. The alterna-
tive is to consider information as a dialectical 
process that establishes an interconnection of 
subjects and objects via a threefold process of 
cognition, communication, and co-operation. 
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(CF) 
CYBERNETICS (S. cibernética, F. cybernétique, 
G. Kybernetik) [Interdisciplinary]discipline 
"Cybernetics" stems from the Greek Word 
Κυβερνήτης, meaning the art of steering a 
ship, used by Plato in the sense of guiding or 
governing men. Nowadays, it refers to the 
study of the control and communication of 
complex systems, whether they are living or-
ganisms, machines or organisations, paying 
special attention to the →feedback as the main 
way of regulation. It is usually considered that 
cybernetics has been properly formulated in 
Norbert Wiener's work of 1948 ("Cybernetics, 
or control and communication in the animal 
and machine"). According to Wiener, cyber-
netics is a science devoted to the study of con-
trol systems, especially, self-control systems, 
whether in living organisms or machines, in 
which this “control is the sending of messages 
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that truly change the behaviour of the receiv-
ing system”. Both in its genesis in the 1940s 
(with contributions coming from evolutionary 
biology -von Uexküll-, psychology -Anokhin-, 
systems control -Wiener-, neurophysiology -
McCulloh and Rosenblueth-, psychiatry -
Ashby…– as in its last development, cybernet-
ics has constitute an eminently interdiscipli-
nary discipline. 
For the epistemologist, anthropologist, and 
cybernetician Gregory Bateson, "cybernetics 
is a branch of mathematics dealing with prob-
lems of control, recursiveness and infor-
mation". He also considered it "the biggest 
bite out of the fruit of the Tree of Knowledge 
that mankind has taken in the last 2000 years" 
(Bateson 1972). For Stafford Beer, considered 
father of management cybernetics, it is “the 
science of effective organisation”. 
First order or classical ~ and second order 
~ (S. de primer y segundo orden, F. de premier et 
deuxième ordre, G. erster und zweiter Ordnung). In 
1958, Heinz von Foerster conducted a critical 
review of Wiener's cybernetic theory, observ-
ing that though this theory was introducing 
significant changes with respect to previous 
conceptions of regulation and control, it did 
not involve an epistemological break with the 
traditional conception of science, because the 
model, in which the observer watch the object 
or the system from outside without causing an 
influence on the observee and attaining an ob-
jective study of it, continued to be applied.  In 
the wors of Watzlawick, Beavin and Jackson 
(1981:33): "Feedback systems are not only dif-
ferent in a quantitatively higher dregree of 
complexity, but also qualitatively different 
from everything included within the field of 
classic mechanics. Their study demands new 
conceptual frameworks: their logics and epis-
temology are discontinuous with regard to cer-
tain traditional principles in scientific analysis, 
such as 'isolating single variables' or Laplace's 
criteria of given a complete knowledge of all 
facts in a specific moment all future states can 
be predicted. Feedback systems require their 
own philosophy, in which the concepts like 
configuration and information become so im-
portant as matter and energy were at the be-
ginning of this century". 
Von Foerster believed that cybernetics should 
overcome this epistemological anachronism, 
so that the observer would be part of the sys-
tem, asserting his own goals and his own role 
within the system. Since then, there is a clear 
distinction between traditional cybernetics (or 
cybernetics of the first order) and cybernetics 
of the second order, also named complexity 
theory. Whereas cybernetics of the fist order 
can be formulated through the question: 
"What and how are the mechanisms of feed-
back of the studied system?", cybernetics of 
the second order entails the question: "How 
are we able to control, maintain and generate 
this system through feedback?" 
Hence, second order cybernetics is posed as 
an implicit theory of observation with the 
range of an epistemology. The step from first 
order to second order cibernetics is in a sense 
the step from observing systems to observing 
observing systems (or systems with observ-
ers). In the words of Pakman (Cit. in Von 
Foerster, 1991:3): "From the very moment in 
which we quit considering the concepts we use 
are properties of the systems, then we observe 
and start conceiving them as an emerging 
product of the interaction between us and the 
observed systems (...) we move from ontology 
to epistemology, from observed systems to 
our knowledge about them". 
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(JMA –ed.- ; JMD, JMA) 
CYBERSEMIOTICS (S. cibersemiótica, F. 
cyber-sémiotique, G Kyber-Semiotik) 
[transdisciplinary, semiotics, cybernetics] theory 
Contents.— 1) Observers within their universe, 2) Cy-
bersemiotics: a crossroad among four knowledge traditions, 
3) Peirce triadic semiotic process on-tology as a new view of 
reality, 4) Cybersemiotics as an integrative transdiscipline, 
5) Cybersemiotics vs information the-orists and info-compu-
tationalism. 
Cybersemiotics is the attempt to provide a 
transdisciplinary framework for the scholarly 
work on information, cognition and commu-
nication coming from the natural, technical 
and social sciences as well as the humanities. 
It builds on two already generated interdisci-
plinary approaches: On the one hand cyber-
netics and systems theory including infor-
mation theory and science, and on the other 
Peircean semiotics including phenomenology 
and pragmatic aspects of linguistics. Cyberse-
miotics attempts to make the two interdiscipli-
nary paradigms – both going beyond mecha-
nistic and pure constructivistic ideas - comple-
ment each other in a common framework. 
1. Observers within their universe. We need 
to realize that a paradigm based on the view of 
the universe that makes irreversible time and 
evolution fundamental, forces us to view man 
as a product of evolution and therefore an ob-
server from inside the universe. This changes 
the way we conceptualize the problem and 
role of consciousness in nature compared to 
what Descartes did with his dualistic para-
digm. The theory of evolution forces us theo-
retically to conceive the natural and social sci-
ences as well as the humanities together in one 
framework of unrestricted or absolute natural-
ism, where consciousness is part of nature. 
This has influenced the exact sciences to pro-
duce theories of information and self-organi-
zation in order to explain the origin of life and 
sense experiences, encouraged biological 
thinking to go into psychology and social sci-
ence in the form of theories of selfish genes, 
socio-biology and evolutionary psychology. 
But these approaches have still not satisfacto-
rily led to an understanding of why and how 
certain →systems have the ability to produce 
sense experiences, awareness and meaningful 
communication. The theories of the phenom-
enological life world and the →hermeneutics of 
→communication and understanding seem to 
defy classical scientific explanations. The hu-
manities therefore send another insight the 
opposite way down the evolutionary ladder, 
with questions like: What is the role of con-
sciousness, →signs and meaning in evolution? 
These are matters that the exact sciences are 
not constructed to answer in their present 
state. Phenomenology and hermeneutics point 
out to the sciences that the type of objective 
knowledge they produce have prerequisite 
conditions in embodied living conscious be-
ings imbued with meaningful language and a 
culture. One can see the world view that 
emerges from the work of the sciences as a re-
construction back into time from our present 
ecological and evolutionary self-understand-
ing as semiotic intersubjective conscious cul-
tural, historical creatures, but unable to handle 
the aspects of meaning and conscious aware-
ness. How can we integrate these two direc-
tions of explanatory efforts? 
2. Cybersemiotics: a crossroad among four 
knowledge traditions. What makes Cyberse-
miotics different from other approaches at-
tempting to produce a transdisciplinary theory 
of information, cognition and communication 
is its absolute naturalism, which forces us to 
view life, consciousness as well as cultural 
meaning as a part of nature and evolution. It 
thus wants to combine a number of different 
platforms from which attempts to make uni-
versal theories of perception, cognition, con-
sciousness and communication have been 
made, by relativizing each of them as only a 
partial view: 1. The physico-chemical scientific 
paradigm based on third person objective em-
pirical knowledge and mathematical theory, 
but with no conceptions of experiental life, 
meaning and first person embodied con-
sciousness and therefore meaningful linguistic 
intersubjectivity; 2. The biological and natural 
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historical science approach understood as the 
combination of genetic evolutionary theory 
with an ecological and thermodynamic view 
based on the evolution of experiental living 
systems as the ground fact and engaged in a 
search for empirical truth, yet doing so with-
out a theory of meaning and first person em-
bodied consciousness and thereby linguistic 
meaningful intersubjectivity; 3. The linguistic-
cultural-social structuralist constructivism that 
sees all knowledge as constructions of mean-
ing produced by the intersubjective web of 
language, cultural mentality and power, but 
with no concept of empirical truth, life, evolu-
tion, ecology and a very weak concept of sub-
jective embodied first person consciousness 
even while taking conscious intersubjective 
communication and →knowledge processes as 
the basic fact to study (the linguistic turn); 4. 
Any approach which takes the qualitative dis-
tinction between subject and object as the 
ground fact on which all meaningful 
knowledge is based and considering all results 
of the sciences, including linguistics and em-
bodiment of consciousness, as secondary 
knowledge, as opposed to a phenomenologi-
cal (Husserl) or actually phaneroscopic 
(Peirce) first person point of view considering 
conscious meaningful experiences in advance 
of the subject/object distinction.  
 
Figure 1. The Semiotic Star: A model of how the com-
municative social system of the embodied →mind pro-
duces four main areas of knowledge. Physical nature is 
usually explained as originating in energy and matter, liv-
ing systems as emerging from the development of life 
processes (for instance, the first cell). Social culture is ex-
plained as founded on the development of meaning in 
language and practical habits, and finally our inner men-
tal world is explained as deriving from the development 
of our individual life world and consciousness. But all 
these types of knowledge have their origin in our primary 
semiotic life-world and the common sense we develop 
here through our cultural history (horizon). In the course 
of this development the results of the natural and social 
sciences as well as humanities feed into our common 
sense horizon and expands it. 
3. Peirce triadic semiotic process ontology 
as a new view of reality. Peirce’s evolution-
ary metaphysics has a phenomenological point 
of departure, but he frames the task differently 
from Husserl as well as from Hegel. Thus, it is 
most relevant to hold on to the name Peirce 
invented for his own stance: phaneroscopy. 
To me, there is a basic problem in modern Eu-
ropean phenomenology from Husserl and on-
ward, viz. that when we talk about phenome-
nology, we cannot get to the world of the oth-
ers and to the world of objects as they hardly 
have any existence outside our own con-
sciousness. This is because it deals with a cer-
tain view of the pre-linguistic consciousness 
before any distinction between object and 
subject. Peirce, however, tries to solve this 
problem by introducing his three basic catego-
ries of Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness 
and connecting them to the sign process, thus 
making a common foundation for cognition 
and communication that makes his theory in-
tersubjective at the basis. First person experi-
ence then does not come from a transcenden-
tal subject, but from ’pure feeling’, or First-
ness. Thus, Firstness must be the unanalyza-
ble, inexplicable, unintellectual basis which 
runs in a continuous stream through our lives 
and therefore is the sum total of conscious-
ness. Thus, possibility is a good word for First-
ness. Existence is an abstract possibility (First-
ness) which is no-thing. Peirce equates being 
with Firstness, as is clear from these two tri-
chotomies: (1) being, (2) actuality, (3) reality; 
and (1) possibility, (2) actuality, (3) necessity. 
Here it is important to understand that the cat-
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egories are inclusive: you cannot have Second-
ness without Firstness or Thirdness without 
Secondness. 
Peirce is referring to Hegel’s dynamical dialec-
tical thinking as a contrast to Aristotle. Where 
Aristotle's logic is concerned with separate, 
discrete phenomena in a deductive pattern, 
Hegel in his phenomenology dissolves this 
classical static view into a dynamic movement. 
This is caused by oppositions between the 
structural elements that - through their fight 
with each other - develop towards a new 
whole, which is usually the whole we have 
now. It is viewed as preserving the former el-
ements (→contradiction) but now united into a 
new higher synthesis. This dialectics is a much 
more organic way of thinking than the more 
mechanical classical logic. Hegel’s term for 
this overcoming of contradiction at a new 
level, which at the same time preserves the 
contradiction on a lower one, is Aufhebung. 
The concept is sometimes translated as "sub-
lation”. 
There is a lot of Thirdness in Hegel’s phenom-
enology as well as an intuitive apprehension of 
the total picture, or Firstness. What is missing 
- from a Peircean point of view - is then that 
healthy sense of reality that Secondness pro-
vides. It is the brute facts on which everyday 
consciousness and self-conscious experience 
confronts in that it does not flawlessly con-
form to our expectations. The resting of real-
ity in Peirce’s analysis. We have to reflect on 
what the brute facts say about Thirdness and 
this is the road to science. Thus Hegel does 
not – in Peirce’s view – see that the difference 
between Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness 
is foundational and that there is no way in 
which one of them can be turned into one of 
the others, nor does he realize that they cannot 
melt together into one whole. 
4. Cybersemiotics as an integrative trans-
discipline. The phaneroscopic semiotics in-
cludes an intersubjective base as Peirce con-
siders all knowledge to be intersubjectively 
produced through signs and view emotions 
and qualia as Firstness. The integrative trans-
disciplinary synthesis of Cybersemiotics starts 
by accepting two major, but not fully explana-
tory, and very different transdisciplinary para-
digms: 1. the second order →cybernetics and au-
topoietic approach united in Luhmann’s triple 
autopoietic system theory of social communi-
cation; 2. the Peircean phaneroscopic, triadic, 
pragmaticistic, evolutionary, semiotic ap-
proach to meaning which has led to modern 
biosemiotics, based in a phenomenological inter-
subjective world of partly self-organizing tri-
adic sign processes in an experiential meaning-
ful world. The two are integrated by inserting 
the modern development of information the-
ory and self-organizing, emergent chemico-bi-
ological phenomena as an aspect of a general 
semiotic evolution in the Peircean framework. 
This creates the Cybersemiotic framework 
where evolutionary experiential and intersub-
jective sign processes become the ground re-
ality on which our conceptions of ourselves, 
action, meaning and the word are built. None 
of the results from exact science, biology, hu-
manities or social sciences are considered 
more fundamental than the others. They con-
tribute on an equal footing to our intersubjec-
tive, semiotic process of knowing ourselves 
and the world. 
Thus, all four approaches: physics, biology, 
phenomenology (awareness and intentional-
ity), and sociology/linguistics are all equally 
important and therefore have to be united into 
a transdisciplinary theory of information, se-
miotics, first person consciousness and inter-
subjective socio-cultural communication. The 
Cybersemiotic Star model illustrates this, 
while at the same time pointing to the fact that 
the discussion about transdisciplinary 
knowledge is conducted in a linguistic dis-
course with other embodied and linguistically-
informed consciousnesses in both a natural 
and cultural Umwelt. 
Looking at The Cybersemiotic Star we see that 
there are four forms of historical explanations 
going on: 1. the cosmological, 2. the biological, 
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3. the historical, and 4. the personal life his-
tory. The natural sciences work towards mak-
ing one grand historical explanation; but so 
far, we have not cracked the problem of the 
emergence of life and consciousness in evolu-
tion, I have argued here. Thus we might have 
to accept that an all-encompassing explana-
tion of the conscious meaningful human com-
munication process cannot be provided from 
any of the corners of the model alone. We can-
not so far reduce our scientific explanations to 
one grand story, but, instead, have to juggle 
with all four at the same time, as long as they 
have the present paradigmatic foundations. 
Each of the four corners of the star represents 
different kinds of epistemologies. In science 
we have – as prerequisite outside the theory – 
several living, embodied conscious subjects 
linked by knowledge sharing in language con-
fronting one or more objects. The first person 
living consciousnesses of the subject(s) as ob-
servers are considered to be outside the world 
they observe. In the biological sciences the ob-
servers share the life experience with their ob-
jects that are also living and therefore experi-
encing. It is sadly often forgotten in molecular 
definitions of life that it is a basic and common 
trait of all life that it senses and experiences, a 
fact not easily explainable from a molecular 
level. We can kill the life we investigate to find 
out the molecular structure, but then we are 
returned to physico-chemical approaches as 
the life and the agency of the living is gone. 
But when studying living beings in the state of 
being alive, sensing their surroundings and 
creating their own Umwelt, we are in a quali-
tatively new situation, as we have to accept 
that the living systems experience the environ-
ment in a specific manner, which will most of-
ten be partly different from ours. Thus we are 
in a second order situation of observing.  
5. Cybersemiotics vs information theorists 
and info-computationalism. A common 
view among information theorists is that in-
formation integrated with entropy in some 
way is a basic structure of the World. Compu-
tation is the process of the dynamic change of 
information. In order for anything to exist for 
an individual, she must get information on it 
by means of perception or by re-organization 
of the existing information into new patterns. 
This cybernetic-computational-informational 
view is based on a universal and un-embodied 
conception of information and computation, 
which is the deep foundation of “the infor-
mation processing paradigm” (s. →General 
Theory of Information, →Info-computational-
ism). This paradigm is vital for most versions 
of cognitive science and its latest develop-
ments into brain function and linguistic re-
search. Taken to its full metaphysical scope 
this paradigm views the universe as a com-
puter, humans as dynamic systems producing 
and being guided by computational function-
ing. Language is seen as a sort of culturally de-
veloped algorithmic program for social infor-
mation processing. 
What seems to be lacking is knowledge of the 
nature and role of embodied first person ex-
perience, qualia, meaning and signification in 
the evolution and development of cognition 
and language communication among self-con-
scious social beings and formed by the gram-
matical structure and dynamics of language 
and mentality. From a general epistemological 
as well as philosophy of science foundation, it 
is argued that a transdisciplinary paradigm of 
information, cognition and communication 
science needs, within its theory, to engage the 
role of first person conscious, embodied social 
awareness in producing signification from per-
cepts and meaning from communication in 
any attempt to build a transdisciplinary theo-
retical framework for information, cognition, 
signification and meaningful communication. 
It has to embrace what Peirce calls cenoscopic 
science or, to use a modern phrase, intentional 
sciences. If it does not do so, but bases itself 
on physicalism, including physicalistic forms 
of informationalism such as →info-computation-
alist naturalism, it is going to be difficult to 
make any real progress in the understanding of 
the relation between humans, nature, compu-
CYBERNETICS 
 
64  g l o s s a r i u m B I T r i  
tation and cultural meaning through an inte-
grated information, cognition and communi-
cation science.  
6. Cybersemiotics groundings  
A theory of signification and how meaning is 
produced through signs is needed to connect 
human consciousness with a theory of nature 
and information. For this we need to enlarge 
the picture by superimposing and integrating 
an even broader foundation such as Charles 
Sanders Peirce’s pragmaticistic semiotics in its 
modern development as biosemiotics. The 
first ground work to explain why and how 
such a combinatory framework of semiotics 
and cybernetics makes it possible to make an 
evolutionary based transdisciplinary theory of 
information, cognition, consciousness, mean-
ing and communication can be found in Brier 
(2008a) and in the subsequent papers written 
after the book manuscript was finished (Brier 
2007, 2008b, ff). 
References 
― BRIER, S. (2007). Applying Luhmann’s system the-
ory as part of a transdisciplinary frame for commu-
nication science. Cybe. Huma. Know., Num. 14, 29-65. 
― BRIER, S. (2008a) Cybersemiotics: Why Information is 
not Enough! Toronto, Canada: University of Toronto 
Press. 
― Brier, S. (2008b). The Peircean paradigm for biose-
miotics. Signs 2008, pp. 30-81. 
― BRIER, S. (2008c). Bateson and Peirce on the pat-
tern that connects and the sacred. In A Legacy for 
Living Systems: Gregory Bateson as Precursor to Biosemiot-
ics; Hoffmeyer, J. (Ed.), London, UK: Springer Ver-
lag, Chapter 12, pp. 229-255. 
― BRIER, S. (2009a). "The Conflict between Indian 
Vedic Mentality and Western Modernity", Durst-
Andersen and Lange, E.E. (Ed.)(2010). Mentality and 
Thought: North, South, East and West, Copenhagen: 
Copenhagen Business School Press, pp. 53-86. 
― BRIER, S. (2009b). “Cybersemiotic Pragmaticism 
and Constructivism”, Constructivist Foundations Vol. 5, 
No. 1, pp. 19-38. 
― BRIER, S. (2009c). “Levels of Cybersemiotics: Pos-
sible Ontologies of signification”, Cognitive Semiotics, 
Issue 4 (Spring 2009), pp. 28-62. 
― BRIER, S. (2010a). “Cybersemiotics: Entropic infor-
mation, evolution and meaning: A World View be-
yond Entropy and Information”, Entropy (An elec-
tronic journal), 12(8), 1902-1920; Lead article for 
special issue on Cybersemiotics that author was of-
fered to edit.  Last paper published 7.th Oct. 2010. 
― BRIER, S. (2010b). “Cybernetics” in Clarke, B. and 
Rosini, M. (Ed.)(2010): The Routledge Companion to 
Literature and Science, London and New 
York:Routledge/Taylor and Francis Group, pp. 89-
99. 
― BRIER, S. (2011a). "Cybersemiotics and the ques-
tion of knowledge" Chapter 1 in Dodig-Crnkovic, 
G.and Burgin, M. (Ed.) (2011).  Information and Com-
putation, World Scientific Publishing Co. 
― BRIER, S. (2011b). “Meaning and Science: Konrad 
Lorenz, Thomas Sebeok and beyond”, in Deely, 
John, Kull, Kalevi and Petrilli, Susan (eds.), Semiotics 
Continues to Astonish: the Intellectual Heritage of Thomas 
Albert Sebeok, Peer reviewed and accepted, Paris and 
Den Haag: Mouton, de Gruyter. 
― BURGIN, M. (2010). Theory of Information: Funda-
mentality, Diversity and Unification. Singapore: 
World Scientific Publishing. 
 (SB) 
 
g l o s s a r i u m B I T r i   65 
D
DATA (S. dato, F. donnée, G. DatenPL, Angabe) 
[transdisciplinary, information science, 
computation science, communication theory, 
epistemology] concept 
Contents.— 1) Data at organizational context, 2) Flo-
ridi's Model (a. Diaphoric definition of data, b. Types of 
data) 
Intuitively, we can identify the data as physical 
events (small parts (or pieces) of reality) able 
to carry certain associated information. They 
have a material nature and can be considered 
as the physical support to information. In 
other words, they are physical facts that do no 
have any inherent meaning, do not necessarily 
present any interpretations or opinions, and 
do not carry indicative characteristics that may 
reveal their importance or relevance. In this 
sense, each of the statements printed in this 
article  can be considered as data. The custom-
er's name, the amount of the purchase or bank 
transaction number that appears on an invoice 
can be considered as the typical examples of 
data within the context of the companies.  
In an effort to systematize, we can offer the 
proposal from the following definition:  
Data = physical support of information. 
1. Data at organizacional context. It is im-
portant to show some characteristics of the 
data from these viewpoints. Firstly, the ques-
tion of being some physical events, the data 
are easy to capture, structure, quantify or 
transfer. Secondly, a datum, depending on the 
encryption key in which it is involved (as dis-
cussed below), it can be conventional or natu-
ral (not conventional).The account number on 
the back of a credit card is an example of a 
conventional type of data. Looking at clouds 
that appear in the sky just before the storm is 
an example of natural or non-conventional 
data. Thirdly, the same data can inform an 
agent or not, as we see below, depending on 
the stock prior to the staff. Fifthly, within an 
organization, data are usually of conventional 
type and they often appear as a collection of 
materialized alphanumeric characters on a 
document (either physical or electronic). And 
finally, in the same context, in the organiza-
tions, the indiscriminate accumulation of data 
does not always necessarily improve decision 
making. 
We can justify this way of defining the concept 
of data by reviewing how the same concept is 
understood in other contexts. For example, 
our characterization reflects the sense that no 
tension is given to the concept of data in the 
disciplines of information technology and tel-
ecommunications: a set of associated charac-
ters of a concept. The character set 
"35,879,987" about the concept number of na-
tional identification (ID) could be an example. 
In the same vein, our proposal fits well with 
the use of the word "data" when defining cer-
tain informatic applications. A database man-
agement system (SGBDD), without going any 
further, usually is defined as a resource that 
enables the management of records from the 
data or sets of characters appearing in the rec-
ords (numbers, words, numbers, etc..) That is 
to say, one can defend the idea that manage-
ment of the records of these tools is a man-
agement of syntactical type (apart from char-
acter sets that appear in the records) but not a 
semantic one (apart from the information 
content associated with these sets of charac-
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ters). A SGBDD, facing a search equation, re-
trieves the records where the data appear to 
make the equation. In the same way, a Data 
Mining or Text Mining system, among other 
things, permits to detect correlations or pat-
terns among data (or sets of characters) that 
appear in the records which shap the system 
so that later in an intellectual manner someone 
can decide whether this pattern is consistent 
or not with a genuine correlation semantics. 
2. Floridi's Model.  
a) Diaphoric definition of data (DDD). According 
to the diafora definition of Floridi (from the 
Greek διαφορά, →difference, discrepancy) "a 
datum is a putative fact regarding some differ-
ence or lack of uniformity within some con-
text." 
According to the author, this definition can be 
applied at three levels: 1) Diaphora de re: as a 
lack of uniformity in the outside world, i.e. 
pure data, before any epistemological interpre-
tation (similar to Euclid's "dedomena"). 2) Di-
aphora de signo: between at least two physical 
states. 3) Diaphora de dicto: between two sym-
bols. 
Due to the stance concerning the ontological 
neutrality and the nature of environmental in-
formation, (1) can be identical to (2), or make 
possible the signs in (2), while those signs are 
necessary conditions for encoding the sym-
bols in (3). 
This definition has the advantage of leaving 
the data free from its support and considers 
four types of independence or neutrality: tax-
onomy (with regard to the classification of the 
relata), typological (with regard to the logical 
type); ontological (with regard to the nature of 
the inequality support), genetic (regarding to 
the semantics of the informee). 
In turn, these four types of neutrality have im-
portant implications regarding the nature of 
information and data: 
According to the taxonomic neutrality, there is 
nothing that can characterize a datum per se. 
Consequently, they are purely relational enti-
ties.  
According to the typological neutrality, the infor-
mation may consist of different data types as 
related: →primary, secondary, metadata, oper-
ational or derivative (see below, §2.b). 
According to the ontological neutrality, in combi-
nation with the rejection of information with-
out data -as stated by General Definition of 
Information the author proposes-, there can 
neither be "without data representation". 
Therefore, at the same time, this may imply 
different levels of ontological neutrality: 1) 
there can be no information without physical 
implementation (regardless of its nature), 2) 
every elements in the physical world "derives 
its function, its meaning, its very existence 
from the appartus-elicited answer to yes-or-no 
questions, binary choices, bits" (i.e., what we 
call reality derives from a theoretical-interrog-
ative analysis), 3) information is nothing but 
an "exchange with the outer world as we ad-
just to it, and make our adjustment felt upon 
it" (Wiener, 1954). 4) "information is a differ-
ence that makes a difference". So the meaning 
becomes a potential basis accoding to its self-
generating ability. 
According to the genetic neutrality, semantics 
can be independent of the informee, thus 
meaning does not have to be in the mind of 
the user; which is not the same as the realist 
thesis, stating that the meaning would even be 
independent of the producer or informer. This 
latter assumption is made when "environmen-
tal information" is considered. 
b) Types of data. Data can be of different types 
supported by the diaphoric definition: 
Primary ~: those that are explicitly related to 
what is in question (eg. the response of an in-
formation system to the query of a user). 
Secondary ~: equivalent to the absence of 
certain primary data (eg. administrative silence 
in front of a determined petition o request). 
Operational ~: those data relating to the op-
erations and the overall system information 
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performance (eg. an indication that the system 
is not working properly or it is busy). 
Derivative ~: those data that can be used as 
indirect sources in inquiries different to those 
directly or primarily addressed by the data 
themselves (eg. "The fact that someone has 
mentioned the sun twice is a sign that he is in 
a good mood"). 
Meta~: information about the nature and 
characteristics of other data, usually primary 
data (eg. "What he/she is saying is a lie", "this 
text is stored in an extended ASCI code," "in 
the data received there are not any detected er-
rors "...).  
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DIALOGIC VS. DISCURSIVE (S. dialógico 
vs discursivo, F. dialogique vs discursive, G. dialogik 
vs. diskursive) [transdisciplinary, communica-
tion and media theory, information society]con-
cept, problem 
Flusser, in his theory of communication, 
“Kommunikologie” (1996), warns of the dan-
ger that chiefly discursive media, in which 
communication is disseminated or distributed 
(as television, radio, etc.), could end up smoth-
ering the dialogical media. While, in the latter, 
information is created (e.g. in scientific discus-
sions, interviews, meetings, etc.) the former 
only disseminates it. Thus, Flusser’s warning 
concerns creativity. This assessment is double 
faced: on the one hand, it is epistemological in 
the line started by Socrates, opposing a dog-
matic and limited thinking to a dialectical and 
open one; on the other hand, it is socio-tech-
nological, according to which, particularly In-
ternet might not be the genuine democratic 
communication, as it pretends to be; on the 
contrary, its democratic character might be 
dominated by hierarchical structures condi-
tioning that information is to be chiefly broad-
casted –sometimes in a subtle manner- from 
centres of information and power domination 
(→Critical Theory of Information). 
A theory of information based on a commu-
nication model as the one used in the Mathe-
matical Theory of Communication (MTC) –
rooted in semiotic theories of significant influ-
ence in the history of ideas, such as Locke´s 
theory– might better account for discursive 
communication than dialogical one (Díaz & Al 
Hadithi 2009, →communication). Regarding to 
this –so to speak- “simple model”, infor-
mation might be considered as transported 
properly codified and next received by means 
of a pertinent decoding operation (→code): ac-
cording to Locke, “the idea they make it a sign 
of is precisely the same” [for both the emitter 
and de receiver] (Locke 2004, III-ii-4); in the 
MTC, the receiver “performs the inverse op-
eration of that done by the transmitter”, and 
such invertivility presupposes an isomorphic 
relation between the emitter and the receptor 
symbolic domains (Shannon 1948: 380). How-
ever, the idea that this “simple model” may be 
the case of discursive communications is just 
an ingenious point of view, in the sense that 
an automatic tuning between the emitter cod-
ing and receiver decoding is presupposed, 
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which is all the more difficult to admit, if the 
heteronomy between emitter and receiver is 
higher. In short, even though the relative au-
tonomy of both coding and decoding opera-
tions in discursive communications seems to 
approach the simple model, the heteronomy 
of these operations –at the same time condi-
tioned by the domination structures, referred 
by Flusser- leads to a practical significant dis-
tance between them (→message). 
Concerning dialogical communications, a 
model able to reflect this type better has to 
emphasize the procedural and cooperative 
character of information as well as the prag-
matic situation where it takes place and in 
which the sense of the utterances is articu-
lated. Whereas in discursive communication 
the →context (in broad sense) plays a second-
ary role and it is often ignored, in the case of 
dialogical communication the context plays a 
crucial role. On the other hand, the referred 
heteronomy or emitter/receiver asymmetry of 
discursive communications, where the role of 
the receiver is minimised or reduced to a pas-
sive subject, becomes a balance between par-
takers in the dialogical ones. Here, the recep-
tion process is enhanced and the homonymy 
plays a transcendental role. Finally, while dis-
cursive communications can be related to a 
vertical structure (from a privileged position to 
a subordinated one), a more horizontal struc-
ture corresponds to dialogical communica-
tions (→message). 
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DIFFERENCE (S. diferencia, F. différence, G. 
Unterschied) [transdisciplinary] concept 
Difference denotes a relationship between 
two entities, or objects, or between an entity 
and itself in different circumstances.  A and B 
are said to be different if the same property or 
attribute, applied to both, yields non equal val-
ues. 
The definition of information presented by 
Gregory Bateson, "a difference that makes a 
difference" is famous in the bibliography of 
information. 
Floridi also uses the term difference, relating 
it to the most basic informational situation, 
the definition of "datum". 
However, to use the concept of difference as 
the deepest substrate of the concept of infor-
mation is dangerous, since it ignores a fact 
which is even more elementary or fundamen-
tal. For a difference between two things to ex-
ist, it necessarily must relate to qualities or at-
tributes of both. For example, if an observer 
reported that John is higher than William, he 
or she is recognizing at least three previous 
facts: 
― John and William are objects. 
― It makes sense to apply the "height" attrib-
ute to both John and William. 
― The "height" attribute comes from a con-
sensus reached by a community of agents, 
which defines the word itself, defines the 
attribute as a function that assigns a real 
number to material objects and defines ac-
ceptable forms of calculating the function. 
This is all part of the common sense or on-
tological background of that community.  
Only if these three facts or previous items ex-
ist the observer can state that the height of one 
differs from the height of the other. This can 
also be seen when someone says that there is 
a difference between the objects A and B. It is 
very likely that anyone who is listening would 
ask: "In what (quality) is it that they differ?". 
Whenever A and B are different, it is because 
of a quality or property they both have. 
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Now, when Bateson uses the phrase above to 
define information, probably refers to the per-
ception of a difference perceived by an ob-
server, whose state, as a result of the percep-
tion, is altered, i.e. differentiated from the state 
existing prior to it. 
When Floridi mentions "difference" he refers 
to the difference produced in, for example a 
sheet of paper, when somebody writes on it.  
In other words, he points to the change of 
state of a record, between two different time 
points.  This operation is usually used to rec-
ord information, by means of consensus sym-
bols, and that is the relationship between dif-
ference and information that Floridi puts for-
ward. 
We see that both uses of the word "difference" 
are not equal; although one could build a rela-
tionship between them. For example, a word 
written on paper might be perceived by an ob-
server and it could trigger therein a state 
change. However, clearly, Bateson refers to 
the domain of perception and knowledge, 
while Floridi refers to the domain of objects 
and records. 
In conclusion, supporting a definition of the 
concept of information only on the concept of 
"difference" we incur the risk of forgetting 
that first we need categories and qualities col-
lectively agreed, and the risk of confusing in-
formation with records and representations of 
it. 
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DIGITAL DIVIDE (S. brecha digital, F. frac-
ture numérique, G. digitalen Kluft) [Information 
society, globalisation, economy] concept 
The development of Information and Com-
munication Technology (ICT) and the expo-
nential growth of information, two features of 
the knowledge-based society, are the pillars 
where the digital divide is based upon. ICT re-
quires infrastructure and economic means to 
sustain itself as well as knowing how it works, 
the possibilities it offers and its appropriate 
use. This may bring about a two-sided digital 
divide: on the one hand, those who have the 
technological means and infrastructure and 
those who do not. On the other hand, we find 
those who know how to use them and those 
who do not. This gap is an aspect that empha-
sizes the social and economic contrast that en-
compasses countries, communities, social 
groups and individuals. One way to deal with 
this gap is through teaching and training peo-
ple by means of lifelong learning. In this re-
gard, the new literacies are: digital literacy, 
technology literacy, multi-literacies, and infor-
mation literacy (INFOLIT). INFOLIT aims at 
training autonomous learners who will be-
come capable of analyzing, selecting, assessing 
and using information to create new content 
or develop their work or leisure time.  
The Organization for Economic Co-opera-
tion and Development (OECD) defines the 
concept of digital divide as having access to 
computers (ICT) and Internet and knowing 
how to use these technologies. However, 
OECD understands technology as a social 
process which calls for exploring a wider 
meaning of this concept. Within this frame-
work, libraries are supposed to assume the re-
sponsibility of reducing the digital divide 
through ALFIN proposals. This is understood 
as considering technology means, information 
and information management experts. None-
theless, development politics has given prior-
ity to digital or technology literacy without 
people having the required information liter-
acy. Information literacy is a must since under-
standing and assessing information is a re-
quirement to use technology tools appropri-
ately and widespread to mediate information 
access and use. Knowledge is a powerful tool 
to fight against poverty. However, not all so-
cieties are ready to assume these changes and 
commitments. So it is necessary to make sure 
that knowledge economy does not aggravate 
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inequalities between a productive sector and 
goods and services, where growth is based 
upon, and a periphery unable to produce 
them.  
It is possible to wonder whether the increase 
of information technologies generates new 
gaps locally or internationally, or whether they 
can improve the wellbeing of our societies. In 
this regard, UNESCO (2005) points out that 
the existence of the digital divide is undenia-
ble. However, it says that there is a more trou-
blesome problem: the digital divide separates 
developed countries from developing ones, 
especially those less privileged. This digital di-
vide runs the risk of deepening while other 
gaps emerge or widen in different societies. It 
accumulates the effects of different gaps 
found in the main fields of knowledge, infor-
mation access, education, scientific research 
and cultural and linguistic diversity. This rep-
resents the real challenge raised to build a 
knowledge society. This gap is based on the 
own inequality dynamics related to 
knowledge. These are worldwide inequalities 
which stem from the distribution of the po-
tential cognition (among other knowledges), 
or the unequal appraisal of certain types of 
knowledges with regards to knowledge econ-
omy. This gap is apparent among countries 
form the North and South, but it is also evi-
dent within each society. Having access to per-
tinent and useful knowledge does not depend 
on infrastructure, but training people in devel-
oping cognitive competencies and proper reg-
ulations on access to content. Keeping people 
in touch by means of wire and optic fiber is 
not enough, unless this connection goes along 
with the creation of competencies and work 
addressed to produce 
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DISINFORMATION (S. desinformación, F. 
désinformation, G. Desinformation) 
[transdiciplinary, communication, medias, 
semantics]concept, problem 
Factual information that intentionally does 
not comply with the facts. It refers to a false 
semantic content that, distinguishing from mis-
information, comes from a well informed 
source. It is also used in the sense of silencing 
or hiding the truth of the (relevant) facts, es-
pecially in the context of mass media (situation 
in which recipients do not have the possibility 
to answer the →message sent by the emitter, be-
ing also unable to control its veracity). 
For most of the approaches to semantic infor-
mation, and even for the common notion of 
information concerning facts, disinformation 
cannot be counted as legitimate information. 
There are, however, some semantic interpre-
tations allegedly neutral with respect to the 
value of truth of its contents. Nevertheless, as 
Floridi states, if such neutrality position con-
cerning truth is held the following problems 
arise: 1) semantic value of false information; 2) 
informative value of necessary truths -includ-
ing tautologies-; 3) non redundancy of “it is 
true that p”, being p genuine semantic infor-
mation. 
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In any case, as said before, disinformation is 
not usually considered as semantic infor-
mation. Thereby in Dreske’s work or in →sit-
uation theories, disinformation is excluded as a 
subset of false information, whereas genuine 
information is characterized by a requirement 
of truth. But more specifically, Floridi’s strongly 
semantic approach excludes disinformation un-
der its veracity requirement. Although this 
might involve a certain inadequacy to the 
facts, it demands a strong adequacy to the re-
flection of these facts in the emitter (Floridi 
2005). This truthfulness commitment has a 
family resemblance with the pragmatic and in-
tentional approach of Grice, according to 
which an effective communication must be 
regulated –among others- by a maxim of qual-
ity (truthfulness) (Grice 1989). 
A whole critical trend on information media, 
especially mass media, followed by a number 
of different schools, intends to unmask those 
disinformation situations, especially concern-
ing institutionalized practices. One of the are-
nas in which this concern has played a central 
attention is the Frankfurt School (Hork-
heimer, Marcuse, Adorno and afterwards Ha-
bermas (2001), →Critical theory of information). 
Also, the studies of W. Benjamin (2008), Mi-
rin, Baudrillard, Bordieu (1999), Ramonet 
(2002), Mattelart (1986), Dan Shiller (2002), 
etc. have deepened in different ways the char-
acterization of dis-information in mass media, 
as well as its psychological, societal, political 
and cultural consequences. 
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DOCUMENT (S. documento, F. document, G. 
dokument) [transdisciplinaryy, documentation, 
LIS, information management] concept 
A document is a message delivered with a 
communicative intention, potentially informa-
tive and reusable for the receiver. It is an in-
formative item. 
Generally speaking, one can assert that docu-
ments have always been involved in humans’ 
intellectual activities. From the beginning of 
the history of thought, man has used a number 
of objects or materials where he can capture 
and store his thought or feelings. There are 
clear examples of such objects or materials: 
the cave paintings, Mesopotamian clay tablets, 
the walls of sacred buildings Egyptian papy-
rus, the parchments and later the paper. Now-
adays, the development of communication 
and information technologies increasingly 
contributes to electronic formats in collecting 
our intellectual production. 
We usually use the term "document" to refer 
to all such objects or materials. In other words, 
we can identify any type medium that holds 
some types of information as a document. In 
this sense, we can consider under the concept 
of a document a written paper, a book, a pho-
tograph, a videotape, a DVD, a file created 
with a word processor, a database or even a 
web page. To give a definition: Document = 
any medium where information is repre-
sented. 
It is clear from the definition that document 
has two dimensions: on one side, it is some-
thing physical/material and on the other, it 
holds/contains an associated information or 
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informative content. Here we see the relation-
ship between these two dimensions with the 
concepts of data, information and knowledge. 
The relationship between the two concepts of 
document and data seems quite simple. If we 
consider data is as the physical medium infor-
mation, document should be understood as (a 
special type of) combination of data. 
Now, let us see what happens to its relation 
with the concept of information. If infor-
mation is understood as the semantic content 
of data derived from an encryption key, docu-
ment would appear to be as the material object 
that can represent and implement infor-
mation. 
This representation and materialization helps 
to explain several things. On the one hand, it 
explains how you can transmit information: 
the information is represented (associated 
with) in (to) a document by a code and its 
transmission is realized by the material trans-
mission of the document itself. On the other 
hand, it also makes it clear that why the preser-
vation and storage of document means the 
preservation and storage of the information it 
contains therein. One can only analyze this 
document under the same codification key (or 
code) used to associate it with that particular 
semantic content for retrieving the infor-
mation after storage of the document. 
Finally, we tackle the articulation of the con-
cept of document against the knowledge. 
Knowledge should be understood as those of 
mental states of an individual that is con-
structed from the assimilation of information 
and that controls the actions of the subject. 
Document, facing these mental states and 
from its physical dimension and ability to carry 
information, plays an important role: it ap-
pears as the material object, which can repre-
sent and implement those mental states resid-
ing exclusively in the head of people. This rep-
resentation and realization, as happened in the 
case of information, helps to explain the trans-
mission and storage of (explicit) knowledge 
from the transmission and storage of docu-
ments. 
In this regard, on one hand, the knowledge in 
an individual represents (is reflected) in a doc-
ument by a code and its transmission is real-
ized by the material transmission of the docu-
ment itself. When a second individual is able 
to obtain the information associated with the 
transmitted document to form a new state of 
mind by it, we can affirm that there has been 
a transmission of that knowledge. On the 
other hand, by the same mechanism, the 
preservation and storage of the document ob-
tained as a fruit of representation of a concrete 
knowledge also allows the preservation and 
storage of that knowledge. One can only ana-
lyze this document under the same codifica-
tion key (or code) which used in the represen-
tation of those mental states to be able to re-
trieve the associated information and create 
new mental states in other individuals after 
storage of the document. In this way, this 
knowledge can be retrieved by anyone who 
needs it at the right time. 
In the same vein, to give a brief outline, it is 
also important to mention one more thing that 
can make clear this entire conceptual scenario. 
We should not forget that, at certain occasions 
and in colloquial terms, we often classify a 
concrete data as information or knowledge. 
We also, usually in an organizational context, 
use the terms "knowledge" and "information" 
to refer to physical representations of the 
mental states, or the informative contents, to 
refer to documents (in any medium (paper, 
electronic , optical, magnetic, etc..)) we use to 
represent and disseminate that knowledge or 
information. For example, if a document (a 
fact, a physical occurrence) carries some infor-
mation or is obtained as a representation of a 
knowledge that a subject has, in a larger sense, 
we say also that this document is respectively 
information or knowledge.  
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DOCUMENT CONTENT ANALYSIS 
(S. análisis del contenido documental, F. analyse de 
contenu documentaire, G. urkundliche Inhaltsanalyse) 
[Research] concept 
Discipline devoted to the identification of the 
main concepts or realities in a document and the 
representation of them in order to enable an 
ulterior retrieval by the users. 
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DRETSKE, FRED [Philosophy, epistemol-
ogy, philosophy of mind] author 
American philosopher (born 1932) that, from 
externalism, has made significant contribu-
tions in the field of information theory, epis-
temology and philosophy of mind. Through-
out his entire academic career, he has taught at 
the universities of Wisconsin, Stanford and 
Duke. Within his scientific works are: Seeing 
and Knowing (1969), Explaining behavior: 
Reasons in a world of causes (1988), Natural-
izing the Mind (1995), Perception, Knowledge 
and Belief (2000). 
But among all of his works there is one that 
stands out, published in 1981 under the title 
Knowledge and the Flow of Information. At 
that time he was still a professor at the Uni-
versity of Wisconsin-Madison and it was be-
fore his collaboration at the prestigious CSLI 
(Center for the Study of Language and Infor-
mation) of Stanford University as a lecturer 
and researcher. At that time, this work at-
tracted the attention of the specialized litera-
ture and later was the backbone of a signifi-
cant amount of the subsequent philosophical 
production. The main objective of Dretske is 
this book was to carry out a conceptual jour-
ney through the mental territory, trying to de-
velop a semantic theory of information that 
was useful for later analysis of principal pro-
cesses, such as knowledge or belief involved in 
our cognitive behavior.  
And to achieve this objective, it seems that the 
work is divided into three distinct parts. The 
first part begins with the attempt to present a 
semantic theory of information, or a theory of 
propositional content of a sign. Then he re-
covers the notion of average amount of infor-
mation contained in the Mathematical Theory 
of Communication (Shannon and Weaver, 
1949), and from there he offers a definition 
for informative content. In particular, a sign 
informs about an occurrence in the world 
when there is a law or regularity between them 
that prevents a sign from occurring without 
the occurrence taking place (or expressed in 
probabilistic terms: when the probability of 
causing the occurrence, once the signal has oc-
curred, is equal to 1). Within this conceptual 
proposal there is no place for false infor-
mation. False information can not be regarded 
as authentic information.  
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(Duke University / Faculty database Philosophy Arts & 
Sciences) 
In the second part he presents his alternative 
definition of knowledge: belief caused by in-
formation. Here Dretske replaces the need for 
the justification of belief in the causality of in-
formation. By this change he tries to over-
come the problems (the counter examples of 
Gettier and the paradox of the lottery) that the 
classical epistemological theories usually pre-
sented and also enfores a suitable argument 
against the thesis of radical skepticism.  
In the third and final part of the work, the au-
thor's purpose is to offer a definition of the 
content of belief, explanatorily compatible 
with its characterists: its intentional character, 
the possibility of possessing a false content 
and its determined role in the conduct. The 
objective is fulfilled when it identifies the con-
tent of the belief with fully digitized infor-
mation. In the same way, the concepts are 
considered as internal structures that are dis-
tinguished by their semantic content, and 
when they are exemplified, they apply a con-
trol over the outputs (conducts) of the cogni-
tive system.  
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E
EMOTION (E. emoción, F. emotion, G. Emo-
tion) [psicología, evolución] concepto 
“Do we cry because we are sad, or rather are we sad 
because we cry?”  (W. James) 
Before answering please consider the follow-
ing simple experiment. In any moment you do 
feel sad, take a pencil and bite it for a couple 
of minutes. You eventually find yourself then 
smiling and finishing your sad state. Now an-
swer the previous question. 
Emotion is the affective tone with wich organ-
isms respond to their circumstances. Three re-
search lines are to be highlighted in the study 
of emotion, with respective antecedents in 
Charles Darwin, William James and Sigmund 
Freud. 
Emotions arise from filogenetically selected 
behaviours. It may happen that obsolete con-
ducts remain, even if they are no longer fit to 
present demands. For example, many persons 
are still afraid of snakes, while it is so unprob-
able to find any wild snake in daily life. It 
would be more fitted for us to be afraid of 
plugs, hobs or lifts, since they really endanger 
our lives. 
Even if it is common to undistinctively talk 
about emotion and feeling, there are differ-
ences between them, particularly as to their 
duration. Emotion takes about miliseconds, 
while feelings are more durable and also later 
result of filogeny in our brain. Emotions are 
located in the limbical system while feelings in 
the orbito ventral area. 
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ENCODER AND DECODER (S. en, F. 
codificateur / decodificateur, G. Kodierer / 
Dekodierer) [transdisciplinary, communication 
theory, telecommunication] concept 
Encoder is a device for converting data or sig-
nals by using a specific code. It is normally 
used with four clearly differentiated purposes: 
1) To remove redundancy or anything that is 
not going to be perceived by the information 
receiver or remain beyond the quality goals of 
the received signal, typically named source en-
coder;  2) To increase redundancy, so that the 
decoder can eventually detect and correct the 
errors occurred within the reception of signals 
or symbols, named channel encoder; 3) To make 
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the coded data unreadable, except if the recip-
ient knows the code, by using encryptors or ci-
phers; 4) To allow the transmission of data 
through a channel with certain resources and 
limitations, corresponding in the MTC com-
munication model to the transmitter-encoder, also 
named modulator -especially in telecommunica-
tions-. 
The decoder (E. decodificador, F. decodifica-
teur, G. Dekodierer) is the device performing 
the inverse operation of the encoder, whatever 
the purpose of the code: 1) the source decoder 
tries to restore the eliminated redundancy; 2) 
the channel decoder removes the redundancy 
that has been introduced by the corresponding 
encoder, and correct those errors being de-
tected; 3) the unencryptor makes the data 
readable; and 4) the demodulator or receiver-
decoder identifies the symbol transmitted 
through the channel –normally according to a 
maximum likelihood criterion– and restate the 
data into its original form, i.e., how it was be-
fore the modulator. 
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ENDOGENOUS INFORMATION (S. in-
formación endógena, F. information endogène, G. en-
dogen/körpereigen information) [cybernetics, epis-
temology, constructivism, theory of complex 
systems] concept 
Contents.— 1) Difference and distinction, 2) The objec-
tivist position, 3) The constructivist position, 4) The radical 
constructivist position. 
1. Difference and distinction. The generali-
zation involved in the common use of the rei-
fied idea of information must not hide the 
complexity and richness of the debate it has 
produced. Debate which significantly emerges 
from the contradictions inherent to Shannon's 
formulation -summarized in the two italicized 
sentences-:  
«The fundamental problem of communica-
tion is that of reproducing at one point ei-
ther exactly or approximately a message se-
lected at another point. Frequently the mes-
sages have meaning; that is they refer to or 
are correlated according to some system 
with certain physical or conceptual enti-
ties.These semantic aspects of communication are 
irrelevant to the engineering problem. The signifi-
cant aspect is that they are selected from a set of 
possible messages». (Shannon y Weaver, 
1949:31-32) 
As Bateson (1985:413) rightly pointed out, 
«the engineers and mathematicians believe 
that they can avoid the complexities and diffi-
culties introduced into communication theory 
by the concept of 'Meaning'» reducing the 
matter to the syntactical level and building the 
concept of information from a theory of sig-
nals (von Foerster, 1991:60). However the 
idea of signal is only apparently aseptic, and 
only apparently syntactical. The signal refers 
to a difference that is ‘out there’, but that 
‘something’ which is difference is distinguished 
by someone. The distinction is presupposed 
by Shannon and Weaver in the form of selec-
tion (see Qvortrup, 1993). The fact that infor-
mation is defined as the probability of selec-
tion involves the observer in at least two as-
pects: first, probability implies expectation and 
context of use; and second, the selection is 
only conceivable on the basis of the assump-
tion of someone who selects. In both cases there 
appears implicit semantics as a horizon of 
meaning (Brier, 1992). 
Moreover, the development of the concept of 
information as a measure of order which con-
stitutes its fundamental link with universal 
magnitudes (such as mass or energy) presup-
poses the observational act as well. In Shan-
non and Weaver’s theory, both information 
and noise depend on variety. If redundance is 
defined according to the “adjustment” be-
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tween variety and the number of elements, in-
formation and noise are expressed in direct 
proportion to variety. In other words, infor-
mation and noise depend on the number of 
elementsdifferent from one another. Neither of 
them can be defined in larger quantities than 
those allowed by the amount of variety 
(Ashby, 1977:238). In fact, as Ashby poses, 
«It must be noticed that noise is in no intrinsic 
way distinguishable from any other form of variety. 
Only when some recipient is given, who 
will state which of the two is important to 
him, is a distinction between message and 
noise possible». (Ibid.:256)  
The issue of the distinction between infor-
mation and noise brings us definitely to the 
problem of observation. It seems implicit in 
Ashby’s words that order is the cognitive con-
tribution of the observer that makes it possible 
to conceive the difference between infor-
mation and noise: order, as a Peircean sign, it 
is so for someone in a certain circumstance. The con-
sequent paradox is that information is pro-
posed as a universal measure of order for a 
system whose activity of selection (to which 
information depends on) involves a local or-
der, coherent with its structure and opera-
tions. From the point of view of communica-
tion (understood as ‘transmission’ of infor-
mation), there has to be a correspondence be-
tween the orders of selection of the observing 
systems involved and, therefore, there has to 
be an operational and structural correspond-
ence between them (von Foerster, 1991:75). 
The epistemological contradictions of infor-
mation ultimately refer to its condition as a 
code of difference. Consequently, it is primar-
ily an observational problem, a problem of the 
management of differences. In this sense, and 
partially following Qvortrup’s classification 
(1993), it is possible to outline at least three 
differentiated positions throughout the con-
temporary debate on the epistemological sta-
tus of information: 
2. The objectivist position (a), according to 
what has been posed before, considers infor-
mation as an ontologically self-sufficient mag-
nitude of Nature. In this case, the information 
is an external difference to the observer and inde-
pendent from him. Without resorting to Ston-
ier’s ontological exaltation in which the inde-
pendent existence of information is remarked 
as "a basic property of the Universe", Wiener’s 
words suffice to illustrate the common de-
nominator of this approach and its cognitive-
communicational derivations: 
«Information is a name for the content of 
what is exchanged with the outer world as 
we adjust to it, and make our adjustment 
felt upon it. The process of receiving and 
using information is the process of our liv-
ing effectively within that environment. To 
live effectively is to live with the adequate 
information». (Wiener, 1954:18) 
3. The constructivist position (b) intro-
duces in the concept of information the obser-
vational instance as a result of the systematic 
reflection on the contradictions pointed out in 
the objectivist approach. The development of 
the second-order cybernetics placed self-refer-
ence in a privileged position within the opera-
tions of the cognitive system, making impos-
sible the conception of the informational flow 
in terms of transmission of objects. The con-
structivist shift established thus two comple-
mentary options: either (b.1) reviewing the 
concept of information, so that it became co-
herent with an idea of communication under-
stood as a behavioural coupling between two 
interacting systems, or (b.2) establishing the 
hypothesis that the environment only exists 
for the system as a product of its own creation. 
The one we call ‘constructivist position’ corre-
sponds to the first option (b.1), while the one 
we name ‘radical constructivism’ will emerge 
from the development of the second hypoth-
esis (b.2). 
The first option, derived from the incorpora-
tion of the observational reflexivity, com-
pelled thus the consideration that communica-
tion did not depend so much on what ‘the en-
vironment gave the system’ but rather on what 
happened with the system in its interaction 
ENDOGENOUS INFORMATION 
78  g l o s s a r i u m B I T r i  
with the environment or with another system 
(Maturana and Varela, 1996:169). Thus infor-
mation ceased to be a ‘capturable’ external dif-
ference and came to be conceived as a differ-
ence in the environment linked to an opera-
tional change (a difference) in the system. The 
Batesonian definition of information as the dif-
ference that makes a difference (Bateson, 1985; 
1991) summarises the conception of commu-
nication as operational coupling and in a way 
advances the second constructivist hypothe-
sis. In fact, for Bateson the difference is an ob-
servational operation that emanates from the 
encounter between the perceptive structure of 
the system and the world as it is presented to 
it. Implicitly the difference is neither in the 
world nor in the observer, but in the encoun-
ter between them. Also implicitly (b.2): the 
world can only be for the observing system de-
pending on what it is (that is, the environment 
is part of the observing system inasmuch its 
operational structure presupposes it). Conse-
quently, the difference is after all defined as a 
mental issue. 
4. The radical constructivist position (c) 
introduces, thus, a differential note with re-
spect to Bateson’s definition. Paraphrasing the 
famous sentence, information would appear 
from this perspective rather as the difference that 
finds a difference (Qvortrup, 1993). In fact, this 
implies an elimination of the conductist sub-
stratum that remained in Bateson’s formula-
tion, in the sense that it made possible glimps-
ing a cause-effect coordination between the 
difference in the environment and the differ-
ence in the observing system. The considera-
tion that the environment exists for the system 
depending on its operational structure obliged 
to restrict the functional determinism of the 
cause-effect connection in the system-envi-
ronment encounter, especially when one was 
careful enough to highlight that communica-
tion was in no circumstance a traffic of differ-
ences from the environment to the system and 
vice versa. 
This view of information as an endogenous 
emergence of the operational coupling implies 
the conception of selection not in the terms of 
a designation or a ‘pointing at’ with respect to 
something external, but as a restriction of the 
system operation itself. In other words, the 
system does not select differences of the envi-
ronment; the system is in itself a selection of 
the differences in the environment. As in the 
previous case, the premise refers to a double 
hypothesis: on the one hand (c.1), the consid-
eration of the set system-environment as an 
inseparable whole for the external observer -
applicable to self-organising systems, like liv-
ing systems-; on the other hand, (c.2) the con-
sideration of observing systems as operation-
ally closed systems. The former line of reflec-
tion (c.1) is the one developed by von Foerster 
(especially in von Foerster, 1981), the latter 
(c.2) constitutes the essence of the autopoietic 
systems theory developed by Maturana and 
Varela (1980, 1996 and Varela, 1979, 1996). 
In his article Notes on an Epistemology for Living 
Things, published in 1972, Heinz von Foerster 
(1991:65-78) outlines the following proposi-
tional chain: (1) The environment is experi-
enced as if it was the residence of objects, sta-
tionary, moving or changing; (2) The logical 
properties of “invariance” and “change” be-
long to the representations, not to the objects; 
(3) Objects and events are not primitive repre-
sentations. They are representations of rela-
tions; in such a way that (4) the environment 
is the representation of the relations between 
“objects” and “events” and (5) a living organ-
ism is a third order relater (operation of rela-
tions between relations of relations) from 
which the differentiation between system and 
environment constitutes an emergence from 
that operation of relations: 
«Let be D* the terminal representation 
made by an organism W*, and let it be ob-
served by an organismW; let W’s internal 
representation of this description be D (W, 
D*); and, finally, let W’s internal represen-
tation of his environment be E (W,  E). [...] 
The domain of relationships between D 
and Ewhich are computable by W repre-
sents the “information” gained by W from 
watching W*: 
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Inf (W , D*) ≡ Domain Rel µ  (D, E) 
(µ = 1, 2, 3, ... m) 
The  logarithm (of base 2) of the number µ 
of relationships Rel m  computable by W (or 
the negative mean value of the logarithmic 
probabilities of its occurrence  <log2 pi = Σ 
pi log2 pi ;  i = 1→m) is the “amount  of  in-
formation, H”  of the description D*  with 
respect to W : 
H (D*, W ) = log2 m 
(or H (D*, W ) = - Σ  pi log2 pi) » 
In such a way that both the descriptive 
approach to the concept of information (Inf) 
and the probabilistic expression of the amount 
of information (H) prove to be relative 
concepts (c.1), being thus impossible to affirm 
that the environment “contains” information, 
and even less that it is “able” somehow to 
“transmit it” to the system. The corollary 
presents somehow solipsist notes that should 
be made more precise. «The environment so as 
we observe it, is our construction», concludes 
von Foerster (1981:41). Something similar 
happens with Varela’s affirmation (1979:45): 
«Information, sensu stricto, does not exist». It is 
important, as Qvortrup (1993) recommends, 
to underline the qualifications “in the way we 
observe it” and “in strict sense” modalizing each 
of the two previous sentences. Both 
qualifications refer to the recursive nature of 
observation. In von Foerster’s terms, both 
precisions remind us thatobservations cannot be 
made without an observer, or as Varela himself 
points out:            
«The fact is that information does not exist 
independent of a context of organization 
that generates a cognitive domain, from 
which an observer community can describe 
certain elements as informational and sym-
bolic». (Varela, 1981:45) 
From the perspective of autopoietic systems 
(c.2), the operational closure of the observing 
system makes that endogenous conception of 
information a logical requirement 
«Autopoietic systems do not have inputs or 
outputs. They can be perturbated by inde-
pendent events and undergo internal struc-
tural changes which compensate these per-
turbations». (Matura and Varela, 1980:81) 
As a consequence, what is normally perceived 
as interaction (in the sense of an exchange of 
information) is understood here as a behav-
ioural coupling of operationally closed sys-
tems perturbing each other (Qvortrup, 1993). 
This no longer involves a difference as cause 
of a difference, which presupposes a certain 
conmensurability between system and envi-
ronment (or, in other words, an ontologiza-
tion of the difference between both). It rather 
entails independent coupling changes (as part 
of systems’ structural drift), becoming part of 
systems’ horizon of operations and, therefore, 
becoming meaningful differences. Rather than 
being produced or made, differences, in that 
case, are found by the system. 
«In the context of the autopoietical repro-
duction the environment exists as irritation, 
disturbance, noise, and it only becomes 
meaningful when it can be related to the 
system's decision-making connections. This 
is only the case when the system can under-
stand which difference it makes for its de-
cision-activity when the environment 
changes or doesn't change in one or the 
other respect. Such a difference which ex-
ists for the system in the environment and 
which for the system may imply a differ-
ence for the system itself, i.e. a different de-
cision, in accordance with Gregory Bateson 
we would call information. As 'difference 
that makes a difference' information is al-
ways the system's own product, an aspect 
of the processing of decision and not a fact 
in the environment which exists inde-
pendently of observation and evaluation. 
On the other hand the system cannot freely 
create information as its own product or let 
it be. The system is continuously pertur-
bated by the environment, and with its de-
cision-network it seeks out perturbations so 
as to transform them into information and 
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to use them as a guide for decision-mak-
ing.» (Luhmann cit. in Qvortrup, 1993). 
Ultimately, the two constructivist perspectives 
considered here link the observational prob-
lems of information to a conception of cogni-
tion that, inasmuch as it is assumed as part of 
its own condition of observation, becomes 
necessarily a kind of epistemology. In other 
words, for the constructivist perspective, cog-
nition and epistemology overlap each other in 
the same operative principle: 
«There is an external world which already 
follows from the fact that understanding 
can be made as a selfcontained operation; 
however, we do not have any direct access 
to the world. Understanding cannot reach 
the outsi de world without understanding. 
In other words, understanding is under-
standing as self-referential process». (Luh-
mann, 1990a:33) 
That self-referential proposal of cognition ar-
ticulated upon an endogenous conception of 
information forces to attend to the biological 
principles implicit in observational logics and 
ultimately poses a radical revision of the con-
cept of communication. 
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ENTROPY or AMOUNT OF INFOR-
MATION (S. entropía/cantidad de información, 
F. entropie/quantité d’information, G. Entropie/ In-
formationsgehalt) [MTC] concept
The entropy or amount of information of 
a discrete information source, characterised 
by the probability pj, of sending each of its 
symbols, j, is the statistical average:  
(bits)log2∑−=
j
jj ppH  
being bounded within the limits NH 2log0 ≤≤
, where N is the number of symbols. 
In case the source might adopt various states 
i, being Pi the state probability, and pi(j) the 
probability of sending symbol j when the 
source is in state i, then the entropy is defined 
as the average of the entropies of each state: 
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According to Floridi (2005), the entropy H 
might designate three equivalent quantities in 
the ideal case of a noiseless channel: 1) “the 
average amount of information per symbol 
produced by the informer”; 2) the “average 
amount of data deficit (Shannon´s uncer-
tainty) that the informee has before inspection 
of the output of the informer”; 3) “informa-
tional potentiality”. 
Since the first two interpretations assume that 
a defined uncertainty corresponds to each 
symbol (whether it is in the emission or recep-
tion), it implies a certain tactical agreement re-
garding to the →alphabet or the informational 
game in which the agents are immersed. In 
both cases, the information can be quantified 
under the condition that the probability distri-
bution can be specified. 
Concerning the third interpretation, entropy 
might be understood in terms of a physical 
magnitude related to the amount of disorder 
in processes or systems conveying energy or 
information. The larger the entropy, the 
higher the number of physical states in which 
the system can be found, consequently, the 
more information it can refer to, or in other 
words, the specification of the state in which 
a certain system is requires more information 
as its entropy increases. Numerically, this is 
equivalent to the amount of information or 
data that has to be given in order to specify the 
state.  
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F
FEEDBACK (S. realimentación / retroali-
mentación, F. rétroaction, G. Rückkopplung) [trans-
disciplinary, System theory, Control theory, 
Cybernetics] concept 
It consists of feeding back the output of a cir-
cuit or system to its own input. Usually used 
in controlling the behaviour of systems, it can 
be found in the most complex systems such 
as: technical, economical, thermodynamical, 
biological or social ones. In the field of social 
groups or human organizations of functional 
type, "feedback" is used in the sense of sharing 
observations, concerns, proposals (especially 
in the opposite sense of normal circulation of 
the operating instructions or orders) to regu-
late the operation of the system toward its 
goals. Feedback systems are also called closed-
loop systems. 
This is one of the fundamental means consid-
ered by →cybernetics for the regulation, control, 
and evolution (specially in second-order cy-
bernetics) of complex systems. Feedback can 
be divided into positive and negative depend-
ing on whether the feedback path of the sys-
tem -from output to input- reinforces or coun-
teracts the causes that create a change in the 
system output. In the study of stability of feed-
back electronic systems, Nyquist found the 
general conditions that such feedback should 
be met to ensure the stability of the system 
(based on mathematical models of the behav-
iour of both the open-loop system -without 
feedback- and the feedback subsystem). 
Positive ~ refers to the situation in which the 
system output -in response to a change in its 
input- tends to increase the variation in the 
same direction. Obviously, this does not lead 
to stability; nevertheless, it serves to explain 
the evolution of a system towards a new equi-
librium state in which it can be stabilized. This 
type of feedback plays a key role in morpho-
genesis, growth and organic development and, 
in general, in processes which are character-
ized by quick changes in their behaviour with 
respect to their initial conditions. 
Negative ~ refers to the situation in which 
the system output -in response to a change in 
its input- aims at reducing the variation; there-
fore, operating in an opposite direction to the 
change of input. In this case the feedback is 
applied to prevent the instability of the system 
due to external changes -which is referred as 
homeostasis, or maintenance of the equilibrium- 
accounting for control of organic behaviour 
and the possibility of a linear operation of the 
system. Such stability with regard to the exter-
nal changes enables a teleological behaviour of 
the system (Rosenblueth 1943). 
Bipolar ~ refers to the situation in which the 
system output -in response to a change in its 
input- can either increase or decrease such var-
iation (depending on both the system state, 
and the variation of the input). 
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FLOKSONOMY (S. folksonomía, F. folk-
sonomie, G. folksonomien) [social web] concept 
Folksonomies are a set of terms (called tags) 
collected from the Natural Language. These 
tags are used to describe web resources se-
mantically. 
Context. This term belongs to the Social Web 
vocabulary. In social tagging, users describe 
their own or external social web resources 
with tags. 
Advantages: 
― Easy to use. Folksonomies are a simple and 
friendly solution to describe resources. 
― Cheap. Everybody is able to employ tag-
ging, without a prior training in either in-
dexing techniques or controlled vocabular-
ies. 
― The vocabulary fits the resource, even 
when the resource is quite specific. The 
user can describe the resources with his 
own terms.  Once the term is used, the folk-
sonomy includes the term as a tag. 
Disadvantages: 
― Tags are ambiguous due to polisemy and 
synonyms. Frequently, systems just allow 
assigning simple terms instead of more spe-
cific compound terms; therefore increasing 
ambiguity. 
― Tags might have orthographical and typing 
errors. 
― Tags are arbitrarily assigned without an in-
dexing policy. 
― There might be no semantic relationship 
between terms. 
Origin. Term coined by Thomas Van Der 
Wal, merging the terms folk (popular) and tax-
onomy. 
Examples: 
― Flicker: Application to manage, share and 
retrieve photos on line. Every user de-
scribes their own photos with relevant tags. 
― Youtube: Application to share video online. 
― Del.icio.us: Application to tag web pages. Us-
ers can index other web pages. 
Folksonomies and ontologies. The goal of 
Folksontologies is to build an ontology from 
a folksonomy. This implies linking every tag 
from a folksonomy with semantic relation-
ships. This allows to achieve shared conceptu-
alizations used by users.  
Related Resources 
― Flicker: http://www.flickr.com 
― Youtube: http://www.youtube.com  
― Del.icio.us: http://delicious.com 
References 
― VANDER WAL, Thomas. "Folksonomy Coinage 
and Definition". (Online) 
<http://vanderwal.net/folksonomy.html> [Con-
sulted 1/11/2009] 
― MORATO, J.; SÁNCHEZ-CUADRADO, S.; 
FRAGA, A.; MORENO, V. (2008). Hacia una web 
semántica social. El profesional de la Información, 
Enero-febrero 2008, vol. 17, núm. 1. 
(JAM –ed-; EC, JML) 
FOTOBLOGS AND ADOLESCENTS (S. 
fotoblogs y adolescentes, F. fotoblog et les adolescents, 
G. Fotoblogs und Jugendliche) [Information 
Society, ICT] problem 
Adolescents have grown up in an information 
society where they have not needed to be ‘ed-
ucated’ in order to learn and employ the 
norms of use of the internet; rather, they have 
developed the norms and have adapted them 
to their own needs. Indeed, today's youth do 
not use the term "new technology" when they 
talk about issues related to computing. To 
them, the net is nothing new. 
The new media provide adolescents with a 
context that allows them to create signs of 
identity. Most adults are unaware of the strat-
egies, practices and codes commonly used in 
chat rooms, instant messaging, SMS texting on 
mobile phones or on blogs that young people 
routinely use in their day to day lives. Use of 
this technology is not just part of their lives, 
but a way of life. They are media which not 
only inform the users who surf the internet. 
Rather, the media shapes users and encour-
ages them to create strategies and attitudes to 
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communicate with their peers from different 
virtual contexts. 
From these means of communication, the ad-
olescent is projecting a representation of him-
self in which he reveals not only his personal-
ity, his character, how he feels or what he likes, 
but also reflects who he would like to be. In 
this way, the photoblog is a place where con-
nections are established with the peer group 
that the adolescent wishes to interact with and 
belong to. With this in mind, the adolescent 
goes about creating and shaping his identity. 
The interaction between subjects with similar 
interests, ages and tastes, leads to the con-
struction of their selves through the image, 
through the interface. Thus, the photoblog be-
comes a space of socialization.  
The adolescent, through the discourse estab-
lished within the photoblog, creates a narra-
tive; one which is understood as a mental con-
struction of reality. As human beings, we seek 
meaning in our experiences through a process 
of using a language that we, as well as others, 
understand. This language can be verbal, tex-
tual, visual or physical. According to Bruner, 
the meaning we give to our experience and to 
that of others depends on the public and 
shared meanings of our interaction as mem-
bers of a culture. Today, it is a culture com-
prised of two generations, one which has 
grown up with computers and another that 
has had to adapt to them. Young people have 
adapted media computers to their interests, 
whereas their predecessors rather adapted to 
them. 
We live in an information and knowledge so-
ciety where interests of different age and gen-
der groups and social classes, concern hobbies 
and ideas that may converge as well as diverge. 
The media expose, more clearly, the character-
istics of each group. Roxana Morduchowicz 
(2004) says that media construct myths and 
stories through which individuals constitute a 
common culture. Thus, the identities of young 
people are drawn in the intersection of written 
text, electronic images and popular culture. It 
is true that we live in an environment that is 
defined by the presence of a plurality of cul-
tures; with this statement we do not refer to 
the reality of the phenomenon of immigration, 
but to the multiplicity of subcultures [1], as, 
for instance, the ones expressing adolescents' 
own interests.  
Adolescent's use of photoblogs shows how 
the relationship between user and media has 
changed due to the transformations intro-
duced by the Internet and the processes of 
digitalization. If the first theoretical models of 
mass communication conceive this relation-
ship as linear and unidirectional, most current 
theories emphasize the active role of the re-
ceiver. Thus, we have moved beyond the so-
called dominant paradigm’s main theory of 
how the media influences us, to being preoc-
cupied with "what do people do with media?", 
or even beyond that to "what media do people 
create?". 
Present day consumers not only actively use 
the media for the purpose of satisfying psy-
chological or emotional needs, as the Theory 
of uses and gratifications has stressed, but ad-
ditionally people have become producers of 
media and audiovisual content. The resulting 
change is not solely based, even on a primor-
dial level, on technological innovation per se, 
but in the creation of new socially recognized 
communication practices (See “Las industrias 
audiovisuales y los nuevos medios” in Durán 
y Sánchez 2008). From our point of view, the 
use of photoblogs by adolescents demon-
strates this turning point that new technolo-
gies have generated. It is precisely this quality 
we wish to demonstrate when we characterize 
photoblogs as a symbolic creative space 
through which an adolescent defines himself 
as a subject via interaction with others by 
means of the aesthetic use of images. 
Thus, adolescents use photoblogs with the in-
tention of creating new communication pro-
tocols that allow them to express themselves 
not as consumers but as creators. It is about 
creating a space that goes beyond posting pic-
tures and comments in order to establish an 
environment that reveals their relationships, 
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moods, tastes, interests, etc. integrated into 
their daily lives. It is an environment that en-
hances the subject’s creativity in an entertain-
ing way, either in the pursuit of the most fit-
ting images or in the formalization of original 
on-screen writing. An interesting characteris-
tic of photoblogs is that they communicate 
that which is seen. All of this is done to estab-
lish a symbol of group identity to which the 
teenager wishes to belong. We say “wishes” 
because, with every change, she is building her 
identity by communicating with her peers. 
Marc Augé (1996) affirms that individuals ac-
quire existence only through the relationships 
among them. In the case of photoblogs, the 
teenager relates to others abiding by some 
rules of use which, although not explicitly cod-
ified, can be guessed through the study of the 
different forms of representation. 
On the other hand, the messages produced by 
teenagers by means of photoblogs cannot be 
translated into another form of communica-
tion because the medium offers resources and 
strategies of its own, which allow the subjects 
to convey ideas and feelings graphically 
through the representation on the screen. 
On photoblogs, the choice of images com-
bined with texts written in a particular way 
constitute a new way of interacting; to express, 
proclaim, question or answer and cannot be 
translated into another mode of communica-
tion because the nature of the environment fa-
cilitates a kind of speech that is difficult to 
translate into spoken language and gestures. 
Perhaps we can consider this medium as one 
of the extensions of the body which McLuhan 
has spoken about (1996); the photoblog is not 
only a means of communication, but rather it 
is a glimpse of a new way of relating between 
people who live in different contexts. 
The use of photoblogs allows for strategies 
and forms of communication that define it as 
a context in which feelings or ideas are ex-
pressed through visual forms that determine 
the nature of the message. Hence, the message 
could not be gestated in a different way and 
obtain the same reaction in the receptor. In 
the edition of these visual forms, there is a 
decorative aesthetic intentionality that forms 
part of the content of the message. The repre-
sentation of texts, together with the images 
themselves, confers a new communicative 
sense to words. 
This article doesn’t pretend to make value 
judgments regarding the use of photoblogs by 
adolescents. It just wants to present a social 
reality and indicate some aspects that reflect 
the so-called digital generation gap. Carles 
Feixa, among other authors, talks about the 
generation ac (after computer) and bc (before 
computer). While in the past, generational 
gaps were marked by historical events or by 
music ruptures, today, the evolution of digital 
media marks the distance between genera-
tions. 
Young people who have grown in digital envi-
ronments are not only more skilful and effec-
tive than their parents in the exploitation of 
these environments, but also show differences 
in their ways of accessing information and 
communication in general. The difference re-
lies not only in the fact that one generation is 
more passive and the other commits to inter-
activity, but in that these processes are chang-
ing traditional cognitive structures and sche-
mata. 
Applying the Uses and Gratifications theory, 
cited in the previous paragraph, we would say 
that the medium is defined by the user. For 
example, the use that adolescents and their 
parents make of mobile phones can make us 
conclude that we are in front of a different de-
vice. While the former are always connected 
through brief and trivial particularized mes-
sages or photographic snapshots, adults 
simply stick to the fixed phone's customary 
routines. 
The same happens with the Web. Vilches 
speaks of "space migrants claiming the right to 
live in the territory of a connected civilization" 
(2001:36). This represents a paradigm shift in 
relationships and in the construction of the so-
cial. Psychologists and sociologists study the 
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consequences that can result from being con-
tinually "plugged in". However, any change or 
rupture always produces arguments pro and 
con. And now we are witnessing, in regard to 
the use young people make of computers, the 
same sort of debate that took place some time 
ago concerning television. However, there is a 
fundamental difference that we mentioned at 
the beginning concerning these two changes, 
while the former TV addicts were passive, cur-
rent messenger abducted youngsters act and 
create. 
In this so-called global society, immersed in 
what Toffler called The third wave, new sys-
tems of symbols and codes have emerged, 
characterized by the use of image. Young peo-
ple receive and send orders and messages 
through visual media. The photoblog is one of 
these spaces in which the image becomes a 
new mode of communication. And we are not 
referring only to iconic images themselves, but 
also to the many ways of producing written 
texts that are displayed on the interface. Such 
"productions" are, in many cases, incompre-
hensible and even insipid for adults, but one 
might as well ask them how those spiral note-
books and diaries they wrote and decorated 
when they were teenagers "felt" at the time, 
and how they see them now. The references 
and archetypes were different, but the need 
for "constructing one’s self" was the same. 
A different approach would consider these 
spaces as an expression of uncommitted and 
merchandised low culture, full of banalities; 
however, we must insist that it is the user who 
makes the medium. There are, in the web, 
multiple collective projects with an altruistic, 
creative or informative character, induced by 
young people who, precisely, strive to avoid 
the systems of economic exploitation in which 
we are immersed. 
To conclude, we say that adolescents’ use of 
photoblogs is part of the divers elements and 
actions that help them build symbolic forms in 
order to make sense of their own experience 
and of their relationship with their environ-
ment. Young subjects simply take advantage 
of digital media to suit their interests and 
needs. A space which was initially conceived 
as a means to "hang" amateur photos has be-
come a medium for the exchange of opinions 
and wishes, and the construction of personal-
ity. 
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FUZZY LOGIC (S. lógica borrosa, F. logique 
floue, G. Fuzzylogik, verschwommene Logik) [trans-
diciplinary, system theory, control theory, 
epistemology, semantics] theory 
Contents.— 1) On fuzziness: thinking, language and 
information, 2) Introduction to fuzzy set theory, 3) Classic 
Set Theory (a. Membership Functions, b. Operations be-
tween sets), 4) Fuzzy Set Theory (a. Fuzzy sets, b. Opera-
tions between fuzzy sets, c. T-Norms and S-Norms), 5. 
Fuzzy Systems (a. Fuzzy Relations, b. Composition of Re-
lations, c. Approximate Reasoning) 
"[...] Is a fuzzy concept a concept at all? - Is a 
photograph that is not sharp, a picture of a person 
at all? Is it even always an advantage to replace a 
picture that is not sharp by a sharp one? Isn't one 
that isn't sharp often just what we need?" (Witt-
genstein, L., Philosophical investigations, §71, 
1958). 
1. On fuzziness: thinking, language and 
information. “Fuzziness” is used as a visual 
metaphor of vagueness, inaccuracy, in opposi-
tion to sharpness or well-definiteness. 
Unlike the traditional endeavour in science 
and philosophy for avoiding vagueness (con-
sider, for instance, the centrality of “clearness” 
and “distinction” in Descartes and by exten-
sion in modern science and philosophy), there 
is a growing awareness of the fact that our 
knowledge of reality (or the information being 
conveyed or received about a concrete reality) 
contains a constitutive vagueness depending 
on the pragmatic situation in which this 
knowledge or information is immersed. The 
fundaments of this certainty can be found in 
the principles of statistical and quantum me-
chanics (→holographic principle), mathematics 
(→incompleteness) or scientific methodology 
(Pointcaré 1907). 
In opposition to a negative assessment of 
vagueness, fuzzy logic has started to be con-
sidered as one of the fundamental features of 
cognitive systems, language and knowledge, 
allowing them to achieve a plasticity and dyna-
mism, which are essential for the adaptation to 
changing environments. Thus, the robustness 
of the cognitive and linguistic system -far from 
being damaged by its fuzzy or blurred charac-
ter- is rooted in such fuzziness (Kosko 1995, 
Pérez-Amat 2008).  
Intending to give an account of the way of hu-
man reasoning, which is simply inaccurate, 
flexible, analogical…, fuzzy logic has been de-
veloped as a logical calculus, embracing the 
classical one -though distancing from its ap-
proaches, particularly in its way of rigid rea-
soning, which has been a fundamental charac-
ter of mathematics since platonic times (Fer-
rater Mora 1994, 409s). This logical calculus 
has been successfully employed in both artifi-
cial intelligence and the so-called fuzzy control 
of industrial application, and it has been posed 
as a basis of a quantitative approach to seman-
tic information (Pérez-Amat 2008). 
But the fuzziness that can be ascribed to in-
formation does not only concern the semantic 
level, which depends upon the more or less 
contingent characteristics of human reason-
ing. On the contrary, the information that can 
be obtained from an observed reality is in-
trinsically fuzzy: the signals that can be re-
ceived from some object are ultimately wave 
phenomena, which can only convey –due to 
its constitutive nature- a finite number of data 
over a bi-dimensional or superficial domain 
bounding the observed objects. That is, the 
whole wave phenomena outside the sources 
can be determined by a discrete distribution 
over a surface surrounding the object, there-
fore the dimension of the wave distribution in 
the surrounding space cannot be bigger than 
the dimension corresponding to such 2-di-
mensional discrete distribution. Thus, alt-
hough the real extension of the observed ob-
ject is 3-dimensional (volumetric) and it might 
be continuous, just a blurred projection of the 
observed object over a bounding surface can 
be achieved based upon the observation of the 
wave phenomena. In other words, the infor-
mation that can be gathered about something 
being observed is constitutively fuzzy (Díaz 
Nafría 2008; Díaz Nafría & Pérez-Montoro 
2010a, 2010b). 
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2. Introduction to fuzzy set theory. The 
fuzzy set theory was initiated by Zadeh in the 
early 1960s (1964, 1965) (see Bellman et al. 
(1964)). In 1951, Menger (1951) explicitly used 
the fuzzy relation "max-product" but with 
probabilistic interpretation. 
Since 1965, fuzzy set theory has been devel-
oped considerably by Zadeh and many other 
researchers. This theory was started to be im-
plemented in a wide range of scientific envi-
ronments.  
There have been many books on fuzzy set the-
ory as the mathematically one by Negoita and 
Ralescu (1975). There are also two research 
collections edited by Gupta et al. and Zadeh et 
al. (1975) and (1977). 
Apart from the excellent research works of 
Zadeh, other introductory articles are those 
presented by Gusev and Smirnova (1973), 
Ponsard (1975), Kandel and Byatt (1978), 
Chang (1972), Gale (1975), Watanabe (1969), 
and Aizerman (1977). 
There are several literature citations on fuzzy 
sets written by De Kerf (1975), Kandel and 
Davis (1978), Gaines and Kohout (1977) and 
Kaufmann (1980). 
Mathematical formulas of the fuzzy sets the-
ory will be presented in the following sections 
(§ 3, § 4, § 5). The basic definitions of classical 
sets, and the definitions and types of fuzzy 
sets, are revised. A detailed explanation of the 
operations between fuzzy sets, rules and 
norms-t-s are also carried out. The properties 
and the composition of fuzzy relations are re-
viewed. The characteristics and approximate 
reasoning are analyzed. 
3. Classic Set Theory. A classical set is a col-
lection of objects of any kind. What is called 
set theory was proposed by Georg Cantor 
(1845-1918), a German mathematician. In set 
theory, the set and the element are primitives. 
They are not defined in terms of other con-
cepts. Let A be a set, "x ∈ A" means that x is 
an element in the set A and "x ∉ A" means that 
x does not belong to the set A. The set A is 
completely specified by the elements it con-
tains. For example, there is no difference be-
tween a set which consists of 2, 3, 5 and 7 ele-
ments and a set of all prime numbers under 
11. 
Let X be a universe of discourse in which the 
set A is a subset, i.e.  
  (1) 
In the classical set theory, any element x which 
belongs to X, belongs or not to the subset A 
clearly and undoubtedly, without any other 
option apart from these two ones. 
Membership or not of an arbitrary element x 
to a subset A is given in most cases by check-
ing whether or not a predicate that character-
izes the subset A and gives rise to a bipartition 
of the universe of discourse X. 
a) Membership Functions. The concept of 
belonging or not of an element to a set A can 
be expressed numerically by membership 
function, also sometimes called characteristic 
function. This function assigns a binary bit (1 
or 0) to each element x of the universe of dis-
course as x belongs or not to the set A  
  (2) 
any set A ⊂ X can be defined by the pairs 
which form each element x of the universe 
and its membership function, as follows: 
  (3) 
b) Operations between sets. Given any two 
sets A and B included in X, it is possible to 
define new sets from them or, which is the 
same, it is possible to operate with them. The 
basic operations between sets are described as 
follows: 
― Intersection: is denoted by A ∩ B and is de-
fined as the set formed by those elements 
of X belonging to A and B simultaneously: 
  (4) 
 when 
when 
 if 
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― Union: it is the set formed by those elements 
that belong to A or B, or both simultane-
ously. It is denoted by A ∪ B 
  (5) 
― Complement: The complement of A is de-
noted by Ā, and consists of all elements of 
X that do not belong to A  
  (6) 
  (7) 
The three operations are shown in the following 
table. 
 
Table 1: Operations between classical sets 
4. Fuzzy Set Theory. In fuzzy set theory, 
classical sets are called crisp sets in order to 
distinguish them from fuzzy sets. Let A be a 
classical set defined in the universe X, then for 
any element x in X, x ∈ A or x ∉ A. In fuzzy 
set theory this property is widespread, there-
fore, in a fuzzy set A, it is not necessary that x 
∈ A or x ∉ A. 
In recent years several definitions have been 
introduced to present the generalization of 
property membership (Dubio 1987), (Pawlak 
1985), (Shafer 1976), but it seems that fuzzy 
set theory is the most intuitive among the 
other theories and existing theorems. 
The generalization is as follows. 
a) Fuzzy Sets. We can define the characteris-
tic function uA: X → (0,1) for any classic set 
as shown in equation (2). In fuzzy set theory, 
the characteristic function is generalized so 
that the membership function assigns a value 
for each  x ∈ X in the interval [0,1] instead of 
two-element set (0,1). The set is based on this 
extended membership is called fuzzy sets. 
Definition 1. Universe of Discourse is de-
fined as the set X of possible values that can 
take the variable x. It can be represented as:  
 
Definition 2. The membership function uA 
(x) of a fuzzy set A is as follows:  
  (8) 
Thus, any element x in X has degree of mem-
bership μA(x) ∈ [0,1]. A is completely deter-
mined by: 
  (9) 
Example 1. Suppose someone wants to de-
scribe a class of fast land animals like ostrich, 
cheetah, horse, spider, man, tortoise and hare. 
Some of these animals definitely belongs to 
this class, while others like the tortoise or the 
spider do not belong. But there is another 
group of animals where it is difficult to deter-
mine whether they are fast or not. Using a 
fuzzy set, the fuzzy set for fast animals is:  
 (Cheetah, 1), (Ostrich, 0.9),  
 (Hare, 0.8), (Gazelle, 0.7), (Cat, 0.4) (10) 
i.e., the hare belongs with grade of 0.8, the ga-
zelle with grade of 0.7 and the cat with 0.4 
grade to the class of fast animals. 
If we assume that C is a classical finite set (x1, 
x2, ..., xn), then an alternative notation is 
  
where + is an enumeration. 
A part from it, Zadeh proposed a more con-
venient notation for fuzzy sets. 
Example 2. The set of all the fast animals, in 
equation (10), is described by:  
 1/Chetah + 0.9/Ostrich + 0.8/Hare +  
 0.7/Gazelle  + 0.4/Cat.  (11) 
that is, one may describe the fuzzy set in equa-
tion (9) is as follows: 
 if 
 if 
FUZZY LOGIC 
g l o s s a r i u m B I T r i    91 
 (12) 
where the symbol of division is only a separa-
tor of sets of each pair, and the sum is the un-
ion operation between all elements of the set. 
The + fulfills the a / x + b / x = max (a, b) / 
x, i.e., if the same item has two different de-
grees of membership 0.8 and 0.6, then the 
membership degree is 0.8. Any discrete uni-
verse can be written as follows:  
  (13)  
but when X is uncountable or continuous, the 
above equation is described as:  
  (14)  
Equations (12) and (14) can written with the 
classical notation as follows: 
  (15) 
Example 3. Figure 1 shows some fuzzy sets 
defined in the universe of discourse Age. The 
fuzzy set "young" represents the membership 
degree with respect to the parameter youth 
where individuals of every age can have. 
 
Figure 1: An example of fuzzy sets  
It can be seen that the fuzzy sets overlap, so 
that an individual might have a degree of 
membership in two groups: "young" and "ma-
ture", indicating that it has qualities associated 
with both sets. The membership degree of x 
in A , as noted above, is represented by μA (x). 
The fuzzy set A is the union of the degrees of 
membership for all points of the universe of 
discourse X, which can also be expressed as:  
  (16) 
Under the notation of fuzzy sets, μA(x)/x is an 
element of set A. The operation ∫x represents 
the union of fuzzy elements μA(x)/x. The uni-
verses of discourse with discrete elements use 
the symbols + and Σ to represent the union 
operation.  
  (17) 
It is commonly convenient to define a fuzzy 
set with the help of some formula so that, for 
example, all "young" could be expressed as:  
Definition 3. The function Γ: X → [0,1] is a 
function of two parameters defined as follows:  
 (18)  
This function can be seen in fig. 2  
 
Figure 2: An example of the function Γ 
Definition 4. Let A and B be two fuzzy sets 
defined respectively on the universe X and Y, 
and is the fuzzy relation R defined on X × Y. 
The support of a fuzzy set A is the classical set 
containing all the elements of A with the  
membership degrees that are not zero. This is 
defined by S (A). 
The support of a fuzzy set A is defined  as fol-
lows:  
  (19) 
Definition 5. A fuzzy set A is convex if and 
only if X is convex and    
 
Young Mature Old 
Age 
 
Young 
 
when 
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  (20) 
Definition 6: The height of a fuzzy set A on 
X, denoted by Alt (A) is defined as: 
  (21) 
A fuzzy set A is called normal, if Alt (A) = 1, 
is subnormal if Alt (A) <1. 
In fuzzy control theory, it is usual to deal only 
with convex fuzzy sets. 
Definition 7. Given a number α ∈ [0,1] and 
a fuzzy set A, we define the α-cut of A as the 
classical set Aα which has the following mem-
bership function:  
 
 (22) 
In conclusion, the α-cut consists of those ele-
ments whose membership degree exceeds or 
equals the threshold α. 
4.2 Operations between Fuzzy Sets. Oper-
ations such as equality, and the inclusion of 
two fuzzy sets are derived from classical set 
theory. Two fuzzy sets are equal if each ele-
ment of the universe has the same degree of 
membership in each one of them. The fuzzy 
set A is a subset of fuzzy set B if every element 
of the universe has a membership degree 
lower in A than in B. 
Definition 8. Two fuzzy sets are equal (A = B) 
if and only if  
  (23) 
Definition 9. A is a subset of B (A ⊆ B) if and 
only if  
  (24) 
The fuzzy sets can be operated with each other 
in the same way as the classical sets, since the 
former is a generalization of the latter. The in-
terpretation with fuzzy sets is not as simple as 
traditional sets because they are used the char-
acteristics of membership functions. It is pos-
sible to define operations like union, intersec-
tion and complement using the same member-
ship functions. Zadeh proposed the following 
(Zadeh 1965): 
Definition 10. The intersection between two 
fuzzy sets is represented as follows:   
 (25) 
Definition 11. The union between two fuzzy 
sets is represented as follows:  
 (26) 
Definition 12. The complement of a fuzzy set is 
represented as follows:  
 (27)  
Definition 13. The product of two fuzzy sets 
A and B is defined as  
 (28)  
Definition 14. The sum of two fuzzy sets A 
and B is defined as 
 (29) 
Definition 15. a function n: [0,1] → [0,1]   is 
said that it is a negation function if and only if it 
verifies the following properties:  
 
1) n(0) = 1, n(1) = 0 (boundary condition) 
2) n(x) ≤ n (y) if x ≥ y (monotone) 
It also says that n is strict if and only if 
3) n(x) is continuous  
4) n(x) <n (y) if x> y ∀ x, y ∈ [0,1]  
and is involutive if and only s  
5) n(n(x)) = x ∀ x ∈ [0,1]  
c) T-Norms and S-Norms. In fact, the 
above definitions are quite arbitrary and could 
have been defined in many other ways. This 
includes considering more other general defi-
nitions for the operations between fuzzy sets 
in which they only have the same properties, 
similar to those seen in the classical sets the-
 when 
in any other case 
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ory. At present it is considered correct to de-
fine the intersection operator by any applica-
tion t-norm and the union operator by any ap-
plication s-norm (Schweitzer and Sklar 1961, 
1963, Weber 1983), which are non-decreasing 
functions, so increasing one of the sets,  also 
imply an increase its intersection or union. 
Definición 16. triangular Norm 
A triangular norm or t-norm is a function t: [0,1] 
× [0,1] → [0,1] which verifies the following 
properties:  
― It is nondecreasing in each argument:  
If x ≤ y and w ≤ z then t(x, w) ≤ t (y, z) 
― Commutativity  
t(x, y) = t(y, x), ∀ x, y ∈ [0,1] 
― Associativity  
t(t(x, y), z) = t(x, t(y, z)), ∀ x, y, z ∈ [0,1] 
― the boundary conditions are satisfied 
t(x, 0) = 0, t (x, 1) = x, ∀ x ∈ [0,1] 
― t is an Archimedean norm if and only if  
t(x, y) is continuous 
t(x, x) < x ∀ x ∈ (0,1) 
And an Archimedean t-norm is strict if and 
only if 
t(x',y')<t(x) if x'<x, y'<y ∀x',y',x,y ∈ (0,1) 
The t-norms are used to express the intersec-
tion of fuzzy sets:  
  (30)  
It can be said that the min operator is a t-
norm. 
Definition 17. Triangular conorm: 
A triangular conorm is also called t-conorm or s-
norm, is an application s: [0,1] × [0,1] → [0,1] 
that satisfies the following requirements:  
― s is nondecreasing in each argument 
― Commutativity 
― Associativity 
― Boundary conditions   
 (31) 
The s-norms are used to express the union 
of fuzzy sets:  
 (32) 
It can be concluded that the max operator 
is a t-conorm.  
― s is an Archimedes conorm if and only if:  
s(x, y) is continuous  
s(x, x)> x ∀ x ∈ (0,1)  
And an Archimedean t-conorm is strict if 
and only if  
s(x′,y′)<s(x,y) si x′<x, y′<y ∀x′,y′,x,y ∈ (0,1)  
 
d) Properties of Fuzzy Sets. The laws and 
properties that fufill the classical sets are not 
always followed in the case of fuzzy sets. The 
following sections examine what laws verify 
the fuzzy sets and what not: 
― Commutative property: always verified, be-
cause the t-norms s-norms are commuta-
tive by definition.  
― associative Property: is also verified as the t-
norms s-norms are associative.  
― Laws of idempotency: are fufilled.  The mini-
mum and maximum are chosen as opera-
tors for intersection and union, respec-
tively.  
― Laws of absorption: they are also met if the 
minimum-maximum pair are selected. This 
not true with other norms.  
― Distributive property: it is also true for the 
minimum and maximum, but not for other 
norms.  
― minor and major Property: always fulfilled due 
to the last property t-norms and s-norms.  
― Complement Involution: is satisfied if we define 
μĀ(x)=1−μA(x) since then:  
  (32) 
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― De Morgan's laws: its fulfillness is guarantized 
if the selected t-norms and s-norms are  de-
rived from each other: t (x, y) = 1-s (1-x ,1-
y).  
― complementary Laws: they are not verified in 
general. It is perhaps the clearest result to 
introduce the concept of fuzziness in the 
sets.  
5. Fuzzy Systems 
a) Fuzzy Relations. As seen before, all the 
operations of union, intersection and comple-
ment, operate in a single universe of discourse. 
However, the Cartesian product allows the 
product of universes of discourse. 
Cartesian Product. Let X and Y be any two uni-
verses of discourse.  A fuzzy relation R be-
tween X and Y is defined as a fuzzy set whose 
universe is the Cartesian product X × Y. That 
is: 
(33) 
  (34) 
If A1 and A2 ⊂ X ⊂ Y, and if  the Cartesian 
product of A12 and A is defined as: 
  (35) 
It can also be expressed as:  
  (36) 
Definition 18. Let X and Y be continuous uni-
verses of discourse. Then the function 
  
   (37) 
is a binary fuzzy relation on X × Y. If X × Y 
are discrete universes, then 
  (38) 
The integral denotes the sets of all tuples μR 
(x, y) / (x, y) on X × Y. It is also possible to 
express Equation (37) with ∫X∫Y μR(x,y)/(x,y), 
,i.e., with double integral. 
Definition 19. Let R and S be binary relations 
defined on X × Y. The intersection of R and S is 
defined by:  
   
  (39) 
T-norm can be used rather than the minimum.  
 
Definition 20. The union of R and S is de-
fined by:  
   
  (40) 
S-norm can be used rather than the maximum.  
 
Definition 21. A projection of a fuzzy relation 
μR: X1 × ... × Xn → [0,1] on the universe of 
discourse Xi, is defined as  
   
  (41) 
b) Composition of Relations. Let R be a 
fuzzy relation in the product X × Y and S 
forms another relationship in Y × Z.  
Definition 22. The sup-min composition of these 
two relations, denoted by R ° S, is defined as 
the fuzzy relation in X × Z whose member-
ship function is: 
 (42) 
Definition 23. The inf-max composition, de-
noted by R × S, is defined as: 
 (43) 
Definition 24. The sup-product composition as 
fuzzy relations in X × Z whose membership 
function is defined as: 
 (44)  
If we generalize the minimum and the product 
by a t-norm and the maximum by a s-norm, 
respectively, the compositions are obtained 
sup-t and inf-s: 
 (45) 
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c) Approximate Reasoning. Unlike classical 
logic, in fuzzy logic, reasoning is not precise, 
but it occurs in an approximate manner. This 
means that one can infer a consequent alt-
hough the rule antecedent is not completely 
verified (Approximate Reasoning). The higher 
the degree of compliance of the antecedent of 
the rule, the more approximate to the original 
rule the consequent part will be. The approxi-
mate reasoning is generally summarized, by 
extension of classical reasoning in the forms 
of "generalized modus ponens" and "general-
ized modus tollens. 
premise 1: Premis of the rule: 
x IS A* 
premise 2: rule: 
IF x IS A THEN y IS B 
Consequent: y is B*  
where A, B, A* and B* are fuzzy sets defined 
on the universes of discourse X, Y with mem-
bership function μA(x), μB(y), μA*(x) and 
μB*(y) respectively. This is the generalized modus 
ponens, which is reduced to the classical modus 
ponens when A = A* and B = B*. 
The function of involvement is represented by 
a fuzzy relation in X × Y: R = A → B  
  (47)  
This function can be defined in several ways. 
For example,  
1) Mamdani Implication: With respect to fuzzy 
control this Implication is the most important. 
Its definition is based on the intersection op-
eration as described above,  
    
  (48) 
that can be represented as a t-norm  
 
  (49) 
2) Zadeh Implication: The most widespread im-
plication. It firstly solves if A then B, if not A 
then C and then take A → B as a special case 
where C coincides with its universe of dis-
course, 
 (50) 
which can be written as  
  
  (51) 
Finally, the conclusion B * is a fuzzy set B *= 
A * ° (A → B) can be evaluated by a generali-
zation of Modus Ponens proposed by Zadeh:  
 
  (52) 
or 
 
 (53) 
i.e.,  
 
  (54) 
A more general case is that a system composed 
of r1 rules, each of which is of the form IF x 
IS Ai1 THEN y IS Bi1  
 
where i1={1,…, r1}   (55) 
 
  
Finally we analyze the case of rules with two 
antecedents. Let A, B and C defined fuzzy sets 
in X, Y and Z respectively. The rules are rep-
resented as follows: 
premise 1: Premisa of the rule: 
x IS A* E and IS B*  
premise 2: rule: 
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SI x IS Ai1 E y IS Bi2 THEN z IS Ci1 i2  
Consequent: z is C*  
being  (56) 
with  
 (57) 
and it can be described as: 
 (58) 
and 
 
 (59) 
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G
GENERAL THEORY OF INFORMA-
TION (GTI) (S. Teoría general d ela información, 
F. Theórie Générale de l'Information, G. Algemaine 
Theorie der Information) [Trans-disciplinary, For-
mal theories, Mathematical theories] theory, disci-
pline 
The General Theory of Information proposed 
by Mark Burgin (2003, 2010) is a synthetic ap-
proach, which reveals the essence of infor-
mation, organizing and encompassing all main 
directions in information theory. GTI has 
three parts or strata: 
• Philosophical/phenomenological, which gives a 
new vision of information and its place in 
the modern world; 
• Methodological, which studies basic princi-
ples of information theory and infor-
mation technology (→Principles of GTI); 
• Theoretical, which is mathematically based 
making available different mathematical 
models of information, information pro-
cesses and information processing sys-
tems (→Mathematical stratum). 
Under the awareness of the irreducible variety 
of information kinds, instead of pursuing a 
unitary definition of information, a parametric 
definition is developed on the phenomenologi-
cal level of the general theory of information. 
By this means, information in the strict sense 
stands in a very flexible way for a capacity to 
cause changes in an infological system. It is the 
adaptability of these infological systems, 
which enables this approach to adapt to the 
multifaceted reality of information by means 
of formal models. On the other hand, on the 
theoretical level, the general theory of infor-
mation provides tools for measuring and eval-
uating information. 
Information levels 
In the context of GTI, the concept of infor-
mation is considered on three basic levels of 
generality: 
1. Information in a broad sense is considered 
when there are no restrictions on the in-
fological system. 
2. Information in the strict sense is considered 
when the infological system consists of 
structural elements. 
3. Cognitive information is considered when the 
infological system consists of cognitive 
structures, such as knowledge, beliefs, 
ideas, images, etc.  
An infological system IF(R) of the system R is 
called cognitive if IF(R) contains (stores) ele-
ments or constituents of cognition, such as 
knowledge, data, ideas, fantasies, abstractions, 
beliefs, etc. A cognitive infological system of a 
system R is denoted by CIF(R) and is related 
to cognitive information.  
Consequently, we have three levels of infor-
mation understanding: 
1. Information in a broad sense for a system R is 
a capability (potential) to change (trans-
form) this system in any way. 
2. Information in the strict sense for a system R is 
a capability (potential) to change (trans-
form) structural components of this sys-
tem, e.g., cognitive information changes 
knowledge of the system, affective infor-
mation changes the state of the system, 
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while effective information changes sys-
tem orientation.  
3. Cognitive information for a system R is a ca-
pability (potential) to change (transform) 
the cognitive subsystem of this system. 
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H
HERMENEUTICS (S. hermenéutica, F. 
herméneutique, G. Hermeneutik) [Philosophy of 
language, semiotics, communication theory, 
ethical issues, information society] theory, discipline 
Contents.— 1) Is difference enough or do we also need 
interpretation?, 2) Roots of hermeneutics (a. Between obscu-
rity and clarity. Antiquity and Christianity, b. Modernity 
and the epistemology of clearness, c. From the evening of en-
lightenment towards postmodernity), 3) Hermeneutics in the 
digital era, 4) Towards a digital hermeneutics. 
1. Is difference enough or do we also need 
interpretation? Concerning hermeneutics 
and information theory, at the very beginning 
of the former we found a reflection con-
trasting with the famous definition of the cy-
bernetician Bateson, by whom information is 
“a difference what makes a difference” (Bateson 
1972: 459). In contrast with this causal rela-
tion, we found in Plato’s Theaetetus that “the 
reason [of what is said] is an interpretation 
(hermēnéia) of the difference” (“λόγος δέ γε ἦν ἡ 
τῆς σῆς διαφορότητος ἑρμηνεία”, Theaetetus: 
209a). What has been understood by interpreta-
tion has a long and varied history, but in any 
case, it refers to a problematic rather than a 
univocal process, also stressing a sense of ef-
fort. Such endeavour for a problematic sense 
clearly differs from the most common view-
point regarding information, for which there 
is a kind of causal and blind relation between 
information and its results in recipients. The 
dominance of this viewpoint in information 
concerns –which can be for instance observed 
in the automatic benefits expected by the in-
vestment in information technologies (Pérez-
Montoro 2008)– might draw us away from the 
awareness of the problems regarding the un-
covering of sense. To this regard, Søren Brier 
claims that “information is not enough” in the 
problem solving enterprise of our contempo-
rary societies (Brier 2008). 
As mentioned above, interpretation, whose 
modern sense usually refers to the going back 
from the sign to its sense, has a long tradition 
(in the extensions of both the latin interpretatio 
or its corresponding Greek term hermēnéia) 
where we also might encounter a root for the 
–so to say- transparency of information. 
2. Roots of hermeneutics.  
a) Between obscurity and clarity. Antiquity and Chris-
tianity. In addition to the mentioned sense in 
Plato’s work of interpretation as a problematic 
apprehension of sense, we also found hermēnéia 
in other Plato’s works as an art of accounting 
for an obscure and distant meaning (Ion: 535a, 
Statesman: 260d). Such strain in the uncovering 
of the hidden is to be extensibly deepened in 
the medieval exegesis and its influence in the 
humanism trends (in both positive and nega-
tive senses). 
Aristotle points out a connection, which is go-
ing to maintain a long tradition in hermeneu-
tics: for him, hermēnéia is linked to language as 
an externalist expression of thoughts (De an. 
420b). On the other hand, by using the term 
to name one of the treaties of the Organon, 
Perì hermēnéias, it is going to be later on identi-
fied as a technical term.  
In Christian Middle Ages, two main trends 
might be identified regarding the reception of 
the holy truth, whose weight varied through-
out this long period, and reaching both lines 
the consecutive times: 
In early high middle ages, the Agustine’s dic-
tum “credo ut intelligam” stands for a trans-
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parency and clarity of the holy message, rele-
gating interpretation just for allegorical images 
of the old testament (Augustine 1888: §89). 
From later high middle ages, such transpar-
ency will be doubted and moved towards the 
whole holy texts. In some contrast to 
Agustine’s dictum we find Anselm of Canter-
bury´s assert: “Fidens quaerens intellectum” 
(c. 1033 - 1109), remarking that the apprehen-
sion has to be active (Ortega 1956, Williams 
2007). 
The sense of deepening into obscure mean-
ings to bring them to light will be stressed to-
wards the humanism period, where these two 
tendencies can again be identified: on the one 
hand, an ecumenical strive for an interpreta-
tion of allegorical writings of neoplatonic as-
cendancy, as in the case of Pico della Miran-
dola (1463-1494); on the other hand, a relative 
rejection of allegoric readings in contrast with 
the clarity of God’s word, which must be ac-
cessible to all men, as in Erasmus of Rotter-
dam (c.1466-1536). This last trend, alienated 
with the Augustinian tradition can easily be 
identified with the endeavour for clarity in the 
very core of modernity, where the question of 
truth is not going to be tightened to religious 
discourse. 
b) Modernity and the epistemology of clearness. Alt-
hough the prevalence of the discourse of clar-
ity, the contrasting stances regarding the re-
ception of sense do not diminish with the ad-
vent of modernity, on the contrary, it some-
times showed an open and sharpen conflict 
between the role of authority in counter-refor-
mation and all men accessible strive for clarity 
in rationalism. While among the former, au-
thority is a mediating warranty in the hardness 
of interpretation, in the latter, clarity is the 
main guidance for the spirit: “all the things 
which we clearly and distinctly conceive are 
true” (Descartes 2008, §4). This topic of clear-
ness is going to be dominant in the rationalist 
and enlightenment movement, founding an 
epistemology in which the transparency of 
sense and true will be, for instance, the base of 
Locke’s semiotic theory, which is going to play 
an influential role in the scientific tradition –
especially in the Anglo-Saxon world 
(Copleston, v.5, §7.8). In Locke we observe 
two tendencies that we may later encounter in 
the communication models of the Mathemat-
ical Theory of Communication: 1) the already 
mentioned transparency contrasting with the 
hardness of interpretation, 2) the regardless of 
context contrasting with the necessity to re-
build the –so to speak- sense scene (Díaz and 
Hadithi 2009). Regarding the first, Locke con-
cludes his appraisal on general terms stating 
that: 
“[…] men making abstract ideas, and settling 
them in their minds with names annexed to them, 
do thereby enable themselves to consider things, and 
discourse of them, as it were in bundles, for the eas-
ier and readier improvement and communication of 
their knowledge […]” (Locke 1690, B.III, 
§3.20) 
But these general terms –supporting communi-
cation and knowledge- are bounded to general 
ideas which must be decontextualize: 
“Words become general by being made the signs of 
general ideas: and ideas become general, by separat-
ing from them the circumstances of time and place, 
and any other ideas that may determine them to this 
or that particular existence.” (ibidem, B.III, §3.6). 
c) From the evening of enlightenment towards post-
modernity. After the relative unfulfillment of the 
Enlightenment promises, right after the 
French Revolution, the topic of clearness 
opens towards a deeper consideration of the 
obscure, noteworthy in the Romanticism 
movement as well as in the idealism. In the 
nineteenth century, for instance in the work of 
Schleiermacher, the non transparency of the 
text is going to be acquainted not with respect 
to a transcendental distance, but to linguistic, 
historical and cultural reasons. The restoration 
of the context comes to the first plane and the 
interpretation aims -in Schleiermacher- to 
“understand the author better than he under-
stood himself” (Bollnow 1949), in the sense 
that even something about the historical-cul-
tural context can be found out in the herme-
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neutical process (thus beyond author’s inten-
tion). The historical knowledge and interpre-
tation becomes two faces of a same process. 
Such identification is going to be stressed in 
Dilthey for whom interpretation is an inten-
tional understanding (verstehen) of life mani-
festations permanently fixed (Dilthey 1909: 
319). Such interpretation process clearly dif-
fers from the “easier and readier” “communi-
cation” of “knowledge” depicted by Locke. 
Hermeneutics become circular: the interpreta-
tion of a reality to be understood is based on 
some previous (contextual) data, but the sense 
of this data is at the same time given by the 
understanding of the reality being interpreted. 
In other words, the outer perspectives alleg-
edly used to ‘explain’ phenomena –usually by 
means of causal reason–, is here substituted by 
a inner perspective in which phenomena is re-
cursively grasped. A similar change in the per-
spective of understanding is experienced in 
the foundations of second order →cybernetics. 
In the XXth century, most hermeneutical the-
ories continue the paths opened by Schleier-
macher and Dilthey. If we consider the phe-
nomenological reduction (epojé), through 
which phenomena should clearly manifest 
(Husserl 1970), as probably the last serious 
philosophical attempt of rebuilding the clear-
ness project of modernity (Marías 1967: 403ss, 
1980: 263-266), we might then regard the time 
after recognising the impossibility of the phe-
nomenological reduction as post-modernity. 
It is possible to establish a link between this 
breakdown and the discovery of Godel’s in-
completeness in formal systems or Heisen-
berg’s uncertainity in physics (Díaz 2003), 
which might also be considered as some for-
mal foundations of post-modernity. 
As Ortega showed in his early refutation of 
Husserl’s epojé (Ortega 1914) the apprehension 
can never be done without assumption. This 
is the fundament of Heidegger’s hermeneutics 
(Heidegger 1927: §32) for whom any existence 
has an inherent pre-understanding of the 
world where it “is thrown” (geworfen); and 
such pre-understanding is embodied in the 
language which is available to that existence. 
Interpretation in Heidegger becomes “the ar-
ticulation of that which is understood” as well 
as a constitutive dimension of the existence 
(ibidem). This existence is “being-in-the-
world with Others” and to that extend cannot 
be fully analysed (ibidem, §34). However the 
original worldly pre-understanding can be 
grasped in the unveiled “world”, i.e. in the sys-
tem of semantic relations allowing us to un-
derstand something as what can “stand out ex-
plicitly”. Deepening in this line, Gadamer de-
velops (especially focusing on art, history and 
language, therefore in a narrower sense that 
Heidegger) a fully hermeneutical ontology (Gada-
mer 1975). 
But if we take a look at the Anglo-Saxon tra-
dition we find out a practical absent of the in-
terpretation concept as it was generalised first 
in the nineteenth century historicism and af-
terwards by Heidegger. In this tradition, inter-
pretation has been restricted in two directions: 
1st) the comprehension of discourses and liter-
ary texts, stressing devotion on literacy criti-
cism and methodology; 2nd) pragmatism, where 
Peirce is the most relevant source. In this sec-
ond line, the influence of Peirce’s concept of 
interpretation as concerning the effects con-
veyed by signs (Peirce 1958: 5.475) has been 
of major relevance in the development of 
communication theory and semiotics, and also 
in several concepts of information. 
As we posed at the beginning of this article, is 
there not a lack of concern in information the-
ories with respect to the problems revealed by 
hermeneutic? Could not an approach between 
these two lines of interpretation bring new 
lights into information concerns? 
3. Hermeneutics in the digital era. We live 
in societies whose political, legal, military, cul-
tural and economic systems are based on digi-
tal communication and information networks 
or in societies that are making major efforts to 
bridge the so-called digital divide (Capurro et 
al. 2007). Maybe this is one reason why her-
meneutics, the philosophic theory dealing 
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with issues of interpretation and communica-
tion, has apparently lost the academic interest 
it had in the nineteenth century as a relevant 
methodology in the humanities as well as a 
way of understanding human existence in the 
twentieth century. Santiago Zabala, editor of a 
recent book in honor of the Italian philoso-
pher Gianni Vattimo, quotes Hans-Georg 
Gadamer, the founding father of philosophic 
hermeneutics, as follows: 
Vattimo has specifically called hermeneutics a 
koiné: the common language in which philosophical 
thought after Heidegger and Wittgenstein, after 
Quine, Derrida and Ricoeur, has spread every-
where; virtually a universal philosophical language. 
(Zabala 2007, p. 3) 
Vattimo's hermeneutical critique of metaphys-
ics and his plea for "weak thinking" can be re-
lated to Turing's halting theorem, basic to 
computational theory, as well as to Gödel's in-
completeness theorem (Chaitin 1982) as far as 
these theorems state some fundamental limits 
to our seeking after truth, which forces us to 
stand back from the claims to truth of moder-
nity as mentioned above.  According to these 
limits, we always make theoretical and/or 
practical presuppositions that cannot be made 
completely explicit once and for all. 
As shown in Capurro’s paper “Interpreting 
the digital human” (2008) hermeneutics is in-
timately related since the 1970s with digital 
technology. After having passed through crit-
ical theory (J. Habermas), critical rationalism 
(K. Popper), analytic philosophy (early L. 
Wittgenstein, Hilary Putnam, Donald Da-
vidson), deconstructivism (J. Derrida), the 
phenomenology of the symbol (P. Ricoeur), 
psychoanalysis (J. Lacan), dialectic materialism 
(A. Badiou), mediology (R. Debray), the her-
meneutics of the subject (M. Foucault) and 
particularly through Gianni Vattimo’s “weak 
thought” (“pensiero debole”), to mention just 
some of the prominent contemporary philo-
sophic schools, Hermeneutics is facing today 
the challenge arising from digital technology 
by becoming what Capurro calls digital herme-
neutics. Every revolutionary transformation in 
philosophy that leads to the creation of a new 
type of rationality arises usually from an out-
standing scientific or technological break-
through (Bosteels 2006, p. 116). Today’s 
global and interactive digital network, the In-
ternet is one of those breakthroughs. The In-
ternet’s challenge to hermeneutics concerns 
primarily its social relevance for the creation, 
communication and interpretation of 
knowledge. This challenge implies a question-
ing of the pseudo-critical rejection of herme-
neutics with regard to technology in general 
and to digital technology in particular 
(Capurro 1990). Facing the digital challenge 
hermeneutics must develop a “productive 
logic” (Heidegger 1976, p. 10) towards under-
standing the foundations of digital technology 
and its interplay with human existence.  A pro-
ductive logic “leaps ahead” (ibid.) of the estab-
lished self-understanding of a given science, in 
this case of hermeneutics, in order to under-
take a revision of its main concepts and dis-
close a new area of research. 
There is a blindness in some studies of con-
temporary hermeneutics with regard to these 
challenges (Figal 2007), with a few exceptions 
(Irrgang 2005, 2007; Fellmann 1998; Kurthen 
1992), as well as in seemingly comprehensive 
encyclopaedia articles (Gadamer 1974, Gron-
din 1996, Ramberg and Gjesdal 2005) also 
with a few exceptions (Introna 2005; Mallery, 
Hurwitz and Duffy 1990). In their article 
“Hermeneutics” in the Encyclopedia of Arti-
ficial Intelligence Mallery et al. do speak about 
the “precomputational nature of contempo-
rary hermeneutics” and suggest “the reformu-
lation and refinement of ideas about both her-
meneutics and AI.” (Mallery et al. 1990, p. 
374). 
4. Towards a digital hermeneutics. As ar-
gued elsewhere (Capurro 2008, 2009) the task 
of hermeneutics in the digital age is twofold, 
namely to think the digital and at the same 
time to be addressed by it. The first task leads 
to the question of the way in which the digital 
code has an impact on all kinds of processes, 
particularly the societal ones. In this regard, 
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digital hermeneutics is at the core of →infor-
mation ethics understood as the ethical reflec-
tion on rules of behaviour underlying the 
global digital network including its interaction 
with other social systems as well as with natu-
ral processes. The second task refers to the 
challenge of the digital with regard to the self-
interpretation of human beings in all their ex-
istential dimensions, particularly their bodies, 
their autonomy, their way of conceiving and 
living in time and space, their moods and un-
derstanding of the world, the building of social 
structures, their understanding of history, 
their imagination, their conception of science, 
and their religious beliefs. 
According to Lawrence Lessig “code is law” 
(Lessig 1999). If this is the case then herme-
neutics must reflect on the nature of this code 
and its interaction with economics, politics 
and morality. The balance between these 
spheres, including nature, is related to what 
was often called justice (“dike”) in Greek clas-
sical philosophy. This concept is broader than 
the one applied to social interactions, particu-
larly with regard to the distribution of eco-
nomic wealth. It implies the complex interplay 
between humans and nature using different 
programs or digital codes that interact with 
natural processes (Eldred 2006). It would be 
‘unjust’ if cyberspace were to dominate other 
spheres by becoming a digital metaphysics. 
The task of weakening such a project is a ma-
jor task of digital hermeneutics. One example 
of a strong version of the digital is the domi-
nance of mass media with their hierarchical 
structures in the twentieth century. Vilém 
Flusser feared that this power would eventu-
ally become the dominant one over dialogical 
structures of communication (Flusser 2006). 
The Internet weakens media monopolies. The 
digital code makes possible the interaction of 
the human with the natural and the artificial. 
The digital network weakens the classic West-
ern view of an autonomous subject and makes 
possible a dialogue with Taoist views of nature 
(Jullien 2003) as well as with Japanese Bud-
dhism (Capurro 2006). 
Ethics deals mainly with one question: who 
am I? This question is not to be understood as 
asked by an isolated individual but as a basic 
human question that is stated implicitly or ex-
plicitly in practical life by every human being 
no less than by groups, states and today's 
global dimension: who are we as humankind? 
This question is anything but academic. It is a 
question of survival. Hermeneutics in the dig-
ital age must become aware of this situation in 
order to make explicit the different political, 
legal and cultural norms and identities, the way 
they are affected by the digital code and the 
consequences for the construction of human 
identities as well as for the interaction between 
nature and society. Following Foucault, ethics 
can be understood as the questioning of mo-
rality (Foucault 1983). It works as a catalyst of 
social processes weakening the dogmatism of 
morality and law without just striving towards 
their replacement through another moral 
code. It is an open or free space that allows for 
a permanent critique of all kinds of blocking 
processes within and beyond the digital 
sphere. Who are we as a society at the local 
and global level in the age of digital and glob-
alized communication? This question does not 
address a problem of text interpretation but 
our own self-understanding and ‘verification’ 
in the sense that the media itself and the pro-
cesses that are object of hermeneutical study 
are at the same time existential dimensions of 
the interpreters themselves The hermeneutic 
subject ‘verifies’ or makes herself a digital ob-
ject. 
Human existence is a valuing activity but the 
human evaluator has no value but a “dignity” 
or “Würde” as Kant called it. This is not nec-
essarily based on a metaphysical view of man 
and world but arises already from the very sit-
uation of being-in-the-world itself as far as this 
being itself is not something we could valuate 
but is the horizon within which every valua-
tion takes place. Within this horizon, all be-
ings, human or not, have a dignity but non-
human beings, as far as they are not subjects 
of valuation processes, have a relative value 
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when they become object of human transac-
tions within a social process of valuation. 
From this perspective, the economy as a pro-
cess of permanent valuation is a main trait of 
every human community as such. This herme-
neutic reflection makes clear why the digital 
sphere as a product of human invention, can-
not become the final horizon of valuation for 
all possible understanding of the world and 
human existence. Being relative, the digital be-
comes an opportunity for the subjects of the 
twenty-first century to transform themselves 
and their connections in and within the world 
overcoming for instance the strong metaphys-
ical concepts that were leading for the self-un-
derstanding of Western societies for centuries. 
This does not  mean that such concepts could 
be set aside or just replaced by the new ones, 
but they can be hybridized with different kind 
of reasons, imaginations, ambitions and uto-
pias, hopes and disappointments arising from 
the digital code. 
If this is the case, in different ways and inten-
sities, the digital code becomes a real contri-
bution to humanity as well as to its interaction 
with non-human spheres. It could weaken the 
metaphysical ambitions of (Western) logos by 
making it more flexible with regard to the 
global cultural interplay in which we look for 
reasons for our preferences in dialogue with 
different beliefs and desires of other human 
beings. A future world must be open to an 
open horizon of understanding in which the 
"principle of charity" plays a major role avoid-
ing the danger of reasons becoming dogmatic 
beliefs to be eventually imposed on others by 
force. The digital network could become the 
place where such translations between differ-
ent languages take place in a global scale in this 
new century. This means allowing the other to 
articulate herself in the network, looking for 
nodes of relations, becoming as a hermeneutic 
subject of the digital age. This is the reason for 
the relevance of intercultural information eth-
ics (Hongladarom and Ess 2007; Capurro et al. 
2007). 
Who are we in the digital age? What does it 
mean for humanity to become transformed 
through the digital code? What are the episte-
mological, ontological and ethical conse-
quences? How do human cultures become hy-
bridized and in which way does this hybridiza-
tion affect the interplay with natural processes 
and their interplay with the production and 
use of all kind of artificial products in a digital 
economy? These questions go far beyond the 
horizon of classic hermeneutics as a theory of 
text interpretation as well as beyond classic 
philosophic hermeneutics dealing with the 
question about human existence inde-
pendently of the pervading impact of digital 
technology. We live in a world that is less and 
less a familiar “life-world.” We have become a 
troublesome field that requires hard labor and 
heavy sweat (“factus sum mihi terra difficulta-
tis et sudoris nimii”; Augustinus 1998, X, p. 
16). Hermeneutics misunderstands itself if it 
does not take care ontically and ontologically 
of digital technology with its overwhelming 
impact on our lives. Whereas digital technol-
ogy would pursue an empty target, if we be-
lieve that “information is enough” and we ne-
glect restoring “the reasons of what is said”. 
Thus we might be building up a “meaning-
less” Information Society. 
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HOLOGRAPHIC PRINCIPLE (S. principio 
holográfico, F. principe holographique, G. Holo-
grafisches Prinzip) [theoretical physics] concept, the-
ory 
This principle, suggested by Gerard’t Hooft in 
1993 and developed by Leonard Susskind 
(1997), points out that the information con-
tained in a volume can be represented by in-
formation over its bounding surface. 
Since there is a (quantum) limit in the entropy 
by surface unit (for every four Planck areas 
there is at most one degree of freedom –or a 
entropy unit corresponding to a Boltzman 
constant): the maximum entropy contained in 
a volume bounded by a surface of area A 
(measured in Plank areas) is A/4, which is 
named holographic bound. 
The holographic principle is related to the 
“generalized second law” [of thermondynam-
ics], proposed by Bekenstein, stating that “the 
sum of black hole entropies and the ordinary 
entropy outside the black holes cannot de-
crease” (Bekenstein 2003). 
By extension of the holographic principle, 
Bekenstein suggests that if the physics of our 
real universe (four-dimensional) were holo-
graphic, there would be an arbitrary set of 
physical laws to be applied on some three-di-
mensional bound of the space-time (i.e. the 
horizon of events). 
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I
IMAGE (S. imagen, F. image, G. bild) [audiovis-
ual, aesthetics, communication theory, cogni-
tion, message] concept 
“Image is always shaped by deep structures attached 
to the exercise of a language, as well as to the mem-
bership in a symbolic organization (a culture, a so-
ciety); but image is also a means of communication 
and representation of the world that has its place in 
all human societies”. (Jacques Aumont) 
Hans Belting says that an image is more than 
a product of perception. It manifests itself as 
a result of personal or collective symboliza-
tion. We know many of the events of the past, 
present and future through images that pro-
vide us, altogether, with a view, that is, with an 
idea, a concept, a sense of the period or situa-
tion. 
Thus, there are images that we see, but also 
mental or conceptual images that can act as 
benchmarks, models or diagrams helping us to 
interpret the world and our relationship with 
it. Currently, more than ever, we receive the 
information we process, analyze and synthe-
size at different levels, through visual images 
that act on the receptor differently depending 
on the context and circumstances where they 
manifest themselves. 
Logically, in turn, our mental images nourish 
themselves from the visual content circulating 
through the Technologies of Information and 
Communication; this provides a new para-
digm for the decoding of messages, the inter-
pretation of content and the development of 
communication mediated relations, in which 
images are the absolute protagonist, displaying 
their variegated meanings and presented 
through different media and in diverse for-
mats. 
But, what is a visual image? 
Visual image are the ones we perceive through 
sight, displayed in a support, material or me-
dium. A visual image is a photograph, a sculp-
ture, painting, illustration, engraving or the in-
terface of the computer screen. Images never 
present themselves, but always re-present, be-
cause they are displayed in a new material or 
medial dimension. This means that the refer-
ent acquires a concrete, new, synthetic or em-
phatic meaning when it is displayed through 
an image, which completes its full sense when 
it is interpreted by a receiver. 
As Vilches argues, images are empty forms, and 
require, if they have to transmit information, 
an observer’s interpretative competence to 
complete them with contents. An image is a 
proposition of which the receiver extracts the 
contents and meaning producing the phenom-
enon of communication in time and space. 
The material and the immaterial are unified in 
the image, which always needs a context and a 
specific time to be interpreted accurately. 
Moreover, rather than the presence of an ab-
sence, the image is defined as a synthesis, as an 
emphasis on an intention to mean something. 
We say "a" synthesis and not "the" synthesis, 
because the same image, depending on the 
context, the intention of the issuer, or the per-
ception of the receiver, can offer many senses. 
Therefore, the sense an image can have is not 
hermetic, but it depends on the interaction of 
several factors. Régis Debray, in Vie et mort de 
l’image, says that we internalize the images-
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things and externalize mental images, so that 
imagery and imagination induce each other. 
The classification of images has been, and is, a 
path chosen by different authors to come near 
a definition of the concept of image. We can 
dwell on the arguments of some of them. 
Abraham Moles establishes four features of im-
ages: the degree of figuration (the representa-
tion of objects or known beings), the degree 
of iconicity (the abstraction concerning the 
item represented), the degree of complexity 
(the various plastic elements) and the degree 
of normalcy (which is related to diffusion or 
copying). For Moles, visual messages allow us 
to represente a fragment of the world, whether 
real or imaginary; the visual communication 
process is established with an exchange of sig-
nals between the sender and receiver, either in 
a purely conventional framework or exploring 
an imaginary world in which different levels of 
abstraction are established or schematized. 
These different levels are what he calls the 
scale of iconicity. 
Martine Joly points out that there are three fac-
tors that play a role in the transmission of in-
formation through images: plastic signs (col-
ors, shapes, textures and space), iconic signs 
(pictures and motives) and linguistic signs. Joly 
starts out from the idea of analogy, and ex-
plains that an image is something that resem-
bles something else. Thus, in the study of the 
photographic image, she establishes two dis-
tinct levels: "observation" and "interpreta-
tion", and believes that in reading an image an 
interaction between it and the reader is estab-
lished which causes a series of expectations 
such as memorization and anticipation. 
For Donis A. Dondis there are three levels of 
visual expression: representation, which 
means particularity, abstraction, which means 
universality, and symbolism, which is conven-
tional. It must be said that these three levels of 
information are interconnected. Besides pro-
posing this general classification, she states 
that the content and form of an image are in-
separable; in visual communication this di-
chotomy does not occur. Any message is com-
posed with a purpose (i.e., to express, explain, 
direct, incite, accept) which, to be significant, 
requires the optimization of the formal ex-
pressions. 
On the other hand, Rudolf Arnheim distin-
guishes three functions, not classes, coining 
the terms of representation, symbol and sign. 
However, the most interesting part of his the-
oretical contribution is his formulation of "vis-
ual thinking". Arnheim says that visual percep-
tion is visual thinking, taking the first to be not 
a passive record of observed material, but an 
active interest of the mind. Also, images 
stored in memory are used to identify, inter-
pret and contribute to the perception of new 
images. Arnheim’s point can be used to con-
nect the two sorts of images we mentioned 
earlier in this article: visual images and mental 
images. 
Jacques Aumont also distinguishes three modes, 
namely: the symbolic mode, as when the di-
vine presence materialized through idols ven-
erated as sensitive manifestations (although it 
must be said that images, in its symbolic form, 
have also been used in the secularization of 
Western societies to transmit new values); the 
epistemic mode, as when images provide in-
formation and knowledge about the world; 
and the aesthetic mode, in which images 
please the viewer and provide him specific 
sensations. 
Visual studies, which have visual culture as ob-
ject of interest, analyze the information con-
tained in images, focusing on how technology, 
media and social practices of representation 
and reception are deeply interwoven with hu-
man societies, ethics and politics, aesthetics 
and epistemologies of seeing and being seen. 
W.J.T. Mitchell thinks that images have "lives" 
generated by those who created them; he fo-
cuses not only on the field of art, but also ar-
gues that visual culture is nourished by the 
most varied expressions from all areas. Mov-
ing beyond a semiotic view, he maintains that 
images are presented to us, and that we can 
not describe or interpret them linguistically. 
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Although they are related, words and images 
belong in knowledge categories that can not 
be compared with each other. 
The multiple visual environments of our time 
lead us to process information in a non-linear, 
immediate and fleeting way. In images we see, 
reflected, the environments where we operate, 
but also through images what exists, which 
can be intangible or, paradoxically, not visual, 
manifests itself. The fact of “putting in im-
ages” emotions, desires, arguments or differ-
ent intentions helps us discover new ways of 
imagining reality. 
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INCREMENTAL INFORMATION (S. 
información incremental, F. informations 
supplémentaires, G. inkrementelle Information) 
[Situation theory] concept 
Incremental informational content: relative to 
constraint C’, and given event s’, a situation s 
carries the information that there is a situation 
of type S’’ if and only if:  
a) There is a constraint C’ holding between 
the type that results from the conjunction 
of S and S’, and the type S’’ (C = [S S’ => 
S’’]). 
b) The anchoring event s’ is of type S’. 
c) The situation s is of type S. 
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INCOMPLETENESS (S. incompletud, incom-
pletitud, F. incompletude, G. Unvollständigkeit) 
[transdiciplinary, logics, recursiveness theory, 
formal semantics] concept  
Gathering things is quite different from gath-
ering sentences. Things, in its most general 
sense (what the classics called transcendental) 
are gathered in sets or bigger classes, up to the 
proper class of everything. We may say such a 
huge collection is complete. But notice it is de-
prived of the collection of all and only incom-
plete collections. Hence it is not complete af-
ter all. 
More modestly, we may gather all things that 
are sentences of a language. Just as in Borges' 
Babel Library, where the infinite set of all pos-
sible sentences are compiled. This set may 
seem somehow complete, but again notice it is 
not particularly interesting, since it is a trivial 
chaos where anything expressible is expressed. 
So let's now gather, even more modestly, only 
all the true sentences of a language. This is the 
first useful sense of completeness. Given a do-
main of interpretation and a language referring 
to it, a set of sentences is model-complete if it 
contains all sentences that are true in such a 
domain. Notice that other languages with dif-
ferent expressive power may also contain this 
set among their sentences; just as such a do-
main may be described by other languages. A 
mathematically precise notion of “domain of 
interpretation” brings us to distinct semantics. 
It's certainly not easy to gather model com-
plete set of sentences. Accumulating all truths 
about my left little finger is a huge task. Even 
gathering all expressible truths about my left 
little finger is an impressive unprobable piece 
of work. However, there are a number of such 
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huge tasks that we perform with our tiny 
brain, poor resources and limited time. 
Learning a natural language is one of them, 
since it involves the task of acquiring a recur-
sive procedure to access the infinite set of all 
sentences. Another example of the application 
of finite rules to construct an infinite amount 
of finite sequences is Babel's Library as de-
scribed by Borges, which is learnable or con-
structible with just the alphabet. 
Another computable procedure with the same 
recursive structure is the one constructing de-
ductions or proofs from rules and axioms. In 
this case sequences of sequences are recur-
sively formed, in such a way that an infinite set 
of truths can be condensed in a finite, even 
small, set of axioms. 
Is there a similar procedure to recursively ob-
tain a model-complete set of truths?, that is, a 
recursive or computational means to access all 
truths with respect to a certain domain of in-
terpretation? 
Take for example the natural numbers, as the 
infinite domain standardly interpreting arith-
metic. Let the language of arithmetic be given, 
say as was informally taught to us in school. 
Moreover, we have a computational proce-
dure to calculate logical consequences from 
basic axioms of arithmetic (as discovered by 
Peano and Frege). Do we have then a logical 
procedure to compute all arithmetical truths? 
Gödel proofed that such a procedure does not 
consistently exist, the proof being the first in-
completeness theorem. This answers nega-
tively the question whether a model complete 
collection of truths is accessible by purely re-
cursive or computational means. Notice it 
does not answer the question of whether non-
recursive methods are available to access the 
set of all truths (arithmetical or of another na-
ture). 
Annexed files include several explicit proofs 
and additional materials. for the notion of in-
form. 
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INDEXING LANGUAGE (S. lenguaje 
documental, F. langages documentaires, G. 
kontrolliertes Vokabular) [Information 
management, documentation, Library and 
Information Science] concept 
Indexing languages are a subset of natural lan-
guages used to describe documents. These 
languages are part of the information science 
techniques used to describe resources. The 
goal is to represent information in order to im-
prove the retrieval of relevant documents.  
There are several types of indexing languages. 
The oldest are library classifications and sub-
ject headings. In recent times, Computer Sci-
ence's development and changes in infor-
mation needs has brought new indexing lan-
guages.  
Indexing languages are concerned by two fac-
tors: 
― Considerations regarding linguistic aspects 
― Functional considerations. In specific con-
texts these tools are used to improve per-
formance. 
1. Types of Indexing languages 
d) Free Language: (i) Uniterm lists, (ii) Keyword 
lists, (iii) Glossaries, (iv) →Folksonomies 
e) Language codes: library classification schemes 
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f) Controlled vocabularies: (i) Based on hierar-
chies: →Taxonomies, (ii) Based on hierar-
chies, associations and equivalent terms: 
Thesauri and subject headings, (iii) Based 
on terminology ontologies in a specific con-
text and with associations to current re-
sources: →Topic Maps. 
2. Thesaurus as a reference model. 
Thesurus is a prototypical indexing language. 
A thesaurus is structured as a semantic net-
work limited to a domain. This network is 
composed of nodes, and each node represents 
a concept. This is an agreed language, with 
shared definitions in the domain. It is con-
trolled in the sense that only the thesuarus' 
terms could be used to describe a resource. 
This principle guarantees uniqueness in the re-
lationship concept-term. As a tool to control 
terminology it has the following term types: 
― Descriptors (terms used to represent the 
concepts within the domain). 
― Non-descriptors (terms from the domain 
that have an equivalent in the list of de-
scriptors. These terms are not used to rep-
resent documents, using the equivalent de-
scriptor). 
Descriptors are related by means of: 
― Hierarchical and associative relationships 
― Equivalence relationship to relate De-
scriptors and Non-descriptors.   
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INFO-COMPUTATIONALISM (S. Info-
computacionalismo, F. Info-calcul, G. Info-Berech-
nung) [Transdiciplinary, Philosophy of infor-
mation and computation, Computation the-
ory] theory 
Info-computationalism is the view that the 
physical universe can be best understood as 
computational processes operating on infor-
mational structure. Classical matter/energy in 
this model is replaced by information, while 
the dynamics are identified as computational 
processes. In this view the universe is a gigan-
tic computer that continuously computes its 
next states by following physical laws. Info-
computationalism thus appears as a conjunc-
tion of two theses: one about processes (com-
putation) – pancomputationalism (see e.g. 
Chaitin, 2009) and one about structure (infor-
mation) – paninformationalism (see Floridi, 
2008). 
What makes info-computationalist naturalism 
a promising research programme is, according 
to (Dodig-Crnkovic and Müller, 2010): 
― Unlike mechanicist paradigm, info-compu-
tationalist naturalism has the ability to 
tackle as well fundamental physical struc-
tures as life phenomena within the same 
conceptual framework. The observer is an 
integral part of the info-computational uni-
verse. (See Dodig-Crnkovic, 2010) 
― Integration of scientific understanding of 
the structures and processes of life with the 
rest of natural world will help to achieve 
“the unreasonable effectiveness of mathe-
matics” (or computing in general) even for 
complex phenomena of biology that today 
lack mathematical effectiveness (Gelfand) – 
in sharp contrast to physics (Wigner). 
― Info-computationalism (which presup-
poses pancomputationalism and paninfor-
mationalism) presents a unifying frame-
work for common knowledge production 
in many up to know unrelated research 
fields. Present day narrow specialization 
into various isolated research fields has led 
to the alarming impoverishment of the 
common world view. 
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― Our existing computing devices are a subset 
of a set of possible physical computing ma-
chines, and Turing Machine model is a sub-
set of envisaged more general natural com-
putational models. Advancement of our 
computing methods beyond the Turing-
Church paradigm will result in computing 
capable of handling complex phenomena 
such as living organisms and processes of 
life, social dynamics, communication and 
control of large interacting networks as ad-
dressed in organic computing and other 
kinds of unconventional computing. 
― Understanding of the semantics of infor-
mation as a part of the data-information-
knowledge-wisdom sequence, in which 
more and more complex relational struc-
tures are created by computational pro-
cessing of information. An evolutionary 
naturalist view of semantics of information 
in living organisms is given based on inter-
action/information exchange of an organ-
ism with its environment. 
― Discrete and analogue are both needed in 
physics and so in physical computing which 
can help us to deeper understanding of their 
relationship. 
― Relating phenomena of information and 
computation understood in interactive par-
adigm will enable investigations into logical 
pluralism of information produced as a re-
sult of interactive computation. Of special 
interest are open systems in communication 
with the environment and related logical 
pluralism including paraconsistent logic. 
― Of all manifestations of life, mind seems to 
be information-theoretically and philo-
sophically the most interesting one. Info-
computationalist naturalism (pancomputa-
tionalism + paninformationalism) has a po-
tential to support, by means of models and 
simulations, our effort in learning about 
mind and developing artifactual (artificial) 
intelligence in the direction of organic com-
puting. 
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INFOMORPHISM (E. Infomorfismo, F. Info-
mosphisme, G. Infomorphismus) [transdisciplinary, 
logics, semantics, situation theory] concept 
The mathematical concept of morphism tries 
to produce an image of a set that captures its 
structure. The notion of infomorphism gener-
alizes and extends this idea by means of defin-
ing certain homomorphism among structures 
supporting infons. The concept emerged orig-
inally in situation semantics and it has been ap-
plied in distinct contexts.  
Any set A includes all elements or tokens de-
fining a family R of relations on A. Let us call 
relational structure A the set A with these re-
lations. Let A, B respectively be relational 
structures <A,R> y <B,S>. Taken with be-
nevolence, an homomorphism from A to B is 
defined as any function f from A into B such 
that:  If  R(a1…an), then S(f(a1)…f(an)). B is 
then a homomorphic image of A.  
Consider now the specific relational structure 
which we may call classificatory relational 
structure A, taken as the result of classifying 
the elements or tokens of A by means of a set 
ΣA of types. For example, the set of tokens: {a, 
a, a} corresponds to a unique type a. We write 
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 y Ax 
to say that the token x instantiates the type y. 
Barwise and Seligman (1997) called classifica-
tions such classificatory structures 
A=<A, ΣA, A> 
where A is the grounding token set, ΣA  the set 
of individual types and A the relation of being 
an instance of. 
Let  A and B both be classificatory structures: 
An infomorphism i relating A y B consists in 
a pair of functions f+ (from ΣA  to ΣΒ ) and f- (from B 
to A) such that, for every type α of A and every token 
β de B: f+(b)A α ⇔ b B  f(α). 
Schematically: 
 
As an homomorphism preserves structure, so 
an infomorphism preserves the instantiation 
relation, among sets that can be quite distinct, 
but informationally analogous. 
In the references (Devlin, Gunji) you may find 
relevant examples of infomorphisms.  
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INFON (S. Infón, F. Infon, G. Infon) [transdis-
ciplinar, lógica, semántica] concepto 
You being happy is a state of things com-
posed by the object you instantiating the rela-
tion being happy. State of things such as: 
<<happy, you, yes>> are to be distinguished 
from other realities, such as the object you 
happy and the property of happiness-in-you. 
An ontology composed by things as you is dis-
tinct from another one composed by state of 
things.  
Notice how properties and relations are in-
stantiated in objects (your happiness, the red 
of my lips), while objects are not instatiated in 
other objects: they are fragments or parts, but 
not instances. Even if there is, through-out the 
milennia, no precise characterization of these 
basic notions of part and instance, both set 
theory and situation theory begin with some 
basic assumptions about both no-tions.  
Now, situation semantics assumes that situa-
tions are parts of reality which also have parts 
being states of affairs whcih are information. 
They are, it is assumed, objects instantiating 
properties and relations. Infons are the mi-ni-
mal information units posed by the onto-logi-
cal and set theoretical tools of situation se-
mantics. Notice that information is not only 
refered to a situation, but it is such situa-tion.  
Therefore, infons are states of things ex-press-
ible as tuples in the form 
<<R,a1,a2, ...,an,1>>,<<R,a1,a2, ...,an,0>> 
where R is a relation between n appropiate ob-
jects denoting that such objects are or are not 
in the relation. The final element is called po-
larity and signals the veracity <<R, a1, a2, ..., 
an, 1>>, or the falsity <<R, a1, a2, ..., a, 0>> 
of the relation R.  
Given a situation s and an infon σ, we write 
s  σ 
if the infon σ is supported or made factual in 
the situation s. In other words, the situation s 
is a fragment of reality which supports or car-
ries the information σ, eventually among many 
other states of things that happen to be real in 
that situation. 
Given the notion of infon, we can define the 
class of situations supporting such an infon. 
For example, <<war making, Afghanistan, 
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western countries, yes>> is supported in dis-
tinct situations through history, as in s1, the 
19th century british war making, s2 the 20th  
century russian war making, s3 the 21st cen-
tury US war making. Different situations in-
stantiate types of situations: given a relation R, 
let s be an assignment of real entities instanti-
ating R. A type of situation is a pair <<R, s>>, 
that can be satisfied or supported in different 
situations. We write: 
s  <<R, s>> 
to indicate that the situation s supports or sat-
isfies the type <<R, s>>. 
Note that a situation not satisfying a given 
type does not imply it satisfying that type's ne-
gation. 
The concept of type of situation makes it pos-
sible to introduce propositions in an in-fon 
setting; at least some particular family of prop-
ositions. A simple proposition is formed by a 
situation s and a type of situation <<R,s>> 
so that: proposition (s, <<R,s>>) is true if and 
only if  s <<R,s>> 
Finally, an infon is a fact just in case the ac-
tual situation supports it. 
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INFORMATION AESTHETICS (S. en, F. 
fr, G. al) [transdisciplinary, ICT] concept, theory, the-
orem, discipline, author, resource 
“Reality is a formality being present to man, not by 
a concept, or by a reasoning, but -from my view-
point- by an act of what I have called Sentient In-
telligence, namely by an impression.” (X. Zubiri) 
We consider aesthetics as the way in which 
subjects are aware of their identity. In an active 
way, they try to reach the reality they belong 
to and with which they have an interdepend-
ence relationship, this means that subjects are 
a way in which reality crystallizes. This way is 
depending on a space and temporary frame-
work that expresses it in terms of action and 
relation. It appears as a necessity for all the 
formalizing synthesis and it will serve as a tool 
to approach to the information from every-
where wanting to make it of one’s own. This 
implies a real perspectiviness, a relation be-
tween analyzing and analyzed that puts the 
known subject in a period between relation-
ships, in an aesthetic space. 
Inside the concept Aesthetics of Infor-
mation we can introduce a lot of methods and 
authors belonging to different fields of 
knowledge. Some of them are the following: 
In the middle of the XIXth century M. Weber 
established the known fraction that tried to 
emphasize a quantitative measure applied to 
the process of perception. For that, he used 
the concept of intensity in the stimulus, some-
thing that till that moment was a bit ambigu-
ous. So that, to perceive a change in a stimulus 
it is necessary that it grows in a constant pro-
portion in relation to its true magnitude:  
∆E/E = K 
This notion acquires a logarithmic form in the 
work of G. Fechner makes it more difficult 
adding to the term the one of intensity of the 
sensation. While this grows in an arithmetic 
progression the one of the stimulus grows in a 
geometric progression. The intensity of the 
stimulus S depends on the logarithm E in re-
lation to two constants K and C, where  
S = K · ln E + C 
S. S. Stevens, thinking about Weber’s law the 
same as Fechner, ended improving the for-
mula. In his case the variation of a sensation is 
not constant in relation to the sensation but it 
is proportional to it. The intensity of the sen-
sation S is equals to the constant C multiplied 
by the intensity of the stimulus E: 
S = C · Ek 
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But in all cases if the stimulus is any element 
or agent that stimulates, provoking a reaction 
in the body, whereas sensation in the impres-
sion produced, then it is expected that any 
quantitative formula intending to measure 
sensation will reduce its applicability hindering 
any comparison between stimulus (the ap-
plicability depends on the determination of 
the field, which nowaday runs the risk to be 
restricted to the fields of media and ICTs). 
A bit later, W. Wundt, follower of the ideas 
of Helmholtz, gave the first steps through the 
door that the previous physiological method 
has opened. He not only gave psychology a 
method but also he gave it the scientific char-
acter that it has currently. On the one hand he 
analyzes the sensations with comparative sys-
tems that play with a reality that is supposed 
to be objective, and on the other one he ana-
lyzes the subjective sensation that provokes in 
people. His new structuralist idea would gen-
erate a long list of followers. 
While this was happening in Leipzig, in Wei-
mar the chool of psychology of the Gestalt 
was being founded: M. Wertheimer, W. Köh-
ler, K. Koffka and K. Lewin will say to the 
world that perceptions are not a group of iso-
lated images but they consist of configurations 
that function as structured unities. Max 
Wertheimer, creator of the school, shows a 
whole series of innate laws that organize per-
ception. Koffka analyzes the way in which the 
human being and the environment interplay to 
develop a theory of the human behaviour. K. 
Lewin starts from the idea of gestalt, which 
first differentiates the figure from the back-
ground. He develops his theory according to 
the idea of environment that functions as the 
framework in which the human being devel-
ops. For that he takes from Physics the con-
cept of field, understood as the place where 
the particles interplay. For him the behaviour 
is a functionbetween the person and the envi-
ronment: C = f(p.a). This communion shows 
that it is impossible the conception of the hu-
man knowledge without taking into account 
the field, and also that it cannot be thought a 
figure without a background. Köhler, in his in-
vestigations about the primate reasoning, con-
cludes that learning is not the result of a 
method of experiment and error, as the behav-
iourist thesis said. On the contrary it showed 
spontaneously and suddenly. 
Karl Bühler, who had also been formed in the 
Weimar school, develops a complete theory 
about language. He analyzes the sign from the 
point of view of the speaker, of the listener 
and the referent and he established three re-
spective functions of language: the representa-
tion, expression, and appeal. His pupil Karl 
Popper adds a new one: the argumentative. 
As they established relations on the way the 
brain orders thought, the development of the 
structuralism was near. 
The analysis of the configurations through 
which the human being discovers reality is sci-
entific, but we cannot forget that to do it we 
need to leave the logic of the speech. That is 
to say, formal analysis needs to be articulated 
by rules that are beyond it for both, Science 
and Language, need rules to be articulated and 
because of it they have a determinist character. 
The basis of the problem is in the final profile 
of some tools that are really hermetic, in the 
case of the formal definitions in general as well 
as in their symbolic side. R. Jakobson, using 
again the mathematic theories of information 
of Shannon and Weaver and influenced by 
Bühler’s ideas, develops a linear model of 
communication where he describes six func-
tions of language (referential, emotive, cona-
tive, phatic, metalingual, and poetic) related to 
the six basic elements of the communicative 
process (context, sender, receiver, message, 
common code and contact) 
It is from scientific and mathematical theories 
and languages that E. Cassirer takes the con-
cept of function to develop a philosophy of 
symbolic forms. The human capability of be-
ing able to name, turns reality into a symbolic 
concept and becomes part of it. That data 
originates complex symbolic forms integrated 
in all areas and functions of the human being. 
This integration creates perceptions which 
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separate from prior data. Critical thinking does 
not come with reason but with its cultural as-
pect. It is a criticism to knowledge which is 
created as a historic criticism that enriches pre-
vious meanings constantly. 
G. Birkhoff approaches to aesthetics through 
mathematical studies on music and geometric. 
In the thirties, he published his book Aesthetic 
Measure that shows the quotient between the 
order and the complexity:  
M=O/C 
Both notions come from a rereading of the 
idea of symmetry, of repetition, of regularity. 
If order refers to the regularity of elements of 
an image, the complexity refers to the number 
of elements that form that image. His work 
begins the interest for the quantitative and 
mathematic formalization of the aesthetic as-
pects generating a way that will be followed by 
authors such as A. Moles, M. Bense o R. Arn-
heim, among others. 
Regarding A. Moles, he mixes technical, phys-
ical and philosophical knowledge with some 
aspects of structuralism with the human be-
haviour in the communicative process to de-
velop his sociological and statistical studies. In 
his book The physical structure of the musical and 
phonetic signal, of the year 1952, he analyzed 
how a signal becomes lower till it isn’t per-
ceived. Six years later he published Theory of 
the information and aesthetic perception 
where his deductions began in the road of 
measurability designed by Weber and in the 
theory of behaviour of Pavlov. In his work it 
is shown up the interaction between the se-
mantic and static aspects of the message. He 
works on concepts such as the greatest infor-
mation, the originality, the complexity and the 
redundancy. His gestalt approach of the form 
develops a sense of unity that follows param-
eters contrary to chance. His structuralist 
method analyzes the communicative action 
within a context in which he places a sender 
and a receiver that share the same language 
and, for that, the same index and a common 
code, emphasizing original, understandable 
and foreseeable elements. 
For M. Bense the aesthetic aspect of the com-
municative process belongs to its own physi-
cal support. In his Aesthetic of information he 
criticizes the arbitrariness and limits that the 
application of Birkhoff’s formula shows, em-
phasizing the order version of S. Maser. In the 
new formula the amount of complexity as-
pects will be taken into account. His work is 
completed by a theory about text, chosen as 
an example of order and display of aesthetic 
elements. 
  
Figure 1: Communicative system taken of A. Moles; B. 
Vallancien (1963) 
 
Figure 2: Communicative system in M. Bense (1972). 
The anthropological turning is due to H.-G. 
Gadamer based on Dilthey, Husserl or 
Heidegger´s phenomenology. From his her-
meneutic perspective, he criticizes the limits of  
the scientific method when being applied to 
the study of interactions within the communi-
cative process. Understanding stops being an 
aspect of behavior to become the individual 
behavior of a person who is trying to interpret 
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his reality.   He looks into the sifnificant struc-
tures on knowledge, analyses the person´s ex-
istence and leaves behind the exact method, 
inflexible and out of its context. 
In the 60s the Frankfurt School is formed. A 
group of left-wing thinkers from different dis-
ciplines, Th. W. Adorno, J. Habermas, M. 
Horkheimer and F. Oppenheimer, who un-
dertake some social studies which criticize the 
political tradition of the time, although with  
no common criteria. Th. W. Adorno, who be-
longs to the dialectical method, studies the 
limits of critical thinking, taking into account 
the media pressure that the person has to un-
dergo in an industrialized society, which is cul-
turally deshumanized and which creates a gen-
uine pressure that deprives ideologies. Follow-
ing Horkheimer, he forms a social criticism in 
which he confronts the ideal being with the 
real one. Reason can´t be historic, there´s al-
ways a criticism. 
J. Habermas goes further. He creates the 
Theory of Communicative Action confront-
ing two rationalities: on the one hand, the sub-
stantive according to the internal perspective 
of the human being and, on the other, the in-
stitutionalized system according to an external 
perspective, which is shown through its struc-
tures and complex formal processes. In this 
framework the rules of the communicative ac-
tion show behaviours which must be analysed 
from the different positions of the subjectivist 
methods. 
The Constance School, with Jauss and other 
researchers, will study the texts focusing on 
the analysis of form and content. It is not a 
matter of reaching a unique truth; the commu-
nicative process constantly enriches reality. 
H.-R. Jauss, influenced by structuralism, 
shows how meanings separate from the per-
son through history. That is why he explains 
the need of an interpretive hermeneutic 
method which provides the text with sense 
away from a historic vision.  
The second half of the XXth century brings 
out some different points of view about the 
aesthetic information. In psychology, R. Arn-
heim says that the human being approaches 
to reality through his senses thanks to forms 
of perception. In fact, perception and 
knowledge are deeply united. The very sensi-
tivity is the one that develops intelligence. 
In the semiotic method data do not have im-
portance or order till they do not have mean-
ing. Ch. Morris studies the role of the receiver 
as the one who interprets the signs of lan-
guage. If the aesthetic measure of Birkhoff 
seemed a bit simple, the value of the iconic 
sign of Morris is quite complicated. His quali-
tative analysis is left for the aspects of the 
speech. As the study begins to take into ac-
count the figure of the person who interprets, 
his behaviour starts to be more important and 
impairs the semantic aspect of the study. U. 
Eco develops and generalizes the semiotic an-
alyzes as communicative facts related to all so-
ciety. 
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INFORMATION AND COMMUNICA- 
TION TECHNOLOGIES (ICT) (S. 
Tecnologías de la Información y las 
Comunicaciones –TICs, F. Technologies de 
l'Information et de Communication -, G. 
Information- und Kommunikationstechnologien)
[Transdisciplinar, Information Society] concept, 
discipline, resource
Currently, our society is characterized by a 
growing and determinant emphasis on 
infor-mation and knowledge in wealth 
production. This constitutes the so-called 
information age, information society or 
knowledge-based soci-ety. This information 
age is characterized by the use, distribution, 
storage and creation of new information 
and knowledge resources through the 
application of information and 
communication technology (ICT). ICT is a 
set of advanced techniques, developments 
and devices that integrate functionalities to 
infor-mation storage, processing and 
transmission. 
120 
This term is used to refer to informatics con-
nected to the Internet and especially the social 
aspect. These technologies can be used for ed-
ucational purposes and cultural global promo-
tion as well.  
Technologies dealing with the treatment of in-
formation offer a special service to society 
since they make possible activities like re-
searching, organizing, and handling data, in-
formation and knowledge along with other 
electronic media like the cell phone, fax, Inter-
net and television. This media have produced 
a significantcultural change as long as -in prin-
ciple- people have access to real knowledge, 
assets and intangible cultural values. ICT is not 
egalitarian. It is prevalent in wealthy countries, 
especially among upscale social groups as a 
mechanism to replicate inequality. However, 
there is a difference with regards to traditional 
inequalities: ICT penetrates faster and 
stronger among young people. What we know 
as the →digital divide does express these ine-
qualities. This information society exclusion is 
no other than a new way to segregate people. 
This can be called digital marginalization. This 
marginalization is the result of the technology 
revolution. Evidently, this is not resolved by 
connecting computers in a network since core 
problems may remain the same. These prob-
lems are amplified by the access to different 
avenues to grow faster excluding even more 
developing countries. This asks for resolving 
essential rights to favour integral individual 
self-improvement allowing the participation in 
current changes in nourishment, education, 
health, and work rights.  
Knowledge production, diffusion and use 
should be transformed into the main growth 
opportunity as farming or industrial produc-
tions once were. Otherwise, we will have no 
other chance to participate in the knowledge 
society and we will only become mere specta-
tors. This issue is not really new. We have 
found out that the development is the result 
of the knowledge that countries are able to 
generate, diffuse and manage. Nowadays, this 
is so evident that differences are still raised ex-
ponentially.  
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Our times are the current stage of transfor-
mations and radical changes so relevant that 
some people do not hesitate to claim we are 
living a third industrial revolution. This is no 
other than the so-called technology and com-
munication information revolution. It goes 
along with a change in the knowledge system.
For several decades now, the extent of tech-
nology transformation has been influencing 
the means for the creation, treatment and dif-
fusion of knowledge. We believe this may 
bring about a new digital knowledge age. 
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INFORMATION ARCHITECTURE (S. 
arquitectura de la información, F. Architecture de l'in-
formation, G. Informations-Architektur) [Research 
and practice] concept 
Information Architecture is born in the late 
1990s, based on the classical principles of solid 
traditional Information Science (mainly from 
the discipline of the Organization and Repre-
sentation of Knowledge). In a technical sense, 
it is a discipline (and at the same time a com-
munity of practice) focused on design princi-
ples and architecture of digital spaces in such 
a way that they comply with criteria of usabil-
ity and information retrieval. In other words, 
it is a discipline that deals with structuring, or-
ganizing and tagging elements of informa-
tional environments to facilitate searching and 
retrieval of the contained information, thus 
improving the usefulness of information envi-
ronments by users. 
One of the main characteristics of the infor-
mation architecture in an information envi-
ronment (for instance, a web page) is that it is 
usually not recognizable by the users. In other 
words, such architecture is invisible to the 
user, though there are in fact a number of (not 
visible) articulated systems or structures, de-
fining the information architecture of, for ex-
ample, a web page. These systems or struc-
tures are called components of the Information 
Architecture of a web or also anatomy of the 
Information Architecture of a web. Among 
these systems or structures that build the in-
formation architecture there are systems such 
as: organization systems, labeling systems, 
navigation systems, search systems and con-
trolled vocabularies.  
Organization systems are classifications that al-
low structuring and organizing the contents of 
a website. The labeling systems, however, define 
the terms used to name the categories, options 
and links used on the web with a useful lan-
guage for users. Navigation systems permit to 
navigate or move through a site to find the in-
formation we need; showing us where we are 
and where we can go inside the structure of a 
site. Search systems enable the retrieval of infor-
mation within the website using tools such as 
indexes. Finally, in this context, controlled vocab-
ularies are documental resources designed to 
articulate other systems and to facilitate infor-
mation searches and retrievals. 
References 
― GARRETT, Jesse James (2002). The Elements of 
User Experience: User-Centered Design for the 
Web. Indianapolis: New Riders Publishing,  
― MORROGH, Earl (2002). Information Architec-
ture: an Emerging 21st Century Profession. Upper 
Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall  
INFORMATION ETHICS 
122  g l o s s a r i u m B I T r i  
― MORVILLE, Peter and ROSENFELD, Louis 
(2006). Information Architecture for the World 
Wide Web. 3rd Edition. Sebastopol (CA): O’Reilly 
Media Inc.  
― PÉREZ-MONTORO, Mario (2010). Arquitectura 
de la Información en entornos web. Gijón: Trea.  
― WODTKE, Cristina (2002). Information Architec-
ture: Blueprints for the Web. Boston: New Riders 
Publishing. 
(MPM. –ed.-; MPM., MG) 
INFORMATION ETHICS (S. ética de la 
información, F. étique de l'information, G. 
Informationethik) [information society] discipline 
Contents.— 1) Introduction, 2) The Global Impact of 
ICT on Society and the Environment, 3) Digital Media 
Ethics: an intercultural concern, 4) Towards a common 
world: new risks, new responsability 
Digital ethics or information ethics in a broader sense 
deals with the impact of digital Information 
and Communication Technologies (ICT) on 
our societies and the environment at large. In 
a narrower sense information ethics (or digital 
media ethics) addresses ethical questions deal-
ing with the internet and internet-worked in-
formation and communication media such as 
mobile phones and navigation services. As we 
will argue, issues such as privacy, information 
overload, internet addiction, digital divide, 
surveillance and robotics, which are topics of 
prevailing discussion, requires an intercultural 
scrutiny. Information Ethics is posed as an en-
deavour to cope with the challenging prob-
lems of our digital age. 
1. Introduction. Since the second half of the 
last century computer scientists, such as Norb-
ert Wiener (1989/1950) and Joseph Weizen-
baum (1976), called public’s attention to the 
ethical challenges immanent in computer tech-
nology that can be compared in their social rel-
evance to the ambivalent promises of nuclear 
energy. In the beginning the discussion was 
focused on the moral responsibility of com-
puter professionals. But for scientists like Wie-
ner and Weizenbaum the impact of computer 
technology was understood to be something 
that concerned society as a whole. 
Half a century after Wiener’s seminal work the 
World Summit on the Information Society 
(WSIS) developed the vision  
“[…] to build a people-centred, inclusive and devel-
opment-oriented Information Society, where every-
one can create, access, utilize and share information 
and knowledge, enabling individuals, communities 
and peoples to achieve their full potential in promot-
ing their sustainable development and improving 
their quality of life, premised on the purposes and 
principles of the Charter of the United Nations and 
respecting fully and upholding the Universal Decla-
ration of Human Rights.” (WSIS 2003). 
The WSIS also proposed a political agenda, 
namely 
“[…] to harness the potential of information and 
communication technology to promote the develop-
ment goals of the Millennium Declaration, namely 
the eradication of extreme poverty and hunger; 
achievement of universal primary education; promo-
tion of gender equality and empowerment of women; 
reduction of child mortality; improvement of mater-
nal health; to combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and 
other diseases; ensuring environmental sustainabil-
ity; and development of global partnerships for de-
velopment for the attainment of a more peaceful, just 
and prosperous world.” (WSIS 2003). 
The academic as well as the social debates on 
these issues have increased rapidly particularly 
since the rise of the Internet. Digital ethics or 
information ethics can be considered in a narrower 
sense as dealing with the impact of digital ICT 
on society and the environment at large as well 
as with ethical questions dealing with the In-
ternet digital information and communication 
media (digital media ethics) in particular. In-
formation ethics in a broader sense deals with in-
formation and communication including -but 
not limited to- the digital media. 
2. The global impact of ICT on society and 
the environment. Economic, political and 
ecological activities of modern societies rely 
heavily on digital communication networks.  
The relevance of digital ICT on the economy 
became obvious with the burst of the 2000 
dot.com bubble. Its close dependence with the 
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financialisation of economy as well as the 
transformation of economical activities in the 
last two decades leading to a increasing glob-
alisation of  the economical structure 
(Estefanía 1996, Ramonet 2004, Castells 2007) 
lead us to consider ICT as one of the main fac-
tors leading to the recent world economic cri-
sis (Bond 2008). Beyond the moral individual 
responsibility of politicians, bankers and man-
agers, there is a systemic issue that has to do 
with the digitalization of communication and 
information in finances and economics. Digi-
tal capitalism was and is still able to bypass na-
tional and international law, control and mon-
itoring institutions and mechanisms as well as 
codes of practice and good governance lead-
ing to a global crisis of trust not only within 
the system but with regard to the system itself. 
Many  experts in politics and economic agree 
that in order to develop a people-oriented and 
sustainable world economic system, national 
and international monitoring agencies as well 
as international laws and self-binding rules are 
needed. Academic research in digital ethics 
should become a core mandatory issue of eco-
nomics and business studies. Similarly to the 
already well established bioethics committees, 
ethical issues of ICT should be addressed tak-
ing as a model for instance the European 
Group on Ethics in Science and New Tech-
nologies to the European Commission (EGE; 
Capurro 2004). 
ICT has a deep impact on politics leading to 
a transformation of 20th century broadcast 
mass media based democracy, or mediocracy, on 
the basis of new kinds of digital-mediated in-
teractive participation. New interactive media 
weakens the hierarchical one-to-many struc-
ture of traditional global mass-media, giving 
individuals, groups, and whole societies the ca-
pacity to become senders and not “just” re-
ceivers of messages (→message, dialogic vs discur-
sive). 
We live in message societies. I call the science 
dealing with messages and messengers angelet-
ics (from Greek: άγγελία/άγγελος = message/ 
messenger) (Capurro 2003, →angeletics). New 
ICTs are widely used for political participation 
and grass-roots protest groups as well as by 
liberation and peace movements. By the same 
token, digital communication networks make 
possible new structures of political surveil-
lance, censorship and control on individuals 
and whole societies. Digital ethics should ad-
dress the question of the human right to com-
municate (→Critical Theory of Information). 
The Internet has become a local and global 
basic social communication infrastructure. 
Freedom of access should be considered a 
fundamental ethical principle similar to free-
dom of speech and freedom of the press. 
Some of the rights stated in the Universal Dec-
laration of Human Rights such as the right to 
freedom of thought, conscience and religion 
(Art. 18), the right to freedom of opinion and 
expression (Art. 19), and the right to peaceful 
assembly and association (Art. 20) need to be 
explicitly interpreted and defined taking the 
new and unique affordances of internet-
worked digital media into consideration. Law-
rence Lessig (1999) envisaged a situation in 
which the universality of Cyberspace is endan-
gered by local codes of the market, the soft-
ware industry, the laws of nation states, and 
moral traditions. He writes: 
“If we do nothing, the code of cyberspace will change. 
The invisible hand will change it in a predictable 
way. To do nothing is to embrace at least that. It is 
to accept the changes that this change in code will 
bring about. It is to accept a cyberspace that is less 
free, or differently free, than the space it was before.” 
(Lessig 1999, 109) 
A free Internet can foster peace and democ-
racy but it can also be used for manipulation 
and control. For this reason, a necessity to 
strive for a future internet governance regime 
on the basis of intercultural deliberation, dem-
ocratic values and human rights has been 
pointed out (Senges and Horner 2009, 
Capurro 2010). 
Another issue arisen in contemporary societies 
concerns the impact of the materialities of 
ICT on nature and natural resources. Elec-
tronic waste has become major issue of digital 
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ethics (IRIE 2009). It deals with the disposal 
and recycling of all kinds of ICT devices that 
already today have devastating consequences 
on humans and the environment particularly 
when exported to Third World countries. Is-
sues of sustainability and global justice should 
be urgently addressed together with the op-
portunities offered by the same media to pro-
mote better shelter, less hunger and combat 
diseases. In other words, I advocate for the ex-
pansion of the human rights discourse to in-
clude the rights of non-human life and nature. 
The present ecological crisis is a clear sign that 
we have to change our lives in order to be-
come not masters but stewards of natural en-
vironment. 
3. Digital media ethics: an intercultural 
concerní. The main topics of digital media 
ethics or digital (information) ethics com-
monly addressed are: intellectual property, pri-
vacy, security, information overload, digital di-
vide, gender discrimination, and censorship 
(Ess, 2009; Himma and Tavani 2008). How-
ever a more critical reflection -as previously ar-
gued- should also embrace issues concerning: 
economical responsibility, political participa-
tion and materialities of ICT. 
All these topics are objects of ethical scrutiny 
not only on the basis of universal rights and 
principles but also with regard to cultural dif-
ferences as well as to historical and geograph-
ical singularities leading to different kinds of 
theoretical foundations and practical options. 
This field of ethics research is now being 
called intercultural information ethics 
(Capurro 2008; Hongladarom and Ess 2007; 
Capurro 2006; →Intercultural Information Eth-
ics). 
One important challenge in this regard is the 
question about how human cultures can flour-
ish in a global digital environment while avoid-
ing uniformity or isolation. Research networks 
on Information Ethics are flourishing in Af-
rica (ANIE: African Network for Information 
Ethics: ANIE) and Latin America (RELEI: 
Red Latinoamericana de Ética de la Infor-
mación). 
An example of the relevance of the intercul-
tural approach in digital media ethics is the dis-
cussion on the concept of privacy from a 
Western vs. a Buddhist perspective. While in 
Western cultures privacy is closely related to 
the self having an intrinsic value, Buddhism re-
lies on the tenet of non-selfand therefore the so-
cial perception as well as the concept of pri-
vacy are different (Nakada and Tamura 2005; 
Capurro 2005). However, a justification of pri-
vacy from a Buddhist perspective based on the 
concept of compassion seems possible and plau-
sible (Hongladarom 2007). 
Digital surveillance of public spaces is sup-
posed to ensure safety and security facing un-
intentional or intentional dangers for instance 
from criminal or terrorist attacks. But at the 
same time it threatens autonomy, anonymity 
and trust that build the basis of democratic so-
cieties (RISEPTS 2009). New technologies al-
lowing the tracking of individuals through 
RFID or ICT implants are similarly ambigu-
ous with regard to the implicit dangers and 
benefits. Therefore they need special scrutiny 
and monitoring (EGE 2005). 
Recent advances in robotics show a wide 
range of applications in everyday lives beyond 
their industrial and military applications 
(ETHICBOTS 2008). Robots are mirrors of 
ourselves. What concepts of sociality are con-
ceptualized and instantiated by robotics? An 
intercultural ethical dialogue – beyond the 
question of a code of ethics to become part of 
robots making out of them “moral machines” 
(Wallach and Allen 2009) – on human-robot 
interaction is still in its infancy (Capurro and 
Nagenborg 2009, →roboethics). 
Another example is the question of infor-
mation overload, which has a major impact 
in the everyday life of millions of people in in-
formation-rich societies (Capurro 2005b) giv-
ing rise to new kinds of diseases and challeng-
ing also medical practice (Capurro 2009). We 
lack a systematic pathology of information so-
cieties. Similarly the question of internet ad-
diction particularly in young generations, is 
worrisome. For example there is a growing 
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need for cell-phones-free times and places, in 
order to protect ourselves from the imperative 
of being permanently available. 
The ethical reflection on these issues belongs 
to a theory of the art of living following some 
paths of thought by French philosopher 
Michel Foucault. He distinguishes the follow-
ing kinds of technologies, namely:   
"technologies of production, which permit us to 
produce, transform, or manipulate things," 
"technologies of sign systems, which permit us to 
use signs, meanings, symbols, or significa-
tions," 
"technologies of power which determine the con-
duct of individuals and submit them to certain 
ends or domination, an  
"technologies of the self, which permit individuals 
to effect by their own means or with the help 
of others a certain number of operations on 
their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct, 
and way of being, so as to transform them-
selves in order to attain a certain state of hap-
piness, purity, wisdom, perfection, or immor-
tality." (Foucault 1988, 18) 
How can we ensure that the benefits of infor-
mation technology are not only distributed eq-
uitably, but that they can also be used by the 
people to shape their own lives? (Capurro 
2005a; See also Capurro 1996; 1995; 1995a). 
Another important issue of digital media eth-
ics concerns the so-called digital divide 
should not be considered just a problem of 
technical access to the Internet but an issue of 
how people can better manage their lives using 
new interactive digital media avoiding the dan-
gers of cultural exploitation, homogenization, 
colonialism, and discrimination. Individuals as 
well as societies must become aware of differ-
ent kinds of assemblages between traditional 
and digital media according to their needs, in-
terests and cultural backgrounds (Ong and 
Collier 2005). An inclusive information society 
as developed during the WSIS must be global 
and plural at the same time. Concepts likehy-
bridization or polyphony are ethical markers that 
should be taken into account when envisaging 
new possibilities of freedom and peace in a 
world shaped more and more by digital tech-
nology. 
In a recent report on “Being Human: Human-
computer interaction in the year 2020,” a re-
sult of a meeting organized by Microsoft Re-
search in 2007, the editors write: 
“The new technologies allow new forms of 
control or decentralisation, encouraging some 
forms of social interaction at the expense of 
others, and promoting certain values while 
dismissing alternatives. For instance, the iPod 
can be seen as a device for urban indifference, 
the mobile phone as promoting addiction to 
social contact and the Web as subverting tra-
ditional forms of governmental and media au-
thority. Neural networks, recognition algo-
rithms and data-mining all have cultural impli-
cations that need to be understood in the 
wider context beyond their technical capabili-
ties. The bottom line is that computer technol-
ogies are not neutral – they are laden with hu-
man, cultural and social values. These can be 
anticipated and designed for, or can emerge 
and evolve through use and abuse. In a multi-
cultural world, too, we have to acknowledge 
that there will often be conflicting value sys-
tems, where design in one part of the world 
becomes something quite different in another, 
and where the meaning and value of a technol-
ogy are manifest in diverse ways. Future re-
search needs to address a broader richer con-
cept of what it means to be human in the flux 
of the transformation taking place.” (Harper, 
Rodden, Rogers and Sellen 2008, 57) 
This remarkable quote from a meeting orga-
nized not by anti-tech humanists, but by one 
of the leading IT companies, summarizes the 
main present and future tasks of digital ethics 
as a critical interdisciplinary and intercultural 
on-going reflection on the transformation of 
humanity through computer technology. 
4. Towards a common world: new risks, 
new responsibility. Humanity is experienc-
ing itself particularly through the digital me-
dium as a totality or system of interrelations. 
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Who are we and what do we want to be as hu-
manity? This question asks for a historical not 
a metaphysical answer. A negative vision of 
such unity are balkanisations and imperialisms 
of all kinds, including digital ones.  
Whereas the digital technologies might dimin-
ish “vulnerability and commitment” (Dreyfus 
2001), the global challenges (as those gathered 
in the UN Millennium Goals), bring about un-
predictable dangers in which information 
technologies are undoubtedly involved (in 
both positive and negative aspects), and claim 
for a renewal of responsibility, regarding what 
technology we want, how we develop it, how 
we share it, how we use it. We might cope with 
all these challenges, which include inequalities, 
divides and injustices of many types, if we 
jump over the human wall, i.e. we consider our 
endeavour for human rights as a part of a wider 
objective for a common world where careful-
ness extends towards nature. And this careful-
ness itself, should jump over a formal strive 
for rights, probably needing a rebirth of care-
fulness -for instance in health care (Kleinman 
et al. 2006), for which a critical appraisal 
within digital environment is needed (Capurro 
2010)- since needs, human or not, are much 
more than simple collections of data, requiring 
a careful interpretation process, a closer interplay 
among partakers (→Hermeneutics). 
Digital globalization should make us aware of 
the human interplay with each other in such a 
common world instead of making of the digi-
tal perspective over our lives and over reality a 
kind of digital metaphysics or (political) ideol-
ogy. This relativization of the digital perspec-
tive has been called digital ontology (Capurro 
2006). 
Who are we in the digital age? As human cul-
tures become digitally hybridized this process 
affects social life in all its dimensions as well 
as our interplay with nature. The key task of 
digital ethics is to make us aware of the chal-
lenges and options for individual and social 
life design. The digital medium is an oppor-
tunity for the subjects of the 21stcentury to 
transform themselves and their relations in 
and with the world. This implies allowing each 
other to articulate ourselves in the digital net-
work, while taking care of historical, cultural 
and geographical singularities. An ethical in-
tercultural dialogue is needed in order to un-
derstand and foster human cultural diversity. 
Hereby we must look for common ethical 
principles so that digital cultures can become 
a genuine expression of human liberty and cre-
ativity. 
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INFORMATION LITERACY (S. 
alfabetización informacional, F. Maîtrise de 
l'information, G. Informationskompetenz) [ICT, 
information society, globalisation, education] 
concept 
Several terms such as information literacy, lit-
eracy in information and development of in-
formation skills or information competencies 
are used interchangeably to identify compe-
tencies, skills, aptitudes, knowledge, personal 
experiences and required values to access, use, 
and communicate information in any medium 
(digital or paper) for academic, research, pro-
fessional or entertainment purposes.  
Translating this term into Spanish has brought 
about different concepts and definitions such 
as information competencies (competencias 
informacionales), information literacy 
(alfabetización informacional), literacy in in-
formation (alfabetización en información). 
However, the term most frequently used in 
Spanish is “desarrollo de habilidades informa-
tivas” (development of information skills) 
(Lau, 2006). To refer to information literacy in 
Spanish, the acronym ALFIN is generally 
used. This acronym was coined by Félix Be-
nito in 1995. In English, the acronym IN-
FOLIT is generally used.  
Information literacy is considered a means to 
develop one of UNESCO’s four pillars for ed-
ucation in the 21st century: learning to know 
about something, long life learning, training 
people to manage information needs to 
search, assess, use and optimize information 
to solve problems and make decisions. IN-
FOLIT is considered a pre-requisite to partic-
ipate actively and effectively in the knowledge 
society. Furthermore, it is part of the basic hu-
man rights for long life learning and promotes 
social inclusion in every nation. OECD and 
European Space of Higher Education include 
information literacy as one of the basic com-
petencies for any citizen.  
INFOLIT is understood as the knowledge 
and capacity to use in a reflective fashion, in-
tentionally and ethically, the set of concepts, 
procedures, and attitudes involved in the pro-
cess of searching, obtaining, assessing, using 
and communicating information through 
online and mainstream media. Literacy in in-
formation is a set of abilities that enable peo-
ple “to recognize when information is needed 
and have the capacity to locate, evaluate and 
use effectively the needed information” (ALA, 
1989). Literacy in information exceeds the 
concept related to user training and it affects 
content as well as pedagogy.  It entails the de-
velopment of technical skills required to ac-
cess, analyze and assess information (Aragón, 
2005).  
Overall, the term “alfabetización”, a transla-
tion from the English word “literacy”, is ap-
plied to the capacity to use different media, 
technologies or languages. Thus, we can talk 
about technology literacy (capacity to handle 
information technology and communication), 
digital (hypertext media domain and Internet), 
audiovisual literacy (capacity to understand 
and criticize audiovisual media and languages), 
scientific literacy (science domain and its 
mechanisms to create, transmit and apply in-
formation) among others. A crucial objective 
of lifelong literacy entails digital and IN-
FOLIT basic read-write literacy integrating 
this with lifelong learning. 
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(EM) 
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT (S. 
gestion de la información, F. gestion de l'information, 
G. informationsmanagement) [Business Informat-
ics, Bussiness Management, Information Soci-
ety, TIC] discipline 
Information management, in the context of 
organizations, can be identified as the disci-
pline that deals with everything related to ob-
taining the appropriate information in the 
right way, for the right person, at the good 
cost, at the appropriate moment, in the right 
place and articulating all these operations for 
the development of correct action. In this con-
text, the main objectives of the Information 
Management are: maximizing the value and 
benefits of use of information, minimizing the 
acquisition cost, processing and use of infor-
mation, identify responsibilities for the effec-
tive, efficient and economic use of infor-
mation and ensure a continuous supply of in-
formation.  
The Information Management has a close re-
lationship with the discipline of Knowledge 
Management in the organizational context. 
The objectives of the Information Manage-
ment focus on those processes related to stor-
age, processing and dissemination of explicit 
knowledge that is represented in the docu-
ments. However, in this context, knowledge 
management goes a little beyond the Infor-
mation Management. This would be in charge 
of making all knowledge into corporative 
knowledge and disseminate it appropriately. It 
mainly deals with the pragmatic and strategic 
decisions relating to the creation, identifica-
tion, capture, storage and dissemination the 
integrated knowledge in an organization. And 
finally, the development of these operations 
would be implemented in tume with the hu-
man dimension of these processes, respecting 
and redesigning the necessary organizational 
elements. 
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INFORMATION FLOW (S. flujo de infor-
mación, F. flux d'information, G. Informationsfluss) 
[transdiciplinary, semantics, situation the-
ory]concept, metaphor  
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Contents.— 1) Information and information flow, 2) 
Defining information flow. 
There is no standard definition of "infor-
mation flow", and neither there is of "infor-
mation". Nevertheless, in ordinary life we 
seem to be in agreement with the meanings of 
information and information flow. A major 
problem is to know whether information flow 
is a concept or a metaphor. Here we are going 
to assume it is a concept. 
While the concept of information is quite dif-
ficult to grasp, a definition of information flow 
in terms of information should not be that 
hard. Therefore, in this entry we propose an 
informal definition of information flow from 
the starting point of some elementary con-
cepts in a well-established theory of semantic 
information: situation theory (Barwise and 
Perry 1983; Barwise 1989; Devlin 1991). 
1. Information and information flow. Situa-
tion theory distinguishes between information 
and information flow (Devlin 1991: 142-144). 
The basic assumption is that information is 
abstract and can be used for classifying con-
crete states of affairs. On this assumption is 
built up the following distinction: 
There is information about a state of affairs as 
long as we can classify it by means of abstract 
states, such as vectors, time periods or logical 
formulae. We then say that the state of af-
fairssupports certain information. Example: we 
have information about the waitress in that we 
know that his hands are muddy. 
There is flow of information from one state of af-
fairs to another as long as some way of classi-
fying the first one indicates some way of clas-
sifying the second. Then we say that the first 
state of affairs carries information about the 
second one. Example: the fact that the wait-
ress' hands are muddy carries the information 
that my plate is possibly muddy. 
In theories prior to situation theory this dis-
tinction was not always taken into account. 
Neither it is clearly stated in recent proposals 
like that of Floridi (2005). On the other hand, 
whenever the flow of information is on the fo-
cus two typical problems arise immediately: 
Is it required the existence of agents for the 
flow of information to take place? Usually this 
question is answered in an affirmative manner. 
Situation theory gives for granted their exist-
ence in despite of some occasional debate on 
this matter. Channel theory (Barwise and 
Seligman 1997), on the contrary, doesn't men-
tion agents very frequently. Dretske (1981) is 
not completely clear. On the one hand he de-
fines the flow of information through the no-
tion of an external observer: "A state of affairs 
contains information about X to just that ex-
tent of which a suitable placed observer could 
learn something about X by consulting it" 
(Dretske 1981: 45); on the other hand, he 
states that information is an agent-independ-
ent phenomenon. Floridi (2005) distinguishes 
between semantic information (which is agent-de-
pendent) and environmental information (which is 
agent-independent). 
How to explain the properties of the flow of 
information? Pérez-Montoro (2007) offers a 
comprehensive discussion of both these prop-
erties: relativity (the same state of affairs might 
carry different pieces of information to differ-
ent agents), and fallibility (sometimes a state of 
affairs do not carry the information it is sup-
posed to carry). Almost any author tries to ex-
plain those properties, which in turn exhibit 
different names as well as diverse formula-
tions. 
2. Defining information flow. Now then, 
neither in situation theory nor in further theo-
ries information flow is defined as such. It is 
only said that there is flow of information 
whenever some states of affairs carry infor-
mation about each other. A definition of in-
formation flow must be therefore based on 
the concept of information. 
If we call "distributed system" to any collec-
tion of states of affairs that are able of carrying 
information about each other (Barwise and 
Seligman 1997), and we call "information 
transfer" to the fact that -with respect to a dis-
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tributed system- a state of affairs actually in-
forms about another one, then we can define the 
flow of information within a distributed system as the 
class of all its information transfers with respect to cer-
tain analysis of the system as well as certain period of 
time. This definition has the advantage of con-
forming with common sense and with some 
basic yet fundamental concepts of situation 
theory. 
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INFORMATION REPORTS (S. enunciados 
de información, F. rapports d'information, G. 
Informationsberichte) [transdiciplinary, 
semantics, situation theory] concept 
Contents.— 1) Definition, 2) Remarks, 3) Methodolog-
ical relevance, 4) Examples. 
1. Definition. In a broad sense, an infor-
mation report is one of these two things: (i) A 
report in which either the noun "information" 
or the verb "to inform" or the adjective "in-
formative" or some other derivative appears. 
(ii) A report that can be paraphrased into a re-
port of the first sort. 
Examples: "a informs to b about p", "database 
DB1 contains more information than database 
DB2", "information source S1 is less reliable 
than information source S2", "it is illegal that 
a conceals from b the information p". 
In a narrow sense, an information report is any 
report that (iii) either exhibits the form "signal 
s carries the information p", (iv) or can be re-
phrased in such a form. 
2. Remarks. We are not dealing with standard 
defitinitons as there is not a well established 
theory on information reports and their se-
mantics. The definition in a broad sense tries 
to gather diverse contributions of the tech-
nical literature since at least Fox (1983). 
An information report in a narrow sense is but 
a variety of information report in a broad 
sense. But the influence of Israel and Perry 
(1991), where the former are defined, justifies 
the distinction. 
The reduction from (ii) to (i) and from (iv) to 
(iii) is not always so clear, therefore it is con-
venient to center on (i) and (iii) up to grasping 
well the information concept. However, there 
are clear cases of possible reduction, as it hap-
pens with reports like "s means p" as they are 
studied in Grice (1957) or Barwise and Perry 
(1983). 
3. Methodological relevance. In analytical 
philosophy it is usually argued for (Fox 1983: 
20-29) that any conceptual investigation on in-
formation must begin with a prior study re-
garding information reports. This does not 
imply resigning from the study of concepts 
and realities in favor of a mere study of lan-
guage. The strategy is to take the language as a 
starting point. First it is agreed that reality X is 
the meaning of expression "X". Then the lin-
guistic uses of "X" are discussed, since this is 
a more objective field than that of the direct 
discussion about X. Finally we come back to 
the study of X, this time from an intersubjec-
tiveagreement and conceptual delimitation 
that stems from the previous discussion about 
the uses of "X". 
4. Examples. Since there is no standard the-
ory regarding information reports, it is more 
secure to introduce them trough concrete ex-
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amples instead of displaying from the very be-
ginning a tentative classification. Let's see two 
of them. The first one comes from Israel and 
Perry (1991), the second from Floridi (2006). 
The former example assumes some 
knowledge on propositional attitude reports 
(McKay y Nelson 2008). The latter requires 
some basics on modal epistemic logic (Hen-
dricks and Symons 2009). 
Example 1: "signal s carries the information that p" 
Israel and Perry (1991) devotes its first section 
to the logical-linguistic study of information 
reports. Paradigmatic examples are: 
(1) "The x-rays indicates that Jackie has a bro-
ken leg." 
(2) "The fact that the x-ray has such and such 
a pattern indicates that Jackie has a broken 
leg". 
Both in (1) and in (2) the initial noun phrase 
plus the verb or verb phrase form the informa-
tional context; the proposition designated by the 
that-clause is theinformational content. The ob-
ject designated by the initial noun phrase of (1) 
is the carrier of the information; the fact desig-
nated by the initial noun phrase of (2) is the 
indicating fact. 
Some important properties of informational 
contexts: 
They are factive: if an information report is 
true, its informational content is true too. 
They are not truth-functional: given "s in-
forms that p" and the logical equivalence be-
tween p and q, one does not conclude "s in-
forms that q". 
They distribute across conjunction: if "s in-
forms that p and q", then "s informs that p and 
s informs that q". 
They do not distribute across disjunction: 
given "sinforms that p or q", one does not con-
clude "s informs that p or s informs that q". 
They are opaque with respect to definite de-
scriptions: given "s informs that c holds the 
property P" and the equality c = "the x that 
holds Q", one does not conclude "s informs 
that the xthat holds Q also holds P". 
Some analyses of information reports based 
on Israel and Perry (1991), like e.g. Barwise 
and Seligman (1997: 12-13), take any report of 
type (1) to be an abbreviation of some report 
of type (2). Such analyses are usually based on 
Dretske (1981). 
Example 2: "agent a is informed that p" 
Floridi (2006) establishes three different ways 
in which an agent a can be related to an infor-
mation piece p, the latter being a contingently 
true proposition. These three relations can be 
seen like interpretations of the expression "the 
agent a is informed about p". 
Being informative: Evaluation of that situation in 
which p brings information to the agent. 
Becoming informed: The process by which the 
agent gets the information p. The result of this 
process is the situation in which the agent is 
informed. 
Being informed: The cognitive state of the agent 
by virtue of which it possesses the information 
p. It can be seen as the result of the action of 
becoming informed. 
Of these three interpretations Floridi (2006) 
focuses only on the third one. He wonders if 
there exist modal logics whose modal operator 
Iap could be read as "the agent ais informed 
that p". If that is the case, those logics would 
be comparable to the modal doxastic logics 
KD, KD4 and KD45 (where Bap means that a 
believes that p), as well as to the modal epis-
temic logics KT, S4 and S5 (where Kap means 
that a knows that p). The proposal of Floridi 
(2006) is to interpret the modal logic KTB as 
the best formal model for the relation of "be-
ing informed". 
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(JO) 
INFORMATION RETRIVAL (S. 
recuperación de información, F. recherche 
d'information, G. informationswiedergewinnung) 
[information management, LIS, linguistics, 
Informatics] concept 
Contents. 1) Changes in the meaning of the 
term, 2) Information Retrieval and Knowledge Re-
trieval, 3) Information Retrieval Language and In-
formation Retrieval Systems, 4) Metadata, de-
scriptors, and indexing, 5) Information retrieval by 
controlled vo-cabularies, 6) Relevance, 7) Retrieval 
Measures, 8) Retrieval Models.  
Information retrieval is the set of activities 
that facilitates the searching and retrieval of 
data. Information retrieval comprises tech-
niques from linguistics, computer science, in-
formation science, and text mining. 
1. Changes in the meaning of the term. In 
the first place, the term only was used to de-
note the set of techniques and process aimed 
to retrieve data from data bases in computer 
systems. In the early nineties, with the increas-
ing amount of text documents in the Web, text 
retrieval becomes the main goal of these tech-
niques. Most of these tools look for finding 
words in common between the textual query 
and textual documents. As multimedia re-
sources growths in Internet, search engines 
begin to search audio, images, and video re-
sources. In the literature, document retrieval, 
text retrieval, information retrieval, and data 
retrieval are often employed as equivalents, 
although, indeed, each one has a specific 
meaning. 
Traditionally, in the Web context the answer 
to a query is a set of documents that probably 
have relevant data about the topic. Another re-
lated area is question-answering systems that 
answer to a query just with a specific data, and 
not with a set of documents.    
2. Information Retrieval and Knowledge 
Retrieval. Usually, information regards to 
what is and which properties has something. 
In other words Information is related to defi-
nitions. But Information seldom cares about 
how relate with other information elements, in 
a specific context. The integration of infor-
mation items among them is what is regarded 
as knowledge. So, an explicitation of know-
how has to define how the items are related 
and how the process is developed.  This ap-
proach assumes two important concepts to 
perform a task: the existence of a goal and the 
existence of relationships in the system among 
the concepts. On one hand, the existence of 
goal implies a purpose and necessity to achieve 
a goal. This goal only exists in living beings. 
Therefore the Knowledge retrieval has sense 
just in the brain of the human being that per-
forms the query. On the other hand, 
knowledge implies that the information is in-
terrelated to archive the goal. So, the infor-
mation is related by means of a set of rules and 
restrictions. The inclusion of these rules in 
computer applications is the reason to change 
the name from Information Retrieval Systems 
to Knowledge Retrieval Systems. These sys-
tems have their origin in the Artificial Intellin-
gence (AI) field. AI tries to emulate human 
reasoning, and this involves having finalities, 
rules, and relationships. Intelligent agents and 
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ontologies are necessary resources to emulate 
the human brain. These resources induce to 
rename information retrieval to knowledge re-
trieval. Knowledge Retrieval Systems tries to 
implement search engine that search not only 
words in the documents, but process, and 
even inference data. 
3. Information Retrieval Language and In-
formation Retrieval Systems. The fact that 
Information Retrieval regards to computer 
systems (in contrast with library methods that 
have a wider meaning) causes that some re-
trieval languages are linked with a specific 
technology or system. Some well-known re-
trieval languages are SQL, SPARQL, Boolean, 
etc. 
4. Metadata, descriptors, and indexing. In 
the 60s and 70s, computers had a limited stor-
age capacity and the speed to compute was 
low. Document in these systems need to rep-
resent its content with metadata and a small 
set of terms, called descriptors. Metadata used 
to be author, title, source, and date. Metadata 
and descriptors assignment was by-hand.  
Nowadays, these metadata are used in the Se-
mantic Web because of their simplicity, facili-
tating its interoperability and navigation in the 
Web. 
Automatic indexing deals with the techniques 
to assign automatically relevant terms to a 
document. Relevance is computed by means 
of statistics and the term location in the docu-
ment. Examples are term frequency and In-
verse Document Frequency (known as tf-
IDF), stop-word removal or, higher weight of 
the words from the title or with stressed typo-
graphically (e.g. bold letters). Most of these 
factors are used in web search engines. 
5. Information retrieval by controlled vo-
cabularies. In Information Science, terms 
from a specific domain often are listed, in a 
normalized way. This list is called controlled 
vocabulary, and each descriptor is known as 
descriptor. This vocabulary could present re-
lationships among terms. Vocabulary control 
tries to avoid typical problems in natural lan-
guage: polysemy, homonyms, and synonyms. 
Relationship types in these vocabularies might 
present different nature. In thesaurus relation-
ship are equivalence, hierarchy, and semantic 
relatedness. Faceted thesaurus shows different 
scopes to facilitate retrieval. 
6. Relevance. Relevance is a measure about 
the degree a certain element answer to a query. 
This measure is subjective, in the sense that 
depends on the knowledge of the person who 
assesses the relevancy. 
7. Retrieval Measures. Performance of an 
information retrieval system might be meas-
ured by the retrieved data/documents. There 
are two coefficients: 
― Precision: proportion of relevant data re-
trieved from the total data retrieved.  
― Recall: extend of relevant data retrieved 
from the total of data relevant in the Data 
Base. 
 
Both measures have an inverse relationship 
(Cleverdon Law). Increase precision produces 
a decrease in recall.  These coefficients meas-
ure two different factors: noise and silence. 
 
― Noise: non-relevant data retrieved 
― Silence: relevant data that have not been re-
trieved from the data base 
Compute recall implies to know how many el-
ements are relevant to a specific query in the 
data base. This relevance list is called test col-
lection, and it is made by-hand. Test-collec-
tions are used in international competitions to 
test retrieval systems. TREC (Text Retrieval 
Conference) is the best known conference 
about retrieval. 
8. Retrieval Models. Retrieval models com-
pute the degree that certain elements answer 
to a query. As a general rule it is computed by 
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means of a similarity coefficient (Cosine, Phi, 
etc). Most popular models are: 
― Boolean: only two values are computed, rel-
evant/non-relevant. Only relevant docu-
ment are retrieved without any order. An 
example is SQL in relational data bases. Alt-
hough there is an extended boolean model 
to provide a way to sort results. 
― Vectorial: A vector is built to represent the 
terms that every item has. The query vector 
and every document vector are compared, 
measuring the grades that are between 
them. 
― Probabilistic: the probability of a document 
to answer to a query is computed. Often is 
used retrieval feedback to improve the 
probability estimate. Feedback is based in 
user judgments about the set of document 
retrieved. Words from positive results are 
given a higher value when the query is 
recomputed.   
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(JML) 
INFORMATION VISUALIZATION (S. 
visualización de información, F. affichage d'informa-
tions, G. anzeigen von Informationen) [Research 
and practices] concept 
Information Visualization is the discipline that 
deals with the visual representation of propo-
sitional content by using charts, graphs and di-
agrams in order to facilitate the apprehension, 
interpretation, transformation and communi-
cation of those contents through these visual 
representations.  
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INFORMATIONAL CONTENT (E. con-
tenido informacional, F. contenu informationelle, G. 
Informationeller Inhalt) [semantics of infor-
mation, situation theory] concepto  
The main references for the notion of infor-
mational content are the works of Fred 
Dretske. According to him, the ideas of Shan-
non and Weber can be adapted in order to 
characterize what can be the informational 
content of a given signal. Dretske’s proposal is 
the following one. A signal s coming from a 
certain source S and registered by a certain sys-
tem R having some knowledge K about S (for 
instance, that S can be F or G or H) would 
have the informational content that S is F if 
and only if the probability that S is F, given s 
and K, is equal to 1. Other proposals have 
been made in the context of teleosemantical 
approaches, like the one favoured by Millikan, 
and in the context of the “situation theory” 
elaborated by Barwise and Perry. 
Because of the way they are defined, informa-
tional contents would be very wide and they 
cannot be erroneous. In contrast with infor-
mational content, →semantic content is very spe-
cific and it can be erroneous. In particular, that 
would be so with respect to the semantic con-
tents associated with propositional attitudes. 
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Informational content would be converted 
into a semantic content through the interven-
tion of functions. When there is the function 
of bearing some information in particular, 
then informational content can be made nar-
row and the relevant information can be acti-
vated in an erroneous way. Dretske’s approach 
considers three ways in which such functions 
can be introduced: 1) as some sorts of natural 
functions selected by biological evolution, 2) 
as some sorts of attributed functions created 
by artificial design, and 3) as some sorts of 
functions acquired by individual learning. 
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INFORMATIONISM (S. informacionismo, F. 
Informationism, G. informationismswissenschaft) 
[transdisciplinary, ICT] theory 
Contents.— 1) Introduction, 2) Historic evolution, 3) 
Evolution in the XIX, XX and XXI centuries, 4) What 
is understood by “information”, 5) Neuronal theory: quanta 
of useful information. 6) Neuronal theories of information, 
7) Other interesting theories, 8) Informationism: former the-
ories, 9) Informationism: a new theory of knowledge, 10) 
Conclusions. 
An epistemology, based on the information 
that rules our lives, is stated –Informationism-
. Information, or perhaps the message, reaches 
the brain as tiny impulses –quanta or useful in-
formation–, hitting and activating the neu-
rones; as a consequence becoming quanta of 
useful information. Among other matters, hu-
man neural evolution due to information, as 
well as other neural information theories are 
studied. 
1. Introduction. In these historic times of 
change in social structures, a transmutation 
process is taking place which affects all human 
manifestations. Its main influence can be seen 
in the conceptual principles related to the the-
oretical basis of many scientific disciplines. 
Considered as a whole as an essential element, 
information is also affected by the transmuta-
tions that are currently taking place. Neuronal 
Information Assimilation theories are studied. 
2. Historic evolution. Descartes (1596- 1650 
AD) in his famous statement “I think,there-
fore I am”, he grants an absolute value to hu-
man thinking, valid by itself; which confers na-
ture to the being. This “thinking” is reached 
through a process of assimilation of infor-
mation producing knowledge. The point of 
view of Cristoph Martin Wieland (1733-1813 
AD) which deals with information, with the 
understanding and the information of the 
heart is also interesting. 
In the Oxford English Dictionary, there is a 
great deal of definitions for information, da-
ting from the XIV century. Apart from point-
ing out information as an element to form the 
mind, to teach and to learn, it mentions its 
function as an advice,as a warning; as well as 
in legal terms. 
3. Evolution in the XIX, XX and XXI cen-
turies. It may have been at the end of the 80’s 
in the XX century,  - one has to be cautious 
with these statements - when the neurological 
connotations of information started to be 
studied as such - neural assimilation -, along 
with its connection with theology  and herme-
neutics.  
All these studies are carried out at the same 
time as the development of computerized 
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communication techniques, computer science, 
and all that is related to computational science. 
4. What is understood by “information”. 
Information is both “everything” and “noth-
ing” at the same time. On the one hand, it is 
indeed “everything”, due to the fact that, 
through its mental or physical use, one can 
reach knowledge and, from that, taking as an 
example its most pragmatic sense, research, 
science, wisdom and the truth - objective, rel-
ative and conditioned truth -. From this rea-
soning, it can be concluded that information 
has a transcendental connotation, given that, 
following the same line of thought; from truth 
one can reach evidence and certainty.  
5. Neuronal theory: quanta of useful infor-
mation. The theories stated the fact that im-
pulses from the outside are received by neu-
rons, which thus start their activity. In other 
words, neurons are activated, giving the indi-
vidual – the human being – a higher reasoning 
capacity and intelligence.  
The signals coming from outside the brain 
formed small “quanta of information” which 
were immediately followed by the processes 
mentioned above to develop knowledge and 
subsequently ideas, becoming “quanta of use-
ful information”. And this is a phenomenon 
that has been occurring since Man became 
Man, or maybe even before that. Helmut 
Anntz affirms that hominid became human 
exactly due to the consecutive reception and 
assimilation of information, reaching its brain 
from the outside, from its environment. 
6. Neuronal theories of information. 
Therefore, we know that information is pro-
cessed - neuronal assimilation - when certain 
impulses, or quanta of useful information, 
reach the brain, thus giving rise to knowledge: 
a useable product. Several authors have done 
research on this significant subject and have 
developed different theories which I can today 
describe as “neuronal theories of infor-
mation”.  
In order to study some neuronal theories, one 
has to go back to the middle of the XX century 
when C. E. Shannon published his Theory of 
Information, which can be considered as the 
starting point. Somewhat later, in 1988, I had 
the satisfaction of releasing my theory of the 
quanta of useful information. Since then, 
many different theories have been developed. 
Most of them try to find some parallelism be-
tween the processes occurring in the brain and 
the mechanisms carried out by computers; in 
accordance with some programmes prepared 
beforehand, in order to have the machine car-
rying out the function for which it was manu-
factured (– by human beings – note of the au-
thor). Some authors think that the process has 
been carried out the other way round; i.e. it 
was the machines’ operation that induced the 
thought of a similar operation in the brain. In 
any case, these theories have been developed 
by different specialists and researchers of the 
field of information science.  
In order to study the mentioned process of 
neuronal assimilation, we will expound some 
relevant opinions, considered as the starting 
point of subsequent researches. On the one 
hand, John McHale considers information is a 
consumer good, which humans should use to 
their benefit and to obtain better living stand-
ards. He assumes living beings use their senses 
to collect information from the environment 
and the difference between human beings and 
other living beings is that man can “process” 
information consciously; humans use a system 
of symbols to communicate with fellow men. 
The author also mentions the changing and 
changeable environment of information - note 
of the author -; since he assumes that it is due 
to its influence and use that our life condi-
tions, basic principles, cultural manifestations 
and so on vary. The use of information to a 
greater or lesser extent measures the level of 
evolution of the human race. More informed 
societies will have more possibilities for 
choice.  
On the other hand, Fred I. Dretske grants in-
formation a holistic, primal and basic nature. 
He states that, in the beginning, there was in-
formation and the world came after it. The 
transition, (perhaps better transmutation – 
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note of the author), was carried out through 
the development of organisms with the ability 
of exploiting information in a selective way, 
with the purpose of being able to survive and 
endure as a species. Information reaches the 
brain and affects and activates the neurons. 
For a reaction to happen, the brain needs a 
reference scale; which is built through consec-
utive information reaching it from the outside 
world. These theories seem somehow inco-
herent to me, since the question about the 
origin of information arises. If the world has 
risen from information, perhaps the idea of an 
all-embracing creator loses strength… or is in-
formation then the creator?  
Another interesting researcher is Thomas J. 
Froelich, who deals with information as an el-
ement to develop knowledge, subsequently 
studying the latter. He states thought is not ab-
solute; it depends on the nature of each indi-
vidual, on its reference system and on its set 
of values. Nothing new so far; but he carries 
on with the statement that thought can always 
and only be valid from the point of view of the 
individual thinking it. Therefore the famous 
sentence of Descartes needs to be inverted, 
thus considering: “I am, therefore I think”. 
Thinking is a human activity and it implies in-
formation as an element, cause and effect. 
This activity grants a social function to think-
ing. Each society - social group - creates a dif-
ferent form of knowledge and thought. 
7. Other interesting theories. Similarly, the 
theories of R.M Berstrom are interesting. Ac-
cording to him, humans behave as a commu-
nication system, at the centre of which is the 
brain. Here, the signals are received from the 
outside and emitted to the outside. Infor-
mation is supposed to be the raw material to 
develop these abilities. The author also states 
one needs to make the difference between in-
formation and the processing of it. Through 
subsequent reasoning, the difference between 
“information” and “information science” can 
be established. As several other authors main-
tain, Bergstom compares the brain with the 
machine - perhaps the computer -, stating that 
information is the raw material driving both 
and thus comparing information with energy. 
The informative capacity of the brain, within 
the brain structure, is estimated to be gener-
ated at approximately 109 bits/sec. However, 
when it reaches the conscious level it is only 
about 100 bits/sec, which means there is a loss 
of 107 bits/sec when going from the physio-
logical to the psychological level. Human be-
ings have the capacity for a higher brain devel-
opment; to be more intelligent. The mecha-
nism to go from the sphere of the “uncon-
scious” to the sphere of the “conscious” is 
missing.  
The theories of Brier will now be considered. 
He deals with the interpretation of the mes-
sage, different from the information; in order 
to make it understandable and comprehensi-
ble by the receiver. The brain, together with 
the machine, is responsible for this compre-
hension, in which a cognitive process is in-
cluded. Brier, together with M. Leupolt and 
other researchers, amongst whom I am in-
cluded, is of the opinion that this cognitive 
process should be extended to every living be-
ing, i.e. plants and animals. 
Alexander King assumes there is a series of 
phenomena, events and stages of understand-
ing, each of them at a higher and more com-
plex level of abstraction, in order to reach the 
“knowledge” of the world we live in, and to 
adapt our acts to this world. Information is in 
every one of these stages, either as a base or as 
a vehicle to pass from one level to the other. 
These theories are actually shared nowadays 
by several specialists and researchers. What 
was new about them was the historic moment 
in which they appeared. Alexander King was 
one of the pioneers and he is well known for 
his many works and papers.  
From the principal theories of Norbert Hen-
richs, it is worth mentioning here his interest 
in the creative ability of human beings, which 
enables them to reach science and, therefore, 
wisdom. This author also focuses on the spir-
itual attributes of information and, to a certain 
degree, grants it theological connotations. 
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Amongst other opinions and research from 
the theories of Peter Ingwersen, we could 
stress those in which research is considered as 
the result of a modification of the structures 
of knowledge of who receives the information 
– supposedly a human being.  
From either point of view, neuronal theories 
are based on the same principles and follow 
almost identical reasoning. Perhaps A. N. Le-
ontiev contributes with something new, by re-
lating information to conscience, and assum-
ing information is in fact the way in which 
conscience exist for the others. Apart from 
that, information is the link between individu-
als; obviously in a process of communication. 
8. Informationism: former theories. After 
what has been written until now, it would 
seem unnecessary to continue justifying the 
possibility of formulating a new epistemology 
based on information: informationism. How-
ever, it may be convenient to establish rela-
tionships with other theories on knowledge 
organization, in order to observe perhaps the 
parallelism between these and information, 
taken now as a mental process. 
On the one hand, information arrives to the 
brain, and activates a mental process which 
starts with the seizure, reaching knowledge 
and then comprehension, to end up with a to-
tal understanding of whatever was involved by 
the information in the origin. All this implies 
a process of organization of knowledge itself. 
On the other hand, information is considered 
to be the connecting thread which affects the 
brain of human beings, helping them to form 
their intelligence. Each historical period has 
based its knowledge theories on a different 
principle, which is itself influenced by the 
stage of the actual evolution of mankind. Sim-
ilarly, the philosophical trends being studied 
by men from different points of view have had 
an influence; different theories have thus 
raised, such as causalism, empiricalism, posi-
tivism, historicism, physicism and so on.  
The relationships that may be applied between 
some of these known theories and infor-
mationism are now considered. Firstly, “cau-
salism” which states there is no effect without 
a cause: effect = quanta of useful information 
reaching the brain; cause = knowledge. Real-
ism states that real objects are the base for 
knowledge.  Here, an idea corresponds to an 
object and the former has its origin in infor-
mation, which will thus become the object. 
Positivism is the theory which matches the 
best. It was devised by August Comte, and 
based on the concept that only the facts, im-
mediately received by the senses and quantita-
tively verified, can generate knowledge. This 
author also allows for a social attitude, given 
that the perception of the outside world may 
condition our behaviour. 
In the past, perhaps since 1980 to mention a 
guiding date, the chemical and spiritual com-
ponents of human beings have been being 
considered; this implies a change in the postu-
lation of such theories. A modern theory of 
knowledge has subsequently risen, based on 
the principle of “get to know you”, which has 
lately gained great importance. This principle 
studies and examines in human beings, both 
physically and psychologically, in a neo-realis-
tic attempt to turn the activities of the spirit 
into mere equations, and chemical and physi-
cal formulae; arguing that a human being is 
formed by chemical elements and com-
pounds. 
More recently, a turn towards a more human-
izing position is being observed. Let us, for in-
stance, quote Fernando de Elzaburu, who ba-
ses his theory of knowledge organization on 
the change of paradigm of his new “vision of 
reality”. We live in a transmutation period and, 
therefore, old reference parameters are no 
longer valid. Other more highly abstracted pa-
rameters, based on system theory, should be 
accepted. Norbert Henrichs also develops his 
theory from a change of paradigm, by adding 
a phylo-theological connotation to infor-
mation, based on obtaining “wisdom” –more 
complex than “knowledge”-; subjective and 
relative knowledge, since it is human, but ob-
jective and absolute with respect to its rela-
tionship with science –note of the author–. Jirî 
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Cejpek’s sets his paradigm on human con-
science, as a psycho-physical phenomenon 
carried out in the brain when it receives infor-
mation. Many other formulations, by many 
other authors, and deducible from the ones al-
ready mentioned, could be quoted here. 
9. Informationism: a new theory of 
knowledge. Even though it is widely admit-
ted that we are currently living in the Age of 
Communication, given that information flows 
back and forth through communication; it is 
obvious that information surrounds and in-
vades us. Not even on a desert island could 
we escape its influence. Information is the ba-
sis for any human activity, for all our reason-
ing, the origin of any social attitude; it is the 
basis… It is the basis on which to formulate a 
theory of knowledge, which takes information 
as fundamental paradigm, and which I call 
“Informationism”. 
On the one hand, Informationism entails an 
optimistic viewpoint, through the belief that a 
more equal and homogeneous world can be 
achieved, if its paradigms are correctly applied. 
On the other hand it implies a waiting and 
hoping attitude, given that it implies an uncer-
tainty before the truth is revealed. Infor-
mationism also assumes a functional principle 
of thinking, a philosophic and scientific activ-
ity, with its repercussion on scientific develop-
ment. Moreover, it affects daily activities, such 
as trade and industry. Its influence can be ob-
served in ethical and cultural behaviours. It 
also has an effect on pragmatic activities such 
as decision-making, for instance. Having an at-
titude based on Informationism means per-
ceiving the world from a higher level, on 
which a broader range of concepts is ob-
served; a higher level of abstraction. 
Informationism is an objective in itself. It re-
lies, in each particular case, on real and objec-
tive reasoning, based on the existence of also 
real and objective information, hence true in-
formation. Therefore, Informationism is also 
true and real. These rather deterministic atti-
tudes; stating a totalitarian view of infor-
mation as the seed of “all” that happens in the 
Universe, within  which is Planet Earth and 
the rest of the cosmos,  leads one to consider 
Informationism from its pantheistic aspect, of 
globalizing connotations, considering this as a 
positive view. Informationism can thus be 
considered to have positivistic attributes. 
It is deduced that Informationism can be de-
scribed as human, objective, realistic, optimis-
tic, globalizing, philosophical, scientific, prag-
matic ,real, terrestrial, cosmic… pantheistic; all 
“good” qualities anyway. Some researchers 
and specialists may not agree with this classifi-
cation and theories… let us await their reac-
tions. 
In any case, it can be stated that Information-
ism period has arrived. 
10. Conclusions. We live in a constantly 
evolving world, which leads to a continuous 
transmutation as well. In the past twenty years 
or so, to set a date, there have been greater 
transmutations than in the fifty years before. 
Information technology has been the cause of 
all these changes. We do not even know our-
selves, neither do we get to specify our atti-
tudes towards machines, faced with a com-
puter for instance. What an amazing change in 
the way we do some research, write a confer-
ence paper or send a letter to a friend! Ma-
chines and electronic devices would not have 
gained such importance in our lives… if it 
were not for the influence of a driving force… 
towards change. Here is just where infor-
mation has its place, exactly in this driving 
force, which is mainly determined by two spe-
cific factors: quantity on the one hand, and 
speed on the other, in which human beings are 
immersed. We live rushed lives. We are in a 
hurry to do everything; even, or maybe due to 
that, to control the amount of information 
surrounding us. 
Ours is a changing world, influenced by infor-
mation. It is information itself which leads us 
to understand that our fields of consideration; 
our points of view must be broadened. Every-
thing is related to everything; and to be able to 
distinguish what captures the relevance, the at-
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tention or the interest, a higher degree of ab-
straction needs to be reached. Things need to 
be looked upon from higher above; a higher 
level of thought needs to be reached… Like-
wise, there should be the aspiration of reach-
ing a Cosmo vision… with higher level of ab-
straction.  
Since the appearance of information was 
shown up: due to the influence on the brain of 
impulses coming from the outside - quanta of 
useful information -, thus reaching the neu-
rons and activating them, nearly all definitions 
found consider this aspect; and then the an-
thropological, neurological, biological, onto-
genetical, epistemological, and theological 
connotations appeared. Regarding this, our 
colleague A. García Gutiérrez mentions “bio 
information”.  
Information, as an all-time route of civiliza-
tion, is also analyzed. It is supposed to belong 
to the mesosystem, within the noosystems. 
And there is also here an induction to consider 
the validity of Informationism: a new episte-
mology, based on the paradigm of the univer-
sality of information. 
A new area of knowledge is emerging, inde-
pendent in itself, but systematic and vertically 
related to the rest of the scientific areas of 
knowledge; that is to say, Information as a sci-
ence in itself.  
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(EC) 
INPUT vs OUTPUT (S. entrada vs salida, F. 
entrée vs sortie, G. Eingabe vs Ausgabe) [System 
Theory, economics] concept 
Input and Output represent the (unidirec-
tional) connections of a dynamic system resp. 
of its elements with its environment. Usually 
there is more than one input and output of a 
system. While inputs represent influences 
from the environment to the system, outputs 
represent the effects of the system on its envi-
ronment. If there is no connection between 
the system and its environment, the system is 
called closed. 
The relation between input and output of a 
system is of particular interest. By the assump-
tion of the black box hypothesis (ignoring the 
inner structure and relations of the system) 
one can try to analyze the output of the system 
in its response to a change in the input. If a 
deterministic system always responds to all 
certain inputs in the same way the system is 
called passive, if not, it is called active. If the 
relations between input and output are sto-
chastic in nature, one can study the condi-
tional probability distributions of the output 
to get more information on the system. 
Input-Output Analysis, developed by Nobel 
Laureate Wassily Leontief (1905-1999), is a 
method to study economic systems on a local, 
regional, (mainly) national or global basis. 
With the help of an Input-Output Table (list-
ing the value of intermediary goods and the 
value added for each firm or industry) one can 
predict the effects of final demand (consump-
tion, investment, foreign trade) on total out-
put. Economical input-output analysis goes 
back to Francois Quesnay (1694-1774) who as 
surgeon in ordinary to king Louis XV of 
France was inspired by blood circulation and 
developed the first tables of an economy. Le-
ontief did not start from scratch. He expanded 
Marx' reproduction schemes and the planning 
tools of the former Soviet Union up to a point 
where Input-Output Analysis became applica-
ble empirically. 
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(PF) 
INTERCULTURAL INFORMATION 
ETHICS (S. ética intercultural de la información, 
F. Éthique interculturel de l'information, G. 
Interkulturelle Informationethik) [Information 
ethics, Information Society] discipline 
Contents.— 1) Erecting a new discipline, 2) The foun-
dational debate (2.1 On the Sources of Morality, 2.2 On 
the Foundation of IIE –Charles Ess, Toru Nishigaki, 
Terrell Ward Bynum, Bernd Forman, Luciano Floridi, 
Philip Brey, Rafael Capurro), 3) Debate on IIE 
Intercultural Information Ethics (IIE) can be 
defined in a narrow or in a broad sense. In a 
narrow sense it focuses on the impact of in-
formation and communication technology 
(ICT) on different cultures as well as on how 
specific issues are understood from different 
cultural traditions. In a broad sense it deals not 
only with intercultural issues raised by ICT but 
by other media as well allowing a large histor-
ical comparative view. IIE explores these is-
sues under descriptive and normative perspec-
tives. Such comparative studies can be done 
either at a concrete or ontic level or at the level 
of ontological or structural presuppositions. 
1. Erecting a new discipline. The interna-
tional debate on →information ethics started 
with the “First International Congress on Eth-
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ical, Legal, and Societal Aspects of Digital In-
formation” organized by UNESCO in 1997. 
Subsequent UN conferences culminated in 
the World Summit on the Information Soci-
ety. The academic debate on intercultural is-
sues of ICT takes place in the biennial confer-
ences on “Cultural attitudes towards technol-
ogy and communication” organized by 
Charles Ess and Fay Sudweeks since 1998. But 
intercultural issues are also raised in the ETH-
ICOMP conferences organized by Simon 
Rogerson since 1995, the conferences on 
“Ethics of Electronic Information in the 21st 
Century” at the University of Memphis since 
1997, and the CEPE conferences (Computer 
Ethics: Philosophical Enquiry) since 1997. 
The first international symposium dealing ex-
plicitly with intercultural information ethics 
was organized by the International Center for 
Information Ethics entitled “Localizing the 
Internet. Ethical Issues in Intercultural Per-
spective.” It took place in Karlsruhe (Ger-
many) in 2004 (Capurro et al. 2007). The Ox-
ford Uehiro Centre for Practical Ethics orga-
nized an international conference, entitled 
“Information Ethics: Agents, Artefacts and 
New Cultural Perspectives” that took place in 
2005 at St Cross College Oxford. This confer-
ence addressed cultural questions of the glob-
alization of information processes and flows, 
particularly “whether information ethics in a 
global sense may be biased in favour of West-
ern values and interests and whether far-east-
ern cultures may provide new perspectives 
and heuristics for a successful development of 
the information society.” (Floridi/Savulescu 
2006, 155). Soraj Hongladarom and Charles 
Ess have edited a book with the title “Infor-
mation Technology Ethics: Cultural Perspec-
tives” (Hongladarom/Ess 2007). The book 
puts together a selection of contributions on 
what Western and non-Western intellectual 
traditions have to say on various issues in in-
formation ethics, as well as theoretical debates 
offering proposals for new synthesis between 
Western and Eastern traditions. 
In the following, an overview on IIE as dis-
cussed in some of these sources is presented, 
dealing with the foundational debate in moral 
philosophy in general as well as with IIE in 
particular. 
2. The foundational debate 
2.1 On the Sources of Morality. There is a 
classic debate in moral philosophy between 
cognitivism and non-cognitivism with regard 
to the truth-value of moral claims. This dis-
tinction presupposes that human emotions 
have no cognitive value and vice versa, that 
human cognition has a truth-value if and only 
if it is free of emotions. According to Capurro 
(2009), this is a wrong alternative since, on the 
one hand, there is no emotion-free cognition; 
on the other hand, emotions have a cognitive 
value as demonstrated by neurobiologist An-
tonio Damasio (1994). 
One classical answer to the question of the 
foundation of morality is that moral claims re-
late to the basic moral principle “do no harm, 
help where you can”. Capurro believes that 
even if we can give good reasons for such a 
fundamental moral principle, the knowledge 
of such reasons is not enough to move the will 
in order to do (or not) the good. Is there a 
foundation for this principle? 
According to Karl Baier (2006), basic moods 
through which the uniqueness of the world 
and the finitude of our existence become man-
ifest, are a transcultural experience common 
to all human beings. They concern our aware-
ness of the common world. It is on the basis 
of the mood of anxiety, for instance, that we 
are aware of death and finitude or in the mood 
of “being born” in which we feel ourselves 
open for new possibilities of being. According 
to Heidegger (1987, 228ff) fear is a mood in 
which one is afraid about something fearsome, 
while anxiety, in contrast, faces us with our be-
ing-in-the-world itself. Wittgenstein describes 
his “key experience” (“mein Erlebnis par ex-
cellence”) in the "Lecture on Ethics" with the 
following words: 
“This experience, in case I have it, can be described 
most properly, I believe, with the words I am 
amazed about the existence of the world. Then I 
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tend to use formulations like these ones: 'How 
strange that something exists at all' or 'How 
strange that the world exists'". (Wittgenstein 
1989, 14, trans. Capurro) 
According to Wittgenstein we have really no 
appropriate expression for this experience – 
other than the existence of language itself. On 
December 30, 1929 he writes: 
“I can imagine what Heidegger means with being 
and anxiety. Human beings have the tendency to 
run against the boundaries of language. Think for 
instance about the astonishment that something at 
all exists. […] Ethics is this run against the 
boundaries of language.” (Wittgenstein 1984, 68, 
trans. Capurro) 
In other words, the primum movens of moral 
actions lies in the call coming from the unique-
ness of the world and the finitude of human 
existence that are disclosed through moods. 
According to Heidegger we are “indebted” or 
“guilty” towards the calling of the world, in 
the various senses of the word “guilty” such as 
‘having debts to someone’ or ‘being responsi-
ble for’ (Heidegger 1987, 325ff) We are pri-
mordially “guilty” in the sense that we are in-
debted to the “there” of our existence, be-
tween birth and death. Our existence is basi-
cally “care” of our given and limited possibili-
ties that manifest themselves within the frame-
work of the uniqueness of the world and hu-
man existence. 
Morality arises from (Greek: “hothen”) the 
awareness and respect for both the uniqueness 
of the world itself and human existence which 
are the invaluable and theoretically non prov-
able truth-values on which all moral claims 
rest. The moral imperative is the call for care 
of our lives in a common world. It is a cate-
gorical imperative since there is no way to 
avoid caring for our lives, but it allows at the 
same time different interpretations that we ac-
cumulate as individuals as well as societies 
building a dynamic cultural memory. Such re-
flection does not provide a sufficient reason 
for doing the good, just because any linguistic 
utterance would be insufficient without the 
experience of the call itself. A theory can only 
point to such call without being able to give a 
foundation, which would negate the phenom-
enon of the call as originating such utterance. 
Our being-in-the-world is the ‘first call’ or pri-
mum movens of our will. This might provide 
a universal non-metaphysical frame of refer-
ence for different experiences and ethical the-
ories.  Buddhism, for instance, experiences the 
world in all its transitoriness in a mood of sad-
ness and happiness being also deeply moved 
by suffering. This mood grasps the world in a 
specific way. There is something common to 
all human beings in the basic moods but at the 
same time there are specific moods at the be-
ginning of human cultures, such as astonish-
ment (“thaumazein”) in the Greek experience 
of the world. Karl Baier points to the danger 
of building stereotypes particularly when deal-
ing with the differences between East and 
West with regard, for instance, to the search 
for harmony as an apparently typical and 
unique mood of Asian cultures or the opposi-
tion between collectivity and individuality 
(Baier 2006). As there are no absolute differ-
ences between cultures there are also no ex-
clusive moods. Experiences such as nausea, 
pangs of moral conscience or the ‘great doubt’ 
are common to Japanese Buddhism and mod-
ern Western nihilism. A future intercultural 
philosophy should look for textual basis from 
literature, art, religion and everyday culture 
paying attention to complex phenomena and 
to the interaction between moods and under-
standing. If there is a danger of building stere-
otypes, there is also one of overlooking not 
only concrete or ontic but also structural or 
ontological differences by claiming a single 
world culture that mostly reflects the interests 
and global life style of a small portion of hu-
manity. 
2.2 On the Foundation of IIE 
a) Charles Ess’ “global information ethics” 
seeks to avoid imperialistic homogenization 
while simultaneously preserving the irreduci-
ble differences between cultures and peoples 
(Ess 2006). He analyzes the connections of 
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such an ethical pluralism between contempo-
rary Western ethics and Confucian thought. 
Both traditions invoke notions of resonance 
and harmony to articulate pluralistic structures 
of connection alongside irreducible differ-
ences. Ess explores such a pros hen ("towards 
one") pluralism in Eastern and Western con-
ceptions of privacy and data privacy protec-
tion. This kind of pluralism is the opposite to 
a purely modus vivendi pluralism that leaves ten-
sions and conflicts unresolved and giving thus 
rise to a cycle of violence. Another more ro-
bust form of pluralism presupposes a shared 
set of ethical norms and standards but without 
overcoming deeply contradictions. An even 
stronger form of pluralism does not search 
identity but only some kind of coherence or, 
as Ess suggests, complementarity between two 
irreducible different entities. 
There are pitfalls of prima facie convergences, 
analogies and family resemblances that may be 
oversimplified by a pros hen strategy. In many 
cases we should try to dig into deeper layers in 
order to understand where these claims origi-
nate or simply accept the limits of human the-
oretical reason by celebrating the richness of 
human experience. As Kei Hiruta rightly 
stresses (Hiruta 2006), it is not clear what the 
points of shared ethical agreements are and 
how this call for unity fits with a call for diver-
sity concerning the judgements of such ethical 
perspectives. According to Hiruta, the advo-
cates of ethical pluralism would like to avoid 
the untolerable, such as child pornography in 
the Internet, working on the basis of a prag-
matic problem-solving strategy leading to 
“points of agreement” or “responses” on the 
basis of Socratic dialogue. Socratic dialogue is 
based on the spirit of parrhesia or “direct 
speech” which is a key feature of Western phi-
losophy (Capurro 2006a). 
b) Toru Nishigaki. In his contribution on infor-
mation ethics in Japan, Toru Nishigaki makes 
a difference between the search of ethical 
norms in the context of new information tech-
nologies on the one hand, and the changes “on 
our views of human beings and society” be-
coming “necessary to accompany the emer-
gence of the information society” on the other 
hand (Nishigaki 2006, 237). Such changes 
concern, for instance, the Western idea of a 
“coherent self” being questioned by infor-
mation processing in robots. While this 
change may lead from a Western perspective 
to nihilism, Buddhist philosophy teaches that 
there is no such a thing as a “coherent self” 
ethics having to do with compassion as well as 
with the relationship between the individual 
and the community. The key ethical question 
might be how our communities are changing 
instead of how far the “self” is endangered. As 
Nishigaki remarks: “It is possible to say, there-
fore, that in a sense the West now stands in 
need of Eastern ethics, while the East stands 
in need of Western ethics” (Nishigaki 2006, 
238). Nishigaki stresses at the same time, that 
there is no “easy bridge” between IT and East-
ern philosophy. IT as looked from a cultural 
standpoint “has a strong affinity with the 
Judeo-Christian pursuit for a universal inter-
pretation of sacred texts.” 
While we in the West look for some kind of 
unchanged meaning of terms, such as in 
Charles Ess’ pros hen search for shared values 
and a tolerant or benevolent view on judgment 
diversity, the ZEN master is eager to exercise 
himself in his disciple “by doing away with 
universal or conventional interpretations of 
the meanings of words” (Nishigaki 2006, 238). 
In other words, the Buddhist stance teaches 
us, Westerners, another strategy beyond the 
controversy between monism and pluralism, 
by way of a different kind of practice than the 
Socratic dialogue. Nishigaki points to the con-
troversy in the West between cognitive science 
and its view of cognition as a “representation” 
of the “outer world” and the view shared by 
our everyday experience as well as, for in-
stance, phenomenology. Biologist Francisco 
Varela’s theory of autopoiesis offers an alter-
native based on the Buddhist view on cogni-
tion as “a history of actions performed by a 
subject in the world” being then not represen-
tation of a pregiven world by a pregiven mind 
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but “enactment” of such a history in the 
world. 
c) Terrell Ward Bynum. ‘The’ information soci-
ety is and has always been culturally frag-
mented into different information societies. 
Consequently, what is morally good for one 
information society may be considered as less 
appropriate in another one. Terrell Ward 
Bynum advocates, borrowing insights from 
Aristotle, Norbert Wiener, and James Moor, 
for a “flourishing ethics” which means that 
“the overall purpose of a human life is to 
flourish as a person” according to the basic 
principles of freedom, equality and benevo-
lence and the principle of minimum infringe-
ment of freedom (Bynum 2006). If the goal is 
to maximize the opportunities of all humans 
to exercise their autonomy – a conception of 
human existence that is culturally grounded in 
Western social philosophy – Bynum rightly 
follows that “many different cultures, with a 
wide diversity of customs, religions, languages 
and practices, can provide a conductive con-
text for human flourishing” (Bynum 2006, 
163). In other words, Wiener’s principles pro-
vide a foundation for a non-relativistic global 
ethics that is friendly to cultural diversity. 
Bynum widens the scope of this human-cen-
tered ethics into a “general theory of Flourish-
ing Ethics” which includes the question of del-
egation of responsibility to ‘artificial agents’ 
and the consequent need for ethical rules for 
such agents. Although Bynum welcomes dif-
ferent ethical traditions, he is well aware that 
some of them would not be compatible with 
“General Flourishing Ethics”. 
d) Bernd Frohmann. Following Michel Foucault 
and Gilles Deleuze, Bernd Frohmann pro-
poses a philosophical interrogation of the lo-
cal effects of the Internet through three main 
concepts, namely effect, locality, and ethics 
(Frohmann 2007). He discusses the relation-
ships between the global and the local or, 
more specifically, between the flows of capital, 
information, technology, and organizational 
interaction by pointing to the similarities and 
difference of today’s “space of flow” (Manuel 
Castells) with some of its predecessors for in-
stance in England’s global empire. According 
to Frohmann, “ethical action consists in a 
’mode of subjectivation’ not eclipsed by the 
will to truth’s drive to knowledge, transcend-
ence, and universality. A philosophical ethos 
seeks contingencies and singularities rather 
than universal determinants, which block the 
aim of getting ‘free of oneself’” (Frohmann 
2007, 64-65). This is a plea for a kind of Inter-
cultural Information Ethics that focuses on a 
careful situational analysis starting with the lo-
cal conditions which does not mean mono-
cultural chauvinism but critical appraisal of the 
way(s) computers control societies and the 
strategies people can develop in order to be-
coming “digitally imperceptible.” Frohmann 
asks for strategies of “escaping” the Internet 
rather than “localizing” it as far as it can be-
come a local instrument of oppression. 
e) Luciano Floridi. Distinguishing between “eth-
ics of global communication” and “global in-
formation ethics”, Luciano Floridi addresses 
respectively: on the one hand, the pragmatic 
dialog in the interaction between different cul-
tures and generations, on the other hand, the 
foundational questions regarding the possibil-
ity of common principles allowing such dialog, 
or the existence of a macro-ethic in the sense 
of some kind of consesualism or deontolo-
gismo or contractualism (Floridi 2009: 222). 
A key issue in Floridi’s theory is the “shared 
ontology” as a mean to overcome in global in-
formation concerns Wittgenstein’s problem of 
the lion: “if a lion could talk, we wouldn’t be 
able to understand it” (Wittgenstein 1953, 
§568). As a basis for common understanding 
Floridi proposes a basic ontology of life and 
death, food and shelter, anguish and protec-
tion (Floridi 2009, 224), i.e. whatever allows us 
to support life and avoid suffering or destruc-
tion of any entity, since – based on the very 
fact of being - every entity has a right for be-
ing. The most elemental opposition is being vs 
entropy, or the “flourishing of entities” in their 
global environment vs the “destruction”, 
“corruption” or “impoverishment of being” 
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(Floridi 2008). He names this minimal ontol-
ogy “ontocentric” –aparently more radical 
than, for instance, biocentric or anthropocen-
tric. In the center, we find the patient of an 
action instead of the agent. He opposes both 
a metaphysical theory stating something about 
the being of entities –as a kind of ontological 
imperialism- and a plain relativism unable to 
suggest any effective interaction regarding in-
tercultural problems. Without imposing hier-
archies of common values, “global infor-
mation ethics” should allow them to embed 
them within particular situation and natures 
(“embeddedness” and “embodiement”). This 
light and horizontal ontology aims at bridging 
cultures, which in their vertical and thick den-
sity are often irreconcilable. 
However, we might ask: this “light” and “hor-
izontal” approach is enough to face the prag-
matic problems arisen in intercultural interac-
tion or we also need a thick and vertical anal-
ysis to overcome them? How could this mini-
mal ontology be politically accepted? The 
“dignity of being” does not pose a minimal 
metaphysical ontology? 
f) Philip Brey. For the Netherlander philoso-
pher Philip Brey, an ethical dialog thoughtfully 
considering cultural differences is necessary to 
cope with intercultural information ethical 
problems (Brey 2007). He includes in infor-
mation ethics issues related to ICTs, compu-
tation and mass media, distinguishing between 
a moral descriptive relativism and a normative 
level, named meta-ethical. The latter faces the 
question about the existence of universal val-
ues and principles or the cultural relativity of 
IE, but the problems should be first reflected 
in a descriptive relativity for afterwards 
searching for differences and commonalities. 
He analyses relativism in privacy, intellectual 
property rights, information freedom and the 
difference between moralities centered in hu-
man rights in Western societies and centered 
in virtues in Far-east societies influenced by 
Buddhism, Confucianism, Taoism and Mao-
ism superimposing social harmony to individ-
ual welfare. 
He leaves to social science the question of the 
usage of ICT as instruments of oppression or 
freedom, just focusing on the comparative 
analysis of moral systems. This limitation 
might be a lack to overcome some avoidable 
cultural relativism, since some cultural clo-
sures might have arisen within the tensions re-
garding oppression and freedom, which can 
easily be connected to the “suffering” vs 
“flourishing” –posed, as seen before, as a basis 
of mutual understanding-. In clear opposition 
to Brey’s stance, the The North American phi-
losopher Ken Himma argues for an objectiv-
ist moral, which should be comparative and a 
part of social sciences (Himma 2008). The en-
deavor of EII is not just interaction –as in 
Brey- but agreement. However, although he 
provides good arguments to defend objectiv-
ism, he does not develop a system of objective 
norms for information ethics. 
g) Rafael Capurro. In today’s information soci-
ety we form ourselves and our selves mainly 
through digital media. The power of digital 
networks does not lead necessarily to slavery 
and oppression but also to reciprocity and mu-
tual obligation. Globalisation gives rise to the 
question of what does locally matter. Cyber-
space vanishes into the diversity of complex 
real/virtual space-time connections of all 
kinds which are not any more separable from 
everyday life and its materiality. The bounda-
ries of language against which we are driven 
appear now as the boundaries of digital net-
works which not only pervade but accelerate 
all relationships between humans as well as be-
tween all kinds of natural phenomena and ar-
tificial things. 
Following Michael Walzer (1994) and Soraj 
Hongladarom (2001), Capurro conceives 
moral arguments as “thick” or “thin” regard-
ing whether they are contextualized or not but 
questioning the view that there is no third al-
ternative between mono- and meta-cultural 
ethical claims (Capurro 2007). A purely meta-
cultural information ethics remains abstract if 
it is not inter-culturally reflected. The task of 
Intercultural Information Ethics is to inter-
twin “thick” and “think” ethical arguments in 
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the information field. The analysis by Michel 
Foucault on the Western tradition of parrhesia 
or ‘direct speech’ shows that it as a special trait 
of Western moral behaviour and democratic 
practice in contrast to the importance of ‘indi-
rect speech’ in Eastern traditions (Foucault 
1983). We should develop this difference for 
instance with regard to Confucian and Daoist 
thought and their relevance for the develop-
ment of information societies in Asia. In reso-
nance to Charles Ess’ concept of an ethical 
pros hen (“towards one”) that looks for a plu-
ralist interpretation and application of shared 
ethical norms (Ess 2006), Capurro argues in 
favor of a hothen (“from which”) approach that 
turns the attention to the question of the 
source(s) of ethical norms including the mul-
tiple cognitive-emotional experience of such 
source(s). The task of IIE is not only to de-
scribe them, but to open the endless task of 
translation between them (→hermeneutics). As 
Susan Sontag suggests (Sontag 2004), the task 
of the translator can be seen as an ethical task 
if we conceive it as the experience of the oth-
erness of other languages that moves us to 
transform our mother tongue – including the 
terminologies used by different philosophic 
schools – instead of just preserving it from 
foreign or heretic influences. 
The concrete impact of information and com-
munication technologies on different cultures 
and particularly on their moral foundations 
has been discussed elsewhere (Capurro 2009, 
2010) 
3. Debate on IIE. IIE is an emerging disci-
pline. The present debate shows a variety of 
foundational perspectives as well as a prefer-
ence for the narrow view that focuses IIE on 
ICT (Capurro 2008, 2009). Consequently 
comparative studies with other media and 
epochs are mostly not being considered so far. 
With regard to IIE issues in today’s infor-
mation societies, there are a lot of cultures and 
regions that have not been analyzed so far. Pri-
vacy as well as online communities, govern-
ance, gender issues, mobile phones, health 
care, and, last but not least, the digital divide 
are on the agenda. New issues such as blogs, 
wikis and “Second Life” are arising. We have 
to deepen the foundational debate on the 
sources of morality. According to Michel Fou-
cault, ethics can be understood as the “prob-
lematization” of morality. Intercultural Infor-
mation Ethics has a critical task to achieve 
when it compares information moralities. This 
concerns the ontological or structural as well 
as the ontic or empirical levels of analysis. One 
important issue in this regard is the question 
of the universality of values vs. the locality of 
cultures and vice versa which is related to the 
problem of their homogenization or hybridi-
zation. 
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K
KNOWLEDGE (S. conocimiento, F. connais-
sances, G. erkenntniss, Wissen) [transdiscipinary, 
philosophy, epistemology, cognitive science, 
semantic] concept 
Contents. 1) Classical epistemologic model, 2) 
Dretske's informational model, 3) Floridi's seman-
tic model, 4) Systemic model of the UTI, 5) Con-
ductual model, 6) Knowledge and near concepts, 
(a. Knowledge vs. information, b. Knowledge and 
mental states, c. Knowledge vs. experience, truth, 
belief and values). 
Throughout the history of thought countless 
words have been written concerning what 
knowledge is. There are innumerous pro-
posals, from different philosophical precepts, 
that have attempted to answer this question. 
In this sense, if we review the literature on 
Cognitive Science and epistemology, we can 
figure out that there are several theoretical 
models that can meet the goal of offering an 
adequete definition of knowledge. 
1. Classical epistemologic model. The pro-
posal of classical epistemology advocates a 
definition of knowledge from the notions of 
belief, truth value and justification (or argu-
ment). In this sense, a person A knows that P 
if and only if it fulfills the following three con-
ditions: (a) A believes that P, (b) P is true and 
(c) is justified in believing that P. 
At the first glance, the classical epistemologi-
cal proposal provides a solid base to approach 
the identification process and knowledge rep-
resentation in the context of an organization. 
In this sense, in order to conclude that a per-
son knows a concrete thing (has a concrete 
knowledge), we only have to verify that this 
person has a belief; the belief that coincides 
with this supposed knowledge we attribute to 
him, that what he thinks is true and that this 
person is justified in believing in it (that this 
attributed belief has to be reasoned, not arbi-
trary). 
2. Dretske's informational model. Fred 
Dretske, the American philosopher, intro-
duced Knowledge in informational terms in 
1981. He provides, from his definition of in-
formative content, a definition of knowledge 
in informative terms: K knows that s is F and 
only if K's belief that s is F is caused (or is 
causally sustained) by the information that s is 
F. 
Within this definition must be understood the 
terms "belief caused by information" as that 
belief caused by the information contained in 
the fact that s is F. 
In short, restoring the definition of informa-
tive content, so that K knows something, K 
should have information of that something 
with probability equal to 1, therefore, knowing 
that s is F requires not only certain infor-
mation about s (an appropriate or sufficient 
quantity), but the information that s is F. 
Two important theoretical benefits can be 
drawn from this Dreskian proposal on 
knowledge:  
The first of these benefits is found in the fact 
that this definition allows us to explain the 
possibility of transmission of knowledge: 
when a speaker K knows that s is F and, 
among other things, ii sincerely asserts that s 
is F, the listeners will come to know that s is F 
from what the speaker says (respecting the 
principle of the introduced copy in the previ-
ous section). This communicative fact is met, 
according to Drestkian definition of 
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knowledge, if K knows that s is F from the 
information that s is F, and if the transmission 
of this information is done with an ambiguity 
equal to 0. 
The second benefit is something beyond the 
possibility of transmission of knowledge. 
What this definition mainly pursues is to reach 
the goal of distancing from those clasical epis-
temological theories that had presented 
knowledge as a justified and true belief. 
Dretske replaces the necessity for the justifica-
tion of belief with causality of information. He 
seeks, in making such a change, to overcome 
the problems usually presented by these clas-
sical theories (the paradoxes of Gettier and 
lottery), and also gets an adequate argument 
against the radical scepticism thesis. 
Dretske defends himself from the thesis of 
radical skepticism (that supports the impossi-
bility of knowledge) clearly distinguishing the 
conditions of an information source from 
what is called the conditions of an information 
channel. While a source generates infor-
mation, the conditions of a channel, although 
it is crucial for the transmission of infor-
mation, do not affect the information circulat-
ing within it. In this respect, the communica-
tion channel should be considered as a series 
of conditions which the sign depends on, that 
either does not generate (relevant) infor-
mation, or only generates redundant infor-
mation. In short, the channel offers no rele-
vant alternatives to the source, and what 
makes an information channel to be ambigu-
ous is its charateristics, not the suspicions that 
may or may not circulate information within 
it. 
3. Floridi's semantic model. According to 
Floridi´s semantic approach (2005a, 2005b), 
knowledge is constituted in terms of justifiable 
semantic information, i.e. information consti-
tutes the elements for further inquiry. At the 
same time, information is the result of a data 
modelling process. But unlike Dretske’s natu-
ralistic assumption, this data modelling does 
not necessarily represent the intrinsic nature 
of the studied system, or it must not be di-
rectly related to the system by means of a 
causal chain; instead, it will depend on the pro-
cessing of data by knowledge. In turn, data are 
conceived as the resources and restrictions al-
lowing the construction of information. 
Therefore, it can be stated that Floridi pro-
poses an architectural relationship between 
knowledge, information and data, being 
knowledge on the summit and data on the 
base. At the same time and as a result of such 
interrelationship, he replaces Dretske’s re-
quirement of truth of (which is also subscribed 
by the situation theory) by a requirement of 
truthfulness, i.e. instead of searching for a cor-
respondence between the statement and what 
the information is about, the attention is ra-
ther paid in the correspondence between what 
is reported and the informer. 
4. Systemic model of the Unified Theory 
of Information (UTI). From a detailed ap-
proach to system theory considering different 
self-organization levels (from self-restructur-
ing to self-re-creation), knowledge is consti-
tuted in the →UTI by means of interpreting 
data (or meaning assignment) and is the basis 
for decision-making, which shapes “practical 
wisdom” (Hofkirchner 1999).  
UTI refers to different levels of information 
rather than dependency relationships, i.e. in-
formation is gradually processed: first, at the 
syntactic or structural level there is data, then 
at the semantic or state level there is 
knowledge, and, finally, at the pragmatic or be-
havioural level there is practical wisdom. The 
information processing is performed by 
means of interrelationship and reciprocal ac-
tion between adjacent strata and not in terms 
of a casual progression (as in Dretske’s natu-
ralism). In other terms, between micro- and 
macro-leves there are upwards- and down-
wards causations (regarded as information 
processes) cooperating in the self-organizing 
processes. 
5. Conductual model. For example, it is ar-
gued that, relating to the conduct and actions 
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of an agent, knowledge is the potential capac-
ity that an actor poseses to act effectively. The 
effectiveness means to compare the behavior 
and potential outcomes with the objectives 
and values of both the actor and those of his 
community or the communities that he be-
longs to.  
Within this conceptual framework one argues 
that there are various types of knowledge. The 
first one is the knowledge of internal infor-
mation. In this type of knowledge is the po-
tential capacity of answering questions with 
correct answers; usually, the questions on real 
objectives, about the state of one part of the 
world in some time. For this kind of 
knowledge, it is a precondition that the actor 
answers without resorting to any external 
sources of information. Typically, any answers 
can be registered in records, which can be used 
by other actors.  
The second type of knowledge is knowledge 
of external information. This is like the previ-
ous one with the exception that in this case the 
access to other sources of information is per-
mitted.  
In the third place, thinking is also a way of ef-
fective action. In this case, starting from avail-
able information, a process of creating new in-
formation takes place, which may become the 
answer to new questions or the spontaneous 
production of information by a thinking agent.  
Finally, there is a non-informative knowledge; 
the capacity of effective action is not related 
to information. It is something that one usu-
ally sees in artists and athletes. They can have 
a highly effective conduct most of the time, 
but they are unable to explain or articulate 
their knowledge on recorded information.  
6. Knowledge and near concepts  
a) Knowledge vs. information. From most points 
of view regarding information and knowledge, 
there are close relationships between these 
two concepts, especially as far as the common 
use of both terms is concerned. Usually, infor-
mation occupies a lower position than 
knowledge, and the former –so to speak- 
‘nourish’ the latter. However, this connection 
is disregarded in cases of a radical syntactic ap-
proach, in which the relationship question is 
avoided just addressing to the technical di-
mension (as in the MTC), or in a radical prag-
matic approach in which only what-is-being-
done is posed, that is, information is consid-
ered as a mere instrument of the action and, 
therefore, the problem of whether the infor-
mation refers to states of affairs is ignored (ei-
ther dealing with a correct apprehension or 
knowing that p is the case). 
Although there have been throughout the his-
tory of thought countless approaches to 
knowledge concerning its definition, possibil-
ity, basis and modes, two fundamental models 
have prevailed: 1) the iconic model, according 
to which knowledge is an accurate picture (of 
mental nature) of the object of knowledge, 
and 2) the propositional model, whereby 
knowledge is a truthful proposition. In the 
iconic model, where perception and appre-
hension play a key role, the main problems lie 
in both the specification of the limits between 
object and subject, and the explanation of 
non-iconic knowledge (such as logical, mathe-
matical and logical “truths”). However, in the 
propositional model, where scientific state-
ments play an exemplary role, the unavoidable 
circle of the justification of knowledge be-
comes problematic (→Gödel´s incompleteness the-
orem). Nevertheless, whatever the model of 
representation, knowledge is distinguished 
from a true opinion, insofar as only the former 
knows how to justify itself (though its justifi-
cation might be partial or problematic). 
According to the above, the relationship be-
tween information and knowledge must evi-
dently appear in all those informational ap-
proaches considering the semantic dimension, 
usually adopting a more analytic notion with 
respect to information, and a more synthetic 
one with respect to knowledge. Furthermore, 
a closer proximity to the object is used in in-
formation concerns, and to the subject in 
knowledge concerns. 
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For Dretske -as mentioned above-, 
"Knowledge is information-produced belief" 
(Dretske 1981, 91-92) and belief always relates 
to "a receiver's background knowledge" (pp. 
80-81). From a naturalistic perspective, in 
which there is a casual dependence between 
the external conditions of a living being and 
and its internal states, information for Dretske 
creates experience (sensorial representations) 
and originates beliefs (cognitive experiences), 
which underlie the sedimentation of 
knowledge.  
b) Knowledge and mental states. We can agree, 
leaving aside the existing alternative defini-
tions, that knowledge must be identified with 
a special kind of mental states (neuronal ar-
rangements), presenting a set of particular 
characteristics, which an individual possesses. 
On the one hand, they are mental states 
achieved by the individual from a process of 
information assimilation or metabolism. This 
characteristic helps to distinguish those men-
tal states of the subject corresponding to 
knowledge from those corresponding to mere 
beliefs, which do not reach the necessary epis-
temic level to be identified as knowledge. 
In this sense, the semantic content of those 
mental states coincides with this assimilated 
information. And the mental states, con-
versely, act as a guide for actions and conduct 
of that individual; in other words, they control 
the decisions made by the subject.  
We can reflect this characterization in the fol-
lowing synthetic expresion: Knowledge = the 
mental states of an individual constructed 
from the assimilation of information, which 
steer the actions performed by the subject. 
However, the characteristics of knowledge do 
not end here. We can elaborate a little more 
about this special kind of mental states. 
Knowledge, unlike data and information, is 
closely related to the actions and decisions of 
the subject, we can even evaluate this 
knowledge using as indicators such actions 
and decisions. Moreover, knowledge is the 
critical factor that permits the holder to assim-
ilate new information -therefore, the creation 
of new knowledge-; and often it is continu-
ously restructured by the entries of new assim-
ilated information. 
c) Knowledge vs. experience, truth, belief and values. 
Nonetheless, it is not sufficient to provide a 
definition of knowledge and explain it with a 
couple of examples to have a better understan-
ing of it. It is also necessary to deal with a 
number of related and interrelated concepts. 
In this vein, we should not forget a concept 
very close to knowledge, and which partly al-
lows its acquisition: experience. Experience 
can be defined as the set of living-experiences 
that each individual has been through. And as 
such, it makes possible the creation of new 
knowledge through enabling the understand-
ing of new situations from others that have 
been experienced, and to find new answers al-
lowing us to adapt to new scenarios. 
We should neither forget the concept of truth. 
As it has been defended since Classical 
Greece, knowledge (or at least a special type 
of knowledge, as we wil see) implies truth: if A 
(an individual) knows P, then it is true that P. 
If anyone knows that the water molecule con-
sists of two hydrogen and one oxygen atoms, 
then it is true that this molecule presents the 
arrangement of atoms. And it is knowledge 
and its arising actions that have to be in tune 
with what really happens. Reality deals with re-
fining and improving knowledge, rejecting and 
cleaning our heads from this supposed 
knowledge (pseudo-knowledge) that does not 
work and is not attuned. 
Another closely related concept is belief, un-
derstood as the mental state that an individual 
possesses. Because knowledge (or at least one 
type of knowledge), besides truth, implies 
judgement or belief: in order that someone 
knows P, this someone has to believe that P. 
That is, knowledge must maintain a commit-
ment to the truth of P. If someone knows that 
the water molecule consists of two atoms of 
hydrogen and one of oxygen, then that some-
one must believe that this molecule presents 
the arrangement of atoms. 
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And finally, when we are talking about 
knowledge, we can not avoid the realm of val-
ues. Values determine the background that 
governs our actions and therefore our way of 
knowing and our knowledge.  
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KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT (S. 
gestión del conocimiento, F. Gestion des connaissances, 
G. Wissensmanagement [business management, 
ICT, Information Society] discipline 
In the last decade, a strong movement con-
cerning a new discipline has emerged and de-
veloped, focused on the scope of organiza-
tions: Knowledge Management. This disci-
pline deals with designing systems and strate-
gies to systematically use the knowledge in-
volved in an organization. Applying the con-
cept of Knowledge Management to the con-
text of companies has been an important 
source of competitive advantage that can en-
sure the proper functioning and survival of the 
companies in the present economic scenario 
characterized by tough competition and mar-
ket globalization.  
It is not easy to define Knowledge Manage-
ment. There is no agreed or shared definition 
among the entire scientific community (No-
naka and Takeuchi, 1995; Davenport and 
Prusack, 1998; Boisot, 1998; Sveiby, 2001, 
Wilson 2002). 
As a starting point, it should be clarified that 
it is not easy to speak of Knowledge Manage-
ment in the abstract. Strictly speaking, only in 
the context of an organization does it make 
sense to deal with Knowledge Management. 
In a broader sense, each organization is a com-
munity or a group of individuals whose mem-
bers are structured and framed to meet some 
certain targets. The paradigm of an organiza-
tion is usually a company (firm), but with this 
description one can consider other communi-
ties of individuals as organizations (not with 
such financial targets), communities such as a 
hospital, an NGO, an educative center, a min-
istry, a research center or a political party. 
Given this, Knowledge Management, in an in-
tuitive sense, deals with designing and imple-
menting systems whose goal is to identify, cap-
ture and share systematically the involved 
knowledge in an organization in such a way 
that it can be converted into a value for the 
organization. Knowledge, in this context, is all 
the information assimilated by a subject and 
oriented toward action. In other words, 
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knowledge is any mental state of a subject (in 
short, a concrete neuronal provision) that has 
been caused by a determined information and 
which allows the subject in question to make 
certain adequate decisions and carry out prac-
tical action derived from the decisions (Audi, 
1988; Crayling, 1998). On the other hand, 
knowledge becomes a value to an organization 
when it has a clear contribution in achieving 
the goals of the organization.  
It is possible to enrich and make more opera-
tional and functional this first intuitive defini-
tion of Knowledge Management if we keep in 
our mind the existence of different types of 
knowledge within an organization, and that, 
therefore, it is essential to respect the special 
nature of each in order to design the most ap-
propriate management. 
In this sense, it is possible to distinguish 6 
types of knowledge within an organization. 
These 6 types can be grouped together in the 
following three pairs: 
a) Tacit Knowledge / Explicit Knowledge 
b) Individual Knowledge / Organizational or 
Corporate Knowledge 
c) Internal Knowledge / External 
Knowledge 
Let us begin with the first pair. Tacit 
knowledge is the knowledge that is based on 
personal experience and in many cases is iden-
tified with the skills of the subject. Its main 
feature is that it is hardly transmissible or com-
municable; therefore, it is not accessible to the 
other individuals in a direct way. To show that 
someone, A, has knowledge of this type, we 
normally use the expression "A knows P" 
(where P is usually a verb). In the same way, 
there are several examples of such knowledge: 
knowing how to swim, knowing to ride a bicy-
cle, knowing to drive a car, knowing to speak 
in public or to articulate and lead a group of 
people. 
Explicit knowledge, in contrast, is character-
ized by being directly encoded in a representa-
tion system such as natural language. Thus, it 
is easily transmitted or communicated and it is 
accessible to other individuals directly. To 
show that someone, A, has knowledge of this 
type we usually use the expression "A knows 
that P" (where P is usually a statement). There-
fore, knowing that water is H2O or knowing 
that when the photocopying machine has the 
red light on someone should change the car-
tridge are two examples of this type of 
knowledge. 
Let us go to the second group of knowledge. 
For individual knowledge we can understand 
all knowledge which an individual of an organ-
ization possesses. Therefore, the individual 
knowledge of a person consists of all explicit 
and tacit knowledge possessed by this mem-
ber. Individual skills, personal contacts and re-
lationships or technical knowledge that a per-
son posseses can be identified as a part of the 
individual knowledge that he has. 
Conversely, corporate or organizational 
knowledge is the knowledge that can be at-
tributed to an organization, the owner of the 
organization. This knowledge is usually physi-
cally presented in some kind of document. 
The databases purchased by an organization 
or intellectual property and patents that they 
develop are two clear examples of this type of 
knowledge. 
Finally we have the third last group. The inter-
nal knowledge is that knowledge which is crit-
ical for the appropriate functioning of an or-
ganization. In other words: the knowledge 
without which it would be impossible for the 
organization to operate. If we identify a chem-
ical laboratory as an organization, the 
knowledge possessed by the chemists of this 
laboratory or the patents developed by them 
are two good examples of internal knowledge 
of the organization. 
External knowledge, however, is that 
knowledge that an organization uses to inter-
act with other organizations. The knowledge 
in the published reports of the organization or 
on its external website are examples of this last 
type of knowledge. 
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With the definition of these six types of 
knowledge in hand we can propose a much 
more complex second definition of 
Knowledge Management in organizations. 
In this sense, Knowledge Management within 
an organization may be understood as the dis-
cipline that deals with designing and imple-
menting a system whose main objective is that 
all tacit, explicit, individual, internal and exter-
nal knowledge involved in the organization 
can be converted systematically to an organi-
zational or corporative knowledge, in such a 
way that the corporate knowledge, being ac-
cessible and shared, allows the increase in the 
individual knowledge of all its members and 
improves the contribution of these individuals 
in achieving the goals of their organization di-
rectly. 
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KNOWLEDGE ORGANIZATION (S. or-
ganización del conocimiento, F. organisation de la con-
naissances, G. WissensOrganisation [LIS, infor-
mation society, knowledge management]disci-
pline 
Knowledge Organization (KO) is a field of 
study that comprises techniques to organize 
documents, concepts, and relationships 
among them. One of the tasks that KO carries 
out is to increase the interoperability mecha-
nisms to enable a way to employ these tech-
niques in a worldwide media. Related fields are 
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information classification, information re-
trieval, information visualization, and 
knowledge acquisition, amongst others. 
It should not be confused with knowledge 
management (KM), since the latter is focused 
on the field of organizations, whereas KO has 
a more general orientation, less focused on the 
concrete returns of organizations, which ob-
jectives are more concrete and explicit. Never-
theless, KM is supported by KO as one of its 
basic processes and techniques. 
A great number of methods to organize 
knowledge are based on principles stated by 
librarians. Some librarian resources used in 
KO are controlled vocabularies and classifica-
tion schemes (v. indexing language, thesaurus, 
and taxonomy).  
Fields related are often overlapped, some of 
these fields and the resources that they de-
velop are: 
Linguistics: NLP tools like taggers, stem-
mers, terminological and lexical databases, etc. 
Artificial Intelligence: ontologies, neural 
networks, and reasoning engines. 
Statistics and data mining: classifier and 
clustering algorithms. 
Information Extraction and Retrieval: 
named entities recognition and classification, 
correference resolution, etc.  
Librarian and information science: re-
sources controlled vocabularies and classifica-
tion schemes, indexing techniques, metadata 
vocabularies.  
Computer science: design applications to or-
ganize and retrieve. 
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KNOWLEDGE ORGANIZATION 
SYSTEM (S. sistemanas de organización del 
conocimiento, F. Systèmes de organisation de la 
connaissances, G. WissensOrganisation Systeme 
[information science] concpet 
The concept Knowledge Organization System 
(aka KOS) group different classification 
schemes used to organize knowledge. Some 
KOSs are library classifications, taxonomies, 
subject headings, thesauri, ontologies, etc. 
KOS is a corner stone in Knowledge Organi-
zation tools. 
Knowledge Organization techniques are used 
to build KOSs. These techniques outline prin-
ciples to build, manage, and visualize KOS. 
Knowledge Organization Systems show a sim-
plified view of the concepts of a domain. The 
goal is provide a way to improve the under-
standing and the management of a field of 
knowledge.  
On account of the variety of disciplines needs 
to facilitate their understanding, KO Systems 
are present in a wide range of fields of 
knowledge. There are examples of KOS in e-
learning, Artificial Intelligence, Software Engi-
neering, and Information Science. Each of 
these fields gives to KO Systems one or more 
different names, and design these KOS in a 
different way, according its specific goals. In 
this manner, e-learning talks about mind maps 
and concept maps; Artificial Intelligence ad-
dress ontologies and semantic networks; Soft-
ware Engineering talks about UML diagrams; 
and Information Science use thesauri, subject 
headings, library classifications, etc. Although, 
each approach has different semantic struc-
tures depending on its goals, all of them col-
lect a domain vocabulary to represent con-
cepts, and semantic relationships among these 
concepts. 
The construction of a KOS requires a high in-
tellectual effort to reach an agreement about 
the representation. This implies to analyze the 
domain to extract the main concepts and rela-
tionships and to agree these analyses   in order 
to show a shared representation. This is a la-
borious and exhausting work with frequent 
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delays. These problems might be minimized 
with a systematic methodology to develop 
these models. Examples came from Software 
Engineering and Ontology Engineering. Sev-
eral software applications have been imple-
mented to easy these tasks.  
One of the main bottlenecks is knowledge ac-
quisition. This phase tries to identify the main 
concepts, by different information sources 
and experts. Next step, it is conceptualization, 
that is structure the domain. This implies ana-
lyze terminology, synonyms, hierarchical, and 
associative structures. Besides these structures 
it is important to identify the constraints that 
present each relation or attribute. 
Some approaches have been made to group 
different KOSs. In this regard and from the 
ontology engineering point of view, thesauri 
and other library classification are called light 
ontologies, in contrast to true ontologies 
(Daconta et al., 2003; 157; Lassila, O. y 
McGuinness, D. L., 2001; Gruninger y 
Uschold, 2002). 
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KOLMOGOROV COMPLEXITY (S. Com-
plejidad de Kolmogorov, F. Complexité de Kolmogo-
rov, G. Kolmogorow-Komplexität) [AIT, computer 
science, complexity theory, coding theory] con-
cept 
Contents. 1) Absolute and relative complexity 
measures; 2) Complexity with respect to an algorithm; 3) 
Absolute Kolmogorov complexity; 4) Diversity of naming, 
approaches and applications. 
1. Absolute and relative complexity 
measures. Kolmogorov complexity is an al-
gorithmic measure or measure of algorithmic 
information. It is defined for constructive ob-
jects, such as words in some alphabet. If x is a 
word, then the original Kolmogorov complex-
ity C(x) of a word x (also denoted by K(x)) is 
taken to be equal to: 
the size of the shortest program (in number 
of symbols) for a universal Turing ma-
chine U that without additional data, com-
putes the string x and terminates. 
As Turing machines are recursive algorithms, 
the original Kolmogorov complexity C(x) is 
a recursive complexity measure. 
This measure is called absolute Kolmogorov com-
plexity because Kolmogorov complexity has 
also a relative form C(x | y). Namely, the rela-
tive Kolmogorov complexity C(x | y) of the 
word x relative to the word y is taken to be 
equal to:  
the size of the shortest program (in number of 
symbols) for a universal Turing ma-
chine U that with y as its input, computes the 
string x and terminates. 
The relative Kolmogorov complexity C(x | y) 
allows one to find the algorithmic quantity 
I(y ; x) of information in a word y about a word x. 
Namely, we have 
I(y ; x) = C(x) - C(x | y) 
2. Complexity with respect to an algo-
rithm. The Kolmogorov complexity CA(x) of 
an object (word) x with respect to an algo-
rithm A is defined as 
CA(x) = min {l(p);  A(p) = x} 
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in the case when there is a word p such 
that A(p) = x; 
otherwise CA(x) is not defined. 
If the Church-Turing Thesis (→Turing Halting 
Theorem) is accepted, then any algorithm is 
modeled by a Turing machine and Kolmogo-
rov complexity is considered only for Turing 
machines. 
3. Absolute Kolmogorov complexity. Solo-
monoff (1964), Kolmogorov (1965), and 
Chaitin (1969) proved that there is an invariant 
up to some additive constant Kolmogorov 
complexity C(x). It is called absolute Kolmogorov 
complexity because there is also relative Kolmogo-
rov complexity C(x|y). Namely, there is a Turing 
machine U such that for any Turing ma-
chine T, there is a constant cUT such that for all 
words x, we have 
CU(x) ≤ CT(x) + cUT 
The machine U is a universal Turing machine. 
This makes the concept of Kolmogorov com-
plexity invariant up to an additive constant if 
we put C(x) = CU(x). 
However, it is necessary to understand that 
this invariance is not absolute because the 
value of the constant cUT depends on the 
choice of the universal Turing ma-
chine U (Weinstein, 2003; Burgin, 2005). 
It was demonstrated that Kolmogorov com-
plexity cannot be computed by a Turing ma-
chine or by any other recursive algorithm 
(Kolmogorov, 1965) but can be computed by 
an inductive Turing machine (Burgin, 1982). 
When the length of a word tends to infinity, 
its Kolmogorov complexity also tends to in-
finity. 
4. Diversity of naming, approaches and 
applications. Although the majority of re-
searchers use Kolmogorov complexity as the stand-
ard name for this measure, there are authors 
who prefer a different name. In particular, the 
following names of this concept are used: algo-
rithmic information content, algorithmic information, 
program-size complexity, information content, shortest 
program length, algorithmic randomness, stochastic 
complexity, information-theoretic complexity, complex-
ity, randomness, KCS (Kolmogorov-Chaitin-Sol-
omonoff) complexity, information size, and algo-
rithmic entropy. 
Different names reflect different approaches 
to the concept. When we want to know how 
difficult it might be computing or constructing 
some object x with recursive algorithms, Kol-
mogorov or algorithmic complexity is an appropriate 
name. When the question is how much infor-
mation we need to build or compute x with 
given algorithms, the name information size of x 
better reflects the situation. When we consider 
probabilistic aspects of x, e.g., randomness, al-
gorithmic entropy might be the best name. 
 Many versions of Kolmogorov complexity 
have been introduced. The most known of 
them are: uniform complexity KR(x), prefix com-
plexity or prefix-free complexity K(x), monotone com-
plexity Km(x), conditional Kolmogorov complexity 
CD(x), time-bounded Kolmogorov complexity Ct(x), 
space-bounded Kolmogorov complexity Cs(x), and re-
source-bounded Kolmogorov complexity Ct,s(x). In 
addition, Kolmogorov complexity has been 
extended to infinite processes, infinite words 
(Chaitin, 1976; 1977), super-recursive algo-
rithms (Burgin, 1995; 2005; Schmidhuber, 
2002), quantum computations (Svozil, 1996) 
and algorithmic problems (Burgin, 2010a). 
Existence of different versions of Kolmogo-
rov complexity caused a necessity to build a 
unified algorithmic information measure. 
Such a theory has been developed as an →ax-
iomatic algorithmic complexity  (Burgin, 1982; 
1990; 2005; 2010). 
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L
LIBRARY SCIENCE (S. biblioteconomçia, F. 
sciences des bibliothèques, bibliothéconomie, G. 
Bibliotheks-, Dokumentations- wissenschaft 
[research, information management] concept 
Branch of the information sciences devoted to 
the theoretical and technical knowledge con-
cerning organization and administration of li-
braries. It deals with the managing of collec-
tions and information resources, and the pro-
vision of user access. 
At the beginning of the 20th century, the term 
"information" was frequently linked to Special 
Librarianship in the English speaking world. In 
the 1960s and after a period in which this ac-
tivity was associated to Documentation, it 
converged with what was labelled as Infor-
mation Science (which in some Latin-American 
countries has been translated into “Ciencia de 
la Información”, with a sense close to the 
English usage). According to Capurro and 
Hjørland (2003), this was motivated by: (i) the 
growing interest in computer applications, (ii) 
the influence of Shannon’s theory, and (iii) the 
current information processing paradigm in 
cognitive sciences. 
Considering Library Science as academic dis-
cipline related to librarians and documental-
ists, two clear trends have been distinguished: 
the general approach, mainly focused on public 
libraries with emphasis in general education 
and significantly detached from the 
knowledge it serves; and the specialised approach, 
aimed at specific knowledge domains. How-
ever, although this second approach was rela-
tively dominant until the 1970s, thereafter it 
lost its leading position as education tended to 
become more general and oriented towards 
psychology, subjective idealism and methodo-
logical individualism. But simultaneously, an 
intermediate approach emerged which could 
be branded as a neutral specialisation (even 
formal or abstract), the domain-analytic approach, 
related to hermeneutics, semiotics and social 
constructivism (Capurro & Hjørland 2003).  
According to Griffith’s definition (1980), “In-
formation Science is concerned with the gen-
eration, collection, organisation, interpreta-
tion, storage, retrieval, dissemination, trans-
formation and use of information, with particu-
lar emphasis on the applications of modern 
technologies in these areas”. The objective of 
its disciplinary framework is “to create and 
structure a body of scientific, technological 
and system knowledge related to information 
transfer”. Thus –despite the problematic or 
contingent linkage to used tools made by Grif-
fith– it can be stated that we are dealing with 
a science which contains elements being theo-
retical (except for its specific application) and 
applied (aimed at services and products). 
Regarding the conceptualisation of infor-
mation carried out in this field, it can be stated 
that special focus is put on two confronted 
meanings: 1) the information as an object in 
documents and 2) its radical subjectivisation, 
i.e. information as everything “that can be in-
formative to someone”.  
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MATHEMATICAL STRATUM OF THE 
GTI (S. Sustrato matemático de la TGI,, F. La 
strate mathématique de la TGI, G Die mathematische 
Substrat der GTI) [General Theory of 
Information] theory 
The mathematical stratum of the →General Theory 
of Information (GTI) builds mathematical mod-
els of information, information processes and 
information processing systems. According to 
the basic principles of GTI, information is in-
trinsically related to transformations. That is 
why portions of information are modeled by 
information operators in infological system 
representation spaces or simply in information 
spaces. Informally, an information space is a 
space where information functions (acts). In 
the formalized approach, information spaces 
are constructed as state or phase spaces of in-
fological systems. It is possible to use different 
mathematical structures for state/phase repre-
sentation. Thus, the mathematical stratum of 
the GTI is build as an operator theory in in-
formation spaces based on principles of this 
theory, which are translated into postulates 
and axioms. 
There are two types of mathematical models 
of information: (1) information processes and 
(2) information processing systems. This sep-
aration results in two approaches: functional 
and categorical.  
In the functional approach, the information 
space is represented by functional spaces, 
such as Hilbert spaces or Banach spaces, while 
portions of information are modeled by oper-
ators in these spaces. 
In the categorical approach, information 
spaces are represented by abstract categories 
(Burgin 2010b). There are two forms of infor-
mation dynamics depiction in categories: the 
categorical and functorial representa-
tions. The categorical representation of infor-
mation dynamics preserves internal structures 
of information spaces associated with in-
fological systems as their state or phase spaces. 
In it, portions of information are modeled by 
categorical information operators. The functo-
rial representation of information dynamics pre-
serves external structures of information 
spaces associated with infological systems as 
their state or phase spaces. In it, portions of 
information are modeled by functorial infor-
mation operators. 
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MENTAL CONTENT (S. contenido mental, 
F. contenú mentale, G. mentaler Inhalt) [mind, se-
mantics, psicology, cognitive science] concept 
It is commonly assumed that mental states can 
be characterized by a certain psychological at-
titude and a certain content. The content of a 
mental state is a mental content. A precedent 
of that analysis can be found in Russell. Be-
lieving, desiring, remembering, feeling, per-
ceiving, etc., are examples of psychological at-
titudes. What is believed, what is desired, what 
is remembered, what is felt, what is perceived, 
MESSAGE 
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etc., would be the mental content that in each 
case is associated with those attitudes. 
Very often, it is also assumed that there are 
two big classes of mental contents: conceptual 
and non-conceptual ones. Conceptual content 
is the semantic content that we can find in 
words, expressions and sentences of a lan-
guage. The content that beliefs, desires, re-
memberings, etc., typically have is the same as 
the content of certain sentences. Mental states 
with conceptual content are also called “prop-
ositional attitudes”, their content being a par-
ticular proposition that could be expressed by 
a certain sentence. 
Non-conceptual content is an experiential, 
qualitative or phenomenological content. It is 
eventually the content that feelings, percep-
tions and sensations typically have. Whereas 
conceptual content is semantically evaluable in 
a quite direct way, non-conceptual content is 
not so. However, non-conceptual content can 
be evaluated as more or less correct or incor-
rect, or as more or less adequate or inadequate, 
etc. Mental states with non-conceptual con-
tent are usually called “qualitative states”, “ex-
periential states” or “phenomenal states”. 
Their content would be a qualitative, experi-
ential, or phenomenal character not identifia-
ble with any proposition. 
A very important thesis with respect to the dis-
tinction between conceptual and non-concep-
tual content is that perhaps there are mental 
states with both conceptual content and non-
conceptual content. Another not least im-
portant thesis is that perhaps every mental 
state with conceptual content has also some 
kind of non-conceptual content. 
The contrast between internism and externism 
has given place to one of the more dramatic 
discussions about mental content in recent 
years. Internism claims that mental contents –
and mental states-- only depend on factors in-
ternal to the mind of the subjects. Externism 
claims that mental contents –and mental 
states-- essentially depend on factors external 
to their minds. Those external factors may in-
clude linguistic norms of the community, how 
experts would use certain terms, and the rela-
tionships with the external world. Descartes 
and Frege are two paradigmatic classical exam-
ples of internism. Externism was introduced 
by authors like Putnam, Burge and Kripke. 
References 
The bibliographic resources offered by David Chalmers 
in his website are extremely useful: 
<http://consc.net/chalmers/> 
― BURGE, T. (1992) “Philosophy of Language and 
Mind 1950-1990”, Philosophical Review, 95.  
― CRANE, T. (1992). The Contents of Experience. Cam-
bridge: Cambridge Univ. Press. 
― DRETSKE, F. (1980). Knowledge and the Flow of Infor-
mation. Cambridge: MIT Press. 
― DRETSKE, F. (1988). Explaining Behavior. Cam-
bridge: MIT Press. 
― FODOR, J. (1987). Psychosemantics, The Problem of 
Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge: MIT 
Press. 
― KRIPKE, S. (1980). Naming and Necessity. Cam-
bridge: Harvard Univ. Press. 
― LYCAN, W, (ed.) (2008). Mind and Cognition. Cam-
bridge: Basil Blackwell. 
― MCGINN, C. (1989). Mental Content. New York, 
Blackwell. 
― MILLIKAN, R. (1984). Language, Thought and Other 
Biological Categories. Cambridge: MIT Press. 
― PETTIT, Ph. & J. McDowell (eds.) (1986). Subject, 
Thought and Content. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
― PUTNAM, H. (1975). “The meaning of ‘meaning’ ”, 
in: Mind, Language and Reality. Cambridge: Cam-
bridge: Univ. Press. 
― PUTNAM, H. (1988). Representation and Reality. Cam-
bridge: MIT Press. 
― RICHARD, M. (1990). Propositional Attitudes. Cam-
bridge: Cambridge Univ. Press. 
― STALNAKER, R. (1999). Context and Content. Ox-
ford: Oxford Univ. Press. 
― WOODFIELD, A. (ed.) (1982). Thought and Object. 
Essays on Intentionality. New York: Oxford Univ. 
Press. 
(ML) 
MESSAGE (S. mensaje, F. message, G. Botchaft, 
Nachricht) [transdiciplinary, communication 
theory, angeletics] concept 
Contents.— 1) Introduction, 2) Message and infor-
mation, from Shannon’s confusion towards a systematic dis-
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tinction, 3) Analysis of Messages, 4) Fallibility and effi-
ciency of messages, 5) Beyond human contexts: a crossroad 
between biology and hermeneutics 
1. Introduction. The message plays such a 
central role in communication processes that 
“the Theory of Communication is largely a 
theory of messages” (Ferrater Mora 1994). 
However, the common direct association be-
tween message and information arises from a 
confusion –even a conceptual void- which 
source can be found in Shannon’s communi-
cation model. For the sake of improving our 
understanding of both message and infor-
mation, a clarification is needed in order to ad-
dress the involved phenomena better. 
If communication requires at least a sender, 
receiver, a medium and a message, but regard-
ing McLuhan famous dictum “the medium is 
the message”, what is then a message? Bring-
ing here some clarity, restoring its importance, 
is perhaps a way to circumvent the “disange-
lium of current times” referred by Sloterdijk 
(1997) or the “phantasmagorical” character of 
new media evoked by Zizek (1997). 
2. Message and information, from Shan-
non’s confusion towards a systematic dis-
tinction. Claude Shannon's theory of commu-
nication (Shannon 1948) is not a theory about 
information transmission but about message 
transmission. Shannon uses the term 'message' 
instead of 'information' in its usual meaning as 
'knowledge communicated'. The concept of 
information within this theory refers to the 
number of binary choices in order to create or 
codify – a message. In reality – as it was con-
ceived and applied – the theory is about signal 
transmission and the ways in which to make it 
more reliable. Shannon correlates information 
and uncertainty, as opposed to the everyday 
meaning of information. The semantic and 
pragmatic aspects are excluded from this engi-
neering perspective of communication. War-
ren Weaver found Shannon's definition of in-
formation as counterintuitive (Shannon & 
Weaver 1972). But Shannon had indeed sub-
stituted the everyday meaning by using the 
word message. 
Message and information are related but not 
identical concepts: 
― a message is sender-dependent, i.e. it is 
based on a heteronomic or asymmetric 
structure. This is not the case of infor-
mation: we receive a message, but we ask 
for information, 
― a message is supposed to bring something 
new and/or relevant to the receiver. This is 
also the case of information, 
― a message can be coded and transmitted 
through different media or messengers. 
This is also the case of information, 
― a message is an utterance that gives rise to 
the receiver's selection through a release 
mechanism or interpretation. 
Thus, we observe they are interrelated con-
cepts but clearly not coincident. How might 
they be distinguished? The theory of social 
systems provides us here some insights. Fol-
lowing Luhmann, a communication process 
within a social system is a three dimensional 
juncture of a meaning offer, selection of 
meaning and understanding (Luhmann 1987, 
196, →Autopoiesis). Considering message as 
meaning offer, and information as its selec-
tion, we already have a distinction: message 
("Mitteilung") is the action of offering some-
thing (potentially) meaningful to a social sys-
tem ("Sinnangebot"); information ("Infor-
mation") is the process of selecting meaning 
from different possibilities offered by a mes-
sage; and understanding ("Verstehen") is the in-
tegration of the selected meaning within the 
system. Communication melts these differ-
ences towards a unity. 
Message, as meaning offer is sender depend-
ent, therefore heteronomous. We receive mes-
sages, but we look for information, which we 
can only do if a meaning offer exists. A mes-
sage brings to the recipient something new or 
surprising, causing uncertainty. It can be 
through different means codified and trans-
mitted, arriving to recipients somehow dis-
torted. Finally, the selection of meanings of-
fered by the message always takes place over 
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the background of a pre-understanding. Re-
cipients understand messages distinguishing 
between the meanings offered and selected. 
The Recipient can doubt about the message, 
interpreting either way or even neglecting it. 
The heteronomy of the message stands there-
fore against the autonomy of interpreting. 
3. Analysis of Messages. Messages admit an 
Aristotelian analysis in terms of form, goal, 
content, producers (and recipients). 
Regarding its form, messages can be primarily 
distinguished between: imperatives, indicatives 
and optionals. However, from the point of view 
of the message directivity, two extreme forms 
can also be identified: 1) a human sender, an 
individual or a group, may believe to have a 
message for everybody and for all times, and 
vice versa, 2) someone may think everything is 
a message to him/her. Between these two 
poles there are several possible hierarchies. 
The form of the message has a basic constraint 
related to the effectiveness: in order to select 
or interpret a message the receiver must have 
some kind of common pre-understanding 
with the sender of the message, for instance a 
similar form or (linguistic) code. 
In his theory of communication or "com-
municology" Vilem Flusser makes a basic dis-
tinction concerning two goals of communica-
tion: 
― the dialogical goal, aiming at the creation of 
new information, 
― the discursive goal, aiming at the distribution 
of information (Flusser 1996, →Dialogic vs. 
Discursive). 
A third goal related to the preservation of in-
formation could be added, namely conserva-
tional, embracing librarian and archivist activi-
ties. 
According to Flusser the age of mass media 
with their hierarchical one-to-many structure 
of information distributors –we could call this 
the CNN-principle– would finally dominate 
all forms of information creation. In other 
words, the possibility for a receiver to become 
a sender of messages within a dialogical system 
remains a subordinate option. Since the rise of 
the Internet things started to change, at least 
concerning the easier and cheaper possibility 
for many receivers to become senders, includ-
ing such hierarchical distribution options as 
one-to-one, one-to-many, many-to-many and 
many-to-one. 
These distribution hierarchies also correspond 
to power constellations, which play a crucial role 
determining contents, producers and recipi-
ents: Who is allowed to send and preserve? 
What messages can be sent? Which recipients 
can be addressed? How can it be done (includ-
ing technical conditions)? What purposes are 
allowed? Whereas in the antiquity the dissem-
ination of messages was a sign of god and 
power, with the advent of philosophy the le-
gitimacy of this right came into question. His-
torically a change from a vertical message 
structure to a horizontal one can be observed 
(Capurro 2003a, Díaz & Al Hadithi 2009). The 
heteronomous determination of messages 
gives rise to its vertical character; however, 
philosophical and scientific discourses are ex-
amples of how a heteronomous message can 
be embedded into a horizontal structure, i.e. 
“dialogical”. 
Concerning the possibilities and constraints of 
digital media with respect to power constella-
tion and the resulting verticality or horizontal-
ity of communication, there is an ongoing de-
bate on the future structure of the Internet. 
The pressure of established information oli-
gopoles (= concentration of power in few 
hands) will not vanish although it may de-
crease. At the same time new forms of domi-
nation and exclusion arise (Capurro et al 2007, 
→Critical Theory of Information, Fuchs 2009). 
A thorough analysis of messages (regarding 
production, transmission and reception) con-
cern different aspects such as origin, purpose, 
and content of messages, power structures, 
techniques and means of diffusion, history of 
messages and messengers, coding and inter-
preting messages, as well as psychological, po-
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litical, economic, aesthetic, ethical and reli-
gious aspects. Therefore an interdisciplinary 
stage, named →angeletics, has been postulated 
where media studies, the study of signs (semi-
otics) and their interpretation (→hermeneutics) 
are specifically convened. 
4. Fallibility and efficiency of messages. 
What kind of specific criteria can be postu-
lated concerning the way a sender, a medium 
and a receiver of messages should act in order 
to be successful under finite conditions? By fi-
nite conditions we mean that neither the 
sender, nor the messenger, nor the receiver 
have any kind of certainty that their actions 
will fit the ideal situation in which: 
― a sender addresses a receiver, sending 
him/her a message that is new and relevant 
for him/her, i.e., he/she follows the princi-
ple of respect, 
― a messenger brings the message undistorted 
to the receiver, i.e., he/she follows the prin-
ciple of faithfulness, 
― a receiver reserves judgement, based on a 
process of interpretation, about whether 
the message is true or not, i.e., he/she fol-
lows the principle of reservation. 
In order to achieve the goals pursued in mes-
sage production (mentioned above), the 
sender requires a strategy and planning on 
how messages should be generated, structured 
and released. The cognitive processes in-
volved in the planning of a message addressed 
to a certain target may be conscious or uncon-
scious. The main objective of the sender as he 
intends to send a message is to affect the con-
duct and/or mental architecture of the re-
ceiver. The design of the message may differ 
depending on which subsidiary goals are pur-
sued (e.g., the desire to be polite), and may also 
vary depending on the cognitive, rhetorical, 
social, strategic, etc. capacities of the individu-
als involved. As a result, several plans are exe-
cuted simultaneously when a message is pro-
duced, transmitted and interpreted. 
The different theories on the production of 
messages generally agree on the idea that par-
takers are subject to the same kind of cognitive 
dynamics at the planning of messages. 
Regarding the more or less interactive charac-
ter of communication, which depends on the 
form and related power constellations men-
tioned above, the message production can be 
more or less cooperative. Indeed, the repre-
sentations produced by the sender do not "in-
ject" a certain meaning in a passive receptor. 
The simultaneous and interactive character of 
communication (if it is horizontal as argued 
above), as well as the constant exchange of 
roles between sender and receiver, leads to a 
model where the message is produced as a re-
sult of the collaboration of the partakers. The 
different plans at stake when transmitting and 
interpreting a message must adapt instantane-
ously to the speech situation, forcing the 
agents to adapt their messages to the different 
constraints of the communicative context. 
5. Beyond human contexts: a crossroad 
between biology and hermeneutics. The 
concept of message has also been frequently 
used in non-human contexts, especially in bi-
ology (genetics, molecular biology). However, 
the communication model used above to 
make a distinction between message and in-
formation, as well as the analysis used to get a 
deeper understanding of messages has to be 
simplified. Considering the original twofold 
meaning of the term 'information' as 'mould-
ing matter' and as 'knowledge communicated' 
we can say that a cell or, more generally, a liv-
ing system, is in-formed on the basis of message 
selection in order to satisfy its constraints. More-
over, a self-organizing system can be seen as a 
system able to make a good behavioural selec-
tion among the offer of behaviours within the 
received messages and with respect to its sur-
vival (→autopoiesis). The dynamics of the selec-
tion mechanism has to be understood in a di-
achronic perspective. 
The physicist Carl-Friedrich von Weiszäcker 
remarks that the modern concept of infor-
mation is a new way of asking for what Plato 
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and Aristotle called idéa or morphé (Weizsäcker 
1974). But what is the main difference be-
tween Plato's concept of participation (me-
thexis) as in-formation and today's view of 
communication? Answer: the inversion of the 
relation between time and form. According to 
today's evolutionary perspective forms evolve 
within the horizon of time not the other way 
round (Matsuno 1998). The process of mes-
sages interpretation also evolves in time. Un-
derstanding means originally the very fact of 
being able to provide a correct answer to given 
possibilities (or messages). This capability 
evolves “in time” from a very elementary way 
of responding to messages to a more complex 
way of interpreting messages (Capurro 
2003b). 
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MIND (S. mente, F. esprit, G. Geist) [transdisci-
plinar, semántica] concept 
The notions of mind, psyche, soul, even con-
sciousness, can be considered equivalent. Per-
ceiving, remembering, believing, desiring, rea-
soning, taking decisions, imagining, under-
standing, having emotions and feelings, etc., 
are examples of mental states and processes. 
The scientific discipline directly concerned 
with the mind is psychology, and the philo-
sophical discipline concerned with the mind is 
the philosophy of mind. There is, however, an 
area of knowledge interested in mind more 
generally –both human and animal, natural 
and artificial, etc.—and in a very interdiscipli-
nary sense. That area is known as “cognitive 
sciences”, or as “cognitive science” in a more 
ambitious interpretation. Artificial intelligence 
would belong to that area. Moreover, it has 
been argued many times that the philosophy 
of mind would also belong to it. 
Very often, mind is contrasted with the physi-
cal world and with the external world. Mind 
seems to constitute some kind of non-physical 
internal world. In relation with that contrast, 
the notion of mind involves three important 
problems: 1) a serious problem of localization 
(Where is the mind located?), 2) a serious 
problem of connection (How does the mind 
connect with the physical world and with the 
external world?), and 3) a serious problem of 
epistemic access (How can we come to know 
something about our own mind? How can we 
come to know something about other 
minds?). 
There are three crucial aspects of the mind: in-
tentionality, qualitative character and personal iden-
tity. Intentionality is what makes possible that 
the mind is related with objects and states of 
actual or possible affairs. Intentionality is ex-
hibited in propositional attitudes, mental 
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states –beliefs, desires, memories, etc.- with a 
semantic content able to represent objects and 
states of affairs. Qualitative character is a peculiar 
quality or phenomenological feature. It is 
manifest in mental states with a content full of 
experiential ingredients. Finally, personal identity 
makes reference to our enduring existence as 
persons with a “self”, or an “ego”. The three 
aspects entail very hard problems, both scien-
tific and philosophical. 
We need to make reference to another field of 
problems. The mind can be considered: a sub-
stance, a set of properties or attributes, or the 
result of quite a peculiar sort of description. 
The realistic compromises of the first option 
are stronger that those of the second option, 
and these ones are stronger than those of the 
third one. The first option is the one of Platon 
and Descartes, a dualism of substances –the 
mind as a different substance than the physi-
cal, material or extensive substance. The sec-
ond option is maintained by Aristotle and by 
many contemporary authors. The third option 
is favoured by eliminativism. According to 
eliminativism, the mind would not have an ob-
jective reality with independence of a certain 
way of describing and interpreting some sorts 
of phenomena, including here a certain way of 
describing and interpreting some phenomena 
having to do with our own body and our be-
haviour. 
The last point worthy of mention is that per-
haps we would not have to speak of “the 
mind” in general, but of different “kinds of 
minds”. There could be purely semantic, con-
ceptual, or cognitive minds in contrast with 
other much more qualitative, non-conceptual, 
or experiential minds. There could be natural 
and artificial minds. There could be very sim-
ple minds and very sophisticated minds. There 
could be human minds and non-human 
minds, etc. 
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N
NEGANTROPY (S. negantropía, F. néguentro-
pie, G. Negentropie) [statistical physics, biology] 
concept 
Negantropy is the negative value of the →en-
tropy. Although the concept was first used by 
Erwin Schrödinger in 1943, who stated that 
“life feeds on negative entropy” (1944), the 
term “negantropy” was first coined by the 
French physicist Léon Brillouin (1953), who 
generalised the second law of thermodynam-
ics as: in any transformation of a closed sys-
tem, the quantity “entropy minus infor-
mation” must always increase over time or 
may, at best, remain constant. Moreover, Bril-
louin’s theory of information is considered as 
a consequence of the negentropy principle, 
which might be illustrated by the negentropy 
cicle: negentropy–information–decision–
negentropy. 
Criticizing the use of this term, Carl Friedrich 
von Weizsäcker stated: “Information has been 
correlated with knowledge, entropy with igno-
rance and consequently information has been 
labelled as negentropy. But this is a conceptual 
or verbal lack of clarity” (1985). To overcome 
such obscurity he distinguished between poten-
tial information (designated by Shannon’s en-
tropy) and actual information, which is factual 
and present. By knowing the macro-state of an 
object, the potential information is bounded; 
while the specification of its microstate is ac-
tual information (Lyre 2002). 
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NON-INFORMATIONAL ACCESS (S. 
acceso no informacional, F. schéma conceptuel, G. Be-
griffslandkarte) [philosophy of mind, cognition] 
concept 
A non-informational access is an access that is 
not informational. Non-informational access 
may be physical or experiential. In that sense, 
informational access is in contrast both with 
physical access and with experiential –or qual-
itative- access. To have informational access 
to a certain amount of money is not the same 
as to have physical access to that amount of 
money. To have informational access to a cer-
tain state of pain is not the same either than to 
have an experiential access to that state of 
pain. 
Of course, we can elaborate theories about in-
formation according to which information is 
identified with certain physical states or prop-
erties. In addition, we can elaborate theories 
about experience according to which experi-
ence is identified with some sorts of informa-
tional states. However, examples as those 
above presented show that such identifica-
tions would always involve very strong onto-
logical compromises. Informational relations 
seem to be very different from physical rela-
tions, and very different too from qualitative, 
experiential or fenomenological relations. 
NON-INFORMATIONAL ACCESS 
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ONTOLOGY (S. ontologia, F. onmtologie, G. 
ontologie [Artificial Intelligence; Semantic Web] 
resource, concept 
Contents.— 1) Modelling techniques, 2) Ontology ele-
ments, 3) Ontology principles, 4) Ontology types 
According to Gomez-Perez (2004), Ontology 
definition has evolved during the last twenty 
years. In 1995, Guarino collects seven defini-
tions about this concept to propose a new one. 
This author defines ontology as “a set of logi-
cal axioms designed to account for the in-
tended meaning of a vocabulary” (Guarino, 
1998). 
One of the reasons for the disagreement is the 
broad definition that has been proposed to 
group all current ontologies. Wikipedia de-
fines ontology as a “Formal representation of 
a set of concepts within a domain and the re-
lationships between those concepts”. These 
definitions might be right even for any other 
Knowledge Organization Systems or termino-
logical resource. Wikipedia adds that ontolo-
gies are “used to reason about the properties 
of that domain, and may be used to define the 
domain”. 
The best known definition was proposed by 
Gruber: “a formal, explicit specification of a 
shared ontology.” (1991). 
1. Modeling techniques. Two are the most 
commonly used techniques: 
― First-order logic 
― Description logic 
2. Ontology elements. Depending on the 
technique that has been used, the vocabulary 
to design some elements might be different. 
― Classes: It is a set of similar individuals. 
These sets represent the main concepts of 
the domain. These concepts are often ar-
ranged in a hierarchical way. Classes might 
have attributes and functions and can be 
linked to another class by relations. 
― Relations: Relationships to link classes and 
individuals 
― Attributes: properties or slots those classes 
and its individuals can have. 
― Functions 
― Individuals: instances or objects of a class. 
To perform inference, the existence of asser-
tions considered true is needed: these asser-
tions are used to express restrictions, rules and 
axioms. 
Finally, the Events are a way to represent how 
the value of attributes and the relationships 
might change. 
First order usually calls these elements: classes, 
relations, attributes (slots), functions, in-
stances, and axioms. 
Description Logic uses the following ele-
ments: concepts (equivalent to classes); roles 
(equivalent to relations and properties of con-
cepts); and Individuals (equivalent to the in-
stances of concepts and their properties). 
3. Ontologies principles. To be able to share 
knowledge, interoperability is required. Many 
principles have been proposed (Gruber 1993): 
― Clarity: objective definitions, formalized 
with axioms, and complete (necessary and 
sufficient conditions). 
― Minimal Encoding Bias 
― Extendibility 
OPEN ACCESS 
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― Minimal ontological commitments 
Gomez-Perez (2004) adds to this list: 
― Representing disjoints and exhaustive knowledge 
― Minimizing distance between siblings 
― Standardizing names in a clear form 
4. Types of Ontologies. There are different 
types of ontologies: 
Upper ~ (top ~ or foundational ~): describe 
very general concepts that are common to all 
the ontologies. Other ontologies can be 
aligned with these concepts by their root term. 
Examples are DOLCE, Proton, SUMO, and 
CYC 
Task ~: describe the vocabulary related to 
some generic task or activity. 
Domain ~: concepts of a domain and their 
relationships. 
Common ~(generic ontologies): common 
knowledge reusable in different domains. Ex-
amples are ontologies about time or space. 
Knowledge Representation ~: primitives to 
express knowledge in a formalized way. 
Application ~: it is an ontology adapted to a 
specific application. 
Regarding the reusabilitity and usability, more 
abstract ontologies are highly reusable 
(Knowledge Representation Ontologies and 
Upper ontologies) but their usability is poor. 
Application and Domain Ontologies have a 
low reusability but a high level of usability. 
5. Languages. Modeling choices are attached 
to different languages. As an example, one of 
the languages related to first order logic is 
KIF; OWL is usually related to frame logic. 
OWL is a language widely used to represent 
ontologies in the Web. OWL serialization is 
based on RDF/RDFS. 
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OPEN ACCESS (S. acceso abierto, F. accès ou-
vert, G. offener Zugang) [research] theory 
Contents.— 1) The Budapest account, 2) The Bethesda 
account, 3) The Berlin account, 4) Other accounts. 
There are three important definitions of Open 
Access, steemed from the declarations of Bu-
dapest, Bethesda and Berlin. The combination 
of these three accounts is regarded as the BBB 
definition of open access. 
1. The Budapest account. According to the 
Budapest Open Access Initiative (BOAI 2002): "by 
'open access' to this literature, we mean its free 
availability on the public internet, permitting 
any users to read, download, copy, distribute, 
print, search, or link to the full texts of these 
articles, scroll them for indexing, pass them as 
data to software, or use them for any other 
lawful purpose, without financial, legal, or 
technical barriers other than those inseparable 
from gaining access to the internet itself. The 
only constraint on reproduction and distribu-
tion, and the only role for copyright in this do-
main, should be to give authors control over 
the integrity of their work and the right to be 
properly acknowledged and cited". 
2. The Bethesda account. The Bethesda State-
ment on Open Access Publishing (2003) adds that 
"An Open Access Publication is one that 
meets the following two conditions:  
(i) The author(s) and copyright holder(s) 
grant(s) to all users a free, irrevocable, world-
wide, perpetual right of access to, and a license 
to copy, use, distribute, transmit and display 
the work publicly and to make and distribute 
derivative works, in any digital medium for any 
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responsible purpose, subject to proper attrib-
ution of authorship, as well as the right to 
make small numbers of printed copies for 
their personal use.  
(ii) A complete version of the work and all 
supplemental materials, including a copy of 
the permission as stated above, in a suitable 
standard electronic format is deposited imme-
diately upon initial publication in at least one 
online repository that is supported by an aca-
demic institution, scholarly society, govern-
ment agency, or other well-established organ-
ization that seeks to enable open access, unre-
stricted distribution, interoperability, and 
long-term archiving.  
3. The Berlin account. Berlin Declaration on 
Open Access to Knowledge in the Sciences and Hu-
manities (2003) confirms the above and offers 
the most theoretic perspective: "Our mission 
of disseminating knowledge is only half com-
plete if the information is not made widely and 
readily available to society. New possibilities 
of knowledge dissemination not only through 
the classical form but also and increasingly 
through the open access paradigm via the In-
ternet have to be supported. We define open 
access as a comprehensive source of human 
knowledge and cultural heritage that has been 
approved by the scientific community. In or-
der to realize the vision of a global and acces-
sible representation of knowledge, the future 
Web has to be sustainable, interactive, and 
transparent. Content and software tools must 
be openly accessible and compatible".  
4. Other accounts. Besides these most influ-
ential accounts, it is also worth mentioning the 
following ones: 
Steven Harnard, considered to be one of the 
founders of the Initiative, says "my definition 
is the same as that of the Budapest conven-
tion: «open access gives free online full-text 
access to peer-reviewed literature». This defi-
nition is lacking two important words though, 
immediate and permanent" (Harris 2006). 
Robert Terry from Wellcome Trust (an inde-
pendent charity funding research and United 
Kingdom’s largest non-governmental source 
of funds for biomedical research) offers his 
own point of view: "we want the digital ver-
sions of papers to be available to all in an un-
restricted way and for them to be available for-
ever by putting it in an archive or institutional 
repository. Anyone who receives one of our 
grants has to put the digital versions of their 
published articles in PubMed Central (or in 
UK PubMed Central once it has been devel-
oped) on the day of publication or no later 
than six months after publication" (Harris 
2006). 
Martin Richardson, managing director of Ox-
ford Journals, a division of Oxford University 
Press, states "our definition is freely-accessible 
online at point of publication without any 
charges to readers. Open access for me is 
much wider than just readers not paying" 
(Harris 2006). 
Finally, Michael Mabe (who has been Elsevier's 
director of academic relations for the past 
seven years, and has now become chief exec-
utive officer of the International Association 
of Science, Technical and Medical Publishers 
-STM) states that "giving a definition goes to 
the heart of the problem with open access. In 
principle it is free availability to everybody on 
the world-wide web. However, many academ-
ics think they are accessing open-access mate-
rial or publishing in open-access journals. 
They have not any barriers because their li-
brary has already paid for the subscription. In 
the industry as a whole there has not been an 
appreciable increase in downloads for open-
access articles. This demonstrates that re-
search papers are generally by academics for 
academics and they have access anyway" (Har-
ris 2006). 
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PARADOX (S. paradoja, F. paradoxe, G. 
Paradox, Paradoxon) [transdiciplinary, 
philosophy, logic] concept 
A paradox is a conflict between reasons: those 
grounding it and those refuting it. The more 
solid the reasons in conflict, the greater the 
philosophical interest of the paradox. In this 
general sense there are paradoxes of very dif-
ferent genres: (a) paradoxes challenging the in-
telligibility of particularly basic notions, such 
as: infinite, time, space, identity, etc.; (b) para-
doxes challenging the rationality of our action 
or decision strategies: Newcomb's, Gaifman's 
paradoxes, prisioner's dilemma, etc.; (c) para-
doxes challenging the rationality of our bodies 
of belief: selfdeceiving paradoxes, Goodman's 
, knower's paradoxes, etc.; among other many 
paradoxes, more or less important and more 
or less funny. 
Logical paradoxes or antinomies are logically 
valid reasonings with non reasonable conclu-
sions. Therefore we call antinomy any deduc-
tively valid reasoning driving to a contradic-
tion from rationally justified, highly acceptable 
or assertable premisses.ones…  
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PRINCIPLES OF THE GTI (S. principios de 
la teoría genral de la información, F. Principes de 
la Theórie Générale de l'Information, G. Grundsätze 
der Algemaine Theorie der Information) [General 
Theory of Information] theory 
The methodological stratum of the →General 
Theory of Information (GTI) studies basic princi-
ples of information theory and information 
technology. 
Ontological Principle O1 
(The Locality Principle). It is necessary to sepa-
rate information in general from information 
(or a portion of information) for a system R.  
In other words, empirically, it is possible to 
speak only about information (or a portion of 
information) for a system. This principle sep-
arates local and global approaches to infor-
mation definition, i.e., in what context infor-
mation is defined. 
The Locality Principle explicates an important 
property of information, but says nothing 
what information is. The essence of infor-
mation is described by the second ontological 
principle, which has several forms.  
Ontological Principle O2  
(The General Transformation Principle). In abroad 
sense, information for a system R is a capacity 
to cause changes in the system R.  
Thus, we may understand information in a 
broad sense as a capacity (ability or potency) 
of things, both material and abstract, to 
change other things. Information exists in the 
form of portions of information.  
Information in a proper sense is defined of 
structural infological systems. In essence, any 
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subsystem of a system may be considered as 
its infological system. However, information 
in a strict sense acts on structural infological 
systems where an infological system is struc-
tural if all its elements are structures. For ex-
ample, systems of knowledge are structures. 
Ontological Principle O2g  
(The Relativized Transformation Principle). Infor-
mation for a system R relative to the infologi-
cal system IF(R) is a capacity to cause changes 
in the system IF(R).  
Elements from IF(R) are called infological el-
ements.  
Ontological Principle O2a  
(The Special Transformation Principle). Infor-
mation in the strict sense or proper infor-
mation or, simply, information for a system R, 
is a capacity to change structural infological el-
ements from an infological system IF(R) of 
the system R.   
An infological system IF(R) of the system R is 
called cognitive if IF(R) contains (stores) ele-
ments or constituents of cognition, such as 
knowledge, data, ideas, fantasies, abstractions, 
beliefs, etc. A cognitive infological system of a 
system R is denoted by CIF(R) and is related 
to cognitive information.  
Ontological Principle O2c  
(The Cognitive Transformation Principle).Cogni-
tive information for a system R, is a capacity 
to cause changes in the cognitive infological 
system IFC(R) of the system R.   
Ontological Principle O3  
(The Embodiment Principle). For any portion of 
information I, there is always a carrier C of this 
portion of information for a system R.  
The substance C that is a carrier of the portion 
of information I is called the physical, or ma-
terial, carrier ofI. 
Ontological Principle O4 
(The Representability Principle). For any portion 
of information I, there is always a representa-
tion Cof this portion of information for a sys-
tem R. 
Ontological Principle O5 
(The Interaction Principle). A transaction/transi-
tion/transmission of information goes on 
only in some interaction of C with R.  
Ontological Principle O6 
(The Actuality Principle).  A system R accepts a 
portion of information I only if the transac-
tion/transition/transmission causes corre-
sponding transformations in R. 
Ontological Principle O7 
(The Multiplicity Principle). One and the same 
carrier C can contain different portions of in-
formation for one and the same system R. 
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R
RECORD (S. registro, F. record, G. Rekord, 
Register, Eintragung) [general, information 
management] concept 
Records emerge in communities made up by 
autonomous agents, with limited memory ca-
pacities and in need of mutual coordination.  
To overcome such limitations of their memo-
ries and achieve effective coordination acts, 
such as contracts or agreements, agents need 
to set informations, definitions, ideas and 
meanings, in a way external to themselves and 
to their memories.  
To achieve that, agents use records, physical 
systems whose state they may change.  They 
define a convention that establishes two rule 
types. The first rule type defines how to mod-
ify a record's state starting from an infor-
mation, a definition, an idea, etc., in order for 
the record to represent it.  The second rule 
type defines how to interpret the information, 
definition, idea, etc., that the author had the 
intention to record, from the state of that rec-
ord. 
In human communities and given the fact that 
with very simple elements it is feasible to pro-
duce an overwhelming amount of states (for 
example, a sheet of paper with a pencil), con-
ventions must reduce the allowed states to a 
very limited fraction of all feasible states. Gen-
erally, then, languages used are based on finite 
alphabets, words and grammars; and texts are 
written sequentially, and in parallel lines or 
rows, either vertically or horizontally, from left 
to right or in the opposite direction. 
Records may be stable and have a long dura-
tion, as with books and CDs, or they may last 
only for short periods of time, as is the case of 
two persons chatting verbally.  This conversa-
tion is performed interchanging auditive rec-
ords, perturbations in the state of the air in 
which both persons are immersed.  When a 
large number of records accumulate, they 
need organization and classification to make 
sure they are useful. This requirement is the 
basis of the Library and Information Systems 
sciences. 
Records are not the same as information. They 
may represent it, but they are not information.  
The same information may be represented 
with many different record types.  If all rec-
ords representing a given information are de-
stroyed, that information does not dissipate, it 
only gets more difficult (or infeasible) to ac-
cess it.  
A record may be false or true; exact or less ex-
act; precise or less precise; valid or not valid.  
However, an information, taken as an abstract 
object, free of any representation form, is al-
ways true, exact, precise and valid. 
References 
― Buckland, M. (1994) "On the Nature of Records 
Management Theory", American Archivist, vol 57, 
pp. 346-351.  
― Gejman, R. (2009). "An integrated framework for 
information, communication and knowledge defini-
tions." tripleC - Cognition, Communication, Co-operation, 
North America, 718 11 2009. 
― International Organization for Standardization, 
(2001), Information and documentation -- Records 
management, ISO/TR 15489-1 and ISO/TR 
15489/TR-2, Geneva, Switzerland 
 (RG) 
REFERENTIAL ABILITY 
182  g l o s s a r i u m B I T r i  
REFERENTIAL ABILITY (S. capacidad ref-
erencial, F. capacité référentielle, G. Referenzielle 
Fähigkeit) [semantics, logic] concept 
Referential ability is the capability of referring. 
We refer to something when we think or say 
something about it. Hence, we can refer to 
both existing and non-existing things (for in-
stance, we can say many things about uni-
corns, and refer to them, even though they do 
not exist). In the same way, we can refer to 
properties, relations, events, states of affairs, 
etc. 
Is our referential ability something always me-
diated by some sort of descriptions, senses, in-
tensions, connotations, etc.? Does it have 
sense to say that, at least in some cases, we get 
to refer to the world in a direct, non-mediated 
way? An affirmative answer to the first ques-
tion gives place to the so called “descriptivist 
theories of reference”. An affirmative answer 
to the second one gives place to “non-descrip-
tivist theories of reference”, also called “theo-
ries of direct reference”. Frege is the paradig-
matic example of descriptivism. Russell and 
Kripke are paradigmatic examples of non-de-
scriptivism. Stuart Mill also defended a non-
descriptivis position. For that reason, being 
non-descriptivist is “to maintain a Millean the-
ory of reference”. 
Orthogonal to the mentioned tension between 
descriptivist and non-descriptivist theories of 
reference, there are two main ways of explain-
ing our referential ability. We can try to explain 
it as derived from some intentions or we can 
try to explain it as derived from some objec-
tive facts (for instance, causal facts, informa-
tional facts, etc.). The problem is that even if 
we were in the ideal situation of knowing all 
the possible truths about us ourselves and 
about the world, the references of the terms of 
our languages, and the references of our own 
thought, would remain indetermined. Refer-
ences could change without any change in the 
truth values of the sentences. 
The situation we have just described would be 
a version of Quine’s thesis about the indeter-
mination of reference. Truth value can be de-
termined by the way things are. The world also 
can determine the references of our languages 
and thoughts. And references can determine 
truth values. There is, however, a radical inde-
termination of reference by truth values. Truth 
values do not determine references. Moreo-
ver, truth values do not determine that we get 
to refer. All the truth contained in an ideal de-
scription of the world would be compatible 
with the non-existence of such a world. 
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REGULARITY (S. regularidad, F. régularité, G. 
Regelmäßigkeit) [transdisciplinaryy, statistics, 
epistemology] concept 
~ Strict:  there is a strict regularity (Hume’s 
constant conjunction) when each fact of a cer-
tain type A is accompanied by a fact of a cer-
tain type B. These types are determined by the 
universals instantiated in the facts. 
~ Statistical: →correlation.  
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REPOSITORY (S. repositorio, F. dépôt, référen-
tiel, G. Aufbewahrungsort) [ scientific research, 
information society] concept 
There is a wide variety of definitions of repos-
itory, but according to Melero (2005, p. 260), 
repositories can just be conceived as archives 
where people can store digital materials (text, 
images, sound). They emerge from the -so 
named- e-print community worried about the im-
pact and dissemination of scholarly communi-
cation. 
Repositories are digital archives containing 
scholarly information, generated from univer-
sities and other research institutions, that is 
open and accessible through the Internet. Re-
positories provide benefits to the scientific 
world and they are supported by a large num-
ber of institutions of many countries. They re-
trieve, reuse and preserve research outputs 
and promote disseminations and visibility of 
scholarly information, guaranteeing the ad-
vancement of Science. 
López Medina (2007, p. 3) defines digital re-
pository as a networking system constituted by 
hardware, software, data and processes with 
the following features: 
― It contains digital objects and metadata. 
― It guarantees the persistent identification of 
the object. 
― It offers some roles of management, ar-
chive and preservation. 
― It provides easy and standardized access to 
the digital objects. 
― It offers safe system of objects and 
metadata. 
― It is sustainable over time. 
Most authors agree that there are two kinds of 
digital repositories: discipline or subject based re-
positories, and institutional repositories. The 
first type include contents depending on the 
subjects or knowledge areas. Lynch (2003) de-
fines institutional repository as "a set of ser-
vices that a university offers to the members 
of its community for the management and dis-
semination of digital materials created by the 
institution and its community members. It is 
most essentially an organizational commit-
ment to the stewardship of these digital mate-
rials, including long-term preservation where 
appropriate, as well as organization and access 
or distribution." 
López Medina (2003) ascribes the following 
functions to institutional repositories: 
― They are a shared tool for managing digital 
content in universities and other research 
institutions. 
― A road to Open Access. 
― A space for storage and preservation. 
Melero (2005), in turn, ascribes them the fol-
lowing functions: 
― They serve as a quality guarantee for the in-
stitution. 
― They contribute to the dissemination, visi-
bility, impact and preservation of the schol-
arly information. 
Interoperability is another technical charac-
teristics of institutional repositories. "The 
Open Archives Initiative (OAI) develops and 
promotes interoperability standards that aim 
to facilitate the efficient dissemination of con-
tent. OAI has its roots in the open access and 
institutional repository movements. Contin-
ued support of this work remains a corner-
stone of the Open Archives program. Over 
time, however, the work of OAI has expanded 
to promote broad access to digital resources 
for eScholarship, eLearning, and eScience”. 
As Melero (2005, p. 261) states, the OAI pro-
motes the building of open and distributed re-
positories containing, at least, descriptive 
metadata of their digital objects. It aims at cre-
ating and furthering interoperability standards, 
which contribute to an effective dissemination 
of the contents of the archives. The OAI-
PMH (Open Archives Initiative-Protocol for 
Metadata Harvesting) "is a low-barrier mecha-
nism for repository interoperability. Data Pro-
viders are repositories offering structured 
metadata via OAI-PMH; whereas Service Pro-
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viders make OAI-PMH service requests to har-
vest such metadata. OAI-PMH is a set of six 
verbs or services that are invoked within 
HTTP". 
The history of this protocol is described by 
Barrueco and Subirats (2003). The version 1.0 
was published in 2001, and version 2.0 came 
out one year later. Its architecture is formed by 
service providers based on metadata  harvested by 
means of the OAI metadata harvesting proto-
col (OAI-PMH) and data providers which are 
the specific repositories. All this information 
can be codified in Simple Dublin Core 
Metadata. 
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REPRESENTATION (S. representaciónt) 
[transdisciplinaryy, epistemology] concept 
Of all the things dubbed “representations” in 
ordinary language, we will be interested in the 
ones that, by design, are supposed, if they are 
successful, to express a content or proposi-
tion. We may call them propositional repre-
sentations. 
A second (see correlation) and more frequent 
use of the term “information” concerns the 
contents expressed by declarative tokens of 
languages or codes. We may call these tokens 
propositional representations. The content of 
a propositional representation −i.e., the prop-
osition expressed by it, or what it says to com-
petent users of the language− is frequently re-
ferred to as the information carried by the rep-
resentation. In contrast with what happens 
with the former notion of information, the 
content carried by a propositional representa-
tion doesn’t depend on the existence of any 
correlation, but on the design history of the 
corresponding language or code. In this view, 
also, contents can be false, and a propositional 
representation may thus carry false infor-
mation. 
While in the case of the first notion of infor-
mation, it seems that it could be reduced to the 
idea of correlation, in the case of the second 
notion, it seems that it could be reduced to the 
idea of content. 
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REVERSIBILITY vs NON-REVERSI-
BILITY (S. Reversibilidad vs Irreversibilidad, F. 
Reversibilité vs Ireversibilité, G. Reversibilität vs Un-
reversibilität) [transdisciplinary, System theory] 
concept 
Reversibility and Non-reversibility or Irreversi-
bility are properties of systems with respect to 
inner changes. In a rigid analysis there is never 
such a thing like complete reversibility, be-
cause on the macro-level and for physical sys-
tems the stream of time cannot be reverted, 
i.e. in the space-time continuum only move-
ments toward increasing points in time are 
possible. If we abstract from time, still pure 
reversibility is impossible in closed systems –
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as we know from thermodynamics-because 
any change which is accompanied by a differ-
ence cannot be performed without a loss of 
energy, and, in general, with an increase of en-
tropy (although according to Ilya Prigogine a 
decrease of entropy = an increase of order 
could be possible locally). As far as we know 
today, irreversibility is a general property of all 
processes in evolution: on the cosmic, geolog-
ical, phylo-genetic, onto-genetic, social or eco-
nomic levels. Reversibility can only happen if 
we abstract from energy/entropy changes. 
For practical purposes it is important to know 
if qualitative or quantitative changes can be 
compensated or not. (e.g. pathological 
changes in tissue or organs, chemical reac-
tions). Jacob Segal (1958) gives the following 
degrees of reversibility: 
1) spontaneous and directly revertible pro-
cesses (with losses in time and energy) 
2) spontaneous and indirectly revertible pro-
cesses (on different pathways than under 1.) 
3) non-spontaneous, but directly revertible 
processes (additional energy necessary) 
4) non-spontaneous, but indirectly revertible 
processes (new side-conditions needed) 
5) absolutely irreversibility 
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ROBOETHICS (S. roboética, F. roboéthique, G. 
Roboethik) [Information ethics] theory 
As Capurro and Nagenborg (2009) state, eth-
ics and robotics are two academic disciplines, 
one dealing with the moral norms and values 
underlying implicitly or explicitly human be-
haviour and the other aiming at the produc-
tion of artificial agents, mostly as physical de-
vices, with some degree of autonomy based on 
rules and programmes set up by their creators. 
Since the first robots arrived on the stage in 
the play by Karel Čapek (1921) visions of a 
world inhabited by humans and robots gave 
rise to countless utopian and dystopian stories, 
songs, movies, and video games. 
Human-robot interaction raises serious ethical 
questions right now that are theoretically less 
ambitious but practically more important than 
the possibility of the creation of moral ma-
chines that would be more than machines with 
an ethical code. But, even when the process of 
invention and development of robotic tech-
nologies take place in a global level, in which 
diverse cultures, therefore also diverse systems 
of values, beliefs and expectations are in-
volved, intercultural roboethics is still in its in-
fancy, no less than intercultural robotics (→In-
tercultural Information Ethics). 
Rougly speaking, the following ethical theories 
and moral values as well as principles are pre-
dominant in Western and Eastern traditions 
rising different questions with regard to hu-
man-robot interaction such as: 
― Europe: Deontology (Autonomy, Human 
Dignity, Privacy, Anthropocentrism): Scep-
ticism with regard to robots 
― USA (and anglo-saxon tradition): Utilitarian 
Ethics: will robots make “us” more happy? 
― Eastern Tradition (Buddhism): Robots as 
one more partner in the global interaction 
of things 
The difference morality and ethics should be 
understood as follows: 
― Ethics as critical reflection (or problemati-
zation) of morality 
― Ethics is the science of morals as robotics 
is the science of robots 
Different ontic or concrete historical moral 
traditions are for instance 
― in Japan: Seken (trad. Japanese morality), 
Shakai (imported Western morality) and 
Ikai (old animistic tradition) 
― In the „Far West“: Ethics of the Good 
(Plato, Aristotle), Christian Ethics, Utilitar-
ian Ethics, Deontological Ethics (Kant) 
The ontological dimension, Being or (Bud-
dhist) Nothingness, can be conceived as the 
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space of open possibilities that allow us to crit-
icize concrete or ‘ontic’ moralities. The human 
relation to such ontological dimension is al-
ways based on basic moods (like sadness, hap-
piness, astonishment etc.) through which the 
uniqueness of the world and human existence 
is experienced differently in different cultures. 
A future intercultural roboethics should re-
flect on the ontic as well as on the ontological 
dimensions for creating and using robots in 
different cultural contexts and with regard to 
different goals. Trends, contributions and bib-
liography focused in this crossroad can be 
found in the mentioned book, edited by 
Capurro and Nagenborg. 
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S
SELF-RE-CREATION (S. auto-re-creación, F. 
auto-ré-création, G. Selbst-Re-Kreation) [UTI]concept 
Used in the →Unified Theory of Information 
(UTI) as one of the three basic processes of 
information systems –the most advanced one.  
Self-recreation is a more elaborated type of 
→self-reproducing processes and refers to the ca-
pacity of self-organizing systems to create the 
necessary conditions, not only for their repro-
duction, but also to create themselves accord-
ing to the objectives that they have established 
themselves. In their capacity to change the en-
vironment for their own settlement, they show 
an even bigger capacity to adapt than the sys-
tems that are merely biotic (→self-reproducing) 
of which they are part. Thus they involve the 
most advanced evolutionary stage (or stage of 
cultural evolution). 
They can be classified as self-determining insofar 
as their self-organising capacities offer, under 
certain circumstances, a set of possibilities, 
which can be chosen by themselves. Given the 
fact that such a choice takes the form of a de-
cision adopted under the condition of an irre-
ducible freedom of choice, the pragmatic and 
semantic levels are separated. Consequently, 
in the stage of social, self-recreating and self-
determining systems, the semiotic relationship 
spreads in its three levels of sign production, 
which can be described in terms of the crea-
tion of ideas. Such creation happens in three 
stages: 1st) the perception of signals from out-
side the system causes the appearance of a 
sign, which is a modification of the system’s 
structure; 2nd) the interpretation of the percep-
tions by which the system’s state is modified 
and another sign emerges, meaning something 
that is given to the system as its object; 3rd) the 
evaluation of the interpretations that cause an-
other sign to emerge, by means of which the 
system -as subject- completes its meaning, 
considering the object as an initial state to 
reach the end and affects the behaviour of the 
system so that it can be modified. 
The sign, in each of these three levels, is called 
(in UTI) →data, →knowledge and wisdom (or 
practical wisdom), respectively, each one cor-
responding to the field of the perceptive, cog-
nitive and evaluative capacities, which to-
gether make up the characteristics of con-
science, which appears in systems. In each 
stage, a break in the self-organisation occurs, 
which is a starting point for another one to oc-
cur (or not occur) afterwards. 
Self-organising systems on the human, social, 
cultural level are capable of constructing 
themselves anew, inventing themselves, creat-
ing themselves again and again. Erich Jantsch 
called this capability "re-creative". Thus "re-
creative systems" are a branch of autopoietic 
systems that leads to a new level: (Self-)Re-cre-
ation is a refinement of, and further develop-
ment in, autopoietic self-organisation (self-re-
producing). 
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SELF-REGULATION VS AUTOMATIC 
REGULATION (S. auto-regulación vs. regulación 
automática, F. Autorégulation vs. régulation 
automatic, G. Selbstregelung vs. automatische 
Regelung) [System Theory, Cybernetics, 
Control Theory] concept 
Contents.— 1) The semantic field of self-regulation, 2) 
Brief history of automatic regulation, 3) Industrial automa-
tion, 4) Social regulation of automation. 
1. The semantic field of self-regulation. 
Self-regulation (or automatic regulation) is used 
in systems theory and cybernetics in the sense 
of homeostasis (→feedback), namely the ca-
pacity of a system to maintain itself in a bal-
anced situation.  
In this sense the term is very commonly used 
in psychology, though not in the meaning of 
"automatic regulation", but as "regulation of the 
self", also named self-control (i.e. the ability to 
control one´s emotions, desires or actions by 
one's own will). Since automatic is used in a 
sense of acting without volition or conscious 
control, there is a certain semantic opposition 
between the psychological meaning of "self-
regulation" or "self-control", on one hand, 
and "automatic regulation" or "automatic con-
trol", on the other hand. 
Automatic regulation, also used in the sense of an 
autonomous maintenance of a balanced situa-
tion, is mainly found in the field of electronic 
systems and control engineering (control theory). 
2. Brief history of automatic regulation. 
The concept of automated machines goes 
back to ancient times, related to myths of liv-
ing mechanical beings. Automata, or machines 
like people, appeared in clocks of medieval 
churches, being 18th century watchmakers 
well-known for their smart mechanical crea-
tures. 
Some of the first automata utilized feedback 
mechanisms to reduce errors, mechanisms 
that are still used nowadays. Among the first 
devices of automatic control registered in the 
literature, we found in Heron's Pneumatica 
(c.150 b.C.) a control for the liquid level in a 
tank which is similar to what is currently used 
in toilette's tanks. The Greek-Byzantine tradi-
tion -symbolised by Hero and the School of 
Alexandria- was developed in the Islamic 
world, going significantly beyond (Rashed & 
Morelon 1996). Some relevant automatic reg-
ulated systems can be found in the literature, 
for instance, from the inventor and scientist 
Al-Jazari (c.1206), whose water clocks repre-
sent a distinguished evolution of Hero's level 
control, or the Andalusian engineer Ibn Kha-
laf al-Muradi, who invented segmental and ep-
icyclic gears employed in clocks. These devel-
opments influenced in Christian Middle Ages, 
where some relevant inventors, who some-
times had to hide their artefacts, might be con-
sidered as predecessors of automation, as Al-
bertus Magnus, Pierre de Maricourt or Roger 
Bacon (Bacon 1859). 
However, there was a lack of theoretical and 
mathematical development behind all these in-
ventions. The first work of what can be called 
a classical control theory is to be found in a signif-
icant work concerning the centrifugal gober-
nor of Boulton and Watt designed in 1788 
(Rumford 1798). This device consisted of two 
metal balls attached to the drive shaft of a 
steam engine and connected to a valve regu-
lating the flow of steam. As the speed of the 
steam engine is increased, the balls are moving 
out of the shaft because of centrifugal force, 
thereby closing the valve. This caused a de-
cline in the flow of steam to the engine and 
therefore the speed will be reduced. 
3. Industrial Automation. The feedback 
control, the development of specialized tools 
and distribution of work into smaller tasks that 
workers or machines might handle, were es-
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sential ingredients in the automation of indus-
try in the eighteenth century. As technology 
improved, specialized machines were devel-
oped for tasks such as putting caps on bottles 
or pour liquid into molds for rubber tires. 
However, none of these machines have the 
versatility and efficiency of the human arm 
and could not reach distant objects and place 
them in the required position.  
 
An automated manufacturing system is designed to 
use the capacity of machines to perform cer-
tain tasks previously tackled by humans, and 
to control the sequence of operations without 
human intervention. The term automation has 
also been used to describe non-manufacturing 
systems in which programmed or automated 
devices can operate independently or semi-in-
dependently of human control. In communi-
cations, aviation and astronautics, devices 
such as automatic telephone switching equip-
ment, autopilots, and automated systems guid-
ance and control are used to perform different 
tasks faster or better than human beings. 
4. Social regulation of automation. Follow-
ing an uncritical dominant concept of social 
progress, automation is considered as one of 
their pillars, increasing productivity and reduc-
ing human drudgery, therefore improving gen-
eral welfare. Nevertheless, the political, socie-
tal and anthropological problems arisen with 
industrial automation –as early warned by 
Norbert Wiener (1989)- must be considered in 
order to evaluate and steer the paths of auto-
mation. This critical appraisal might be con-
ceived as a means to achieve a social self-reg-
ulation (in the sense stressed above) to this 
concern. However, as Noble (1993) argues in 
his Automation Madness, such a critical stance 
has been systematically evaded as well as en-
capsulated in technological ideology (Haber-
mas 1970). According to Noble analysis, the 
adoption of automation did not really account 
for economical benefits, but for military, 
power and class interests. 
Going beyond industrial automation, new 
→information technologies have been posed as the 
automation of intellectual work (Diani 1996). New 
social problems arisen from this perspective 
should also be tackled in a wide critical assess-
ment, reflection and decision-making on auto-
mation of any kind (Chollet and Rivière 2010). 
Both ethics and critical theory has been posed 
as stages for these social endeavours (→Critical 
theory of information, →information ethics, →ro-
boethics).  
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SELF-REPRODUCTION (S. autoreproduc-
ción, F. autoreproduction, G. Selbstreproduktion) 
[UTI]concept 
Used in the →Unified Theory of Information (UTI) 
as an intermediate process -in evolutionary 
sense- of information systems  
Self-reproduction is a more elaborated type of 
self-restructuring processes and refers to the 
capacity of self-organising systems, which do 
not only change their structure into another 
one more or less chosen by themselves, but 
they also insert these modified structures into 
a wider context: that of helping them to keep 
their own existence. Here, a functional struc-
ture is not a simple pattern any more, but a 
‘thing’ that has meaning, and this ‘thing’ will 
be called here a symbol, so that the production 
of signs in this evolutionary stage of living sys-
tems changes from creating patterns to creat-
ing symbols. 
The self-reproducing systems are considered 
an evolutionary stage (called biotic or living) 
among the →self-restructuring and the →self-rec-
reating ones, so that they involve a special case 
of self-restructuring systems, as well as a more 
general case than the self-recreating ones. 
As far as the evolution of the semiotic relation 
is concerned, one can observe here a ramifica-
tion in which the syntactic level is separated 
from the semantic-pragmatic one, regarding 
the former just to the sensations of the living 
systems. These sensations -on the syntactic 
level- consist of self-organised restructurings 
evoked by the environmental disruptions and 
limited by the “offer of sensitive mechanisms” 
in a recursive process of symbolic production. 
However, on the semantic-pragmatic level, ac-
tions are developed according to sensations. 
Since living systems act according to what 
such sensations mean in terms of relevance for 
survival, we could talk about both meaning 
and action, although in an indissoluble man-
ner. The syntactic difference means -in prac-
tice- a difference with regard to the objective 
of the survival, so that the signs now represent 
the aptitude of the system towards the envi-
ronmental conditions (whereas in the self-re-
structuring systems one talks about reflection, 
one could talk here about representation). 
Self-organising systems on the biotic level are ca-
pable of reproducing themselves. Notice that 
"reproduction" in that context is not the same 
as to what biologists are used to referring. The 
notion here includes the narrow biological 
meaning of reproduction but goes beyond 
that. It refers to the capability of the system to 
maintain itself – a meaning that usually comes 
with the notion in sociological context only. 
This kind of reproduction can be called after 
Maturana and Varela "→autopoiesis". There-
fore living systems can be called "autopoeitic 
systems". Autopoiesis is a refinement of, and 
further development in, dissipative self-organ-
isation (self-restructuring). 
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SELF-RESTRUCTURING (S. auto-restruc-
turación, F. autorestructuration, G. Selbst-re-
strukturierung) [UTI] concept 
Used in the →Unified Theory of Information as 
the lowest capacity of information systems. 
Self-restructuring is the most primitive type of 
self-organising processes, in which the most primi-
tive manifestation of signs also occurs. This 
type of systems is also called dissipative, be-
cause, in thermodynamic terms, they dissipate 
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the entropy as a sub-product of the work car-
ried out during the restructuration, in which, 
at the same time that the energy degrades, the 
system manages to get rid of it. This is neces-
sary for the new structure to be considered a 
creation of a superior order, instead of a deg-
radation of the system. The structuring pro-
cess leads to a special and/or temporal pat-
tern. 
Understood as information processing, the 
creation of patterns is the rudimentary way of 
producing signals, being the pattern the dis-
tinction carried out by the system in which the 
three semiotic relations can be found (→sign): 
1st) a syntactic relation can be observed, inso-
far as the creation of the pattern is a type of 
recursive process which builds on the previ-
ous pattern and chooses one amongst various 
possible patterns; 2nd) as far as the incoming 
energy allows the system to change its pattern, 
the input becomes a signal that makes the new 
pattern arise, although it does not establish it 
completely. The state adopted by the system 
when creating a new pattern can be inter-
preted as a representation of the input, thus it 
can be said it is a semantic relationship. 3rd) As 
long as the new pattern corresponds to the ob-
servable behaviour in which the system ex-
presses its activity, the pragmatic relation re-
mains also thematised here. 
However, the three semiotic relationships co-
incide with the pattern and, therefore, they are 
not differentiated yet. It can be said that the 
pattern reflects the conditions of its environ-
ment, as the pattern depends on it. Such re-
flection of the environment constitutes a pre-
condition for the appearance of a sphere of in-
fluence in which the behaviour of the system 
launches that of the adjacent ones, so that the 
appropriate conditions can emerge for the 
maintenance and improvement of the system, 
which will be possible in →self-reproducing sys-
tems. 
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SEMANTIC CONTENT (S. contenido 
semántico, F. contenú sémantique, G. semantischer In-
halt) [semantics] concept 
Semantic content, conceptual content, propo-
sitional content and cognitive content are syn-
onymous in many contexts. It is a kind of con-
tent directly valuable in semantic terms (as 
having a reference, a sense, some truth values, 
etc.). It is a content made of concepts. More-
over, it is a content identifiable with a certain 
proposition. In addition, it is a kind of content 
able of having cognitive relevance. It makes a 
difference in the premises, or consequences, 
of our theoretical or practical reasoning.   
The three kinds of entities able of having se-
mantic content are linguistic items, actions 
and psychological entities. Sentences and cer-
tain parts of sentences of natural languages 
may bear semantic content. Actions, in partic-
ular speech acts, also would have semantic 
content. Finally, the mental states that are usu-
ally called “propositional attitudes” (beliefs, 
desires, memories, etc.) also would have se-
mantic content. 
It is very difficult to determine whether the se-
mantic content in each one of those three 
cases can be independent of the semantic con-
tent of the other ones. Both the so called Gri-
cean program and informational accounts of 
semantic content make any semantic content 
dependent on the semantic content that we 
can find in some mental states, and the seman-
tic content of mental states dependent on ob-
jective informational relations. 
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SEMANTIC WEB (S. web semantica, F. web sé-
mantique, G. semantisches Web) [Web] concept 
Contenidos.— 1) Evolución, limitaciones y virtu-
des de la propuesta, 2) Capas de la Web Semántica, 
3) El Estándar Topic Map y la Web Se-mántica. 
1. Evolution, limitations and advantages of 
the proposal. Tim Berners-Lee created this 
concept by proposing a network in which in-
formation and services are semantically de-
fined so that requests of people and machines 
could be understood and satisfied. Computers 
would be able to analyze all Web data: content, 
links, transactions between persons and com-
puters. A Semantic Web that could be able to 
do this is emerging, and this way, when this is 
possible there will be a qualitative leap in the 
interconnection between multiple reposito-
ries, electronic commerce, semantic queries 
and automatic question-answer systems. 
Semantic Web has already been with us for a 
decade and a great effort has been invested for 
its development by private and academic enti-
ties, but regretfully results are currently scarce, 
because this forward-looking approach impli-
cates a “technical construct of protocols, pro-
cess, languages, and tools. 
However, three factors present Semantic Web 
as an attractive solution; these are the interop-
erability and the creation of semantic re-
sources with the common domain knowledge: 
i) Interoperability: some authors consider the Se-
mantic Web as a project for creating a univer-
sal mediator for information interchange (Kal-
foglou, 2007). This would be possible through 
the creation of interoperable documents se-
mantically well defined for the computer ap-
plications of the World Wide Web. In other 
words, it is about converting the Web, and its 
distributed databases, into a great database. In-
teroperability between the documents is sus-
tained through the use of a common language 
based on RDF (Resource Description Frame-
work) (W3C, 2005), a language which is based 
on XML (Extensible Markup Language) 
(W3C, 2006). The advantages of obtaining this 
interoperability are obvious for knowledge re-
use (Russ, Jones and Fineman, 2006), concep-
tual navigation, and the fusion of Knowledge 
Organization Systems (KOS) through multi-
ple domains (W3C, 2006; Zeng, 2004). 
ii) Semantic Resources: Semantic Web requires 
that the semantic knowledge should be ex-
pressed in documents written in a Web lan-
guage oriented to knowledge modeling, like 
RDF. These documents model KOS and its 
instances. KOS have an important role in the 
Semantic Web because they support the se-
mantic knowledge management. This is neces-
sary to perform indexing and retrieval tasks, 
giving as a result more relevant and noiseless 
information for the user. KOS define the con-
cepts utilized for describing and representing 
an area of knowledge (Daconta, Smith and 
Obrst, 2003; Gruber, 2005). These resources 
are used by persons, databases, and applica-
tions that need to share information on a spe-
cific domain, considering for every domain the 
specification of a knowledge area, such as 
medicine, real estate, commercial manage-
ment, etc. 
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2. Semantic Web Layers. Semantic Web 
proposal suggests a seven layer “cake” for its 
implementation. Each layer has to be compat-
ible with previous ones. For instance, the layer 
three -RDF/RDFS- must be understood by 
XML applications, while the next layer, usually 
encoded by OWL, must be able to extract in-
formation from RDF documents.  
Although the following layer scheme corre-
spond to the most well known version of the 
cake, other versions has also been proposed 
(Bratt, 2007): 
1) Unicode-URI: basic coding and resource 
identification. 
2) XML-NS-XMLSchema: syntax and its re-
lationship with name-spaces, also express-
ing XML structure. 
3) RDF+RDFSchema: RDF/RDFS shows 
primitives to represent knowledge. 
4) Ontology Vocabulary: structuring and 
classifying concepts by an ontology.  
5) Logic: axioms and monotonic rules. 
6) Proof: to validate assertions 
7) Trust: trustworthiness of the data. 
3. Topic Map Standard and Semantic 
Web. Topic Maps standard constitutes a pro-
posal similar in purpose but earlier in its roots. 
This standard was proposed at the beginning 
of the 1990s. Nowadays the proposal have 
been updated to recommend XML encoding 
and other improvements. Although this pro-
posal has lower inference capabilities, it is 
more intuitive. With the same objective of 
metadata vocabularies, this standard initially 
used Public Subject Indicators (PSI). 
Related Resources 
― Swoogle http://swoogle.umbc.edu/  
― Hakia http://www.hakia.com/  
― Eyeplorer http://www.eyeplorer.com/eyePlorer/  
― World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) 
http://www.w3c.org 
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SHANNON, CLAUDE ELWOOD [MTC, 
Information theory, engineering, communica-
tion, cryptography] author 
Contents.— 1) Formative years, 2) The impact of World 
War II, 3) From Cryptography to Communication Theory, 
4) Entropy and Information, 5) Shannon as a Pioneer in 
Artificial Intelligence, 6) A Complex Legacy. 
(b. Petoskey, Michigan, 30 April 1916, d. Med-
ford, Massachusetts, 24 February 2001). 
Shannon is first and foremost known as a pi-
oneer of the information age, ever since he 
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demonstrated in his seminal paper “A Mathe-
matical Theory of Communication” (1948) 
that information could be defined and meas-
ured as a scientific notion. The paper gave rise 
to “information theory,” which includes met-
aphorical applications in very different disci-
plines, ranging from biology to linguistics via 
thermodynamics or quantum physics on the 
one hand, and a technical discipline of mathe-
matical essence, based on crucial concepts like 
that of channel capacity, on the other. Shan-
non never showed much enthusiasm for the 
first kind of informal applications. He focused 
on the technical aspects and also contributed 
significantly to other fields such as cryptog-
raphy, artificial intelligence, and domains 
where his ideas had their roots and could be 
readily applied in a strict fashion, that is, tele-
communications and coding theory. 
1. Formative Years. Claude Elwood Shan-
non was the son of Claude Shannon Sr. (1862–
1934), a businessman who was also a judge of 
probate, and Mabel Wolf Shannon (1880–
1945), a high school principal. Until the age of 
sixteen, he lived in Gaylord, Michigan, where 
his mother worked. His youth was to prove a 
decisive influence on his life as a scientist: his 
grandfather was a tinkerer, possessed a patent 
on a washing machine, and created various— 
sometimes nonsensical—objects. By the time 
he graduated from high school, the young 
Shannon had already built a radio-controlled 
boat and a telegraphic system to communicate 
with a friend nearly a mile away, using barbed 
wires. He made some pocket money by fixing 
various electrical devices, such as radios, and 
he admired Edison, with whom he discovered 
later that he shared a common ancestor. 
Shannon left Gaylord in 1932 for the Univer-
sity of Michigan, where he studied both elec-
trical engineering and mathematics, obtaining 
in 1936 a bachelor of science degree in both 
fields. He then found a way to match his tink-
ering capacities with his knowledge in electri-
cal engineering, working in the Department of 
Electrical Engineering at the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology (MIT) on the mainte-
nance of the differential analyzer that had 
been constructed by Vannevar Bush (1890–
1974). Bush was to become his mentor over 
the next decades. It was in Bush’s department 
that Shannon wrote his master’s thesis, titled 
“Symbolic Analysis of Relay and Switching 
Circuits,” which he submitted on 10 August 
1937. In an interview, Shannon recalled in 
1987: 
"The main machine was mechanical with spinning 
disks and integrators, and there was a complicated 
control circuit with relays. I had to understand both 
of these. The relay part got me interested. I knew 
about symbolic logic at the time from a course at 
Michigan, and I realized that Boolean algebra was 
just the thing to take care of relay circuits and 
switching circuits. I went to the library and got all 
the books I could on symbolic logic and Boolean al-
gebra, started interplaying the two, and wrote my 
Master’s thesis on it. That was the beginning of my 
great career!" (Sloane and Wyner, eds., 1993, p. 
xxv) 
The insight was decisive: It constituted “a 
landmark in that it helped to change digital cir-
cuit design from an art to a science” (Gold-
stine, 1972, p. 119). His study dealt with the 
circuits based on relays and switching units, 
such as automatic telephone exchange systems 
or industrial motor equipment. He developed 
rigorous methods for both analysis and syn-
thesis of circuits, showing how they could be 
simplified. At this time, he probably had his 
first intuitions on the relations between redun-
dancy and reliability, which he was to deepen 
later. That his stance was both theoretical and 
practical becomes clear at the end of his mas-
ter’s thesis, where he illustrated his approach 
with five circuits: a selective circuit, an elec-
tronic combination lock, a vote counting cir-
cuit, a base-two adder, and a factor table ma-
chine. 
This dual approach was also revealed in an im-
portant letter that Shannon sent to Bush in 
February 1939. He wrote that “Off and on [he 
had] been working on an analysis of some of 
the fundamental properties of general systems 
for the transmission of intelligence, including 
telephony, radio, television, telegraphy, etc.” 
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He stated that “Practically all systems of com-
munication may be thrown into the following 
form: f1(t) →  T  → F(t) →  R  → f2(t); f1(t) is 
a general function of time (arbitrary except for 
certain frequency limitations) representing the 
intelligence to be transmitted. It represents for 
example, the pressure-time function in radio 
and telephony, or the voltage-time curve out-
put of an iconoscope in television.” 
Shannon was awarded the Alfred Noble Prize 
of the American Society of Civil Engineers for 
his master’s thesis in 1940. He continued to 
work on the use of algebra to deepen analogies 
and began his doctoral studies in mathematics, 
with the same supervisor, the algebraist Frank 
L. Hitchcock. The topic, however, stemmed 
from Bush, who suggested that Shannon apply 
Boolean algebra to genetics, as he had to cir-
cuits. The result of his research was submitted 
in the spring of 1940 in his thesis “An Algebra 
for Theoretical Genetics.” Meanwhile, Shan-
non had also published his “Mathematical 
Theory of the Differential Analyzer” (1941) 
and during the summer of 1940 had started 
working at the Bell Laboratories, where he ap-
plied the ideas contained in his master’s thesis. 
He also spent a few months at the Institute for 
Advanced Study in Princeton working under 
Hermann Weyl thanks to a National Research 
Fellowship, and he then returned to the Bell 
Labs, where he worked from 1941 to 1956. 
2. The Impact of World War II. Any scien-
tist who worked in public institutions, private 
companies, or universities at this time became 
increasingly engaged in the war effort. From 
1940 onward, interdisciplinary organizations 
were founded: first the National Defense Re-
search Committee (NDRC, June 1940), under 
the supervision of Vannevar Bush, and later 
the Office of Scientific Research and Devel-
opment (May 1941), which included the 
NDRC and medical research. Shannon soon 
became involved in this war-related research, 
mainly with two projects. The first project fo-
cused on anti-aircraft guns, which were so im-
portant in defending Great Britain under the 
V1 bombs and V2 rockets and more generally 
for air defense. Because World War II planes 
flew twice as high and twice as fast as those of 
World War I, the fire control parameters had 
to be automatically determined by means of 
radar data. Shannon was hired by Warren 
Weaver, at the time also head of the Natural 
Sciences Division of the Rockefeller Founda-
tion. He worked with Richard B. Blackman 
and Hendrik Bode, also from Bell Labs. Their 
report, “Data Smoothing and Prediction in 
Fire-Control Systems,” pointed in the direc-
tion of generality in signal processing. Fire 
control was seen as “a special case of the trans-
mission, manipulation, and utilization of intel-
ligence.” They stated that there was “an obvi-
ous analogy between the problem of smooth-
ing the data to eliminate or reduce the effect 
of tracking errors and the problem of separat-
ing a signal from interfering noise in commu-
nications systems” (Mindell, Gerovitch, and 
Segal,2003, p. 73). 
The second project was in the field of cryptog-
raphy. At the outbreak of the war, communi-
cations could be easily intercepted. The main 
transatlantic communication means for confi-
dential messages was the A3 telephone system 
developed at Bell Labs, which simply inverted 
parts of the bandwidth and was easily deci-
phered by the Germans.Shannon worked on 
the X-System, which solved this problem, and 
met British mathematician Alan Turing during 
this time. Turing had come to Bell Labs to co-
ordinate British and American research on 
jamming, but the “need-to-know” rule that 
prevailed prevented them from engaging in a 
real exchange on these issues. The quintes-
sence of Shannon’s contribution to war cryp-
tography can be found in a 1945 report (de-
classified in 1957) titled “A Mathematical The-
ory of Cryptography,” which outlined the first 
theory, relying on both algebraic and probabil-
istic theories. Shannon explained that he was 
interested in discrete information consisting 
of sequences of discrete symbols chosen from 
a finite set. He gave definitions of redundancy 
and equivocation, and also of “information.” 
Trying to quantify the uncertainty related to 
the realization of an event chosen among n 
events for which a probability pi is known, he 
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proposed the formula H=Σi(i=1..n){pi log pi} 
where H was at first merely a measure of un-
certainty. He then showed that this formula 
verified eleven properties such as additivity 
(information brought by two selections of an 
outcome equals the sum of the information 
brought by each event) or the fact that H was 
maximum when all the events had the same 
probability (which corresponds to the worst 
case for deciphering). For the choice of the 
letter H, obviously referring to Boltzmann’s 
H-Theorem, he explained that “most of the 
entropy formulas contain terms of this type” 
(Sloane and Wyner, 1993, pp. 84–142). Ac-
cording to some authors, it might have been 
John von Neumann who gave Shannon the 
following hint: 
"You should call it entropy, for two reasons. In the 
first place your uncertainty function has been used 
in statistical mechanics under that name, so it al-
ready has a name. In the second place, and more 
important, no one really knows what entropy really 
is, so in a debate you will always have the ad-
vantage." (Tribus, 1971, p. 179) 
3. From Cryptography to Communication 
Theory. In his 1945 memorandum, Shannon 
also developed a general schema for a secured 
communication. The key source was repre-
sented as a disturbing element conceptualize 
as a “noise,” similar to the message, but apart 
from that, the schema was similar to the one 
he described in 1939 in his letter to Bush. 
Shannon always kept this goal in mind, even 
when he worked in cryptology. In 1985, Shan-
non declared to Price “My first getting at that 
was information theory, and I used cryptog-
raphy as a way of legitimizing the work. … For 
cryptography you could write up anything in 
any shape, which I did” (Price, 1985, p. 169) 
Relying on his experience in Bell Laboratories, 
where he had become acquainted with the 
work of other telecommunication engineers 
such as Harry Nyquist and Ralph Hartley, 
Shannon published in two issues of the Bell 
System Technical Journal his paper “A Math-
ematical Theory of Communication.” The 
general approach was pragmatic; he wanted to 
study “the savings due to statistical structure 
of the original message” (1948, p. 379), and for 
that purpose, he had to neglect the semantic 
aspects of information, as Hartley did for “in-
telligence” twenty years before (Hartley, 1928, 
p. 1). For Shannon, the communication pro-
cess was stochastic in nature, and the great im-
pact of his work, which accounts for the ap-
plications in other fields, was due to the sche-
matic diagram of a general communication 
system that he proposed. An information 
source” outputs a “message,” which is en-
coded by a “transmitter” into the transmitted 
“signal.” The received signal is the sum of the 
transmitted signal and unavoidable “noise.” It 
is recovered as a decoded message, which is 
delivered to the “destination.” The received 
signal, which is the sum between the signal 
and the “noise,” is decoded in the “receiver” 
that gives the message to destination. His the-
ory showed that choosing a good combination 
of transmitter and receiver makes it possible 
to send the message with arbitrarily high accu-
racy and reliability, provided the information 
rate does not exceed a fundamental limit, 
named the “channel capacity.” The proof of 
this result was, however, nonconstructive, 
leaving open the problem of designing codes 
and decoding means that were able to ap-
proach this limit (→Shannon's fundamental theo-
rems). 
The paper was presented as an ensemble of 
twentythree theorems that were mostly rigor-
ously proven (but not always, hence the work 
of A. I. Khinchin and later A. N. Kolmogorov, 
who based a new probability theory on the in-
formation concept). Shannon’s paper was di-
vided into four parts, differentiating between 
discrete or continuous sources of information 
and the presence or absence of noise. In the 
simplest case (discrete source without noise), 
Shannon presented the H formula he had al-
ready defined in his mathematical theory of 
cryptography,which in fact can be reduced to 
a logarithmic mean. He defined the bit, the 
contraction of “binary digit” (as suggested by 
John W. Tukey, his colleague at Bell Labs) as 
the unit for information. Concepts such as 
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“redundancy,” “equivocation,” or channel 
“capacity,” which existed as common notions, 
were defined as scientific concepts. Shannon 
stated a fundamental source-coding theorem, 
showing that the mean length of a message has 
a lower limit proportional to the entropy of 
the source. When noise is introduced, the 
channel-coding theorem stated that when the 
entropy of the source is less than the capacity 
of the channel, a code exists that allows one to 
transmit a message “so that the output of the 
source can be transmitted over the channel 
with an arbitrarily small frequency of errors.” 
This programmatic part of Shannon’s work 
explains the success and impact it had in tele-
communications engineering. The turbo 
codes (error correction codes) achieved a low 
error probability at information rates close to 
the channel capacity, with reasonable com-
plexity of implementation, thus providing for 
the first time experimental evidence of the 
channel capacity theorem (Berrou and 
Glavieux, 1996). 
Another important result of the mathematical 
theory of communication was, in the case of a 
continuous source, the definition of the capac-
ity of a channel of band W perturbed by white 
thermal noise power N when the average 
transmitter power is limited to P, given by  
C=W log{(P+N)/N} 
which is the formula reproduced on Shan-
non’s gravestone. The 1948 paper rapidly be-
came very famous; it was published one year 
later as a book, with a postscript by Warren 
Weaver regarding the semantic aspects of in-
formation. 
4. Entropy and Information. There were 
two different readings of this book. Some en-
gineers became interested in the program-
matic value of Shannon’s writings, mostly to 
develop new coding techniques, whereas 
other scientists used the mathematical theory 
of communication for two reasons: on one 
hand, a general model of communication; and 
on the other, the mathematical definition of 
information, called “entropy” by Shannon. 
Those ideas coalesced with other theoretical 
results hat appeared during the war effort, 
namely the idea of a general theory for “Con-
trol and Communication in the Animal and 
the Machine,” which is the subtitle of Cyber-
netics, a book Norbert Wiener published in 
1948. Shannon, von Neumann, Wiener, and 
others were later called “cyberneticians” dur-
ing the ten meetings sponsored by the Macy 
Foundation, which took place between 1946 
and 1953. Shannon and Weaver’s 1949 book, 
along with the work by Wiener, brought forth 
a so-called “information theory.” 
Rapidly, connections were made between in-
formation theory and various fields, for in-
stance in linguistics, where influences went in 
both directions. In order to be able to consider 
“natural written languages such as English, 
German, Chinese” as stochastic processes de-
fined by a set of selection probabilities, Shan-
non relied on the work of linguists, who, in 
turn, were vitally interested in the calculus of 
the entropy of a language to gain a better un-
derstanding of concepts like that of redun-
dancy (Shannon, 1951). Roman Jakobson was 
among the most enthusiastic linguists; he had 
participated in one of the Macy meetings in 
March 1948. At the very beginning of the 
1950s, in most disciplines, new works were 
presented as “applications” of information 
theory, even if sometimes the application only 
consisted of the use of logarithmic mean. Try-
ing to understand the connections between 
molecular structure and genetic infor-
mation—a couple of months before the dis-
covery of the double helix for the structure of 
DNA—Herman Branson calculated, in a sym-
posium entitled “The Use of Information 
Theory in Biology,” the information quantity 
(H) contained in a human. He gave the expres-
sion “H (food and environment) = H (biolog-
ical function) + H (maintenance and repair) + 
H (growth, differentiation, memory)” 
(Quastler, 1953, p. 39). Henry Quastler came 
to the conclusion, as did Sidney Dancoff, that 
“H (man)” was about 2 x 10 28 bits (p. 167). 
Taking issue with these different kinds of ap-
plications, Shannon in 1956 wrote a famous 
editorial, published in the Transactions of the 
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Institute of Radio Engineers, with the title 
“The Bandwagon.” As he stated, referring to 
his 1948 paper, “Starting as a technical tool for 
the communication engineer, it has received 
an extraordinary amount of publicity in the 
popular as well as the scientific press. In part, 
this has been due to connections with such 
fashionable fields as computing machines, cy-
bernetics, and automation; and in part, to the 
novelty of its subject matter. As a conse-
quence, it has perhaps been ballooned to an 
importance beyond its actual accomplish-
ments.” At this time, some applications of in-
formation theory already reflected a mood, es-
sentially based on a loose, rather than a scien-
tific definition of information. Forty years 
later, the project of “information highways,” 
presented to promote the Internet, partly re-
lied on the same idea. 
5. Shannon as a Pioneer in Artificial Intel-
ligence. At the time Shannon published his 
relatively pessimistic editorial, he was already 
engaged in other research, typically related to 
his ability to combine mathematical theories, 
electrical engineering, and “tinkering,” 
namely, artificial intelligence. Shannon coau-
thored the 1955 “Proposal for the Dartmouth 
Summer Research Project on Artificial Intelli-
gence,” which marked the debut of the term 
“artificial intelligence.” Together with Na-
thaniel Rochester, John McCarthy, and 
Marvin L. Minsky, he obtained support from 
the Rockefeller Foundation to “proceed on 
the basis of the conjecture that every aspect of 
learning or any other feature of intelligence 
can in principle be so precisely described that 
a machine can be made to simulate it.” In ex-
plaining his own goal, Shannon named two 
topics. 
The first topic, presented as an “application of 
information theory,” was based on an analogy: 
in the same way that information theory was 
concerned with the reliable transmission of in-
formation over a noisy channel, he wanted to 
tackle the structure of computing machines in 
which reliable computing is supposed to be 
achieved using some unreliable elements, a 
problem to which John von Neumann de-
voted considerable attention. Starting from 
this parallel, notions such as redundancy and 
channel capacity were to be used to improve 
the architecture of computing machines. 
The second topic dealt with the way in which 
a “brain model” can adapt to its environment. 
This had no direct link with information the-
ory but was more related to the work Shannon 
had presented during the eighth Macy meet-
ing, in March 1951, where he gathered with 
other cyberneticians. Shannon demonstrated 
an electromechanical mouse he called The-
seus, which would be “taught” to find its way 
in a labyrinth. In his Dartmouth proposal, 
Shannon put the emphasis on “clarifying the 
environmental model, and representing it as a 
mathematical structure.” He had already no-
ticed that “in discussing mechanized intelli-
gence, we think of machines performing the 
most advanced human thought activities—
proving theorems, writing music, or playing 
chess.” He posited a bottom-up approach in 
the “direction of these advanced activities,” 
starting with simpler models, as he had done 
in his 1950 paper entitled “Programming a 
Computer for Playing Chess.” In this first 
published article on computer chess, Shannon 
offered the key elements for writing a “pro-
gram,” such as an “evaluation function” or a 
“minimax procedure.” 
 
Claude Shannon with an electronic mouse which has a “super” 
memory and can learn its way round a maze without a mistake 
after only one “training” run. (Hulton Archive/Getty Images). 
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6. A Complex Legacy. Shannon’s contribu-
tions to artificial intelligence have often been 
neglected because of the enormous aura. He is 
so well known for his work on information 
theory that his credit for AI is often ignored. 
Most history of AI does not even mention his 
presence at the Dartmouth meeting of infor-
mation theory. None of the works he wrote 
after the 1950s received such recognition. He 
left Bell Labs for the Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology (MIT) in 1956, first as a visiting 
professor; he was a permanent member of the 
Research Laboratory of Electronics at MIT 
for twenty years, starting in 1958, after he had 
spent a year as a fellow at the Center for Ad-
vanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences in 
Palo Alto. 
Most of his scientific work was devoted to the 
promotion and deepening of information the-
ory. Shannon was invited to many countries, 
including the Soviet Union in 1965. While 
there, giving a lecture at an engineering con-
ference, he had an opportunity to play a chess 
match against Mikhail Botvinik. He tackled 
the case of transmission with a memoryless 
channel (a noisy channel where the noise acts 
independently on each symbol transmitted 
through the channel). It is on this topic that he 
published his last paper related to information 
theory, as early as 1967, with Robert G. Gal-
lager and Elwyn R. Berlekamp. 
In the late 1960s and 1970s, Shannon became 
interested in portfolio management and, more 
generally, investment theory. One of his col-
leagues at Bell Labs, John L. Kelly, had shown 
in 1956 how information theory could be ap-
plied to gambling. Together with Ed Thorp, 
Shannon went to Las Vegas to test their ideas. 
In 1966 they also invented the first wearable 
computer at MIT that was able to predict rou-
lette wheels. 
Shannon never gave up constructing eccentric 
machines, like the THROBAC (THrifty RO-
man-numeral BAckward-looking Computer) 
he built in the 1950s, the rocket-powered Fris-
bee, or a device that could solve the Rubik’s 
Cube puzzle. He developed many automata, 
many of which he kept at his home: among 
others, a tiny stage on which three clowns 
could juggle with eleven rings, seven balls, and 
five clubs, all driven by an invisible mecha-
nism of clockwork and rods. Juggling was one 
of his passions, which also included playing 
chess, riding a unicycle, and playing to clarinet. 
In the early 1980s Shannon began writing an 
article for Scientific American called scientific 
Aspects of Juggling,” which he never finished 
(Sloane and Wyner, 1993, pp. 850–864). 
At the dawn of the twenty-first century, Shan-
non’s contributions are manifold. Whereas 
there are still applications that only consist of 
using the logarithmic mean or the schematic 
diagram of a general communication system 
(applications he condemned in his 1956 edito-
rial, “The Bandwagon”), there are also numer-
ous new fields that could not be defined with-
out referring to his work. In the field of tech-
nology, coding theories that are applied to 
compact discs or deep-space communication 
are merely developments of information the-
ory. In mathematics, entire parts of algorith-
mic complexity theory (→Algorithmic Infor-
mation Theory) can be seen as resulting from the 
development of Shannon’s theory. In biology, 
the protean use made of the expression “ge-
netic information” explains the development 
of molecular biology (Fox Keller, Kay and 
Yockey). From the 1990s onward, in physics, 
the domain of “quantum information” took 
off around the definition of qubits, which ex-
tended the bit initially used by Shannon to 
measure information. Shannon unfortunately 
could not take part in these developments nor 
take them into account; from the mid-1990s 
he struggled with Alzheimer’s disease, to 
which he succumbed in February 2001. 
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SHANNON´S FUNDAMENTAL THE-
OREMS (S. teoremas fundamentals de Shannon, F. 
théorèmes fondamental de Shannon, G. Shannon-
Grundsätze) [MTC] theorem 
Contents.— 1) Fundamental theorem for a noiseless 
channel, 2) Fundamental theorem for a discrete channel with 
noise, 3) Complementarity of both theorems. 
1. Fundamental theorem for a noiseless 
channel. Let a source have entropy H (bits 
per symbol) and a channel have a capacity C 
(bits per second). Then it is possible to encode 
the output of the source in such a way as to 
transmit at the average rate C/H–ε symbols 
per second over a channel where ε is arbitrary 
small. It is not possible to transmit at an aver-
age rate greater than C/H. (Shannon 1948: 16) 
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Shannon probes here the existence of a limit 
to the efficiency of what has been called source 
coding (→encoder). If the entropy of a source –
characterised by the emission of a finite set of 
symbols– can be determined, then we know H 
(in bit/symbol) would correspond to the min-
imum binary digits to be used for its coding. 
Any move to this limit translates into a grow-
ing complexity (in operational and/or circuital 
costs). As in other fundamental results of the 
MTC, it deals with a non constructive conclu-
sion “leaving open the problem of designing 
codes” (→Shannon, C.E.). 
In technical practice, source coding is not only 
attained to the statistical level addressed by 
Shannon. The most sophisticated techniques 
of source coding are actually a combination of: 
1)   predictive coding, in which the sender only 
conveys what cannot be predicted from previ-
ous sendings, achieving optimal results if 
source peculiarities and pragmatic context are 
analysed in depth (e.g. for the reproduction of 
a piano playing, keyboard touching is just reg-
istered). 
2)   Transformational coding (especially applicable 
for signals addressed to sensory organs), in 
which a linear transformation is applied to sig-
nals to be conveyed (reversible) enabling to 
distinguish ranges of different sensibility. This 
makes possible to leave out data being imper-
ceptible or under certain quality thresholds 
(operation entailing an irreversible loss of data 
–not necessarily information, as it is com-
monly said, if this data is not able in the least 
to ‘inform’ recipients). In that coding, effi-
ciency is achieved through an analysis in depth 
of the sensory perception. 
3)   Statistical coding, in the sense pointed out by 
the MTC where source emissions are regarded 
as ergodic and stationary processes. 
2. Fundamental theorem for a discrete 
channel with noise. Let a discrete channel 
have the capacity C and a discrete source the 
entropy per second H. If H≤C there exist a 
coding system such that the output of the 
source can be transmitted over the channel 
with an arbitrarily small frequency of errors (or 
an arbitrary small equivocation). If H>C it is 
possible to encode the source so that the 
equivocation is less than H–C+ε where ε is ar-
bitrarily small. There is no method of encod-
ing which gives an equivocation less than H–
C. (Shannon 1948: 22) 
Since here the source is characterised by its in-
formation transmission rate (according to 
Shannon’s definition of entropy), this theorem 
warns us that the transmission of this infor-
mation flow requires at least a channel of ca-
pacity bigger than H. We might vainly try to 
transmit it through a channel of lesser capac-
ity, any excess of source entropy with respect 
to channel capacity will imply a corresponding 
increase in the rate of error reception. On the 
other hand, approaching to the threshold 
(C≈H) leads to an increase in (operational/cir-
cuital) complexity. 
How can the distance between source entropy 
H and channel capacity C be employed? Re-
dundancy might be employed in order to facil-
itate recipients identification and correction of 
transmission errors. This kind of coding in 
named channel coding (→encoder). There are 
several techniques to add redundancy, which 
can be classified in block codes and convolutional 
codes. In the former, consecutive data blocks 
are used to determine the added redundancy; 
in the convolutional ones, state machines are 
used, which output depends on the coder state 
and entry data. Error correction looks in the 
former for the most similar valid block, in the 
later for the most similar sequence of valid 
code. 
3. Complementarity of both theorems. 
Thus, there is a certain practical complemen-
tarity between these two theorems: the former 
indicates how far we can compress the code 
for conveying source messages (maximally re-
moving redundancy); the second shows us the 
redundancy the system could use in order to 
facilitate error correction. 
At a glance, source coding tries to equate bi-
nary digits to bits, maximizing entropy and 
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eliminating whatever is non entropic and use-
less for decoding purposes, whereas channel 
coding adds non entropic digits that can be 
recognized by recipients to eliminate transmis-
sion errors. 
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SIGN (S. signo, F. signe, G. Zeichen) [transdisci-
plinary, semiotics, communication theory]con-
cept 
The use frequently given in antiquity to the 
word sign, σημεῖον, corresponds to a signal, usu-
ally verbal, through which something is repre-
sented. However, it was also used in a number 
of more technical meanings -sometimes con-
fronted-, such as in the realist and nominalism 
positions. In modernity, especially among ra-
cionalists, a sign tends to refer to ideas. How-
ever, in Empiricism, the word sign gains a sig-
nificant relevancy, distinguishing its suggestive 
dimension –already pointed out in antiquity 
and medieval nominalism-. In current times, 
the most influential trends are perhaps the 
ones started by Saussure, Peirce and Husserl, be-
ing the first two more influential in linguistics, 
semiotics and anthropology, whereas Hus-
serl’s influence was driven by phenomenology 
and →hermeneutics into a wide spectrum of so-
cial sciences.  
For Saussure, the sign (seen from a linguistic 
point of view) is a non-separable double-faced 
“psychic entity”: the acoustic image (named 
signifier –“significant”) and the concept (signi-
fied –“signifié”), where its bonding link is arbi-
trary. Structuralism extended Saussure’s con-
cept of sign to non verbal phenomena. 
Peirce designates as sign “an object which 
stands for another to some mind”. He distin-
guishes three points of view: 1) as being signs 
in themselves (dealt with in grammar); 2) as 
being related with an object (dealt with in 
logics); 3) as being related to subjects or “in-
terpretants” (dealt with in pure rhetoric). He 
also distinguishes, depending on the relation 
with three types of signs: iconic (which are sig-
nificant even if the object does not exist); in-
dexes (which loss their constituting character if 
its object is suppressed, but not if the inter-
preter is missing); and symbols (which loss their 
constituting character if its interpreter is miss-
ing). Structuralism develops an even more 
elaborated classification, in which these three 
types pointed out by Peirce reappear, based on 
the established relationship between signifi-
cant and signified (arbitrary, metaphoric, met-
onymic, etc.). 
Morris –following Pierce- states that the sign 
is what supports a triadic relation: with other 
signs, with designated objects and with the 
subjects using the sign. Syntactics, semiotics and 
pragmatics are concerned with the study of each 
of these relations respectively, whereas semiot-
ics or semiology deal with the general study of 
the sign. 
Husserl makes a fundamental distinction be-
tween sign and signification, according to 
which, even though every sign is a sign of 
something, not all signs have signification, i.e., 
it does not necessarily comprise a sense being 
expressed by it. Sometimes, we cannot even 
say that a sign designates that of which it is 
called a sign. For Husserl, signs can be indica-
tive (limited to indicate, but not to signify) and 
significative (or expressions pointing to a signi-
fication, which is one of the elements of the 
intentional act, usually wider than effectua-
tions or fulfillments, and only matching up 
such act if a complete adequacy is given be-
tween signification and what is signified, the 
intentional object). With this characterization, 
a stance is taken up rejecting both the signic 
arbitrariness of nominalism and the expressive 
naturalness of realism, clarifying the “ambigu-
ous significative situation”.  
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SITUATIONAL LOGIC (S. lógica situacional, 
F. logic situationnel, G. situative Logik) [Situ-
acional Semantics] theory 
Situation Theory is an attempt to provide with 
a mathematical formulation the Situational Se-
mantics developed by Braswise and Perry 
(1983). Keith Devlin (1991) in Logic and In-
formation dressed the Situation Theory with 
the mathematical necessary apparatus to be 
able to treat it from an own, solid and mathe-
matically coherent perspective.  
The basic ontology of the Situation Theory 
forms those organizations that a mental agent, 
with his limitations, is able to individualize 
and/or to discriminate. Among the objects, 
also known as uniformities (or regularities) we 
found individuals in the situational ontology, 
relations, locations, temporary locations, situ-
ations, types and parameters.  
The framework regarding to the agent who 
gathers the ontology denominates “individual-
ization scheme” (appropriate for the study of 
the flow of information of an agent). The in-
formation always must be information refer-
ring to a certain situation, and it takes in the 
form of well-known discreet items, like “in-
fons”. An infon is an object of the form: 
 
where R denotes a relation among n appropri-
ate objects to describe it and denotes if these 
objects are in relation or they are not. The last 
element (1 or 0) is called “polarity” and is the 
one that shows the veracity if polarity is 1, or 
falseness if polarity is 0, of the relation R. 
In terms of the Situation Theory, infons are 
semantic objects within the mathematical the-
ory. They are not phrases in some language 
that require an interpretation. Infons are the 
minimum units of the information.  
Infons can be referred to more than a relation 
by means of operations of conjunction and 
disjunction. These infons are labeled "com-
pounds infons", e.g. the one obtained repre-
senting the infon that characterizes the shout 
of the word fire. 
 
The infons can include parameters as in the 
previous example are a  and t, in this case of 
spatial and temporary type respectively. The 
parameters indicate elements that do not be-
come informational until they are anchored* 
to a concrete situation. 
Given a situation s and an infon σ we wrote:   
s  σ 
in order to indicate that the infon σ is a “fac-
tual fact” for the situation s. Expressed in 
other words, we can say that σ is a information 
item that is a truth in the situation s. There-
fore, from the situational perspective the in-
formation is treated like merchandise. Mer-
chandise that, in addition, doesn’t have to rep-
resent always a “true” value, because for each 
infon exists its dual negative that can be un-
derstood as their opposite informational one 
and both cannot be “true”.  
Situations that share common characteristics 
are gather in Types, giving place to entities of 
higher-order, situation-types. This one is an 
abstract concept that gathers elements with 
common characteristics and always belongs 
relative to the agent. 
Constraints are abstract bonds between types 
of situations. They can be of diverse types: 
natural laws, linguistic, empirical conventions, 
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relations logics, rules, or of any other type. Its 
paper in the chain of the information is well 
gathered in Israel and Perry (1990) by the 
word “meaning”. 
The constraint between two types T and T' in-
dicates that an element of type t, will carry in-
formation of an element of the type t' within 
the terms determined by the situation that in-
cludes them.  
In order to be able to construct the meaning, 
the agent must be able to settle down con-
straints between each one of the identified sit-
uations type, in the context of the situation. 
The representation of Infon gathering the 
constraint between two situations type s and s' 
is the following one:  
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SOCIAL WEB (S. Web social, F. Web Social, G. 
Soziales Netzwerk) [Web, Information Society, 
ICT] concept, resource 
Contents.— 1) History of the term, 2) Semantic Web 
and Social Web, 3) Social Web and Semantic Web Com-
parison, 4) Conversion of folksonomies into more complex 
KOS. 
Social Web is a set of resources and practices 
that enable the users to socialize with each 
other. In the literature, Web 2.0 is usually em-
ployed as a synonym. 
Also Web 2.0 is used to refer to the set of tech-
nologies focused on social interaction. Most 
of these tools are free. 
Web 2.0 is a platform, where users are the 
principal centre of attention; the user decides 
what to use and how to use it. Applications 
such as Flick or YouTube demonstrate the 
great acceptance and vitality of this platform. 
The approach is based on the involvement 
and collaboration of users for the manage-
ment of resources, using friendly and well de-
signed user interfaces. The architecture of 
these applications permits to users to describe 
resources with tags.  In contrast to Semantic 
Web, this approach lacks a central authority to 
organize and standardize the way that the Web 
is managed, and hinders progress towards gen-
eral acceptance by other software developers. 
1. History of the term Web 2.0. Dale 
Dougherty from O’Reilly Media was the per-
son that invented the term Web 2.0 at a con-
ference with Craig Cline from MediaLive. 
During the speech on the evolution of the In-
ternet they realized the numerous collabora-
tive services that had emerged, as well as the 
will of the users to share resources. The term 
was affirmed in the 2004 Web 2.0 Conference; 
within one year the term Web 2.0 already had 
10 millions references in Google, even though 
its significance remained vague. In contrast 
with the Semantic Web, its appearance was 
not in response to a planned and coordinated 
effort, neither the assumption on behalf of the 
experts that the Web was evolving autono-
mously, was suggesting such a proposal. 
2. Semantic Web and Social Web. Web 2.0 
and Semantic Web (SW) are technologies with 
a great potential for the network and ulti-
mately, for the final user. Both aim to improv-
ing the mechanisms for sharing information 
and resources. Frequently, Web 2.0 is pre-
sented as an intermediate stage to future Web 
3.0 (called Semantic Web). Web 2.0 is oriented 
to persons, while the Semantic Web is ori-
ented to applications; this stems from the fact 
that the first employs a free language and the 
latter a controlled language. Web 2.0 attempts 
to give the users a legible and usable semantic, 
while the Semantic Web projects the correct 
interpretation of the semantic for computer 
applications. 
3. Social Web and Semantic Web compar-
ison. To explain why the Social Web is more 
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popular  than the Semantic Web, at the mo-
ment, we analyze and compare some charac-
teristics between both webs according to dif-
ferent criteria. Some of them demonstrate that 
they treat the two concepts with different ap-
proaches. 
At first glance, it could be assumed that both 
the Social Web and the Semantic Web could 
be in conflict. At the same time, though, they 
could be viewed as two complementary as-
pects of the Web which, by operating syner-
gistically, could increase the potential of both. 
Therefore, after questioning the reason for 
their mutual existence and why the Social Web 
has had such success compared with the Se-
mantic Web, it becomes evident that they treat 
two independent necessities as being equally 
indispensable. 
4. Conversion of folksonomies into more 
complex KOS. Some Web resources are un-
der analysis for their evolution to KOS com-
plexes, e.g. the folkontologies, which study 
evolution mechanisms starting from a folk-
sonomy. 
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SUPER-RECURSIVE KOLMOGOROV 
COMPLEXITY (S. complejidad de Kolmogorov 
super-recursiva; F. Complexité de Kolmogorov super-
récursif; G. Superrekursive Kolmogorow-Komplexität) 
[AIT, computer science, complexity theory, 
coding theory]concept 
Contents.— 1) Absolute and relative super-recursive 
complexity; 2) Inductive Kolmogorov complexity 
1. Absolute and relative super-recursive 
complexity. Super-recursive Kolmogorov  
complexity is an algorithmic measure or meas-
ure of algorithmic information. It is defined 
for constructive objects, such as words in 
some alphabet. If x is a word and K is a class 
of super-recursive algorithms, then, as in the 
case of recursive algorithms, we have two 
types of super-recursive Kolmogorov com-
plexity. 
The Kolmogorov complexity CB(x) of an ob-
ject (word) x with respect to an algo-
rithm B from K is defined as 
CB(x) = min {l(p);  B(p) = x} 
in the case when there is a word p such 
that B(p) = x; 
otherwise CB(x) is not defined. 
When K has universal algorithms, Burgin 
(1982; 2005) proved that there is an invariant 
up to some additive constant super-recur-
sive Kolmogorov complexity KC(x). It is 
called absolute super-recursive Kolmogorov 
complexity because there is also relative su-
per-recursive Kolmogorov complexity 
KC(x|y). Namely, there is an algorithm U such 
that for any Turing machine T, there is a con-
stant cUT such that for all words x, we have 
CU(x) ≤ CT(x) + cUT 
The machine U is a universal in K algorithm. 
This makes the concept of super-recur-
sive Kolmogorov complexity invariant up to 
an additive constant if we put KC(x) = CU(x). 
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Thus, the super-recursive Kolmogorov com-
plexity KC(x) of a word x is taken to be equal 
to: 
the size of the shortest program (in number 
of symbols) for a universal in K algorithm 
U that without additional data, computes 
the string x and terminates. 
This measure is called absolute super-recur-
sive Kolmogorov complexity because super-
recursive Kolmogorov complexity has also a 
relative form KC(x | y). 
There are many different classes of super-re-
cursive algorithms: limiting recursive func-
tions and limiting partial recursive func-
tions introduced by Gold, trial and error pred-
icates introduced by Hilary Putnam, inductive 
Turing machines of different orders and limit 
Turing machines of different orders intro-
duced by Burgin, trial-and-error machines in-
troduced by Hintikka and Mutanen, general 
Turing machines introduced by Schmidhuber, 
etc. Each of these classes defines its own su-
per-recursive Kolmogorov complexity. 
2. Inductive Kolmogorov Complexity. In-
ductive Turing machines form the class of su-
per-recursive algorithms closest to the con-
ventional classes of algorithms, such as the 
class of all Turing machines. As a result, the 
closest to the conventional (recursive) Kolmo-
gorov complexity C(x) is inductive Kolmogo-
rov complexity IC(x). If x is a word, then the 
original Kolmogorov complexity IC(x) of a 
word x is taken to be equal to 
the size of the shortest program (in number 
of symbols) for a universal inductive Turing 
machine of the first order U that without 
additional data, computes the string x. 
This measure is called absolute inductive 
Kolmogorov complexity because inductive 
Kolmogorov complexity has also a relative 
form IC(x | y). Namely, the relative induc-
tive Kolmogorov complexity IC(x | y) of 
the word x relative to the word y is taken to be 
equal to: 
the size of the shortest program (in number of 
symbols) for a universal inductive Turing ma-
chine U that with y as its input, computes the 
string x and terminates. 
The inductive relative Kolmogorov complex-
ity IC(x | y) allows one to find the algorithmic 
quantity IC(y ; x) of inductive information 
in a word y about a word x, i.e., information 
that can be extracted by inductive algorithms. 
Namely, we have 
IC(y ; x) = C(x) - C(x | y) 
The inductive Kolmogorov complexity of 
an object (word) x with respect to an induc-
tive Turing machine T is defined as 
ICT(x) = min { l(p);  T(p) = x} 
in the case when there is a word p such 
that T(p) = x; 
otherwise ICT(x) is not defined. 
Burgin (1990; 1995) proved that there is an in-
variant inductive Kolmogorov complex-
ity IC(x). Namely, there is an inductive Turing 
machine U such that for any inductive Turing 
machine T, there is a constant cT such that for 
all words x, we have 
ICU(x) ≤ ICT(x) + cT 
The machine U is a universal inductive Turing 
machine. This makes the concept of inductive 
Kolmogorov complexity invariant up to an 
additive constant. 
It is proved (Burgin, 2005) that inductive Kol-
mogorov complexity for a word x is usually 
much less than recursive (conventional) Kol-
mogorov complexity for the same word. It 
means that to build a constructive object, e.g., 
a word, it is necessary to have much less in-
ductive algorithmic information than recur-
sive algorithmic information. 
At the same time, many properties of induc-
tive Kolmogorov complexity are similar to the 
properties of the conventional Kolmogorov 
complexity For instance, when the length of a 
word tends to infinity, its inductive Kolmogo-
rov complexity also tends to infinity. 
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SYSTEM (S. sistema; F. système; G. System) 
[transdiciplinary, system theory] concept 
The idea of viewing reality as a whole, or as a 
series of interconnected structures or systems, 
is perhaps as old as mankind. And it appears 
to be deeply rooted in our ordinary 
knowledge. 
The history of ideas has left us an amount of 
problems closely related to the notion of sys-
tem (for example, the relationship between the 
whole and its parts, or the relationship be-
tween the causes and the goals). Nowadays, 
Bertalanffy, Wiener, Thom, Prigogine, Man-
delbrot… have highlighted the need for a sys-
tems approach in science. Bertalanffy is well 
known as the creator of the Theory of Sys-
tems. A system is defined as a complex object 
of interacting elements. Given some condi-
tions, an element will behave in a certain way. 
When these conditions change, the behaviour 
will also change. Bertalanffy thinks the main 
characteristic of a system is that the whole 
contributes more tan the separate parts, taken 
in isolation, due to interactions among them. 
The meaning of the term “system” is not un-
ambiguous, but each author seems to give a 
different meaning. That is why different for-
malizations have been proposed (Klir, Bunge, 
Zeigler…). These formalizations help to clar-
ify many of the intuitive notions about the re-
lationships between systems and their envi-
ronment, about the distinction between natu-
ral and artificial systems, about the structural 
complexity of the systems, about the relation-
ships between systems and their models, etc. 
The concept of system goes usually associated 
with the concepts of model and simulation. A 
meaning of the term model is that of a simu-
lated system. There are different systems mod-
elling techniques (for example, System Dy-
namics).  
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SYSTEM THEORY (S. teoría de sistema; F. 
Théorie des Systêmes; G. Systemstheorie) 
[transdiciplinary] theory 
Systems theory (ST) is a specific way of how 
to reflect the totality of material or mental ob-
jects, their structures, their quantitative and 
qualitative change and their relations to their 
environment. It represents the structured por-
traying, designing, reifying and interpreting of 
this totality. By portraying ST picks up certain 
essential aspects of perceived reality; by de-
signing ST (re)constructs this totality in a cer-
tain way; by reifying it transforms the mental 
image into scientific language and/or into 
mathematical expressions; by interpreting ST 
links the totality to the philosophical, political 
or scientific context. 
ST deals with the relations between structure, 
function and dynamics of a system, with the 
relations between its elements or parts and the 
total system, with the relations between the 
system and its environment, and with the 
identification and classification of systems. 
The vibrant development of the productive 
forces in the last century based on scientific 
revolutions provides the basis for a deepened 
understanding of totalities. At the same time, 
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extreme specialization of science and research 
generates a growing need for ST to handle 
complex practical problems of contemporary 
life. 
Although systems thinking can be traced back 
to ancient Egypt, ST as an area of study was 
developed by the works of Ludwig von Ber-
talanffy, William Ross Ashby, Gregory 
Bateson, Kenneth E. Boulding, C. West 
Churchman, Heinz von Förster, Paul Lazars-
feld, Kurt Lewin, Warren McCulloch, John 
von Neumann, Margaret Mead, Anatol 
Rapoport, Norbert Wiener and others in the 
1950s. Between 1946 and 1953 ST was specif-
ically catalyzed by the Society for General Sys-
tems Research and the Macy Conferences (or-
ganized in the US by the Josiah Macy, Jr. 
Foundation). 
Specific versions of Systems Theories exist in 
cybernetics and in the theory of adaptive sys-
tems. Applications can be found in mathemat-
ics and computing (control theory), system dy-
namics (Jay Forrester), agent based modeling, 
systems engineering, biochemistry, theories of 
living systems, anthropology, sociology and 
social cybernetics, economics, ecology, politi-
cal sciences, history, archeology, systems psy-
chology, group dynamics and theories of or-
ganization etc. 
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T
TAXONOMY (S. taxonomía, F. Taxinomie, G. 
Taxonomie) [Knowledge Management, 
Knowledge organization, semiotics] concept 
Taxonomy is a classification or categorization 
of a set of objects in a hierarchical way. A ge-
neric-specific relationship is established be-
tween pairs of terms. This hierarchical ar-
rangement is present in every Knowledge Or-
ganization System (SKOS): thesaurus, concept 
model, or ontology. 
The main components of taxonomies are: 
― Hierarchical structure (specific context) with 
different levels of specificity. 
― Labels (names that label each concept). 
They are the elements in the structure, 
grouped in thematic sets. 
― Faceted. Every concept might belong to a 
different facet. These facets enable han-
dling sets of terms grouped by attributes. 
This approach facilitates indexing and re-
trieval tasks. 
Taxonomies are used in companies and organ-
izations to manage and organize their infor-
mation resources. This facilitates searching, 
browsing and navigation in the hierarchy. 
Some applications allow: 
1) Arrangement of the company vocabulary in 
domains that are not important enough to 
have their own public controlled vocabu-
lary. 
2) Representation of the terms that the organ-
ization employs every day. 
3) Completion of terms with definitions about 
their specific use. 
4) User orientation. 
5) Navigation through the hierarchical struc-
ture.  
6) Specification of the query, thus narrowing 
the used terms.  
7) Organisation on internal business needs. 
Users arrange terms in a meaningful way. 
8) Development and updating of the struc-
ture, according to changing business re-
quirements.  
Taxonomy organizes not only the vocabulary 
of an organization, but also its output and re-
sources, including its know-how. Taxonomies 
inherit the hierarchical classification from 
SKOS and the descriptors from the thesaurus. 
They are used to organize large amounts of 
data, with the help of a controlled vocabulary. 
In short, taxonomy arranges its hierarchical 
structure in accordance with a context and a 
group of users. This resource merges an in-
dexing language with a specific vocabulary, re-
flecting in its structure both the domain and 
information needs of an organization. 
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onomies for content organization", Knowledge Organi-
zation, Vol. 33, n. 3, pp. 160-169. 
(JAM) 
TEMPORAL LOGIC (S. lógica temporal, F. ta-
xonomie, G. taxonomie) [logic] concepto 
Ever since Aristotle (and even before him, see 
the stoics), philosophers have tried to formal-
ize time. It is only around the fifties, starting 
with the work of Arthur Prior, when temporal 
logic is developed considerably with the devel-
opment of new systems used to represent dif-
ferent types of time (linear time, infinite time, 
branching time, etc.). The foundation of pos-
sible worlds semantics was vital for the seman-
tics of such systems. These systems have 
found applications in a variety of fields, the 
most representative being those of linguistics 
and computer science. 
Temporal logic systems can be based on prop-
ositional logic or on first order logic. On both 
cases operators are added to represent the past 
(P and H) and the future (F and G). It is also 
possible to include operators to represent in-
tervals. The most common semantics is based 
on the notion of moment. These moments are 
organized through an ulteriority relation (be-
fore/after). Hence, if I claim that m0 < m1 I 
am claiming that moment m0 is previous to 
moment m1. This ulteriority relation has dif-
ferent properties depending on the type of 
time we are working with, although it is always 
irreflexive. Thus, for instance, if time is transi-
tive, the ulteriority relation will have the tran-
sitive property and syntactically transitivity ax-
ioms will be introduced (FFA→FA and 
PPA→PA). 
There are multimodal and bidimensional sys-
tems of temporal logic, such as the system of 
indeterministic time HN1, which combines 
temporal and modal operators and in whose 
semantic, evaluation is made in two indices 
(moment and history). 
Presently, hybrid temporal logic systems are 
being developed. These systems increase the 
expressive power of temporal logic, because 
they allow making reference in the syntax to 
the moments. 
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THESAURUS (S. tesauro, F. thésaurus, G. 
thesaurus) [Information retrieval] concept 
Contents.— 1) Thesaurus elements, 2) Thesaurus fea-
tures, 3) Differences between Ontologies and Thesauri, 4) 
Methodologies to build Thesauri, 5) Some Thesauri online, 
6) Software to edit and manage Thesauri, 7) Standards 
A thesaurus is a controlled vocabulary used to 
represent the concepts of a specific domain 
systematically. The thesaurus identifies the re-
lationships between concepts. Every concept 
is represented by a single term, called a de-
scriptor. Thesauri are resources developed to 
index documents by these descriptors.  
1. Thesaurus elements. The thesaurus con-
sists of: 
Descriptors: normalized terms. Descriptors rep-
resent a relevant concept in the domain. 
Non-descriptor: Some descriptors might have an 
equivalent term, called a non-descriptor. A 
non-descriptor can only address one de-
scriptor in the thesaurus. These terms repre-
sent an equivalence relationship with a single 
descriptor in the domain; they could be used 
to expand the query. 
Hierarchical relationships: they represent the rela-
tion between a generic concept and a specific 
concept. This relationship includes: Broader-
Narrower Concepts; Genus-Species; Whole-
Parts; and Class-Instances. Polyhierarchies, a 
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specific concept with two or more generic 
concepts are allowed 
Associative relationship: This is a relationship to 
link concepts semantically. It is used when 
there is no hierarchical or equivalence relation 
Scope notes: This is an explanatory note about 
the scope and utilization of a descriptor. 
Example:  
CAR 
BT  automotive vehicle 
NT  ambulance 
NT  cab 
RT  driver 
RT  road 
UF  automobile 
SN  Regarding part of a train, see railcar 
where BT stands for Broader Term; NT Narrower 
Term; RT Related Term; UF Use For; and SN Scope 
Note 
2. Thesaurus features 
Domain coverage. Some thesauri are multidisci-
plinary; others just cover a specific domain. 
Multidisciplinary contexts increase the ambi-
guity. This is due to a higher probability of 
polysemes and homonyms. 
Output formats: Usually, a thesaurus layout has 
two output formats on paper: alphabetic and 
systematic (hierarchical). The rise of the web 
has produced an increase in web formats, 
XML or RDF, both with the metadata vocab-
ulary SKOS. Other vocabularies have been 
proposed like Zthes, BS8723, MADS, or 
Topic Maps' PSI. 
Monolingual/Multilingual: Multilingual contexts 
have the same problems as multidisciplinary 
context. 
Polyhierarchies/Monohierarchies: problems with 
polyhierarchies are due to query expansion in 
a random way. 
Uniterms/Compound terms. Compound terms 
are usually nouns, but some thesauri have ad-
jectives (as part of compound terms), acro-
nyms, verbs and proper nouns. 
3. Differences between Ontologies and 
Thesauri. The thesaurus has a few predefined 
elements. It has a lexical nature, and its main 
applications are in natural language. The origin 
of the thesaurus was on paper, nowadays the 
thesaurus has moved to digital media. This im-
plies the codification of thesauri using web 
languages, like RDF or XML, and expressing 
thesaurus elements with metadata vocabular-
ies, like SKOS. 
Ontology has a semantic nature. Its origin was 
in philosophy, logical mathematics and artifi-
cial intelligence. It enables inference by a set 
of rules, axioms, and restrictions. The current 
success of ontologies is due to their presence 
in the Semantic Web. In this context, they pro-
vide a necessary way to share knowledge on 
the Web. One of the main concerns is interop-
erability, which is a property that ensures that 
unknown software will be able to work with 
ontologies all over the Web. Interoperability 
needs to represent knowledge in a formalized 
way, like RDF or OWL. Primitives of ontolo-
gies are properties (slots), instances, hierar-
chies, and relationships. 
An important difference with ontologies is 
that thesauri are built to facilitate an existing 
information need. Ontologies have a proactive 
origin. They are often built before the need 
arises. 
Both, ontologies and thesauri, represent the 
main concepts of a domain, and its relation-
ships. Methodologies to build ontologies and 
thesauri share their first steps, but the higher 
semantic and logic load nature of ontologies 
divides later stages in their respective develop-
ments. In the ontology literature, thesauri are 
called light ontologies. Building ontologies is a 
laborious task, and to work with a natural lan-
guage thesaurus represents a more efficient 
and simple approach. 
4. Methodologies to build thesaurus 
1) Firstly, identify the information needs that 
the thesaurus will satisfy and the domain to 
be covered.   
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2) Next, similar thesauri and resources must 
be analyzed to see if they can be utilized. 
3) Select software to edit and codify the the-
saurus. User interfaces to manage and query 
must be as intuitive and friendly as possible. 
4) Main terms must be selected. Typically, re-
sources needed to identify these terms are 
domain experts or specialized literature. 
5) Define a small number of seed terms in the 
thesaurus. Usually, around 10 is enough. 
6) Terms must be arranged in a hierarchical 
way. Usually, new terms are included to 
avoid gaps in the hierarchical structure. 
7) Relationships between concepts must be 
defined. 
8) Train Indexers to use the thesaurus. 
9) Maintain, update and improve the thesau-
rus. 
5. Some thesaurus online 
Agrovoc: multilingual thesaurus developed by 
FAO and focused on agriculture. It has an 
equivalent thesaurus in NALT. 
CAB Thesaurus: focused on life sciences 
Canadian literacy thesaurus: literature the-
saurus, bilingual. 
Eurovoc: multilingual thesaurus, developed 
by EU to manage administrative documents 
Mesh: Medical Subject Headings, one of the 
largest, centered on the medical domain and 
used to index the Medline database. 
Wordnet: lexical database, centered on the 
English language. There are other versions in 
other languages. It is widely used in ontology 
construction, word sense disambiguation 
(WSD), merging, retrieval, translation, and 
other Natural Language Processing (NLP) ap-
plications. 
6. Software to edit and manage thesauri: 
TCS: thorough and flexible software. It has 
suitable features to adapt thesauri to the Web. 
It has a good set of export formats 
Domain Reuse: This suite has some tools to 
perform term filtering and to identify relation-
ships between terms. 
TemaTres:  A free platform to edit and man-
age thesauri on the Web. It can export to sev-
eral Web formats and use different metadata 
vocabularies. 
ThManager: a tool to edit and manage the-
sauri, free, and multilingual. It exports with 
Dublin Core and SKOS formats. This soft-
ware can extract terms with WordNet. 
7. Standards 
ISO 2788 (1986) Guidelines for the Establish-
ment and Development of Monolingual The-
sauri. 
Z39.19 (2005) Guidelines for the Construc-
tion, Format, and Management of Monolin-
gual Thesauri 
ISO 5964 (1985) Guidelines for the Establish-
ment and Development of Multilingual The-
sauri. It is one of the first standards to talk 
about the alignment problems. 
ISO 13250 (2003) Topic Maps, were devel-
oped to merge index of words, and its Pub-
lished Subject Indicators (PSIs) about thesauri 
are strongly related to the SKOS proposal. 
Related Resources: 
― Cab thesaurus. [Online] <http://www.cabi.org/> 
[Consulted 1/7/2009] 
― Canadian literacy thesaurus. [Online] 
<http://www.thesaurusalpha.org/> [Consulted 
1/7/2009] 
― Domain Reuse. [Online] <http://www.re-
usecompany.com/vali-
daProducto.aspx?id=13&demo=1> [Consulted 
1/7/2009] 
― TCS-10 [Online] <http://www.web-
choir.com/products/tcs10.html> [Consulted 
1/11/2009] 
― Thmanager.  [Online] <http://thmanager.source-
forge.net> [Consulted 1/7/2009] 
― Tematres [Online] <http://te-
matres.r020.com.ar/index.en.html> [Consulted 
1/11/2009] 
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TOPIC MAPS (S. mapas conceptuales F. schéma 
conceptuel, G. Begriffslandkarte) [Praxis, e-learn-
ing, Technical communication] concept 
Contents.— 1) Standards related to Concept Maps, 2) 
Related proposals, 3) Concept map editors. 
A concept map is a graphic resource to repre-
sent the knowledge within a specific context. 
Originally, it is a learning resource to improve 
understanding about a process, subject or 
topic (Novak). Concept maps have a set of la-
beled nodes, linked among them. These links 
might be labeled, to improve the understand-
ing of the graph.  Neither, the graphical repre-
sentation nor the types of relationships are 
standardized. 
1. Standards related to Concept Maps 
Topic Maps: The standard Topic Map (ISO 
13250:2003) is a scheme to formalize the rep-
resentation of concepts and relationships of a 
domain. Concepts (called “topics”) are related 
(by “associations”), and referenced to infor-
mation resources (“occurrences”). TopicMaps 
is part of the Semantic Web. These maps are 
expressed in XML to improve intereroperabil-
ity. Despite the name, graphic representation 
is not the main concern of this standard. 
UML and Entity Relationships Diagrams: 
UML stands for Unified Modeling Language, 
together with Entity Relationship Diagrams, it 
is the most popular graphical resource in Soft-
ware Engineering. Their combined goal is to 
improve the communication between non 
technical clients and software developers. 
There are several types of diagrams: 1) Struc-
tural Diagrams: Class diagrams, components 
diagrams, object diagrams, deployment dia-
grams, and package diagrams. 2) Behavior in-
formation is represented by: activity diagrams, 
state diagrams; 3) Interaction Diagrams are 
represented by sequence diagrams. UML is 
supported by the Object Management Group 
(OMG). When compared with ontologies, a 
particular strength is that it is possible to spec-
ify activities and processes in a way that is un-
derstood by both software developers and 
their clients. 
2. Related Proposals 
Semantic Networks: This is a network show-
ing semantic relationships. The main differ-
ence from concept maps is the origin. Concept 
maps were developed with a pedagogical goal, 
emphasizing graphical understanding; seman-
tic networks had their oringins in computer 
engineering and artificial intelligence, stressing 
process like inference and codification. So the 
edges of semantic networks are usually labeled 
with weights. These weights express the close-
ness between the nodes. 
Mind Maps or memories: This is a type of 
concept map centered on a single node/con-
cept. Related concepts or ideas are linked with 
this central node, in a shape similar to a star 
(radial hierarchies or tree structures). Brain 
storming sessions usually express the outputs 
with mind maps. 
Social Networks: This is a type of semantic 
network, where the nodes are individuals or 
organizations. The Erdős number (also 
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known as the Bacon number) is one of its met-
rics. This number computes the coauthorship 
distance between the mathematician Erdős 
and another author. Other measures are cen-
trality and cohesion. 
Web Concept Navigation: Navigation by 
web links is one of the most important devel-
opments of concept maps. This topic is taken 
into account when planning the site architec-
ture and is quite close to the Topic Maps 
Standard. 
3. Concept maps editors 
Most of these editors enable the linking of sev-
eral graphic resources (images, emoticons, 
shapes …). 
― DigiDocMap: free tool developed by 
Pompeu Fabra University 
― CMapTools: developed by the Institute 
for Human and machine cognition (Univer-
sity of West Florida). It has functionalities 
to merge concept maps and to export to the 
Topic Maps standard. 
― Mindman: Allows accessing simultane-
ously several users to the same map. 
― Inspiration 
Resources 
― DigiDoc Map (Online) <http://www.mapasconcep-
tuales.com> [Consulted: 1/9/2009] 
― CMapTools (Online) <http://www.cmap-
tools.com> [Consulted: 1/9/2009] 
― Mindman (Online) <http://www.mindman.com> 
[Consulted: 1/9/2009] 
― Inspiration (Online) <http://cf.inspiration.com/es-
panol/ index.cfm> [Consulted: 1/9/2009] 
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TRUTH VALUE (S. valor de verdad, F. valeur 
de vérité, G. Wahrheitswert) [semantics, episte-
mology, knowledge theory] concept 
Successful propositional representations ex-
press conditions on the world that may or may 
not be satisfied by it. If they are satisfied, we 
say the representations are true. If not, we say 
they are false. Failed propositional representa-
tions may not express any condition on the 
world and, thus, lack truth-value. 
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TURING’S HALTING THEOREM (S. te-
orema de parada de Turing, F. Indecibilité de l'ar-
rêt, G. Unentscheidbarkeit von Turings 
Halteproblem) [Logic, computability] theorem, con-
cept 
Contents.— 1) Basic idea, 2) Concepts, 3) Proofs. 
1. Basic idea. Many problems around us in 
ordinary life do not seem to have a computa-
tional solution. More interestingly, some pre-
cisely formulated   theoretical and scientific 
problems are also seemingly insoluble in com-
putational terms. By “computable” we shall 
understand here computable in its standard 
sense, that is, able to be solved by the finite, 
precise and recursive means of any Turing Ma-
chine.  
However, it is indeed surprising and theoreti-
cally highly interesting that certain arithmeti-
cally formulated problems are insoluble by any 
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standard computation. Imagine we introduce 
arbitrary finite sequences in a system under the 
following rules: (1) answer “yes” if the se-
quence codes a program which terminates, (2) 
answer “no” if it doesn't (does not codify a 
programm or does not terminate).This is Tu-
ring's Halting problem, for which he proofed 
the inexistence of any algorithmical decision 
procedure. The interest of this undecidability 
result lies in the purely logical reasons sup-
porting it and exporting its uncomputability 
results to any procedure able to answer it. 
Moreover, Rice generalizes and extends Tu-
ring's results for any non-trivial property of 
partial functions. 
It is important to notice that this and other 
limitative results from logic, such as incom-
pleteness, do not teach us that we are able to 
proof results that are beyond any computer. 
We can, but this is not surprising, belief them. 
2. Concepts. The general notion of computa-
tion is usually made precise by means of the 
concept of recursion. Church's Thesis states 
that all computable functions are recursive. 
Under this asumption, all computable fun-
cions are definable in a fragment of the lan-
guage of formal arithmetic, or, equivalently, by 
means of Turing's Machine Algorithms.  
In this way, to each program or computation 
M corresponds a natural number n which is its 
code or index Mn. The result of introducing 
an input k in the machine M, gives as a result 
a sequence M(k). Since computation languages 
are themselves sequences, they apply to them-
selves, just as a calculation can be applied over 
its own code (Mm(m)). This is the source ot 
may fruitful applications and also of some cru-
cial limitations of computability.  
A set is recursively enumerable whenever it is 
definable in the language RE of formal first 
order Arithmetic (basicly the standard lan-
guage of formal arithmetic without negation 
and with  bounded cuantificación). Equiva-
lently, we call a language recursively enumera-
ble if it contains all finite sequences codifying 
a Turing machine and an input, so that the ma-
chine stops at that input. A set (or a problem, 
or a language) is recursive if and only if both 
itself and its complement are recursively enu-
merable. 
For example, consider the problem TERMI-
NATES, posing the task of determining, given 
a program with code m and an input n for it, 
if the program terminates or not at n. The 
problem TERMINATES(m,n) is recursively 
enumerable, since there is a program accepting 
TERMINATES, that is, a program terminat-
ing whenever its input is in TERMINATES, 
and not doing it in any contrary case. A pro-
gram computing TERMINATES terminates 
at some input n.  
Let us now consider the complement NON-
TERMINATES of the problem TERMI-
NATES. If there is a program for it, it will ter-
minate if its input is in NONTERMINATES, 
and in any contrary case it won’t terminate. As 
we shall see, NONTERMINATES is not re-
cursively enumerable, and hence  TERMI-
NATES is not recursive.  This is, informally 
summarized, the course of the following argu-
ment.  
3. Proofs  
Enumeration Theorem. There is a dyadic re-
lation T(x,y) which is recursively enumerable 
and recursively enumerates all recursive enu-
merable sets. That is, for any recursively enu-
merable set C there is a code e such that 
C={n:T(e,n)}. 
Proof: Let Re be the set {x:T(e,x)}. Te is recur-
sively enumerable, since both T and e are de-
finable in the language RE. Now, C being bt 
hypothesis also enumerable recursive, it is de-
fined by a formula in a free variable x. Let e be 
the code or Gödel number of such formula. 
Hence,  C=Te.  
Certain “diagonal” theorem. The diagonal 
relation is not computable (recursive).  
Proof: Let K be the set {x:T(x,x)}. K is recur-
sively enumerable, but its complement –K it's 
not. If it were, -K=Te for some e. But for all 
x, by the definition of complement, x belongs 
to –K if and only if x does not belong to Tx. 
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In the particular case of e, we have e belongs 
to –K if and only if e does not belong to Te, 
that is, e does not belong to –K, which is a 
classical contradiction. 
Halting Theorem. TERMINATES is not 
computable (recursive). 
Proof: Suppose for reductio that the two argu-
ment function t (m,n) were computable being 
t(m,n)=1 or =0 depending on whether the ma-
chine m with n as input terminates or not. Un-
der this assumption, the diagonal function 
t(n,n)=t’(n) is also computable, which is im-
possible by the previous diagonal theorem. 
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U
UNIFIED THEORY OF INFORMA-
TION (UTI) (S. Teoría Unificada de la Infor-
mación, F. Théorie Unifiée de l'Information, G. Ver-
einheitlichte Theorie der Information) [Research and 
practice] theory 
Although the Anglo-Saxon term was used by 
Kerns Powers (1956) "to provide a unified 
mathematical theory for the treatment of the 
statistical processes by which information is 
conveyed in communication systems", it is 
now used in a more ambitious proposal that in 
contrast to Power is not limited to the syntac-
tical level. The UTI aims at a theoretical artic-
ulation embracing all processes and structures 
related to the creation, transformation and the 
crystallizing out of information in cognitive, 
communicative and cooperative contexts, by 
means of (a supposedly feasible) blending of 
the concepts of self-organization and  semio-
sis (self-re-structuring, self-reproduction, self-re-crea-
tion). 
The purpose of achieving a comprehensive 
theory is to enable society to cope with the 
challenges of the so-called information soci-
ety. A transdisciplinary development is pur-
sued – nourished by notions developed in the 
cross-disciplines of informatics, cybernetics, 
systemics and evolutionary theory, as well as 
in disciplines of life sciences, psychology, and 
social and human sciences like semiotics. This 
approach has been advanced by Peter Fleiss-
ner, Wolfgang Hofkirchner, Norbert Fenzl, 
Gottfried Stockinger and Christian Fuchs. 
They did so by taking up, while modifying, po-
sitions of Michael Conrad, Pedro Marijuán, 
Koichiro Matsuno, Tom Stonier, Søren Brier, 
John Collier, Dail Doucette, and others. Most 
of the scholars named above have been con-
tributing to the building up of a new Science of 
Information, though they might differ in the fea-
sibility of a unified theory (Capurro et al. 1999, 
Hofkirchner 2008, Marijuán 2008). 
Capurro and Hjørland (2003) criticize this ap-
proach as having a metaphysical rather than a 
scientific status insofar as “a view of the whole 
of reality that is not possible for a finite ob-
server” is assumed. 
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USABILITY (S. usabilidad, F. utilisabilité, 
usabilité, G. Benutzerfreundlichkeit, Benutzungs-
freundlichkeit) [Engineering, Information 
management, ICTs]concept, discipline 
Usability is a discipline whose primary goal is 
to be involved in the design of objects and re-
sources in order to make them more conven-
ient and easy to use.  
In the context of software and web pages, the 
term "usability" is used to describe the disci-
pline concerned with controlling how easily a 
digital resource can be used; that is to say, it 
assesses how this resource facilitates or hin-
ders the use of it.  
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V
VIRTUAL (E. vitrual, F. virtual(elle), A. virtuell) 
[transdisciplinary, semantics, epistemology]con-
cept 
If we look up “virtual” on the dictionary we 
will find: “1. Existing or resulting in essence or 
effect though not in actual fact, form, or name: 
the virtual extinction of the buffalo. 2. Exist-
ing in the mind, especially as a product of the 
imagination. Used in literary criticism of a text. 
3. Computer Science Created, simulated, or 
carried on by means of a computer or com-
puter network: virtual conversations in a cha-
troom.” 
So we understand virtual as potentiality, ability 
to be. Things experienced as they could possi-
bly be. Something absurd can never be virtual. 
To be considered as virtual, something has to 
be plausible in experience. It is similar to the 
case of perceptual illusions, even when it is ex-
plained to us that something is a perceptual il-
lusion, we cannot help perceiving it (the oppo-
site occurs with, for instance, logical fallacies). 
Moreover, with regard to the virtual, even 
though we know it is a fiction, it is not possible 
to avoid the feeling of reality. 
Virtual is a special type of simulation. The dif-
ference between the virtual and other types of 
simulations can be located on the way of per-
ceiving what we experience. Whereas with a 
simulation model, one is normally aware that 
one is presenting hypotheses and checking 
what happens with them, thinking of different 
scenarios to choose a line of action, with the 
virtual one normally tries to live experiences in 
a new scenario (like in the case of games, now 
so popular, involving virtual life). The prob-
lem is whether these experiences are lived as 
real or not. Do we have the same perception 
of what is lived when simulating a model than 
when experimenting with virtual realities? 
Virtual can also be interpreted as having some 
sort of misleading element, for instance, as-
sumed reconstructions of the past or future 
predictions that are said to be inevitable. It is 
a case of virtual reality when, in order for a city 
to obtain the UNESCO world heritage recog-
nition, it is not enough to have beautiful 
streets or well kept houses, but rather it is re-
quired that it has an idea behind it. Things like 
being designed according to the mentality of 
the Enlightment could be enough and so, the 
past is reconstructed so that it becomes suita-
ble. It is enough for the idea to be believable, 
and if it is indeed the case, most people will 
end up believing it (regardless of whether it is 
true or not). Recently television (“National 
Geographic” and others), is full of documen-
taries where the past and the future are recon-
structed. We see programs about evolution 
made with amazing techniques or investiga-
tion programs about the murder of some 
Egyptian emperor. When we see them, we get 
the impression of watching something real, of 
seeing the truth about things. Even though we 
know there is not enough information to 
know what really happened, we believe what 
they tell us, these programs are appealing, be-
cause they tell us the story on an entertaining 
and didactical way. Also, it is announced on 
the news that we can now see the real face of 
Jesus Christ (or Nefertiti) and they show it to 
us, but if we listen closely we realize it is a mere 
reconstruction from the heads of people from 
the same age and time. As if they could not be 
different from their kind. In some cases, like 
when predicting facts about the future 
VIRTUAL 
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through a series of data, we do not have im-
ages. It would seem that without images we 
cannot have virtual reality. I do not think so. I 
believe that what is characteristic about the 
virtual is the perception from the user of that 
as real. If a series of fictional data is perceived 
as real, then it is up to a certain extent a virtual 
reality. 
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